JUDGMENT : KAUSER EDAPPAGATH, J. These writ petitions have been preferred by the accused Nos. 1, 2 and 4 in S.C.No.33/1996 on the files of the I Additional Sessions Court, Thrissur (for short, the trial court). The said case arose out of Crime No.205/1994 of Guruvayoor Police Station. W.P. (C). No.23349/2013 has been filed by the accused Nos. 1 and 2, and W.P.(C). No.23348/2013 has been filed by the accused No.4. There were nine accused altogether. As the accused No.3 was absconding, the case against him was split up. The accused No.6 died pending trial and the charge against him stood abated. The remaining accused faced trial. The trial court convicted the accused Nos. 1, 2, 4 and 5 for the offences punishable under Sections 143 , 148, 449 read with 149 of the IPC , Section 324 read with 149 of the IPC , Section 326 read with 149 of the IPC and Section 302 read with 149 as well as 147 of the IPC . They were sentenced to undergo imprisonment, including life imprisonment. The accused, Nos. 7, 8 and 9 were acquitted. 2. The accused, Nos.1, 2, 4 and 5, challenged the conviction and sentence before this Court in Crl. Appeal No.195/1997. The accused No.4 preferred Crl.M.C No.2492/1998 to order further investigation in the case on the ground that during the investigation of two other crimes (Crime No.220/1996 of Mathilakam Police Station and Crime No.165/1995 of Vadanappally Police Station), it was revealed that some other persons have actually committed the crime in S.C.No.33/1996. This Court heard and disposed of Crl. Appeal No.195/1997 as well as Crl.M.C No.2492/1998 together. It was found that there was no sufficient evidence to prove that PWS 1 to 5, who were the eyewitnesses, identified the accused Nos. 1, 2, 4 and 5. Accordingly, the benefit of doubt was given to them, and they were acquitted. So far as Crl. M.C. filed by the 4th accused was concerned; it was held that no further investigation could be ordered since it was filed based on a newspaper report. 1, 2, 4 and 5. Accordingly, the benefit of doubt was given to them, and they were acquitted. So far as Crl. M.C. filed by the 4th accused was concerned; it was held that no further investigation could be ordered since it was filed based on a newspaper report. However, it was made clear that if it is revealed during the investigation in Crime No.220/1996 of Mathilakam Police Station and Crime No.165/1995 of Vadanappally Police Station that some other persons have committed the offence in Crime No.205/1994 of Guruvayoor Police Station (S.C.No.33/1996), the Government is at liberty to order appropriate investigation for securing the ends of justice. 3. These Writ Petitions have been filed by the accused Nos.1, 2 and 4 to give a direction to the 6 th respondent to conduct further investigation in Crime No.205/1994 of Guruvayoor Police Station as well as in Crime No.220/1996 of Mathilakam Police Station and Crime No.165/1995 of Vadanappally Police Station. There is a further prayer to give directions to respondents Nos.1 to 3 to conduct an enquiry as to under whose instruction the petitioners were falsely implicated in the case. The petitioners have also sought compensation of Rs.50,00,000/- (Rupees Fifty lakhs only) for the damages allegedly suffered by them due to the wrongful prosecution and conviction. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners Sri.Shaijan C. George and the learned Additional Director General of Prosecution Sri. Grashious Kuriakose. 5. The acquittal of the petitioners vide the judgment of this Court in Crl.A.No.195/1997 has become final. The learned Additional Director General of Prosecution submitted that, based on the direction of this Court in the judgment in Crl. M.C.No.2492/1998, further investigation was ordered in Crime No.205/1994 of the Guruvayoor Police Station. On 13.8.2024, the Deputy Superintendent of Police-II, Crime Branch, Thrissur, who conducted further investigation in Crime No.205/1994 (renumbered as Crime No.296/CB/TSR/17), filed a report. In the report, it is clearly stated that further investigation revealed that the previously accused persons (including the petitioners) in Crime No.205/1994 were not the real culprits, and the crime was actually committed by a Muslim fundamental group, namely Jm-Iyathul Ihsaniya. The nine members of the said group were arrayed as the accused. Out of them, accused Nos. 2, 5, 6, 7 and 9 were arrested and accused Nos. 1, 3 and 4 were found to be absconding. The nine members of the said group were arrayed as the accused. Out of them, accused Nos. 2, 5, 6, 7 and 9 were arrested and accused Nos. 1, 3 and 4 were found to be absconding. It is further stated in the report that a draft final report has been prepared and submitted to the ADGP Crime Branch, Thiruvananthapuram, through proper channels, and the final report will be filed soon after getting approval from the ADGP Crime Branch. Thus, now, in further investigation, it has come out that the petitioners were falsely implicated in Crime No.205/1994, and they were not at all the actual culprits. The question whether the newly introduced accused actually committed the offence is a matter to be established in the trial to be conducted after the submission of the final report. But the fact remains that, now it is concluded that the petitioners were falsely implicated, prosecuted and convicted. They had to undergo the trauma of trial for a pretty long period, and ultimately, they were acquitted, which has become final. The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners are entitled to compensation for their illegal and wrongful prosecution and conviction. 6. Punishing an innocent is a serious miscarriage of justice. It undermines the rule of law. In the Twelfth Century, the Jewish philosopher Maimonides argued: ‘It is better and more satisfactory to acquit a thousand guilty persons than to put a single innocent man to death once.’ And William Blackstone famously declared in his Commentaries on the Law of England: ‘Better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffers.’ Every legal system operating in a modern democracy, including ours, is designed to protect the innocent and ensure that only those proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt are punished. 