JUDGEMENT & ORDER : ROBIN PHUKAN, J. Heard Ms. R.D. Mozumdar, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. S.P. Choudhury, learned counsel for the respondents. 2. In this appeal, under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the appellant has put to challenge the correctness or otherwise of the Judgment and Award dated 02.02.2010, passed by the learned Member, MACT, Sonitpur (‘Tribunal’, for short) in MAC Case No. 361/2007. 3. It is to be noted here that vide impugned Judgment and Award dated 02.02.2010, the learned Tribunal has directed the appellant to pay a sum of Rs. 4,67,577/- to the respondent No. 1 being the compensation with 6% interest from the date of passing of the judgment. Background Facts:- 4. The background facts, leading to filing of the present appeal, are adumbrated herein below:- “On 19.04.2007, the respondent No. 1, namely, Bhupen Bhuyan was driving the Maruti Car, bearing registration No. AS-01-W-8763 from Biswanath Charnali towards Guwahati and he was accompanied by his friend, namely, Niranjan Saikia, the owner of the said vehicle. At about 03:10 pm, when they reached Khetri, in front of Dimoria College, an old woman with a minor child suddenly came in front of their vehicle and to save them, the respondent No. 1 turned his vehicle and as a result, the vehicle dashed against a standing oil tanker. In the said accident, the respondent No. 1 got grievous injuries on his person and the vehicle was also badly damaged. Thereafter, the respondent No. 1 had reported the matter to police and upon which, Khetri P.S. Case G.D. Entry No. 473, dated 19.04.2007, was registered. The vehicle in question was duly insured with Oriental Insurance Company Limited, the appellant herein and it had the valid insurance coverage at the time of the accident. Thereafter, the respondent No. 1 had instituted one claim petition under Section 166 of the M.V. Act, claiming compensation of an amount of Rs. 6,50,000/- for injuries sustained by him. Upon the said claim petition, MAC Case No. 361/2007 was registered before the learned Tribunal. Subsequently, the application was coverted from application under Section 166 of the M.V. Act to an application under Section 163(A) of the M.V. Act. 6,50,000/- for injuries sustained by him. Upon the said claim petition, MAC Case No. 361/2007 was registered before the learned Tribunal. Subsequently, the application was coverted from application under Section 166 of the M.V. Act to an application under Section 163(A) of the M.V. Act. Thereafter, the appellant had contested the claim petition by filing written statement and after hearing learned counsel for both the parties, the learned Tribunal had directed the appellant herein to pay a sum of Rs. 4,67,577/- under different heads to the respondent No. 1 being the compensation along with 6% interest from the date of passing of the judgment, i.e. 02.02.2010.” Grounds:- 5. Being highly aggrieved and dissatisfied, the appellant has approached this Court by filing the present appeal on the following grounds :- (i) That, the claim petition was initially filed under the provision of Section 166 of the M.V. Act, but subsequently amendment was made and the said petition was converted into any petition under Section 163(A) of the M.V. Act and in view of the aforesaid factual position, the amount of Rs. 10,000/- awarded by the learned Tribunal under the head of physical pain and suffering is highly excessive and not warranted by the provisions of the Second Schedule of the M.V. Act; (ii) That, the respondent No. 1/claimant had claimed in his application that he was earning Rs. 6,000/- only as a Class II contractor. But, he failed to produce any documentary evidence to prove the same and in that view of the matter, the learned Tribunal ought to have taken Notional Income as provided under the Second Schedule to the M.V. Act, i.e. Rs. 15,000/- only as the annual income for assessing the compensation. And as the claim petition was filed under Section 163 (A) of the M.V. Act and not under Section 166 of the M.V. Act, the learned Tribunal instead of taking the Notional Income as provided for under the Second Schedule to the M.V. Act, ought not to have accepted Rs. 100/- only per day as the daily income of respondent No. 1/claimant i.e. Rs. 100/- only per day as the daily income of respondent No. 1/claimant i.e. Rs. 36,000/- annual income for assessing the compensation, which is contrary to the provisions under the Second Schedule of MV Act; (iii) That, from the evidence adduced by the witnesses in the present case, it is apparent that no doctor was examined to substantiate the extent of disability, i.e. 45%, as revealed from Exhibit No. 3, the Disability Certificate issued by the District Social Welfare Officer, Sonitpur and the District Social Welfare Officer was also not examined to prove the disability suffered by the respondent No. 1/claimant and non- examination of a doctor by the respondent No. 1/claimant in the instant case has resulted in denial of opportunity to the appellant Insurance Company to cross-examine the doctor to ascertain the extent of permanent disability; and (iv) That, the appellant Insurance Company has been fastened with the liability to pay the compensation, as assessed on the basis of permanent disability suffered by the respondent No. 1/claimant without giving an opportunity of cross-examining the doctor and as such, the said judgment and award requires interference of this Court. Submissions:- 6. Ms. Mozumdar, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant has challenged the impugned judgment and award on the following counts: (i) That the doctor has not been examined to prove the disability certificate and as such, the appellant got