JUDGMENT : Sathish Ninan, J. The decree in a suit for damages is under challenge by the defendant-Insurance Company. 2. The plaintiff is a Private Limited Company. It is engaged in the business of processing and exporting of frozen marine products. It has factories at places including one at Veraval in the State of Gujarat. The plaintiff had insured its plant, machinery and cold storage, along with the stock, with the defendants. 3. On 06.08.2007, there occurred incessant rain at Veraval, leading to the opening of a dam, and resultant heavy floods. The Electricity Department switched off the power supply. Since the water level had arisen up to a height of six feet, the generator was submerged and could not be operated. The water started to recede on 08.08.2007. The flood water inundated into the cold storage resulting in damage to the stock. The plant and machinery and the stock in the cold storage were damaged due to the flood. 4. According to the Insurance Company, the policy of insurance, though covers perils due to flood, the damage to the stock in the cold storage was not the direct result of the flood. There could not have been inundation of water into the cold storage. The damage to the stock was a consequence of the power supply being switched off and the resulting fall in temperature in the cold storage. It was a peril which the plaintiff could have opted to insure. However, the plaintiff had not chosen to take such cover. The insurance company repudiated the plaintiff's claim with regard to the stock in the cold storage. 5. The trial court held that the evidence on record suggests inundation of flood water into the cold storage, resulting in damage to the stock. It was also held that, even if damage to the stock was caused due to power failure, the causation of the damage was the flood. Accordingly the suit was decreed. 6. We have heard learned Senior Counsel Sri.George Cherian, on behalf of the appellants- defendants and Sri.John Joseph the learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff. 7. The points that arise for determination in this appeal are:- (i) Is the finding of the trial court that, damages to the stock in the cold storage was caused by inundation of flood water, sustainable on the materials? 7. The points that arise for determination in this appeal are:- (i) Is the finding of the trial court that, damages to the stock in the cold storage was caused by inundation of flood water, sustainable on the materials? (ii) Was the trial court right in holding that disconnection of power supply consequent to the flood and the resultant damages to the stock in the cold storage is covered by peril against flood under the insurance policy in question? (iii) Do the decree and judgment of the trial court warrant any interference? 8. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellants argued that, the finding of the trial court that water had entered the cold storage, does not stand to logic and reasoning. The cold storage is a water-tight and airtight compartment. Hence water cannot enter the chamber from outside. The surveyor did not notice any water marks inside the cold storage. There is no possibility of water having entered through the defrosting pipe as claimed by the plaintiff. If water had entered through the defrosting pipe, then even after the water receded outside, some water would still have been visible in the stock area. Learned Senior Counsel also referred to the various diagrams available in the surveyor's report (Ext.B6), to substantiate that the finding of the trial court that water has entered the cold storage is not correct. 9. The plaintiff is unable to say precisely as to how water entered the cold storage. It is not in dispute that, consequent on the flood, the water level at the place had risen upto six feet. The surveyor as DW1 deposed that when he visited the site most of the water had receded. He deposed “when I entered the building most of the water had gone away, in certain areas one inch of water is still there”. He further deposed that at the time of his visit, water had drained away from the process area and the plant and machinery area. He further deposed that on the day of his visit there was no water in front of the cold storage though he saw some mud marks on the door and walls of the cold storage area. 10. It is the case of the Insurance Company that the damages to the stock occurred due to switching off the power supply leading to fall in temperature inside the cold storage. 