ORDER : 1. This instant criminal misc. petition has been filed by the petitioner under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. with the following prayer:- “It is, therefore, humbly prayed your lordships may very graciously be pleased to accept this Misc. Petition and the FIR No. 336/2010 dated 28/10/2010 (Annexure-1) registered at Police Station Pradhan Aarakshi Kendra, Anti Corruption Bureau, Jaipur District Chowki A.C.B. Kota for the offence under Sections 8, 10, 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and Under Section 120-B I.P.C. qua accused petitioner may kindly be quashed and set aside and the order dated 10/2/2017 (Annexure-3) passed by the learned Special Judge, Sessions Court, Prevention of Corruption Act, Kota taking cognizance Under Section 120-B IPC and Under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) or 13(1)(d), 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 read with Section 120-B I.P.C. qua petitioner at the time of framing of the charges against those persons against whom, challan was filed without the sanction of the Govt. and directing the Supdt. of Police, Anti Corruption Bureau, Kota to produce the sanction after obtaining the same in Sessions Case No. 21/2015 may also kindly be quashed and set aside.” 2. Brief facts of the case are that an FIR was lodged against seventeen (17) persons including the present accused-petitioner on suspicion that some mischief has been committed by them in the matter of the allotment of the houses by the Rajasthan Housing Board under various schemes by way of lotteries. An FIR No.336/2010 was registered on 28.10.2010 for the offences punishable under Sections 8, 10, 13(1)(d), 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short ‘the Act of 1988’)and Section 120-B of IPC. 3. After completion of the investigation, the Investigating Agency out of seventeen (17) persons submitted the charge-sheet only against two persons, and against rest of fifteen (15) persons, including the present petitioner, the final negative report was submitted. The Investigating Agency on the basis of the evidence collected during the course of investigation came to the conclusion that the accused-petitioner was not found to have been involved in the commission of the alleged offence. 4. The Investigating Agency on the basis of the evidence collected during the course of investigation came to the conclusion that the accused-petitioner was not found to have been involved in the commission of the alleged offence. 4. On submission of the final report i.e. charge-sheet against two accused persons and the final negative report as regards fifteen (15) other persons including the present petitioner, the Court of Special Judge, Prevention of Corruption Act, Kota vide order dated 31.08.2015 took cognizance against Anuj Mathur & Mukesh Gupta for the offences punishable under Sections 8, 10, 13(1)(d) & 13(2) of the Act of 1988 and Section 120-B of IPC. 5. The matter came up for hearing on the issue of framing of charge against the accused namely; Mukesh Gupta & Anuj Mathur, against whom the Police submitted the charge-sheet and the cognizance was taken. The Court of learned Special Judge, Sessions Court Prevention of Corruption Act, Kota while framing charge against the accused namely; Mukesh Gupta & Anuj Mathur vide order dated 10.02.2017 also took cognizance against the present accused petitioner for offences punishable under Section 120-B of IPC and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) or 13(1)(d), 13(2) of the Act of 1988 read with Section 120-B of IPC and further ordered to submit the prosecution sanction against the accused-petitioner. 6. Being aggrieved by the order dated 10.02.2017, passed by the Court of learned Special Judge, Sessions Court Prevention of Corruption Act, Kota (Raj.) the petitioner has preferred this present criminal misc. petition. 7. One of the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that once on a report is submitted by the Police and the Competent Court has taken cognizance on the same then no subsequent order of taking cognizance can be passed by the Court. Counsel further submits that the cognizance on the report submitted by the Police can only be taken once, however, in the present case initially the cognizance was taken against two persons on submission of the final report by the Police on 31.08.2015 and now in an illegal and an arbitrary manner the learned Court of Special Judge, Sessions Court Prevention of Corruption Act, Kota has passed another order by which cognizance has been against the petitioner on 10.02.2017. 8. 8. Learned Public Prosecutor on the other hand submits that the order of taking cognizance against the petitioner is justified and legal as the same has been passed after going through the facts of the case including the material made available to it. He further submits that the order of taking cognizance against the petitioner is based on the material collected during investigation which was submitted along with the final report. 