no opportunity to cross-examine the doctor to ascertain the actual percentage of disability suffered by the respondent No. 1. As such, the finding of the learned Tribunal in respect of percentage of disability suffered by the respondent No. 1 is not at all sustainable. In that regard, Ms. Mozumdar has referred one decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Raj Kumar vs. Ajay Kumar , reported in (2010) 13 SCR 179 (ii) That this application was filed under Section 163(A) of the MV Act and as such, while assessing the compensation, the learned Tribunal is bound to follow the assessing procedure as per Second Schedule of the MV Act. But, the same has not been followed by the learned Tribunal and on such count, the impugned judgment and award is liable to be set aside and quashed. But, the same has not been followed by the learned Tribunal and on such count, the impugned judgment and award is liable to be set aside and quashed. (iii) That the quantum of compensation is excessive inasmuch as the learned Tribunal had ascertained the percentage of disability on the basis of the certificate issued by the Social Welfare Department, Sonitpur and without examination of the Doctor. As such, the amount of compensation so assessed is excessive and in view of the Second Schedule of the MV Act, under which the compensation has been assessed, the respondent No. 1 is not entitled to such an amount. 6.1. Ms. Mozumdar further submits that the respondent No. 1 had submitted medical documents and vouchers for a sum of Rs. 2,59,200/- being spent for treatment of the respondent No. 1 and there is also doubt about the genuineness of the same. Ms. Mozumdar also submits that the claimant was not the driver of the vehicle and he had borrowed the vehicle from the owner and that in view of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Oriental Insurance Company Limited vs. Jumma Saha and Others , reported in (2007) 9 SCC 263 , the insurance company is not liable to pay the compensation. Therefore, Ms. Mozumdar has contended to allow this petition. 7. On the other hand, Mr. Choudhury, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 submits that the learned Tribunal had assessed the monthly income of the respondent No. 1 @ Rs. 3,000/- per month and the same is not at all excessive. Mr. Choudhury further submits that this appeal is not maintainable as the issues raised before this Court has not been raised before the learned Tribunal and that those grounds taken in this appeal are not there in the written statement. Mr. Choudhury pointed out that no rebuttal evidence was adduced by the appellant herein and that the petition was filed under Section 163(A) of the MV Act, where rash and negligent driving is not required to prove. Mr. Choudhury also submits that the learned Tribunal had rightly awarded the compensation and there is no perversity in the judgment and therefore, it is contended to dismiss the appeal. 8. In reply to the submission of Mr. Choudhury, Ms. Mr. Choudhury also submits that the learned Tribunal had rightly awarded the compensation and there is no perversity in the judgment and therefore, it is contended to dismiss the appeal. 8. In reply to the submission of Mr. Choudhury, Ms. Mozumdar submits that the appellant herein has not denied the involvement of the accident and the injuries sustained by the respondent No. 1. But, the respondent No. 1 is not entitled to the amount which is awarded by the learned Tribunal for the disability being suffered by him. Consideration of this court :- 9. Having heard the submissions of learned counsel for both the parties, I have carefully gone through the memo of appeal as well as the grounds mentioned therein and also gone through the impugned Judgment and Award dated 02.02.2010, passed by the learned Tribunal, in MAC Case No. 361/2007 and also gone through the case laws referred by Ms. Mozumdar, learned counsel for the appellant. 10. It is not in dispute that the respondent No.1 herein is not the owner of the vehicle. But, he was driving the Maruti Car, bearing registration No. AS-01-W-8763 from Biswanath Charnali towards Guwahati and the owner of the vehicle, namely, Niranjan Saikia, was with him in the said vehicle. And while they reached Khetri at about 03:10 pm, in front of Dimoria College, an old woman with a minor child suddenly came in front of their vehicle and to save them, the respondent No. 1 turned his vehicle and as a result, the vehicle dashed against a standing oil tanker and in the said accident, the respondent No. 1 sustained grievous injuries. 11. It also appears that the claim petition was filed under Section 166 M.V. Act. But, the learned Tribunal has converted the petition to a claim petition under Section 163A M.V. Act and awarded the compensation under the said section. Indisputably, in a petition under Section 163(A) of the MV Act, the claimant is not required to prove the rash and negligent driving. 