10. It is the case of the Insurance Company that the damages to the stock occurred due to switching off the power supply leading to fall in temperature inside the cold storage. He has deposed that, if there is a rise in temperature inside the cold storage, the melting will start from the upper layer and that the temperature in the lower layer will always be lower. He has deposed thus :- “If the whole stock is intact and if there is a raise in temperature at what point will the melting start (Q). The melting is starting on the upper lawyers first as the temperature will always be lower in the lower layers.” He had also deposed that when he inspected the cold storage, the temperature inside was around minus 14 degree celsius. He also deposed that the commodity will not melt at minus 14 degree centigrade. Under such circumstances, for the stack inside the cold storage to fall, there must have been a rise in the temperature at the bottom which could have resulted only by the stock getting in touch with water. Though the learned Senior Counsel would argue that the surveyor did not notice any water marks inside the cold storage it is to be noted that even according to the surveyor he was unable to enter the cold storage and had taken photographs by merely putting one leg inside the cold storage. It is to be noted that, for a rise in temperature at the bottom it is not necessary that a large quantity of water need to have collected inside the cold storage. It is enough if at the floor of the cold storage there had been a rise in the temperature. When the cold storage maintained a temperature of minus 14 degree celsius on the date of inspection by the surveyor, and he found the stacks fallen down, the temperature at the bottom portion might have risen leading to such fall of stacks. It could have occurred only due to inundation of flood water. 11. In the above context, clauses 5 and 7 of Ext.A9 e-mail communication by the surveyor (DW1) to the plaintiff, issued on 10.08.2007 after his site inspection, is significant. The same reads thus :- “5. It could have occurred only due to inundation of flood water. 11. In the above context, clauses 5 and 7 of Ext.A9 e-mail communication by the surveyor (DW1) to the plaintiff, issued on 10.08.2007 after his site inspection, is significant. The same reads thus :- “5. As explained to you immediately after receipt of policy and once again a little while ago that this policy would cover your stock to the extent directly affected by flooding water . However , any other stock which is lying in upper layers which is getting damaged due to non maintenance of temperature is a consequential loss and is not covered under this policy. 7. moreover, my colleague Mr. Ashwin Gohil (+91 94265 13254) is at the site since this morning. You are requested to co-ordinate and co-operate for assessing the quantum of material directly affected by flooding water.” Evidently, therein he has acknowledged the damage caused to the stock by flood water. He has also taken exception that the stock in the upper layers which is getting damaged due to non-maintenance of temperature is not covered by the policy. Pertinently, Ext.A9 communication was issued after he perused the insurance policy of the plaintiff. The trial court has taken note of the above circumstances and concluded that the damage to the stock must have resulted consequent on the inundation of flood water into the cold storage. We do not find sufficient material to hold otherwise. Point No.1 is answered accordingly. 12. The Insurance Company seeks to get absolved from liability stating that the damages to the stock has resulted consequent on the fall in temperature in the cold storage due to the lack of power supply, and not directly due to the flood. The learned Senior Counsel drew our attention to clause 6 of the “General Exclusions” in Exts.B1, B2 and B3 insurance policies of the plaintiff, which are verbatim. The same reads thus:- “ (A) GENERAL EXCLUSIONS This Policy does not cover (not applicable to policies covering dwellings) xxxx xxxx xxxx 6. Loss, destruction or damage to the stocks in Cold Storage premises caused by change of temperature.” According to the appellant, the damage to the stock resulted due to rise in temperature which occurred consequent on the disruption of the power supply. Loss, destruction or damage to the stocks in Cold Storage premises caused by change of temperature.” According to the appellant, the damage to the stock resulted due to rise in temperature which occurred consequent on the disruption of the power supply. Though the disruption of the power supply happened consequent on the flood, it cannot be said that flood was the direct and proximate cause for the damage to the stock. The stock got damaged because of fall in temperature, which is excluded under the clause above. Therefore, the Insurance Company does not have the liability for the loss of goods, is the contention. 13. The learned Senior Counsel would refer to the judgment of the Apex Court in General Assurance Society Ltd v. Chandmull Jain ( AIR 1966 SC 1644 ) which held that, contracts of insurance are to be understood based on the words expressed by the parties in the contract and it is not for the Court to make a new contract however reasonable it may be, if the parties have not made it themselves. He also relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in Central Bank of India Ltd Amritsar v. Hartford Fire Ince. Co. Ltd. (AIR 1965 SC 1288), which held that plain and categorical language cannot be radically changed by relying upon the surrounding circumstances. The learned Senior Counsel also referred to the meaning of the word “proximate” as obtaining in the Oxford Dictionary and Halsbury's Laws of England to contend that, the loss must have been the direct effect, and that the “cause and effect” must be without anything in between. He further referred to the judgments of the Apex Court in Sikka Papers Ltd. v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. [ (2009) 7 SCC 777 ] , New India Assurance Co. Ltd. V. Zuari Industries Ltd. [ 2009 (9) SCC 70 ] to support his contention that, in the absence of any infirmity found in the surveyor's report, the same is liable to be accepted, since it has a statutory flavor under Section 64UM of the Insurance Act, 1938. The proxima causa between the cause and the damage is to be established, it is argued. 