9. Chapter-XIV of Cr.P.C. deals with the requisite conditions for initiation of proceedings. Section 190 of Cr.P.C. provides for cognizance of offences by the Magistrate. Section 193 Cr.P.C. deals with cognizance of offences by the Court of Sessions.Section 190 of Cr.P.C. reads as under:- Section 190- Cognizance of offences by Magistrate- “(1) Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, any Magistrate of the first class, and any Magistrate of the second class specially empowered in this behalf under sub-section (2), may take cognizance of any offence- (a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence; (b) upon a police report of such facts; (c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such offence has been committed. (2) The Chief Judicial Magistrate may empower any Magistrate of the second class to take cognizance under sub-section (1) of such offences as are within his competence to inquire into or try.” Section 193 of Cr.P.C. reads as under:- Section 193 - Cognizance of offences by Courts of Session - “Except as otherwise expressly provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, no Court of Session shall take cognizance of any offence as a Court of original jurisdiction unless the case has been committed to it by a Magistrate under this Code.” 10. On perusal of the aforesaid provisions, it is very much clear that cognizance can be taken by the competent Court “upon a Police report of such facts.” The said provision clearly speaks that even in a case of a final negative report having been submitted by the Police, if the concerned Court finds some material to proceed against the concerned accused, he may take cognizance for such offences made out based on the facts and evidence placed before it. In the present case, the Police has submitted the final report i.e. charge-sheet against two persons namely; Mukesh Gupta & Anuj Mathur, out of total seventeen (17) persons named in the First Information Report but did not find any allegations to have been proved against the remaining fifteen (15) persons, including the petitioner. Had there been any material submitted by the Investigating Agency while submitting the Police report under Section 173(2) of Cr.P.C. the Court would have been under an obligation to undertake scrutiny of the said material placed before it and pass an appropriate order regarding taking cognizance. However, in the present case, on submission of the Police report under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. the Court below took cognizance only against two persons namely; Mukesh Gupta & Anuj Mathur, meaning-thereby, there was no material on record to prosecute the present accused-petitioner. 11. The impugned order of cognizance against the petitioner has been passed at the stage when the Court was considering the issue of framing of charges against two persons, against whom cognizance had already been taken vide order dated 31.08.2015 and without there being any additional evidence submitted by the Police or the Investigating Agency or without keeping the investigation as pending under Section 173(8) of Cr.P.C. or without having sought permission from the Court for conducting further investigation. The aforesaid facts clearly speak that the order by which the cognizance has been taken against the petitioner is a second cognizance order, which is against the provisions of law and the law laid down by the Courts across the Nation. 12. The Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Shodan Singh & Anr. Vs. State of Rajasthan [2017 (2) RLW 1565 (Raj.)] has observed as under:- “17. The Supreme Court in Hardeep Singh Vs. State of Punjab and Others, (2014) 3 SCC 92 , analyzed the law laid down in Dharam Pal, supra, and held that until and unless the case reaches the stage of inquiry or trial by the court, the power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. cannot be exercised, and that does not seem to have been disturbed by the five- Judge-bench in Dharam Pal, supra. The five-Judge-bench in Dharam Pal, supra, had rightly held that Section 193 Cr.P.C. gives the power of original jurisdiction upon the Sessions court to add the accused once the case is committed to it. The five-Judge-bench in Dharam Pal, supra, had rightly held that Section 193 Cr.P.C. gives the power of original jurisdiction upon the Sessions court to add the accused once the case is committed to it. After committal, the cognizance of offence can be taken against an accused not named in the FIR as per Section 193 Cr.P.C. but against whom materials are available in the papers sent. The Supreme Court in Hardeep Singh, supra, further held that the Magistrate at the stage of Sections 207 to 209 Cr.P.C. is forbidden, by express provision of Section 319 Cr.P.C., to apply his mind to record. the merits of the case and determine as to whether any accused needs to be added or subtracted to face trial before the Court of Sessions. The Court of Sessions is empowered on committal under Section 209 of the Cr.P.C. to proceed against such person not named as accused and issue summons against him under Section 193 Cr.P.C., without resorting to the provisions of Section 319 Cr.P.C. The Sessions Court has jurisdiction on committal to take cognizance of the offence as offender in the case as evident from the material available on record. 