12. Thus, having borrowed the vehicle from the owner and driving the same by himself, the respondent No.1 had entered into the shoes of the owner. Ms. Mozumdar, the learned counsel for the appellant has rightly pointed this out during argument. Now, a question arises as to whether a claim petition under Section 163A M.V. Act is maintainable in the present factual scenario. Ms. Mozumdar, the learned counsel for the appellant has rightly pointed this out during argument. Now, a question arises as to whether a claim petition under Section 163A M.V. Act is maintainable in the present factual scenario. This aspect has been dealt with by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajni Devi, reported in (2008) 5 SCC 736 , as under:- “ 11. The liability under Section 163-A of the Act is on the owner of the vehicle as a person cannot be both, a claimant as also a recipient. The heirs of Janak Raj could not have maintained a claim in terms of Section 163-A of the Act. For the said purpose only the terms of the contract of insurance could be taken recourse to.” 13. This proposition of law is carried forward further in the Ningamma v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., reported in (2009) 13 SCC 710 , by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, as under:- “ 21. In our considered opinion, the ratio of the decision in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. case [ (2008) 5 SCC 736 ] is clearly applicable to the facts of the present case. In the present case, the deceased was not the owner of the motorbike in question. He borrowed the said motorbike from its real owner. The deceased cannot be held to be an employee of the owner of the motorbike although he was authorised to drive the said vehicle by its owner and, therefore, he would step into the shoes of the owner of the motorbike. We have already extracted Section 163-A of the MVA hereinbefore. A bare perusal of the said provision would make it explicitly clear that persons like the deceased in the present case would step into the shoes of the owner of the vehicle. 22. In a case wherein the victim died or where he was permanently disabled due to an accident arising out of the aforesaid motor vehicle in that event the liability to make payment of the compensation is on the insurance company or the owner, as the case may be as provided under Section 163- A. But if it is proved that the driver is the owner of the motor vehicle, in that case the owner could not himself be a recipient of compensation as the liability to pay the same is on him. This proposition is absolutely clear on a reading of Section 163-A of the MVA. Accordingly, the legal representatives of the deceased who have stepped into the shoes of the owner of the motor vehicle could not have claimed compensation under Section 163-A of the MVA. 23. When we apply the said principle into the facts of the present case we are of the view that the claimants were not entitled to claim compensation under Section 163-A of the MVA and to that extent the High Court was justified in coming to the conclusion that the said provision is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 14. Thus, it is well settled that in the given factual scenario, the claim petition under Section 163A M.V. Act cannot be maintained. Ms. Mozumdar, learned counsel for the appellant has rightly pointed this out at the time of hearing and I find substance in the same. And the decision in Jumma Saha (supra) referred by her also strengthened her submission. 15. Now, the question arises as to whether the claimant would be remedy less if he cannot successfully maintain a claim petition under Section 163A of the M.V. Act. This question also stands answered in the case of Ningamma (supra) in the following para:- “ 24. However, the question remains as to whether an application for demand of compensation could have been made by the legal representatives of the deceased as provided in Section 166 of the MVA. The said provision specifically provides that an application for compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified in sub-section (1) of Section 165 may be made by the person who has sustained the injury; or by the owner of the property; or where death has resulted from the accident, by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased; or by any agent duly authorised by the person injured or all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased, as the case may be. 25. When an application of the aforesaid nature claiming compensation under the provisions of Section 166 is received, the Tribunal is required to hold an enquiry into the claim and then proceed to make an award which, however, would be subject to the provisions of Section 162, by determining the amount of compensation, which is found to be just. 25. When an application of the aforesaid nature claiming compensation under the provisions of Section 166 is received, the Tribunal is required to hold an enquiry into the claim and then proceed to make an award which, however, would be subject to the provisions of Section 162, by determining the amount of compensation, which is found to be just. Person or persons who made claim for compensation would thereafter be paid such amount. When such a claim is made by the legal representatives of the deceased, it has to be proved that the deceased was not himself responsible for the accident by his rash and negligent driving. It would also be necessary to prove that the deceased would be covered under the policy so as to make the insurance company liable to make the payment to the heirs.” 16. The proposition of law, which can be inferred from the discussion made herein above, is that even though a claim petition under Section 163A M.V. Act is not maintainable in the given factual scenario of the case in hand, the petition under Section 166 of the M.V. Act can be maintained. It is worth mentioning here in this context that the respondent No.1 had filed the claim petition under Section 166 M.V. Act. But it was converted to a claim petition under Section 163A of M.V. Act. 17. Thus, in view of decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ningamma (supra) and also being the first appellate Court this Court deemed it appropriate to assess the just compensation which the respondent No.1 is legally entitled to under Section 166 of M.V. Act. 18. I have carefully gone through the record of the learned Tribunal. It appears that before the learned Tribunal the respondent No.1 had examined himself as P.W.1 and