JUDGMENT : J. C. DOSHI, J. 1. The present petition, invoking Article 227 of the Constitution of India, arises from a deeply unsettling and emotionally charged case where the petitioner — a grieving father — seeks justice for the mysterious and suspicious death of his son, Hasmukh. The gravamen of the complaint is that the petitioner’s son, Hasmukh, who had gone to his in-laws’ residence to bring back his wife, was found dead under suspicious circumstances. Allegations of a calculated conspiracy involving not just the in-laws (accused Nos. 1 to 5), but also police officers (accused Nos. 6 and 7), even doctors who conducted the postmortem (accused Nos. 8 and 9), form the foundation of the criminal complaint filed by the petitioner under several serious provisions of the INDIAN PENAL CODE , 1860 (for short, “the IPC”). 2. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nadiad, initially adopted a cautious approach by ordering a criminal inquiry and recording statements of witnesses under Section 202(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, “CrPC”). However, being dissatisfied with the outcome of such own inquiry, the learned Magistrate passed an interim order directing the Superintendent of Police to constitute a special investigating team and conduct further inquiry under Section 202(1) of the CrPC, and to submit a report. 2.1. Despite this additional inquiry, doubts continued to linger in the mind of the learned Magistrate. On 25.01.2006, not satisfied with the medical version presented, the Court summoned the very doctors who had conducted the autopsy adopting course of conducting inquiry at his end again. Eventually, upon the bifurcation of the district and the matter falling under the jurisdiction of the learned CJM, Anand, further inquiry ensued, culminating in the issuance of process under Section 204 of the CrPC against Jasodaben Makwana, Nitinbhai Makwana, and Bhavesh Makwana, for offences punishable under Sections 323 and 114 of the IPC. Thus, what began as a father's desperate plea for justice has now evolved into a full-blown legal battle, raising questions about complicity, cover-up, and the sanctity of criminal investigation. 2.2. The complainant, being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, preferred a Criminal Revision Application No.49 of 2011 under Section 397 of the CrPC before the Sessions Court at Anand, limiting the challenge to only three persons against whom process had been is-sued. The revision application came to be dismissed. 2.3. 2.2. The complainant, being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, preferred a Criminal Revision Application No.49 of 2011 under Section 397 of the CrPC before the Sessions Court at Anand, limiting the challenge to only three persons against whom process had been is-sued. The revision application came to be dismissed. 2.3. The said concurrent findings have now been assailed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India by the original complainant, contending that the learned Trial Court ought to have issued process for the offence under Section IPC, along with other offences as alleged in the private complaint. 2.4. Curiously, the revision proceedings were confined only to three individuals—Jasodaben Makwana, Nitinbhai Makwana, and Bhavesh Makwana—but in the present petition, the petitioner has imploded as respondents all the persons who were originally arrayed as accused in the private complaint, despite the fact that no process was issued against the rest. 3. In the context of the aforementioned facts, I have heard the learned Advocate Mr. Suresh B. Bhatt for the petitioners, learned Advocate Mr. Riddhesh Trivedi for respondents No. 1 to 5, learned Advocate Mr. Alkesh N. Shah for respondents No. 8 and 9, and the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor representing the respondent- State. Though notice was duly served upon respondents No. 6 and 7, none appeared before this Court. 4. In his exhaustive submissions, learned Advocate Mr. Suresh Bhatt, while assailing the concurrent findings of the trial court for declining to issue process against all the accused as well as for of- fences under Section 302 and other provisions, principally con- tended that the order dated 28.3.2011 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Anand, and subsequently confirmed by the learned Sessions Judge in revisional jurisdiction—directing issuance of process solely for offences under Sections 323 and 114 of the IPC and that too against merely three accused—is manifestly erroneous and grossly perverse. 4.1. The learned advocate submitted that the impugned order egregiously ignores the antecedent findings and judicial observations made by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nadiad during the preliminary inquiry. He vehemently argued that through meticulous analysis and comprehensive findings, the learned CJM, Nadiad conclusively determined that the death of the deceased Hasmukh bore suspicious circumstances. 