JUDGMENT : UTKARSH THAKORBHAI DESAI, J. 1. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, Palanpur, vide his judgement delivered in Sessions Case No.62 of 1998 had acquitted the accused from the charge under Section 302 of the INDIAN PENAL CODE and Section 135 of the BOMBAY POLICE ACT . The complainant-State being aggrieved by the said judgement, had preferred the present appeal under Section 378(1) of the CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE . The prosecution had submitted as many as 27 documents and had examined 09 witnesses to bring home the guilt in Sessions Case No.62 of 1998. The charge was framed by the learned Sessions Judge under the sections mentioned herein above. 2. Heard learned Public Prosecutor Mr.Hardik A. Dave for the complainant – State who has taken us through the evidence which had come on record and more particularly the oral evidence of PW-6 Dr.Arunkumar Harjibhai Acharya, the Medical Officer of Tharad Medical Hospital and PW-9 Dr.Mahesh Babubhai Trivedi, who was having Champa Neurological Hospital at Mehsana. The deceased Bhagabhai Kalabhai Vajir was taken for treatment to both these doctors and as such, their evidence would be of importance, so far as the present case is concerned. 3. Learned Public Prosecutor Mr.Dave has also drawn own attention towards the complaint which was lodged by Hirabhai Bhagabhai Vajir vide Exh.24, who was the son of the deceased and who had been examined by the prosecution as PW-2 vide Exh.11. So also, the prosecution had examined PW-3 Nanjibhai Popatbhai vide Exh.12, who happened to be the nephew of the deceased and PW-4 Dariyaben Bhagabhai Vajir vide Exh.30, the wife of the deceased. According to Mr.Dave, considering the depositions of these three witnesses, it had come on record that, it had come on record that, they had asked the deceased as regards the incident, to which, he had disclosed about he having been attacked by the accused and having sustained injuries, and thereby, such version of the deceased before these three witnesses would amount to his oral dying declaration. Mr.Dave has submitted that, though the doctors have stated that the deceased would have lost his consciousness immediately after sustaining injuries, the learned Trial Court had erred in disbelieving the evidence of the prosecution witnesses viz. PW-2 Hirabhai, PW-3 Nanjibhai and PW-4 Dariyaben. Mr.Dave has submitted that, though the doctors have stated that the deceased would have lost his consciousness immediately after sustaining injuries, the learned Trial Court had erred in disbelieving the evidence of the prosecution witnesses viz. PW-2 Hirabhai, PW-3 Nanjibhai and PW-4 Dariyaben. So also, Mr.Dave has drawn the attention of the Court towards the deposition of PW- 5 Arjun Singh Gohilsingh Darbar examined vide Exh.60, who was the Panch Witness as regards two Panchnamas viz. Exh.70, which was the panchnama of place of incident, whereas, Exh.18 was the panchnama of discovery of the alleged weapon, which was used for the commission of the crime. Accordingly, Mr.Dave has urged to allow the appeal and interfere with the judgement that was rendered by the learned competent Court, and convict the respondent-accused for the offense for which he was charged for by the learned Sessions Court. 4. None is present on behalf of the respondent accused. 5. At the outset, it is true as also had been observed by the learned Sessions Judge that, PW-2 Hirabhai who is the original complainant, PW-3 Nanjibhai Popatbhai who was nephew of the deceased and PW- 4 Dariyaben Bhagabhai who was the wife of the deceased having stated in their respective depositions about the deceased having narrated about the incident and having implicated the accused in the crime. However, it would be apposite to refer to the deposition of PW-6 Dr.Arunkumar Darjibhai Acharya, who was the Medical Officer at Referral Hospital, Tharad, examined vide Exh.19 who had admitted in his cross examination that, a patient who would have suffered the injuries which were found on the person of the deceased, would immediately slip into shock and would lose his consciousness. The same fact had been affirmed by PW-9 Dr.Maheshbhai Babubhai Trivedi examined at Exh.42, who was having a neurosurgical hospital at Mehsana, where the deceased was taken for his treatment. This witness had categorically admitted in his cross-examination that, the patient’s relatives had given the case history wherein, they had stated that the patient upon having sustained injury, had immediately lost his consciousness i.e. he was semiconscious. He had also admitted that, the patient was not in a position to speak once he was injured. This witness had categorically admitted in his cross-examination that, the patient’s relatives had given the case history wherein, they had stated that the patient upon having sustained injury, had immediately lost his consciousness i.e. he was semiconscious. He had also admitted that, the patient was not in a position to speak once he was injured. One more fact which cannot go unnoticed is the history which was given to PW-6 Dr.Arunkumar by Dipsinh Jashvantsinh Chauhan, which is mentioned in the certificate at Exh.20, as well as stated by the said witness in his examination-in- chief. This same literally translates as “as mentioned by Dipsinh Jashvantsinh Chauhan they did not wanted to file a police case and the injured having accidentally stumbled on the threshold of the house, had sustained the injury.’ The said witness in his cross-examination had also admitted that, Dipsinh had stated the history before him and the other persons who were accompanying the injured, had not objected. If this be so, it can be emphatically presumed that PW-2 - the original complainant, PW-3 - the nephew and PW-4 - the wife though being present along with the victim and Dipsinh had not objected to what had been stated by Dipsinh before the doctor. 6. One more fact which has been highlighted by the defense is that, though the deceased was taken for treatment initially to Tharad and thereafter, to Mehsana and on the same night having been brought back to village Jetda, it did not deem fit to PW-2 Hirabhai to lodge a complaint against the accused, rather, PW-3 Nagjibhai Popatbhai admits in his cross-examination that, when he had spoken to the Sarpanch of the village, it was the Sarpanch who had advised him to lodge a complaint. Not stopping at that, the Sarpanch had also told him that, he would accompany him to lodge a complaint. The said witness had also admitted that, when they had brought back Bhagabhai from Mehsana to Jetda at night, they had discussed with the Sarpanch as to what had to be done and how the complaint had to be lodged. The said witness had also admitted that, the Sarpanch had asked him to lodge a complaint and had also told him that, the complaint would be lodged in the manner that was decided between them. 7. The said witness had also admitted that, the Sarpanch had asked him to lodge a complaint and had also told him that, the complaint would be lodged in the manner that was decided between them. 7. On perusing the judgement rendered by the learned competent Court in Sessions Case No.62 of 1998, the Court had duly and rightly observed the infirmities and discrepancies, which had surfaced from the evidence which was rendered before it. Hence, no further discussion on this count would be required. 