exhibited 272 documents as Exhibit 1 to 272. That perusal of the evidence of the respondent No.1 reveals that on 19.04.2007, the respondent No. 1, was driving the Maruti Car, bearing registration No. AS-01-W-8763 from Biswanath Charnali towards Guwahati with his friend, Niranjan Saikia, who was the owner of the said vehicle. That perusal of the evidence of the respondent No.1 reveals that on 19.04.2007, the respondent No. 1, was driving the Maruti Car, bearing registration No. AS-01-W-8763 from Biswanath Charnali towards Guwahati with his friend, Niranjan Saikia, who was the owner of the said vehicle. Then at about 03:10 pm, when they reached Khetri, in front of Dimoria College, an old woman, with a minor child suddenly came in front of their vehicle and to save them, the respondent No. 1 turned his vehicle and as a result, the vehicle dashed against a standing oil tanker. In the said accident, the respondent No. 1 sustained grievous injuries on his person and the vehicle was also damaged. 18.1. The Accident Information Report-Exhibit1, the Discharge Certificate-Exhibit-2, issued by Down Town Hospital and the Disability Certificate- Exhibit- 3 also lend support to his evidence that he suffered injury on account of the accident that took place on 19.04.2007. Exhibit-2 reveals that the injury suffered by the respondent No. 1 is grievous in nature and the Exhibit-2 indicates that that he suffered head injury with multiple ribs fracture and dislocation of right hip with acetabular fracture, fracture of right ischium and fracture of B.B. right forearm. Exhibit-3 indicates that his disability was assessed at 45%. Further, it appears from his evidence in affidavit that the respondent No.1 herein had exhibited the Hospital Bill as Exhibit-4 for a sum of Rs. 1,89,787/- one Money receipt as Exhibit-5 for a sum of Rs. 3,880/ and Cash Memos as Exhibit-6 to 125 for a sum of Rs. 1,03,872/- Grand Total for a sum of Rs. 2,97,539/- and other medical documents of his treatment as Exhibit-126 to 272. 18.2. The appellant herein had cross-examined the respondent No.1, but, failed to elicit anything tangible to discredit his evidence. His evidence that the accident took place not because of his rash and negligent driving and that he himself is not responsible for the accident remains un-rebutted. The documents, so exhibited by him also by and large, remained undisputed. He denied with vehemence that he did not possess driving licence at the time of accident. 19. It also appears that at the relevant time the age of the respondent No.1 was 40 years and he was a Class-II contractor and his monthly income was Rs.6,000/- per month. These facts also has not been disputed by the appellant herein in his cross-examination. 20. 19. It also appears that at the relevant time the age of the respondent No.1 was 40 years and he was a Class-II contractor and his monthly income was Rs.6,000/- per month. These facts also has not been disputed by the appellant herein in his cross-examination. 20. It is to be mentioned here that while dealing with the quantum of compensation, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Raj Kumar Vs. Ajay Kumar, reported in 2011 (1) TAC 785(SC) held that in routine personal injury cases, the heads under which the compensation can be awarded are as follows - (i) Expenses relating to treatment, hospitalization, medicine, transportation, nourishing food and miscellaneous expenses; (ii) Loss of earning which the injured would have made had he not been injured, comprising - (a) loss of earning during the period of treatment; (b) loss of future earning on account of permanent disability; (iii) Future medical expenses; (iv) Damages for pain, sufferings, trauma as a consequences of injury ; (v) Loss of amenities (and/or) loss of prospect of marriage; (vi) Loss of expectation of life (shortening of normal longevity); 21. Now, coming to the quantum of compensation, I find from the record that the claimant had spent a sum of Rs. 1,89,787/- , in view of Final Bill – Exhibit-4, issued by Down Town Hospital, where he was admitted and undergone treatment. Though he had enclosed some vouchers of the expenses incurred by him, yet, he clearly admitted in cross-examination that the expenses shown in the vouchers are incorporated in the Final Bill i.e. Exhibit-4. But, it appears from the impugned judgment and award that besides awarding the said amount the learned Tribunal also awarded a sum of Rs. 8590/- as shown in Exhibit-112 and 118 and awarded a sum of Rs. 1,98,377. This Court is inclined to award the aforesaid sum under the head No.(i). Thus, it is provided that the respondent No.1 will be entitled to Rs. 1,98,377 (Rupees one lakh ninety eight thousand three hundred and seventy seven) only, in treatment of the injuries sustained by him in the said accident. 22. Now, coming to the quantum of compensation under the head No. (ii) (a) and (b), we find from the evidence of the claimant that at the relevant point of time, the injured was 40 years old and professionally he was a Class-II Contractor and his monthly salary was Rs.6000/-. 22. Now, coming to the quantum of compensation under the head No. (ii) (a) and (b), we find from the evidence of the claimant that at the relevant point of time, the injured was 40 years old and professionally he was a Class-II Contractor and his monthly salary was Rs.6000/-. But, on account of non production of any documentary evidence the learned Tribunal has assessed his monthly income at Rs.3000/. But, the same appears to be not justified. The respondent No.1 was a healthy person. Indisputably, he was also a Class –II Contractor though no document was produced in support of his avocation. The respondent No.1 was hospitalized from 19.04.2007 to 20.05.2007, as indoor patient. Further it appears that he was laid up for six months and thereafter, he was inside the house for another six months. But, it appears that the learned Tribunal had not assessed his financial loss for the aforesaid period. Further, it appears that the learned Tribunal has assessed the disability of the respondent No.1 as 30%. But, said assessment was done without indicating the disablement as permanent or partial disablement and Disability Certificate - Exhibit-3 is also silent in this regard. However, it appears that the claimant could walk with the aid of stick only. He cannot climb stairs. 