18. In Dharam Pal, supra, an FIR was registered against one N and the appellants for commission of offence under Section 307 and 323 read with Section 34 IPC. The police after investigation submitted its report under Section 173(2) of the Code before the Magistrate sending only N for trial while including the names of the appellants in Column 2 of the report. On receipt of such police report, the Magistrate did not, straightaway, commit the case to the Sessions Court but, on an objection being raised by the complainant, issued summons to the appellants therein to face trial with the other accused N as the Magistrate was convinced that a prima facie case to go for trial had been made out against the appellants as well. While doing so, the Magistrate did not hold any further inquiry, as contemplated under Sections 190, 200 or even 202 of the Code, but proceeded to issue summons on the basis of the police report only. In this background, the following questions arose for the consideration by the Constitution Bench: “7.1 Does the Committing Magistrate have any other role to play after committing the case to the Court such procedure? In this background, the following questions arose for the consideration by the Constitution Bench: “7.1 Does the Committing Magistrate have any other role to play after committing the case to the Court such procedure? of Session on finding from the police report that the case was triable by the Court of Session? 7.2 If the Magistrate disagrees with the police report and is convinced that a case had also been made out for trial against the persons who had been placed in column 2 of the report, does he have the jurisdiction to issue summons against them also in order to include their names, along with Nafe Singh, to stand trial in connection with the case made out in the police report? 7.3 Having decided to issue summons against the appellants, was the Magistrate required to follow the procedure of a complaint case and to take evidence before committing them to the Court of Session to stand trial or whether he was justified in issuing summons against them without following 7.4 Can the Sessions Judge issue summons under Section 193 CrPC as a court of original jurisdiction? 7.5 Upon the case being committed to the Court of Session, could the Sessions Judge issue summons separately under Section 193 of the Code or would he have to wait till the stage under Section 319 of the Code was reached in order to take recourse thereto? 7.6 Was Ranjit Singh v. State of Punjab, (1998) 7 SCC 149 , which set aside the decision in Kishun Singh v. State of Bihar, (1993) 2 SCC 16 , rightly decided or not?” 19. In those facts, the Supreme Court in Dharam Pal, supra, held that in the event a Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence and then commits the case to the Court of Session, the question of taking fresh cognizance of the offence and, thereafter, proceed to issue summons, is not in accordance with law. The language of Section 193 of the Code very clearly indicates that once the case is committed to the Court of Session by the learned Magistrate, the Court of Session assumes original jurisdiction and all that goes with the assumption of such jurisdiction. The language of Section 193 of the Code very clearly indicates that once the case is committed to the Court of Session by the learned Magistrate, the Court of Session assumes original jurisdiction and all that goes with the assumption of such jurisdiction. The provisions of Section 209 will, therefore, have to be understood as the learned Magistrate playing a passive role in committing the case to the Court of Session on finding from the police report that the case was triable by the Court of Session. 23. In the present case, no such situation can be envisaged for two reasons; firstly, because when the order of cognizance was taken by the Magistrate against five accused, with regard to whom the charge-sheet was originally filed by the Investigating Officer, neither the Magistrate invoked his suo motu jurisdiction of taking cognizance against those not charge-sheeted nor complainant exercised his right by moving any application under Section 193 of the Code of Criminal Procedure at that stage, praying for taking cognizance also against them. The Magistrate while playing active role took cognizance only against five accused and committed the case to the Court of Sessions. It is then only there that the complainant filed the application under Section 193 of the Cr.P.C., which application, when the case was made over to the Court of Additional Sessions Judge for trial, stood transferred along- with the entire record to him. The position would have been entirely different if the Magistrate had not taken cognizance and then committed the matter to the Court of Sessions by playing a passive role and thereafter the court of Sessions would have transferred the matter for trial to the court of Additional Sessions Judge. In that situation, it would be fully competent for the Additional Sessions Judge to take cognizance not only against those charge-sheeted by the police but also against such number of additional accused, on the basis lifted. of