4.2. It was further submitted that the police personnel who investigated the offence under Section 202 of the CrPC were in collusion with the accused and consequently failed to conduct a proper and kosher investigation. 4.2. It was further submitted that the police personnel who investigated the offence under Section 202 of the CrPC were in collusion with the accused and consequently failed to conduct a proper and kosher investigation. The learned advocate emphasized that the CJM, Nadiad identified numerous lacunae in the investigation and, in the order dated 5.1.2006, undertook painstaking evaluation of each piece of evidence collected during the investigation, ultimately concluding that the case did not constitute suicide but rather culpable homicide amounting to murder. 4.3. The learned advocate submitted that the CJM had also taken judicial cognizance of the said facts after due application of mind. Referring to the findings of the learned CJM in paragraph 24 (page 71) of the order dated 25.1.2006, he contended that since the learned CJM, Nadiad, after judicious consideration and thorough inquiry, found that the essential ingredients of offences under Section 302 of the IPC and other provisions were prima facie established and sufficient material was available to assume cognizance, the only judicial course available to the learned CJM, Anand—following the bifurcation of Nadiad and Anand districts—was to pass the requisite order for issuance of process. 4.4. However, the learned CJM, Anand, instead of adopting the findings arrived at by the learned CJM, Nadiad, formed his independent opinion and erroneously held that insufficient evidence existed on record to issue process for offences under Section 302 of the IPC. The learned advocate thus submitted that a grave error of law has been committed by the learned CJM, Anand, which error has been perpetuated by the learned Sessions Judge through the delivery of a non-speaking order in revisional jurisdiction. 4.5. To elucidate the concept of "cognizance," learned advocate Mr. Suresh Bhatt placed reliance upon the authoritative pronouncements in the case of State of West Bengal v. Khalid , 1994 LawSuit (SC) 1079, Chief Enforcement Officer v. Videocon International Ltd. , 2008 LawSuit (SC) 122 , Smt. Kamalshivaji Pokarnekar v. State of Maharashtra and Others , (2019) AIR (SC) 847, and the judgment of this Court in Dhanabhai Puniyabhai Mohaniya v. State of Gujarat and Others , 2010 LawSuit (Guj) 1157 . 4.6. Principally founded upon the aforementioned submissions, learned advocate Mr. 4.6. Principally founded upon the aforementioned submissions, learned advocate Mr. Bhatt, appearing for the petitioner, earnestly prayed for the allowance of the present petition and sought to quash and set aside the concurrent findings arrived at by the learned trial court, with a consequential direction to restore the criminal inquiry for de novo adjudication. 5. Per contra, learned Advocate Mr. Riddhesh Trivedi for the respondent Nos.1 to 5 vehemently opposed the contentions advanced on behalf of the petitioner and submitted that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Anand, has rendered a well-reasoned and legally sustainable order, premised upon the inquiry conducted by the investigating agency pursuant to the directions issued by the learned CJM, Nadiad. He pointed out that the deceased had categorically disclosed that he consumed pesticide (Rozzer) owing to emotional distress caused by his wife's persistent refusal to return to the matrimonial home. 5.1. Learned advocate submitted that this self-incriminating disclosure by the deceased himself effectively decimate the substratum of the petitioner’s allegations and nullifies the theory of homicidal causation. He further argued that the learned CJM, Anand, upon meticulous examination of the material available on record, has rightly recorded a finding that no prima facie case is made out so as to invoke the provisions of Section 302 IPC or to warrant issuance of process for the alleged offence of culpable homicide amounting to murder. 5.2. He contended that the act of levelling bald and sweeping allegations against the police and imputing complicity with the accused, without any cogent or corroborative evidence, is an exercise in conjecture. He submitted that in a matter involving invocation of Section 302 IPC—a grave and serious offence—the complainant is expected to lay down a robust and persuasive foundation based on substantive evidence. However, in the present case, the petitioner has failed to discharge this threshold burden, and the record is conspicuously bereft of any material that would necessitate the issuance of process against the respondents. 5.3. As regards the observations made by the learned CJM, Nadiad, learned advocate Mr. Riddhesh Trivedi submitted that although certain scathing remarks were indeed made in the course of the order, no process was actually issued against the accused pursuant to such observations. Instead, summons were issued only to the medical professionals for the purpose of recording their statements. 