23. Now, what left to be seen is whether in absence of any medical evidence and disability certificate the alleged disability of the claimant can be assessed as 30%. While dealing with the issue in the case of Raj Kumar (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that:- Assessment of future loss of earnings due to permanent disability:- 6. Disability refers to any restriction or lack of ability to perform an activity in the manner considered normal for a human-being. Permanent disability refers to the residuary incapacity or loss of use of some part of the body, found existing at the end of the period of treatment and recuperation, after achieving the maximum bodily improvement or recovery which is likely to remain for the remainder life of the injured. Temporary disability refers to the incapacity or loss of use of some part of the body on account of the injury, which will cease to exist at the end of the period of treatment and recuperation. Permanent disability can be either partial or total. Temporary disability refers to the incapacity or loss of use of some part of the body on account of the injury, which will cease to exist at the end of the period of treatment and recuperation. Permanent disability can be either partial or total. Partial permanent disability refers to a person's inability to perform all the duties and bodily functions that he could perform before the accident, though he is able to perform some of them and is still able to engage in some gainful activity. Total permanent disability refers to a person's inability to perform any avocation or employment related activities as a result of the accident. The permanent disabilities that may arise from motor accidents injuries, are of a much wider range when compared to the physical disabilities which are enumerated in the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 (`Disabilities Act' for short). But if any of the disabilities enumerated in section 2(i) of the Disabilities Act are the result of injuries sustained in a motor accident, they can be permanent disabilities for the purpose of claiming compensation. 7. The percentage of permanent disability is expressed by the Doctors with reference to the whole body, or more often than not, with reference to a particular limb. When a disability certificate states that the injured has suffered permanent disability to an extent of 45% of the left lower limb, it is not the same as 45% permanent disability with reference to the whole body. The extent of disability of a limb (or part of the body) expressed in terms of a percentage of the total functions of that limb, obviously cannot be assumed to be the extent of disability of the whole body. If there is 60% permanent disability of the right hand and 80% permanent disability of left leg, it does not mean that the extent of permanent disability with reference to the whole body is 140% (that is 80% plus 60%). If different parts of the body have suffered different percentages of disabilities, the sum total thereof expressed in terms of the permanent disability with reference to the whole body, cannot obviously exceed 100%. 8. If different parts of the body have suffered different percentages of disabilities, the sum total thereof expressed in terms of the permanent disability with reference to the whole body, cannot obviously exceed 100%. 8. Where the claimant suffers a permanent disability as a result of injuries, the assessment of compensation under the head of loss of future earnings, would depend upon the effect and impact of such permanent disability on his earning capacity. The Tribunal should not mechanically apply the percentage of permanent disability as the percentage of economic loss or loss of earning capacity. In most of the cases, the percentage of economic loss, that is, percentage of loss of earning capacity, arising from a permanent disability will be different from the percentage of permanent disability. Some Tribunals wrongly assume that in all cases, a particular extent (percentage) of permanent disability would result in a corresponding loss of earning capacity, and consequently, if the evidence produced show 45% as the permanent disability, will hold that there is 45% loss of future earning capacity. In most of the cases, equating the extent (percentage) of loss of earning capacity to the extent (percentage) of permanent disability will result in award of either too low or too high a compensation. What requires to be assessed by the Tribunal is the effect of the permanently disability on the earning capacity of the injured; and after assessing the loss of earning capacity in terms of a percentage of the income, it has to be quantified in terms of money, to arrive at the future loss of earnings (by applying the standard multiplier method used to determine loss of dependency). We may however note that in some cases, on appreciation of evidence and assessment, the Tribunal may find that percentage of loss of earning capacity as a result of the permanent disability, is approximately the same as the percentage of permanent disability in which case, of course, the Tribunal will adopt the said percentage for determination of compensation (see for example, the decisions of this court in Arvind Kumar Mishra v. New India Assurance Co.Ltd. - 2010(10) SCALE 298 and Yadava Kumar v. D.M., National Insurance Co. Ltd. - 2010 (8) SCALE 567 ). 