application filed by the complainant invoking Section 193 of the Cr.P.C. simultaneously therewith as he deemed fit. As held by the Supreme Court in Kishun Singh, supra, that the Sessions Court has jurisdiction, on committal of case to it, to take cognizance of offence against those named in column 2 as offender, whose complicity in the crime comes to the light from the material came on record. As held by the Supreme Court in Kishun Singh, supra, that the Sessions Court has jurisdiction, on committal of case to it, to take cognizance of offence against those named in column 2 as offender, whose complicity in the crime comes to the light from the material came on record. On committal, the restriction on the Court of Sessions to take cognizance of the offence as a court of original jurisdiction gets lifted. 25. The ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Dharampal, supra, when applied to the facts of the present case, would lead to this that cognizance here has been taken once by the Magistrate and thereafter, by the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, which would therefore tantamount to taking cognizance of the same offence(s) twice by two courts at different stages. lifted as The Additional Sessions Judge has thus by the impugned order taken fresh cognizance of the offence(s) of which cognizance had already been taken by the Magistrate. Such a course cannot be held in accordance with law. No doubt, on committal of the case by the Magistrate to the Court of Sessions with reference to Section 209 of the Cr.P.C., the restrictions on the power of the Court of Sessions, including that of the Additional Sessions Judge in the present case, would get in that event the Court of Sessions/Additional Sessions Judge would exercise such power as a court of original jurisdiction. But a conjoint reading of Sections 193 and 209 of the Cr.P.C., would make it clear that the situation where part cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate and part by the Additional Sessions Judge cannot be held to be legally permissible. This, however, would not create any difficulty for the Additional Sessions Judge in invoking Section 319 of the Cr.P.C. at the appropriate stage after statements of the prosecution witnesses are recorded, if still evidence surfaces against the petitioner in their statements, to issue process against them and make them join trial along-with other accused.” 13. This, however, would not create any difficulty for the Additional Sessions Judge in invoking Section 319 of the Cr.P.C. at the appropriate stage after statements of the prosecution witnesses are recorded, if still evidence surfaces against the petitioner in their statements, to issue process against them and make them join trial along-with other accused.” 13. Accordingly, this Court keeping in mind the facts of the case and the provisions of the Cr.P.C. and also the verdict of the Co- ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Shodan Singh (supra), can safely hold that the order of cognizance dated 10.02.2017 against the petitioner by the Court of learned Special Judge, Sessions Court Prevention of Corruption Act, Kota, is bad in law and not sustainable as same is second order of taking cognizance in single matter which is not permissible under law. 14. Another issue raised by counsel for the petitioner is that the court below has taken cognizance against the petitioner Public Servant without there being any prosecution sanction on record, as is required, under the mandate of Section 19 of the P.C. Act. Section 19 of the P.C. Act imposes specific bar on taking cognizance in absence of prosecution sanction against such Public Servant. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the aforesaid order in regard to submitting the prosecution sanction is also bad in the eyes of law for the reason that the concerned Court cannot direct the Investigating Agency to obtain and/or submit the prosecution sanction. It is for the competent authority, after making due application of mind, having taken into consideration the material placed before it, to take a decision as regards whether to grant the prosecution sanction or not against the public servant concerned. Section 19 of the Act of 1988 also speaks that no Court shall take cognizance against a public servant without having obtained previous prosecution sanction by the competent authority. Section 19 of the Act of 1988 also speaks that no Court shall take cognizance against a public servant without having obtained previous prosecution sanction by the competent authority. Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 reads as under:- “(1) No court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under [sections 7, 11, 13 and 15] alleged to have been committed by a public servant, except with the previous sanction [save as otherwise provided in the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 (1 of 2014): (a) in the case of a person [who is employed, or as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed] in connection with the affairs of the Union and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Central Government, of that Government; (b) in the case of a person [who is employed, or as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed] in connection with the affairs of a State and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the State Government, of that Government; (c) in the case of any other person, of the authority competent to remove him from his office: Provided that no request can be made, by a person other than a police officer or an officer of an investigation agency or other law enforcement authority, to the appropriate Government or competent authority, as the case may be, for the previous sanction of such Government or authority for taking cognizance by the court of any of the offences specified in this sub-section, unless— (i) such person has filed a complaint in a competent court about the alleged offences for which the public servant is sought to be prosecuted; (ii) the court has not dismissed the complaint under section 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) and directed the complainant to obtain the sanction for prosecution against the public servant for further proceeding: Provided further that in the case of request from the person other than a police officer or an officer of an investigation agency or other law enforcement authority, the appropriate Government or competent authority shall not accord sanction to prosecute a public servant without providing an opportunity of being heard to the concerned public servant: Provided also that the appropriate Government or any competent authority shall, after the receipt of the proposal requiring sanction for prosecution of a public servant under this sub-section, endeavour to convey the decision on such proposal within a period of three months from the date of its receipt: Provided also that in case where, for the purpose of grant of sanction for prosecution, legal consultation is required, such period may, for the reasons to be recorded in writing, be extended by a further period of one month: Provided also that the Central Government may, for the purpose of sanction for prosecution of a public servant, prescribe such guidelines as it considers necessary. Explanation.—For the purposes of sub-section (1), the expression “public servant” includes such person— (a) who has ceased to hold the office during which the offence is alleged to have been committed; (b) who has ceased to hold the office during which the offence is alleged to have been committed and is holding an office other than the office during which the offence is alleged to have been committed. (2) Where for any reason whatsoever any doubt arises as to whether the previous sanction as required under sub-section (1) should be given by the Central Government or the State Government or any other authority, such sanction shall be given by that Government or authority which would have been competent to remove the public servant from his office at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)— (a) no finding, sentence or order passed by a special Judge shall be reversed or altered by a Court in appeal, confirmation or revision on the ground of the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in, the sanction required under sub-section (1), unless in the opinion of that court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby; (b) no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction granted by the authority, unless it is satisfied that such error, omission or irregularity has resulted in a failure of justice; (c) no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on any other ground and no court shall exercise the powers of revision in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any inquiry, trial, appeal or other proceedings. (4) In determining under sub-section (3) whether the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in, such sanction has occasioned or resulted in a failure of justice the court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at any earlier stage in the proceedings.” Explanation. (4) In determining under sub-section (3) whether the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in, such sanction has occasioned or resulted in a failure of justice the court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at any earlier stage in the proceedings.” Explanation. For the purposes of this section, (a) error includes competency of the authority to grant sanction; (b) a sanction required for prosecution includes reference to any requirement that the prosecution shall be at the instance of a specified authority or with the sanction of a specified person or any requirement of a similar nature. 16. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the order passed by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of State of Rajasthan Vs. Girvar Dayal Dave, 1975 0 Supreme (Raj) 69 and the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Matajog Dobey Vs. H.C. Bhari, AIR 1956 Supreme Court 44(1). 17. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Girvar Dayal Dave (supra) has observed as under:- “We have heard learned Public Prosecutor. Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 runs as follows — 6. Previous sanction necessary for prosecution— (1)No Court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under sec. 161 or sec. 164 or sec. 165 of the IPC. or under sub-sec. (24) or sub-sec. (3-A) of sec. 5 of this Act, alleged to have been committed by a public servant, except with the previous sanction— (a) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the a flairs of the Union and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Central Government, of the Central Government. (b) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of a State and is not removable from bis office save by or with the sanction of the State Government, of the State Government. (c) in the case of any other person, of the authority competent to remove him from bis office. (2) Where for any reason whatsoever any doubt arises whether the previous sanction as required under sub-sec. (c) in the case of any other person, of the authority competent to remove him from bis office. (2) Where for any reason whatsoever any doubt arises whether the previous sanction as required under sub-sec. (1) should be given by the Central or State Government or any other authority, such sanction shall be given by that Government or authority which would have been competent to remove the public servant from his office at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed. This section is clear that the Court shall not take cognizance of any offence punishable under various sections mentioned therein except with the previous sanction, and in the case of a person, who is employed in connection with the affairs of a State, the sanction has to be of the authority competent to remove him from office. The sanction has to precede the taking of cognizance, and not to follow it. The sanction here was subsequent to taking of cognizance. It will not, therefore validate the taking of cognizance by the Court. This sanction has to be by the authority who is competent to remove the public servant from his office. In the present case, the accused other than Umarao Mal were subordinate police officers, and, therefore, the sanction was required to be of the authority who was competent to remove them from office. Learned Public Prosecutor admits that the accused Girvar Dayal Dave was appointed as Sub-Inspector in the integrated set-up of Rajasthan by the Inspector General of Police. Thar being so, the sanction for prosecution, accorded by the Deputy Inspector General of Police prior to the filing of the challan was of no avail. The competent authority, namely, the Inspector General of Police, had accorded the sanction after the proceedings had commenced before the learned Special Judge, sanction being given on 18-9-1967. Learned Public Prosecutor submitted that the Special Judge cannot be said to have taken cognizance of the offence merely by issuing of summons against the accused. This, in our view, is an entirely erroneous submission to make. Learned Public Prosecutor submitted that the Special Judge cannot be said to have taken cognizance of the offence merely by issuing of summons against the accused. This, in our view, is an entirely erroneous submission to make. Cognizance of an offence is taken by a Court when it applies its mind to the facts alleged against the accused, and then decides to proceed in the matter by issuing a process, or otherwise We may refer to two cases of the Supreme Court: R.R. Chari v. State of U.P. and Baijnath v. State of M.P. In the last mentioned case, the police had submitted a charge-sheet against the accused on 4-4-1953. The order sheet recorded by the Magistrate went to show that on 6-4-53, he had ordered that the prosecution witnesses were to be summoned on a future date, and that the accused were to be present in the Court from the Jail on that date. It was held by their Lordships that the Magistrate had taken cognizance of the offence on 6-4-53 when he ordered that the accused shall be produced in the court from jail on the next date. Therefore in the present case, the learned Special Judge will be taken to have taken cognizance of the offence against the accused when he ordered the issuing of the summons against the accused in the first instance. The sanction for prosecution was accorded by the competent authority, namely, Inspector General of Police as late as 18-9-67, that is, long after the taking of the cognizance. This sanction, therefore, cannot validate the taking of cognizance by the learned Special Judge, or the proceedings taken subsequently. The learned Special Judge was, therefore, tight in holding that there was no valid sanction accorded by the competent authority before the taking of the cognizance.” 18. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Matajog Dobey (supra) has observed as under:- 15. The minor contentions may be disposed of at the “outset. Even if there was anything sound and substantial in the constitutional point about the vires of Section 5(1) of the Act, we declined to go into it as it was not raised before the High Court or in the grounds of the petition for special leave to appeal. Article 14 does not render Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code ultra vires as the discrimination is based upon a rational classification. Article 14 does not render Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code ultra vires as the discrimination is based upon a rational classification. Public servants have to be protected from harassment in the discharge of official duties while ordinary citizens not so engaged do not require this safeguard. It was argued that Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code vested an absolutely arbitrary power in the Government to grant or withhold sanction at their sweet-will and pleasure, and the legislature did not lay down or even indicate any guiding principles to control the exercise of the discretion. There is no question of any discrimination between one person and another in the matter of taking proceedings against a public servant for an act done or purporting to be done by the public servant in the discharge of his official duties. No one can take such proceedings without such sanction. If the Government gives sanction against one public servant but declines to do so against another, then the government servant against whom sanction is given may possibly complain of discrimination. But the petitioners who are complainants cannot be heard to say so, for there is no discrimination as against any complainant. It has to be borne in mind that a discretionary power is not necessarily a discriminatory power and that abuse of power is not to be easily assumed where the discretion is vested in the government and not in a minor official. Further, we are not now concerned with any such question. We have merely to see whether the court could take cognisance of the case without previous sanction and for this purpose the court has to find out if the act complained against was committed by the accused while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of official duty. Once this is settled, the case proceeds or is thrown out. Whether sanction is to be accorded or not is a matter for the government to consider. The absolute power to accord or withhold sanction conferred on the government is irrelevant and foreign to the duty cast on the court, which is the ascertainment of the true nature of the act.” 19. Whether sanction is to be accorded or not is a matter for the government to consider. The absolute power to accord or withhold sanction conferred on the government is irrelevant and foreign to the duty cast on the court, which is the ascertainment of the true nature of the act.” 19. In the present case, the Court below has taken cognizance against the petitioner for offences punishable under Sections 8, 10, 13(1)(d) & 13(2) of the Act of 1988 and Section 120-B of IPC without there being any valid prosecution sanction against the petitioner, hence the order of taking cognizance against the petitioner is contrary to law, violative of Section 19 of the Act of 1988 and the dictum as laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in case of Girvar Dayal Dave (supra) and the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Matajog Dobey (supra) 20. Another issue raised by the counsel for the petitioner is that the learned trial Court has directed the Superintendent of Police, A.C.B. Kota to obtain and submit the prosecution sanction against the petitioner as the court below cannot issue any specific positive direction as same is against the basic principles of law as related to prosecution sanction, including due application of mind. 21. The prosecution sanction against a public servant may be granted or refused by the Competent Authority after making due application of mind and taking into consideration the material placed before it, including the evidence collected during investigation. Law has been well-settled in cases of Central Bureau of Investigation Vs. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal and others, (2014) 14 SCC 295, State of Karnataka Vs. Ameerjan, (2007) 11 SCC 273 , Harish Chandra Bunkar Balai Vs. Board of Revenue, Ajmer & Ors., (D.B. Spl. Appl. Writ No. 707/2023) decided on 18.10.2024 & Vijay Kumar Singhal Vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr. (S.B. Criminal Misc. (Petition) No. 5351/2023) decided on 07.10.2024 that competent authority is to issue prosecution sanction after due application of its mind. 22. In the present case, the Court below has directed the Superintendent of Police, A.C.B. Kota to obtain and submit the prosecution sanction, meaning-thereby, he has taken away the right of the concerned Competent Authority as regards their decision making power with respect to the issue of grant of prosecution sanction. 22. In the present case, the Court below has directed the Superintendent of Police, A.C.B. Kota to obtain and submit the prosecution sanction, meaning-thereby, he has taken away the right of the concerned Competent Authority as regards their decision making power with respect to the issue of grant of prosecution sanction. The Court cannot direct any authority to take a decision as regards the granting of prosecution sanction in a particular direction. It is the prerogative of the Prosecution Sanctioning Authority to take the decision positive or negative as regards the issue of grant of prosecution sanction against a public servant, based on due application of mind. The direction of the Court below to obtain and submit prosecution sanction against the petitioner is against the basic principle of law as regards the grant of prosecution sanction. 