5.4. Learned Advocate Mr. Riddhesh Trivedi submitted that although certain scathing remarks were indeed made in the course of the order, no process was actually issued against the accused pursuant to such observations. Instead, summons were issued only to the medical professionals for the purpose of recording their statements. 5.4. Learned Advocate Mr. Trivedi therefore contended that the said remarks, though critical in nature, cannot be construed as that learned Magistrate having taken cognizance of the alleged offences. He further submitted that the impugned order passed by the learned CJM, Anand—which has withstood judicial scrutiny in revision and has been affirmed by the learned Sessions Court—squarely amounts to the proper exercise of judicial discretion in declining to issue process. 5.5. In light of the foregoing submission, learned advocate Mr. Trivedi emphatically argued that the present petition is devoid of substance, bereft of any tenable legal foundation, and accordingly deserves to be dismissed at the threshold. 6. Learned advocate Mr. Raiyani, appearing on behalf of the other accused, while adopting the submissions advanced by learned advocate Mr. Trivedi, further submitted that the complainant has failed to implead other persons who were arrayed as accused in the original complaint in the revision proceedings, thereby attracting the bar contemplated under Section 401(2) of the CrPC. He submitted that the present proceedings arise out of revisional jurisdiction and not original jurisdiction, and hence, except the persons against whom process has been issued by the learned trial Court, no other individuals can be impleaded or arrayed as accused or party respondent. 6.1. It was further contended that in view of this procedural impropriety, the petition, insofar as it pertains to the remaining respondents who were not parties to the revision application, is not maintainable in law and consequently deserves to be quashed. 7. Learned APP, while supporting the concurrent findings recorded by the learned trial court, submitted that in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, this Court should not interfere merely to correct every error of law or fact. He submitted that unless it is demonstrably shown that the impugned order suffers from a patent illegality resulting in grave miscarriage of justice, no interference is warranted. He, therefore, urged that the present petition, being devoid of exceptional circumstances justifying invocation of such limited supervisory jurisdiction, does not merit consideration and deserves to be dismissed in limine. 8. He submitted that unless it is demonstrably shown that the impugned order suffers from a patent illegality resulting in grave miscarriage of justice, no interference is warranted. He, therefore, urged that the present petition, being devoid of exceptional circumstances justifying invocation of such limited supervisory jurisdiction, does not merit consideration and deserves to be dismissed in limine. 8. I have heard the learned advocates for both sides and have meticulously perused the record. At the outset, it is apposite to delineate the scope and ambit of the power vested under Article 227 of the Constitution before embarking upon an adjudication of the merits of the present case. 8.1. The supervisory jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is circumscribed and limited to ensuring that subordinate courts or tribunals function within the parameters of their lawful authority, and does not extend to correcting errors apparent on the face of the record, much less errors of law or fact. A mere erroneous decision, without anything more, is insufficient to attract the exercise of jurisdiction under this constitutional provision. The Court, while exercising supervisory powers, does not assume the mantle of an appellate forum. (See: Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaquim (1984) 4 SCC 566; See also: Ousep Mathai v. M. Abdul Kadir (2002) 1 SCC 319 .) 8.2. In Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate Pvt. Ltd., (2001) 8 SCC 9 , it has been held that in the exercise of power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, it is the duty of the High Court to keep the in- ferior courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority. The power is restricted to cases of serious dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law and justice. 8.3. In decision, in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai , (2003) 6 SCC 675 , the Apex Court observed that supervisory juris- diction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. 