14. The fact that due to the flood the power supply was switched off by the Electricity Board, is undisputed. The proxima causa between the cause and the damage is to be established, it is argued. 14. The fact that due to the flood the power supply was switched off by the Electricity Board, is undisputed. If this caused damage to the stock in the cold storage and whether the damage could be held to be the direct result of the flood, is the question. “Leyland Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society Ltd., (1918-19) All E.R. 443 have dealt with the same which is summarised by Lord Shaw in his concluding judgment as under : In this way the discussion of the scope of proxima causa is very relevant and its ascertainment vital. In my opinion, too much is made refinements upon this subject. The doctrine of cause has been since the time of Aristotle, and the famous category of material, formal, efficient and final causes, one involving the subtlest of distinctions. The doctrine applied in these to existences rather than to occurrences. But the idea of the cause of an occurrence or the production of an event or the bringing about of a result is an idea perfectly familiar to the mind and to the law, and it is in connection with that the the notion of proxima cause is introduced. Of this, I will venture to remark that one must be careful not to lay the accept upon the word “proximate” such a sense as to lose sight of or destroy altogether the idea of cause itself. The true and overruling principle is to look at a contract as a whole, and to ascertain what the parties to it really meant. What was it which brought about the loss, the event, the calamity, the accident? And this not in an artificial sense, but in that real sense which parties to a contract must have had in their minds when they spoke of cause at all. To treat proxima causa as the cause which is nearest in time is out of the question. Causes are spoken of as if they were as distinct from one another as beads in a row or links in a chain, but-if this metaphysical topic has to be referred to – it is not wholly so. The chain of causation is a handy expression, but the figure is inadequate. Causation is not a chain but a net. Causes are spoken of as if they were as distinct from one another as beads in a row or links in a chain, but-if this metaphysical topic has to be referred to – it is not wholly so. The chain of causation is a handy expression, but the figure is inadequate. Causation is not a chain but a net. At each point influences, forces, events, precedent and simultaneous, meet, and the radiation from each point extends infinitely. At the point where these various influences meet it is for the judgment as upon a matter of fact to declare which of the causes thus joined at the point of effect was the proximate and which was the remote cause.” In 'New Insurance Law' by Singh at page 1.75 it is stated thus, “….. Where the loss is the necessary consequence of fire, in the sense that the loss could not have happened but for fire, the fire is the cause of the loss for the purposes of the policy. Hence, loss caused by smoke arising out of the fire, or damage caused by water escaping from pipes, melted in the course of fire, is covered by the policy. …..” “..... When the option is between opting for a view which will relieve the distress and misery of the victims of accidents or their dependents on the one hand and the equally plausible view which will reduce the profitability of the insurer in regard to the occupational hazard undertaken by him by way of business activity, there is hardly any choice. The Court cannot but opt for the former view. Even if one were to make a strictly doctrinaire approach, the very same conclusion would emerge in obeisance to the doctrine of 'reading down' the exclusion clause in the light of the 'main purpose' of the provision so that the exclusion clause doe s not cross swords with the main purpose highlighted earlier. The effort must be to harmonize the two instead of allowing the exclusion clause to snipe successfully at the main purpose.” In New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Zuari Industries Ltd. (supra) as a result of fire in a factory, the electrical supply to the plant was stopped. Due to stoppage of electric supply, the supply of water/steam to the waste heat boiler by the flue gases at high temperature continued resulting in damage to the boiler. Ltd. v. Zuari Industries Ltd. (supra) as a result of fire in a factory, the electrical supply to the plant was stopped. Due to stoppage of electric supply, the supply of water/steam to the waste heat boiler by the flue gases at high temperature continued resulting in damage to the boiler. The Insurance Company repudiated the claim contending that the loss to the boiler was not caused by fire but by stoppage of electric supply. The contention was negatived by the Apex Court. At paragraph 14 