23. While taking cognizance against the petitioner, the Court below has relied upon some call details alleged to have connected the accused-petitioner with the persons against whom cognizance had already been taken. Mere existence of call details implying that he had some conversations with the person who is an accused, cannot be made the basis to implicate a person as an accused, until and unless, there is some substantial material including distinct conversations which would establish connectivity of the petitioner with the alleged offence. 24. Mere existence of call details implying that he had some conversations with the person who is an accused, cannot be made the basis to implicate a person as an accused, until and unless, there is some substantial material including distinct conversations which would establish connectivity of the petitioner with the alleged offence. 24. The Investigating Agency after concluding the investigation submitted its report before the concerned Court with the following conclusion:- ^^vkjksihx.k ds eksckbZy dkWy fMVsy ds laca/k esa fuosnu gS fd C;wjks ds ikl eksckby uacj dh dkWy fMVsy gS ysfdu okrkZvksa ds dksbZ fjdkWfMZax ugha gSA blfy, Jh eqds'k xqIrk o Jh vuqt ekFkqj ds chp gqbZ okrkZ dks ekuk tk ldrk gS fd vkjksih Jh vuqt ekFkqj dEI;wVj izksxzkej }kjk ykVjh dh lwpuk Jh eqds'k xqIrk dks nh xbZ gksxh D;ksafd Jh eqds'k xqIrk us iwNrkN ds nkSjku crk;k gS fd os vkosnu i= Hkjokus ds ckn ml vkosnu i= Hkjokus ds ckn ml vkosnu i= la[;k dh tkudkjh Jh vuqt ekFkqj dks crk nsrk FkkA ysfdu Jh eqds'k xqIrk o Jh jk/ks';ke ds chp gqbZ okrkZ dks ykWVjh esa dh xbZ xMcMh ds vijk/k ls ugha tksMk+ tk ldrk D;ksafd ;s nksuksa nksLr gSaA muds chp ykWVjh esa xMcMh djokus laca/kh okrkZ gqbZ gks ,slk dksbZ izek.k lkeus ugha vk;k gSA blh izdkj Jh eqds'k xqIrk Jh ds-lh- eh.kk ds chp okrkZ ds laca/k esa vuqla/kku ls ik;k x;k gS fd Jh ds-lh- eh.kk ds rRdk0 vfr0 eq[; vfHk;ark] jkt0 vkoklu e.My] t;iqj }kjk fnukad 14-10-2010 tks/kiqj o fnukad 11-10-2010 dks mn;iqj dh ykVjh izf?;k esa dksbZ Hkkx ugha fy;k x;k Fkk vkSj u gh mn;iqj o tks/kiqj dk {ks= muds dk;Z{ks= esa Fkk rFkk fnukad 10-10-2011 ls 16-10-2011 rd ds e/; eqds'k xqIrk ds-lh- eh.kk ds e/; dksbZ okrkZ ugha gqbZ gS rFkk bl nkSjku Jh ds-lh- eh.kk o dEI;wVj ls ykWVjh fudkyokus Jh vuqt ekFkwj ds e/; Hkh dksbZ okrkZ ugha gqbZ gSA blfy, tks/kiqj o mn;iqj dh ykWVjh dh laca/k esa Jh ds-lh- eh.kk rRdk0 vfr0 eq[; vfHk;ark] jkt0 vkoklu e.My] t;iqj dks ugha tksMk tk ldrk gSA izFke lwpuk fjiksVZ esa vkjksih Jh eqds'k xqIrk us 24 i=kofy;ka Jh ds-lh- eh.kk ds ek/;e ls [kjhnuk crk;k gSA mDr i=kofy;ksa ds ckjs esa vkoklu e.My ls fjdkMZ ryc djus ij tkudkjh esa vk;k gS fd izFke lwpuk fjiksVZ esa of.kZr 24 i=kofy;kas esa ls 5 yksxksa dks edku iwoZ esa gh vkoafVr gks pqds FksA rFkk 'ks"k jftLV?s'ku vkt Hkh mUgha ds uke gS rFkk mUgsa dksbZ Hkh edku vkoafVr ugha gqvk gSA mijksDr 24 i=kofy;ka vkjksih eqds'k xqIrk ds edku dh ryk'kh ds nkSjku ugha feyh FkhA** 25. The aforesaid facts make it easily observable that the petitioner is in no manner connected with the alleged lotteries for allotment of the residential houses by the Rajasthan Housing Board. It has also come on record that the area for which the lotteries were conducted for allotment of the residential houses, were neither within the jurisdiction of the post which the petitioner was holding at the relevant time nor he was assigned any job by the Board in connection with the alleged lottery for the allotment of the residential houses. Hence, there is no evidence on record to connect the petitioner with the alleged offences. 26. In view of the aforesaid discussion and the provisions of law and observations made in the judgments referred above, this Court deems it safe to hold that the order of cognizance dated 10.02.2017 and further issuing of directions to the Superintendent of Police, A.C.B. Kota so as to obtain and submit the prosecution sanction against the petitioner, in no manner can be said to be justified and the same is not sustainable in the eyes of law. 27. Accordingly, the present criminal misc. petition is allowed. The order dated 10.02.2017 passed by the learned Special Judge, Sessions Court, Prevention of Corruption Act, Kota (Raj.) in Session Case No. 21/2015 as regards taking cognizance against the petitioner for the offences punishable under Sections 8, 10, 13(1)(d) & 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and Section 120-B of IPC and issuing the directions to the Superintendent of Police, A.C.B. Kota to obtain and submit the prosecution sanction, is hereby quashed and set aside along with all consequential proceedings arising from F.I.R. No.336/2010 at Police Station Pradhan Aarakshi Kendra, Anti Corruption Bureau, Jaipur, District Chowki A.C.B. Kota qua the present petitioner. 28. Consequences to follow. 29. In view of the order passed in the main petition, stay application as well as pending application/s, if any, also stand disposed of.