9. Therefore, the Tribunal has to first decide whether there is any permanent disability and if so the extent of such permanent disability. Ltd. - 2010 (8) SCALE 567 ). 9. Therefore, the Tribunal has to first decide whether there is any permanent disability and if so the extent of such permanent disability. This means that the tribunal should consider and decide with reference to the evidence: (i) whether the disablement is permanent or temporary; (ii) if the disablement is permanent, whether it is permanent total disablement or permanent partial disablement, (iii) if the disablement percentage is expressed with reference to any specific limb, then the effect of such disablement of the limb on the functioning of the entire body, that is the permanent disability suffered by the person. If the Tribunal concludes that there is no permanent disability then there is no question of proceeding further and determining the loss of future earning capacity. But if the Tribunal concludes that there is permanent disability then it will proceed to ascertain its extent. After the Tribunal ascertains the actual extent of permanent disability of the claimant based on the medical evidence, it has to determine whether such permanent disability has affected or will affect his earning capacity. 10. Ascertainment of the effect of the permanent disability on the actual earning capacity involves three steps. The Tribunal has to first ascertain what activities the claimant could carry on in spite of the permanent disability and what he could not do as a result of the permanent ability (this is also relevant for awarding compensation under the head of loss of amenities of life). The second step is to ascertain his avocation, profession and nature of work before the accident, as also his age. The third step is to find out whether (i) the claimant is totally disabled from earning any kind of livelihood, or (ii) whether in spite of the permanent disability, the claimant could still effectively carry on the activities and functions, which he was earlier carrying on, or (iii) whether he was prevented or restricted from discharging his previous activities and functions, but could carry on some other or lesser scale of activities and functions so that he continues to earn or can continue to earn his livelihood. For example, if the left hand of a claimant is amputated, the permanent physical or functional disablement may be assessed around 60%. For example, if the left hand of a claimant is amputated, the permanent physical or functional disablement may be assessed around 60%. If the claimant was a driver or a carpenter, the actual loss of earning capacity may virtually be hundred percent, if he is neither able to drive or do carpentry. On the other hand, if the claimant was a clerk in government service, the loss of his left hand may not result in loss of employment and he may still be continued as a clerk as he could perform his clerical functions; and in that event the loss of earning capacity will not be 100% as in the case of a driver or carpenter, nor 60% which is the actual physical disability, but far less. In fact, there may not be any need to award any compensation under the head of `loss of future earnings', if the claimant continues in government service, though he may be awarded compensation under the head of loss of amenities as a consequence of losing his hand. Sometimes the injured claimant may be continued in service, but may not found suitable for discharging the duties attached to the post or job which he was earlier holding, on account of his disability, and may therefore be shifted to some other suitable but lesser post with lesser emoluments, in which case there should be a limited award under the head of loss of future earning capacity, taking note of the reduced earning capacity. It may be noted that when compensation is awarded by treating the loss of future earning capacity as 100% (or even anything more than 50%), the need to award compensation separately under the head of loss of amenities or loss of expectation of life may disappear and as a result, only a token or nominal amount may have to be awarded under the head of loss of amenities or loss of expectation of life, as otherwise there may be a duplication in the award of compensation. Be that as it may. 11. The Tribunal should not be a silent spectator when medical evidence is tendered in regard to the injuries and their effect, in particular the extent of permanent disability. Be that as it may. 11. The Tribunal should not be a silent spectator when medical evidence is tendered in regard to the injuries and their effect, in particular the extent of permanent disability. Sections 168 and 169 of the Act make it evident that the Tribunal does not function as a neutral umpire as in a civil suit, but as an active explorer and seeker of truth who is required to `hold an enquiry into the claim' for determining the `just compensation'. The Tribunal should therefore take an active role to ascertain the true and correct position so that it can assess the `just compensation'. While dealing with personal injury cases, the Tribunal should preferably equip itself with a Medical Dictionary and a Handbook for evaluation of permanent physical impairment (for example the Manual for Evaluation of Permanent Physical Impairment for Orthopaedic Surgeons, prepared by American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons or its Indian