of the judgment, the Apex Court explained the meaning of the word “proximate cause” thus:- “14. Apparently there is no direct decision of this court on this point as to the meaning of proximate cause, but there are decisions of foreign courts, and the predominant view appears to be that the proximate cause is not the cause which is nearest in time or place but the active and efficient cause that sets in motion a train or chain of events which brings about the ultimate result without the intervention of any other force working from an independent source.” The Apex Court referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in Lynn Gas and Electric Co. v. Meriden Fire Insurance Co. 33 NE 690, wherein it was observed:- “..... The question always is: was there an unbroken connection between the wrongful act and the injury, a continuous operation ? In other words, did the facts constitute a continuous succession of events so linked together as to make a natural whole, or there was some new and independent cause intervening between the wrong and the injury ?” The Apex Court concluded, “..... It is evident from the chain of events that the fire was the efficient and active cause of the damage. Had the fire not occurred, the damage was also would not have occurred and there was no intervening agency which was an independent source of the damage.” The opinion of the surveyors was refused to be accepted. The Apex Court also referred to its judgments in General Assurance Society v. Chandmull Jain (supra) that in case of ambiguity in a contract of insurance, the ambiguity should be resolved in favour of the claimant and against the Insurance Company. A similar view was expressed by the Apex Court in Skandia Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kokilaben Chandravadan [(1987) 2 SCC 654]. A similar view was expressed by the Apex Court in Skandia Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kokilaben Chandravadan [(1987) 2 SCC 654]. The Apex Court held: “..... When the option is between opting for a view which will relieve the distress and misery of the victims of accidents or their dependents on the one hand and the equally plausible view which will reduce the profitability of the insurer in regard to the occupational hazard undertaken by him by way of business activity, there is hardly any choice. The Court cannot but opt for the former view. Even if one were to make a strictly doctrinaire approach, the very same conclusion would emerge in obeisance to the doctrine of 'reading down' the exclusion clause in the light of the 'main purpose' of the provision so that the 'exclusion clause' does not cross swords with the 'main purpose' highlighted earlier. The effort must be to harmonize the two instead of allowing the exclusion clause to snipe successfully at the main purpose.” 15. In the present case, apparently, the flood was the cause for switching off the electricity which resulted in deterioration of the stock in the cold storage. The cause and the events viz. the flood and damage to the stock is proximate and direct. The flood resulted in power failure resulting in damage to the stock. This cannot be considered to be a mere ordinary incident of fall in temperature. The flood was the active cause of the damage. Had the flood not occurred the damage could not have occurred. There was no intervening and independent source of damage. Therefore, the trial court was right in having held that the flood was proxima causa for the damage to the stock. Thus, even if the damage to the stock was caused not by inundation of water into the cold storage but due to switching off of the power supply, still, the insurance company would not be absolved of the liability. 16. Finally the learned counsel for the appellant argued that, as per the terms of the policy, the first 5% of the claim is excluded. However, it was not taken note of by the trial Court. That the policy does not cover the first 5% of the claim is not disputed by the respondent-plaintiff. Hence, from the damages awarded by the trial court 5% is liable to be deducted. However, it was not taken note of by the trial Court. That the policy does not cover the first 5% of the claim is not disputed by the respondent-plaintiff. Hence, from the damages awarded by the trial court 5% is liable to be deducted. After deducting the same the amount is Rs.94,36,761.65 (Rs. 99,33,433.30 – 5%). 17. The trial court has granted interest at the rate of 18% per annum from 12.03.2008, that is, the date on which the claim was repudiated by the insurance company. The rate of interest awarded is evidently, exorbitant. Considering the prevailing rate of interest in Banking transactions, we are of the opinion that grant of interest at the rate of 9% till date of suit, and thereafter at the rate of 6% till realisation, is just and reasonable. Resultantly, this appeal is allowed in part. The decree and judgment of the trial court is modified granting a decree in favour of the plaintiff, for realisation of an amount of Rs.94,36,761.65, with interest at the rate of 9% per annum from 12.03.2008 till date of suit, and thereafter at the rate of 6% per annum till realisation, from the first defendant and its assets. The plaintiff shall be entitled for proportionate costs throughout.