8.3. In decision, in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai , (2003) 6 SCC 675 , the Apex Court observed that supervisory juris- diction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a subordinate court has assumed jurisdiction which it does not pos- sess or has failed to exercise jurisdiction which it does possess, or when the jurisdiction, though available, is being exercised by the court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has been occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. 8.4. Having regard to the aforesaid background, if one examines the submissions advanced by learned Advocate Mr. Suresh Bhatt, the central thrust of his argument is that the learned CJM, Nadiad, while passing detailed observations critical of the police investigation, had opined that a prima facie case under Section 302 IPC and other allied offences was made out. It was contended that once such a judicial opinion was expressed, it assume character of taking cognizance of offence, the learned CJM, Anand, upon bifurcation, could not have ignored or brushed aside those findings, and erroneously concluded that no case under Section 302 IPC was made out, restricting the scope only to offences under Sections 323 and 114 IPC, and that too against merely three of the accused persons while excluding others. 8.5. The vexed legal question that arises for consideration is whether the learned CJM, Nadiad, could have adopted a speculative “hope on” and “hope off” approach by conveniently switching from Section 202(2) to Section 202(1) of the CrPC—without undertaking any independent analysis of the investigation either conducted by herself or through the police—and in the absence of a protest petition, record observations to the effect that offences under Section 302 and other cognate provisions are made out, without proceeding to issue process. The further issue that arises is whether such observations recorded by the learned CJM, Nadiad, could be construed as “taking cognizance” in law, and whether the CJM, Anand, could have ignored the same on the ground that no cognizance was, in fact, taken. 8.6. It is trite that the expression “taking cognizance” has not been expressly defined in the CrPC. However, jurisprudence has evolved clarity on the subject. 8.6. It is trite that the expression “taking cognizance” has not been expressly defined in the CrPC. However, jurisprudence has evolved clarity on the subject. It is well settled that before it can be said that a Magistrate has taken cognizance of an offence under Section 190 (1)(a) of the CrPC, the Magistrate must have not only applied his judicial mind to the contents of the complaint or police report, but such application of mind must be for the purpose of proceeding in a manner contemplated under the CrPC, such as under Sections 200 or 202 thereof. 8.7. Notably, nature of cases dealt under Section 202 of CrPC are cases where material available is not clear to proceed further. The Magistrate is in sesine of matter having taken the inquiry / investigation. He has to decide about existence of ground to proceed and is- sue process on material available. The Magistrate, however, emphatically precluded from making scathing observation against inquiry- investigation carried pursuant of his own order. Without having resistance afforded on one hand and to continue inquiry by himself on other hand. The course adopted by learned Magistrate seemingly unknown to provision of law become unsustainable. 8.8. In In Superintendent & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs Vs. Abani Kumar Banerjee, AIR 1950 Calcutta 437 , the High Court of Calcutta had an occasion to consider the ambit and scope of the phrase “taking cognizance” under Section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 which was in pari materia to Section 190 of the present Code of 1973:- “What is “taking cognizance” has not been defined in the CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE , and I have no desire now to attempt to define it. It seems to me clear, however, that before it can be said that any Magistrate has taken cognizance of any offence under Section 190 (1)(a), Criminal P. C., he must not only have applied his mind to the contents of the petition, but he must have done so for the purpose of proceeding in a particular way as indicated in the subsequent provisions of this Chapter,-proceeding under Section 200, and thereafter sending it for enquiry and report under Section 202. When the Magistrate applies his mind not for the purpose of proceeding under the subsequent sections of this Chapter, but for taking action of some other kind, e.g., ordering investigation under Section 156(3), or issuing a search warrant for the purpose of the investigation, he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of the offence” 8.9. In the older judgment in the case of R.R. Chari v. State of Uttar Pradesh , 1951 SCR 312 was probably the first leading decision of Apex Court on the point. There, the police, having suspected the appellant-accused to be guilty of offences punishable under Sections 161 and 165 of the IPC as also under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, applied to the District