equivalent or other authorized texts) for understanding the medical evidence and assessing the physical and functional disability. The Tribunal may also keep in view the first schedule to the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 which gives some indication about the extent of permanent disability in different types of injuries, in the case of workmen. If a Doctor giving evidence uses technical medical terms, the Tribunal should instruct him to state in addition, in simple non-medical terms, the nature and the effect of the injury. If a doctor gives evidence about the percentage of permanent disability, the Tribunal has to seek clarification as to whether such percentage of disability is the functional disability with reference to the whole body or whether it is only with reference to a limb. If the percentage of permanent disability is stated with reference to a limb, the Tribunal will have to seek the doctor's opinion as to whether it is possible to deduce the corresponding functional permanent disability with reference to the whole body and if so the percentage. 12. The Tribunal should also act with caution, if it proposed to accept the expert evidence of doctors who did not treat the injured but who give `ready to use' disability certificates, without proper medical assessment. There are several instances of unscrupulous doctors who without treating the injured, readily giving liberal disability certificates to help the claimants. 12. The Tribunal should also act with caution, if it proposed to accept the expert evidence of doctors who did not treat the injured but who give `ready to use' disability certificates, without proper medical assessment. There are several instances of unscrupulous doctors who without treating the injured, readily giving liberal disability certificates to help the claimants. But where the disability certificates are given by duly constituted Medical Boards, they may be accepted subject to evidence regarding the genuineness of such certificates. The Tribunal may invariably make it a point to require the evidence of the Doctor who treated the injured or who assessed the permanent disability. Mere production of a disability certificate or Discharge Certificate will not be proof of the extent of disability stated therein unless the Doctor who treated the claimant or who medically examined and assessed the extent of disability of claimant, is tendered for cross- examination with reference to the certificate. If the Tribunal is not satisfied with the medical evidence produced by the claimant, it can constitute a Medical Board (from a panel maintained by it in consultation with reputed local Hospitals/Medical Colleges) and refer the claimant to such Medical Board for assessment of the disability. 13. We may now summarise the principles discussed above: (i) All injuries (or permanent disabilities arising from injuries), do not result in loss of earning capacity. (ii) The percentage of permanent disability with reference to the whole body of a person, cannot be assumed to be the percentage of loss of earning capacity. To put it differently, the percentage of loss of earning capacity is not the same as the percentage of permanent disability (except in a few cases, where the Tribunal on the basis of evidence, concludes that percentage of loss of earning capacity is the same as percentage of permanent disability). (iii) The doctor who treated an injured-claimant or who examined him subsequently to assess the extent of his permanent disability can give evidence only in regard the extent of permanent disability. The loss of earning capacity is something that will have to be assessed by the Tribunal with reference to the evidence in entirety. (iv) The same permanent disability may result in different percentages of loss of earning capacity in different persons, depending upon the nature of profession, occupation or job, age, education and other factors. 24. The loss of earning capacity is something that will have to be assessed by the Tribunal with reference to the evidence in entirety. (iv) The same permanent disability may result in different percentages of loss of earning capacity in different persons, depending upon the nature of profession, occupation or job, age, education and other factors. 24. In the case in hand, there is no medical evidence to substantiate that the disability suffered by the respondent No.1 is of permanent in nature. There is no medical documents to that effect. Though, the respondent No.1 had exhibited the Disability Certificate as Exhibit-3, yet, the same is silent as to whether the same is permanent in nature. Besides, no doctor is also examined to prove the same. 25. In absence of any such evidence and materials, assessing the disability of the respondent No.1 at 45% defies the logic and also against the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajkumar (supra). Therefore, this Court is unable to endorse the approach of the learned Tribunal. It is a fact that Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial piece of legislation and its provisions has to be interpreted keeping in mind the objective sought to be achieved by the legislature. 26. In Bimla Devi vs. Satbir Singh, reported in 2012 (4) SCALE 217 , Hon’ble Supreme Court, held as under:- “ The Motor Vehicles Act is a social piece of legislation and has been enacted with intent and object to facilitate the Claimants/Victims to get redress for the loss of family member or for injuries at an early date. In any case, money cannot be any substitute for it, but in the long run it may have some soothing effect. Thus, it is desirable to adopt a more realistic, pragmatic and liberal approach in these matters.” 