8. At this juncture, we may refer to some of the propositions enunciated by the Supreme Court with regard to exercise of appellate jurisdiction in acquittal appeals. In case of Sanjeev v. State of Himachal Pradesh reported in 2022 (6) SCC 294 para 7 reads as under: “7. It is well settled that:- 7.1 While dealing with an appeal against acquittal, the reasons which had weighed with the Trial Court in acquitting the accused must be dealt with, in case the appellate Court is of the view that the acquittal rendered by the Trial Court deserves to be upturned (See Vijay Mohan Singh v. State of Karnataka3, Anwar Ali and another v. State of Himachal Pradesh). 7.2 With an order of acquittal by the Trial Court, the normal presumption of innocence in a criminal matter gets reinforced (See Atley v. State of Uttar Pradesh). 7.3 If two views are possible from the evidence on record, the appellate Court must be extremely slow in interfering with the appeal against acquittal (See Sambasivan and others v. State of Kerala).” 8.1 Similarly, in the case of Bhupatbhai Bachubhai Chavda and another reported in [2024] 4 S.C.R. 322 , the relevant paragraphs read as under: “6. It is true that while deciding an appeal against acquittal, the Appellate Court has to reappreciate the evidence. After re- appreciating the evidence, the first question that needs to be answered by the Appellate Court is whether the view taken by the Trial Court was a plausible view that could have been taken based on evidence on record. Perusal of the impugned judgment of the High Court shows that this question has not been adverted to. Appellate Court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it is satisfied after reappreciating the evidence that the only possible conclusion was that the guilt of the accused had been established beyond a reasonable doubt. Perusal of the impugned judgment of the High Court shows that this question has not been adverted to. Appellate Court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it is satisfied after reappreciating the evidence that the only possible conclusion was that the guilt of the accused had been established beyond a reasonable doubt. The Appellate Court cannot overturn order of acquittal only on the ground that another view is possible. In other words, the judgment of acquittal must be found to be perverse. Unless the Appellate Court records such a finding, no interference can be made with the order of acquittal. The High Court has ignored the well-settled principle that an order of acquittal further strengthens the presumption of innocence of the 326 [2024] 4 S.C.R. Digital Supreme Court Reports accused. After having perused the judgment, we find that the High Court has not addressed itself on the main question. 7. The second error the High Court committed is found in paragraph 23 of the impugned judgment. The High Court has gone to the extent of recording a finding that the appellants have failed to adduce evidence in their support, failed to examine the defence witness and failed to establish falsity of the prosecution’s version. This concept of the burden of proof is entirely wrong. Unless, under the relevant penal statute, there is a negative burden put on the accused or there is a reverse onus clause, the accused is not required to discharge any burden. In a case where there is a statutory presumption, after the prosecution discharges initial burden, the burden of rebuttal may shift on the accused. In the absence of the statutory provisions as above, in this case, the burden was on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the High Court’s finding on the burden of proof is completely erroneous. It is contrary to the law of the land. ... 11. Therefore, the appeal must succeed. We set aside the judgment and order dated 14th December 2018 of the High Court and set aside the conviction of the appellants. The judgment and order dated 5th July 1997 of the Trial Court is restored. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed. The bail bonds of the appellant no.2 are cancelled. ... 11. Therefore, the appeal must succeed. We set aside the judgment and order dated 14th December 2018 of the High Court and set aside the conviction of the appellants. The judgment and order dated 5th July 1997 of the Trial Court is restored. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed. The bail bonds of the appellant no.2 are cancelled. The appellant no.1 shall be forthwith set at liberty unless he is required to be detained in connection with any other case.” 9. It is also a settled legal position that in acquittal appeals, the appellate court is not required to re- write the judgement or to give fresh reasonings, when the reasons assigned by the Court below are found to be just and proper. Such principle is laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Karnataka Vs. Hemareddy , reported in AIR 1981 SC 1417 wherein it is held as under: "... This court has observed in Girija Nandini Devi V. Bigendra Nandini Chaudhary (1967)1 SCR 93 : ( AIR 1967 SC 1124 ) that it is not the duty of the appellate court when it agrees with the view of the trial court on the evidence to repeat the narration of the evidence or to reiterate the reasons given by the trial court expression of general agreement with the reasons given by the Court the decision of which is under appeal, will ordinarily suffice." 9.1 Thus, in case the appellate court agrees with the reasons and the opinion given by the competent court below, then the discussion of evidence at length is not necessary. 10. We have appreciated, re-appreciated and re- evaluated the evidence rendered in Sessions Case No.62 of 1998 on the touchstone of latest decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court. Considering the evidence in its entirety, we are of the considered opinion that the learned Sessions Judge has rightly, correctly and legally appreciated the evidence which was rendered before him, pursuant to which, he had acquitted the accused from the charges framed against them. Thus, the said judgement does not require any interference. 11. Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed. R & P, if any called for, to be sent back to the concerned Trial Court forthwith.