Magistrate, Kanpur to issue warrant of arrest on October 22, 1947. Warrant was issued on the next day and the accused was arrested on October 27, 1947. On March 25, 1949, the accused was produced before the Magistrate to answer the charge-sheet submitted by the prosecution. According to the accused, on October 22, 1947, when warrant for his arrest was issued by the Magistrate, the Magistrate was said to have taken cognizance of offence and since no sanction of the Government had been obtained before that date, initiation of proceedings against him was unlawful. The question before the Court was as to when cognizance of the offence could be said to have been taken by the Magistrate under Section 190 of the Code. Considering the circum- stances under which “cognizance of offence” under sub-section (1) of Section 190 of the Code can be taken by a Magistrate and referring to Abani Kumar Banerjee (supra), the Apex Court stated:- “It is clear from the wording of the section that the initiation of the proceedings against a person commences on the cognizance of the offence by the Magistrate under one of the three contingencies mentioned in the section. The first contingency evidently is in respect of non- cognizable offences as defined in the CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE on the complaint of an ag- grieved person. The second is on a police report, which evidently is the case of a cognizable offence when the police have completed their investigation and come to the Magistrate for the issue of a process. The third is when the Magistrate himself takes notice of an offence and issues the process. The second is on a police report, which evidently is the case of a cognizable offence when the police have completed their investigation and come to the Magistrate for the issue of a process. The third is when the Magistrate himself takes notice of an offence and issues the process. It is important to remember that in respect of any cognizable offence, the police, at the initial stage when they are investigating the matter, can arrest a person without obtaining an order from the Magistrate. Under section 167(b) of the CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE the police have of course to put up the person so arrested before a Magistrate within 24 hours and obtain an order of remand to police custody for the purpose of further investigation, if they so desire. But they have the power to arrest a person for the purpose of investigation without approaching the Magistrate first. Therefore in cases of cognizable offence before proceedings are initiated and while the matter is under investigation by the police the suspected person is liable to be arrested by the police without an order by the Magistrate. 8.10. In Narayandas Bhagwandas Madhavdas vs The State Of West Bengal 1960 1 SCR 93 the Apex court has again occasion to observe that that when cognizance is taken of an offence depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case and it is impossible to attempt to define what is meant by taking cognizance. Issuance of a search warrant for the purpose of an investigation or a warrant of arrest of accused cannot by itself be regarded as an act of taking cognizance of an offence. It is only when a Magistrate applies his mind for proceeding under Section 200 and subsequent sections of Chapter XV or under Section 204 of Chapter XVI of the Code that it can be positively stated that he had applied his mind and thereby had taken cognizance of an offence 8.11. In Gopal Das Sindhi & Ors. v. State of Assam & Anr., AIR 1961 SC 986 , referring to earlier judgments, it is observed that:- “We cannot read the provisions of Section 190 to mean that once a complaint is filed, a Magistrate is bound to take cognizance if the facts stated in the complaint disclose the commission of any offence. We are unable to construe the word #may# in Section 190 to mean “must”. We are unable to construe the word #may# in Section 190 to mean “must”. The reason is obvious. A complaint disclosing cognizable offences may well justify a Magistrate in sending the complaint under Section 156(3) to the police for investigation. There is no reason why the time of the Magistrate should be wasted when primarily the duty to investigate in cases involving cognizable offences is with the police. On the other hand, there may be occasions when the Magistrate may exercise his discretion and take cognizance of a cognizable offence. If he does so then he would have to proceed in the manner provided by Chapter XVI of the Code.” 9. In view of the settled principles of law, if the factual matrix of the present case is examined, it emerges that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nadiad initially undertook an inquiry under Section 202(2) of the CrPC and recorded statements of witnesses. However, the inquiry concluded without culminating in the issuance of process, thereby resulting in no conclusive judicial action. 