27. The claimant/respondent No.1 was hospitalized for a period of 32 days, from 19.04.2007 to 20.05.2007. He was a Contractor by profession. Since he could not walk for six months and could not go outside his house and remained inside for another six months and suffered disability, he cannot go back to his profession. So, the total period of loss of earning during the period of treatment is assessed at 12 months. He was a Contractor by profession. Since he could not walk for six months and could not go outside his house and remained inside for another six months and suffered disability, he cannot go back to his profession. So, the total period of loss of earning during the period of treatment is assessed at 12 months. And as such his loss of earning during the aforesaid period is assessed as under:- Income per month was = Rs.6000/ Income per day =Rs. 200/ Period of hospitalization=32 days. =(32 x 200) = Rs. 6600/ Period for which he could not go for his work =12 months,(12 x 6000) = Rs. 72,000/ Thus, total loss is assessed at Rs.6600 + Rs.72,000/= Rs.78,600/-. 28. And the disability has not been proved by examining the authority who had issued the disability certificate and consequently, loss of his future earning could not be assessed and as such this Court is of the considered opinion that the respondent No.1 is not entitled to compensation under the sub-head (b) of head (ii). However, he is entitled to Rs.78,600/- under sub-head (a). 29. There is also no medical evidence to suggest that the respondent No.1 has to incur medical expenses in future for his treatment. But he has to go for medical check- up at a regular interval. Therefore, having regard to this aspect, I am of the view that an amount of Rs. 10,000/- will be just and proper compensation under the Head No . (iii). 30. Now, coming to the quantum of compensation under the Head No. (iv), I find from the evidence of the claimant/respondent No.1 that he was in hospital for 32 days due to the injuries sustained by him in the motor vehicle accident. He was 40 years old at the material time of accident. He had to remain inside room for six months; even he could not attend the call of the nature without the help of any person. He could not walk without a stick. After the accident, for one year he could not go for work. Having regard to the tremendous pain, mental agony and trauma he had to suffer, I am of the view that a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- will be the just and proper amount of compensation under this head. 31. He could not walk without a stick. After the accident, for one year he could not go for work. Having regard to the tremendous pain, mental agony and trauma he had to suffer, I am of the view that a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- will be the just and proper amount of compensation under this head. 31. There is no medical evidence to suggest that the injury sustained by the claimant will have any impact upon his normal longevity of life, but certainly he will not be able to enjoy the amenities of his life like a normal person because of the multiple fractures. He is already a married person. Therefore, he is entitled to compensation for the loss of amenities of his life under the sub-head No. (v). Having regard to the nature of injury and the percentage of disability, the quantum of compensation under this head is assessed at Rs.1,00,000/-. But, in absence of any medical evidence to establish loss of expectation of life (shortening of normal longevity); respondent No.1 herein will not entitle to any compensation under the head No. (vi). 32. It worth mentioning in this context that while fixing the quantum of compensation under the head Nos. (iii), (iv) and (v), I followed the principle of law laid by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mekala vs. M. Malathi and Anr., reported in 2014 ACJ 1441 . 33. Further, I would like add a sum of Rs.25,000/ -as the cost of litigation as per judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Boloram Prasad Vs. Kunal Saha & others reported in (2014) 1 SCC 384 . 34. Thus, the claimant/respondent No.1 is entitled to the total amount of Rs. 5,11,977/- (Rupees five lakhs eleven thousand nine hundred & seventy seven) only, as compensation, and in my considered opinion, this amount would be the just, equitable, fair and reasonable amount of compensation here in this case. 35. The learned Tribunal has directed to pay interest @ 6%, from the date of filing the claim petition till payment of the amount. But, in view of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. 35. The learned Tribunal has directed to pay interest @ 6%, from the date of filing the claim petition till payment of the amount. But, in view of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Upahar Tragedy Victims Association and Ors, (2011) 14 SCC 481 and also in Kalpanaraj vs. Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation: (2014) Acci.C.R.693 (S.C.), where it is provided that the amount shall carry interest @ 9%, till realization of the amount, this Court is inclined to award interest @ 9% per annum from the date of filing the evidence-in-affidavit i.e. 23.09.2009. 36. In the result, I find, no merit in this appeal and accordingly, the same stands dismissed. However, the quantum of compensation, which, the claimant is entitled to, is modified to the extent as indicated above. The appellant is directed to pay a sum of Rs. 5,11,977/- (Rupees five lakhs eleven thousand nine hundred & Seventy seven) to the respondent No.1 herein within 30 days from today, adjusting the amount, if any, already paid. 37. Send down the record of the learned Tribunal with a copy of this judgment and order forthwith. The parties have to bear their own cost.