9.1. Subsequently, the learned CJM transitioned to an inquiry un- der Section 202(1) of the CrPC and directed the Superintendent of Police to form an investigative agency and conduct a further in- quiry. Upon receiving the inquiry report, which did not conform with the court’s desire or expectations or judicial assessment, the learned CJM took exception to the manner of investigation and pro- ceeded to record certain offhand observations, opining that suffi- cient material was available to prima facie indicate the commission of an offence under Section 302 IPC. 9.2. However, these remarks did not lead to any consequential or- der issuing process against the accused. As a result, such tentative observations—though strongly worded—cannot be equated with “taking cognizance” within the meaning of Section 190 of the CrPC. They remain in the realm of mere commentary, devoid of procedural consequence. 9.3. It is noteworthy that the order dated 25.01.2006 passed by the learned CJM, Nadiad, despite containing scathing remarks regarding the conduct of the investigation and critical findings vis-à-vis the role of certain medical professionals, ultimately did not yield fulici- nous result in issuance of process under Section 204 CrPC. Rather, after making those remarks, the learned CJM refrained from issuing process and instead summoned the doctors as witnesses while resuming the inquiry under Section 202(2) CrPC. 9.4. Rather, after making those remarks, the learned CJM refrained from issuing process and instead summoned the doctors as witnesses while resuming the inquiry under Section 202(2) CrPC. 9.4. Accordingly, such observations, not having crystallized into any definitive judicial action initiating prosecution, cannot be con- strued as “taking cognizance” of the offence. They remain, at best, preliminary, inconclusive, find forgery non translucent and unsettled thoughts embarked within limitation, and thus, devoid of binding legal effect for the purposes of proceeding against the accused. 9.5. I take note of the fact that both the learned Trial Court and the learned Appellate Court have duly considered the statement of the deceased. The statement of the deceased is unequivocal and speaks with compelling clarity—he explicitly stated that, being dis- heartened and mentally distressed due to his wife’s persistent refusal to return to the matrimonial home, he had procured pesticide and consumed it, thereby taking his own life. Notably, the said statement bears the signature of the deceased, thereby lending authenticity to its contents. 9.6. Learned Advocate Mr. Bhatt, despite his extensive submissions, could not draw the Court’s attention to any material contra- dicting this categorical statement. Interestingly, the learned CJM, Nadiad, while casting aspersions on the police investigation, observed on one hand that the deceased might not have been in a fit physical or mental condition to make any coherent statement; yet, in the same breath, criticized the police for their failure to record a formal dying declaration under Section 202(1) of the CrPC. 9.7. Since the statement forms part of the inquiry proceedings, it carries probative value and may well be treated as a dying declaration under Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act. This statement manifests a clear intent of the deceased to end his own life and thereby substantially undermines the allegation of culpable homicide. There is a conspicuous absence of any material evidence on record to suggest, much less establish, that the accused persons were in any manner responsible for the homicidal death of the deceased. 10. In light of the foregoing discussion, this Court does not find any error, much less an error of law, nor does it find that the learned Trial Court has either acted beyond its jurisdiction or failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it. 10. In light of the foregoing discussion, this Court does not find any error, much less an error of law, nor does it find that the learned Trial Court has either acted beyond its jurisdiction or failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it. Consequently, the petitioner has failed to make out a case warranting interference with the concur- rent findings by this Court in the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 10.1. As regards the various judicial pronouncements relied upon by the petitioner, it is pertinent to note that those authorities merely expound the general principle relating to the stage at which cognizance of an offence is said to be taken. However, as discussed hereinabove, none of those decisions lend support to the case advanced by the petitioner in the present proceedings. 11. Accordingly, the petition stands DISMISSED. Interim relief and Rule, if any, stand vacated. 12. The Registry is directed forthwith to return the record and proceedings of Criminal Case No. 1123 of 2011 (Inquiry Case No. 122 of 2004) to the learned Trial Court for further proceedings in accordance with law.