7. The principle of presumption of innocence is widely recognized as a fundamental aspect of fair trial rights and is enshrined in various international legal instruments, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). As such, nearly all countries adhere to some form of the presumption of innocence within their legal systems. The fact that India ratified these treaties emphasizes its commitment to upholding this principle in accordance with international human rights standards. As such, nearly all countries adhere to some form of the presumption of innocence within their legal systems. The fact that India ratified these treaties emphasizes its commitment to upholding this principle in accordance with international human rights standards. The Indian Constitution implicitly recognizes the presumption of innocence, notably in Article 21 , which guarantees the protection of life and personal liberty through the assurance of a fair trial and due process. The Supreme Court has expansively interpreted Article 21 of the Constitution, thereby reading many rights, including the right to a fair trial, into the right to life. This encompasses the right to a speedy trial, legal representation and the presumption of innocence until proven guilty. In Noor Aga v. State of Punjab [ (2008) 16 SCC 417 ], the Supreme Court held that the presumption of innocence is a human right as envisaged under Article 14(2) of the ICCPR. The presumption of innocence stands as a beacon of justice within the criminal justice system, upholding the fundamental human right to a fair trial and protecting individuals from arbitrary deprivation of liberty. The presumption that the accused is considered innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt acts as a shield against wrongful convictions. 8. Basic human rights protections against unlawful prosecutions, illegal detentions, arrests, wrongful convictions, etc., are guarantees available to every person under the umbrella of Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution. Therefore, wrongful prosecution and conviction violate a person’s fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution. It is undeniable that a person who is wrongly prosecuted, detained or convicted suffers serious consequences in various spheres – societal, emotional, financial and, of course, physical. The detrimental effect of false prosecution (with or without incarceration) was recognised in Lalita Kumari ’s case [ Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P and Others AIR 2014 SC 187 ] where the Hon’ble Court observed thus: “If an innocent person is falsely implicated, he not only suffers from loss of reputation, but also mental tension and his personal liberty is seriously impaired.” For the wrongfully convicted, life after exoneration presents a plethora of issues, including stigmatisation by the community. Despite being found not guilty in the end, his tale of victimisation remains horrific. 9. Despite being found not guilty in the end, his tale of victimisation remains horrific. 9. Internationally, the issue of wrongful prosecution, incarceration, and conviction of innocent persons is identified as a ‘miscarriage of justice’ that takes place after a person has been wrongfully convicted but is later found to be factually innocent based on new facts/evidence coming to light. Article 14(6) of the ICCPR delineates the obligation of States in cases of miscarriage of justice resulting from wrongful prosecutions. It says "when a person has by a final decision been convicted of a criminal offence and when subsequently his conviction has been reversed or he has been pardoned on the ground that a new and newly-discovered fact shows conclusively that there has been a miscarriage of justice, the person who has suffered punishment as a result of such conviction shall be compensated according to law unless it is proved that the non-disclosure of the unknown fact in time is wholly or partly attributable to him." Article 9(5) further underscores this right by declaring that "anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right to compensation”. The ICCPR, ratified by India, also requires the State parties to enact a law compensating the victims of such miscarriages of justice. 10. In India's legal framework, there is no specific statute governing the grant of compensation to persons wrongfully prosecuted or convicted. Under the present statutory regime, barring provisions under Sections 273 and 399 of BNSS (250 and 358 of Cr. P.C.), it is only a 'victim' who can claim compensation under Sections 395 and 396 of BNSS (357 and 357 A of Cr. P.C.). The term 'victim ' as defined in Section 2 (1) (y) [2 (wa) of Cr. P.C] does not include those who are victims of wrongful convictions, etc., and who get acquitted and released after languishing in prison for years, thus disentitling them from any statutory compensation under these provisions. Section 273 of BNSS (250 of Cr. P.C) lays down special provisions for the payment of compensation to the accused person in cases where he is discharged or acquitted as a result of a finding that no reasonable ground exists for launching such a prosecution. Section 273 of BNSS (250 of Cr. P.C) lays down special provisions for the payment of compensation to the accused person in cases where he is discharged or acquitted as a result of a finding that no reasonable ground exists for launching such a prosecution. This provision covers only those specific cases instituted upon a complaint or upon the information given to police or to the Magistrate accusing some person of having committed a certain act or offence triable by a Magistrate. As far as compensating 'persons groundlessly arrested', Section 399 of BNSS offers some token relief. This provision provides that whenever a person causes a police officer to arrest another person and it appears to the Magistrate by whom the case is heard that there was no sufficient ground for causing such arrest, the Magistrate may award such compensation, not exceeding one thousand rupees, to be paid by the person so causing the arrest to the person so arrested. The duty of paying the compensation is vested in the complainant/informant, and there is no obligation on the State to pay the same. The amount of fine that is to be paid as compensation is meagre. As far as compensating the victims of crime is concerned, Sections 395 and 396 of BNSS (357 and 357A of the Cr. P.C) provide for compensation to the victim of crime. Similarly, under Section 359, the complainant victim is entitled to claim the expenses incurred in the launching of the prosecution for loss or injury suffered by him. Therefore, the remedy available to a wrongly prosecuted or convicted person is the private law remedy by instituting a suit against the State before the ordinary civil court, claiming damages based on tort. 11. In addition to the private law remedy for damages for the tort resulting from the contravention of the fundamental right, a claim in public law for compensation is an acknowledged remedy for the enforcement and protection of such rights. Public law remedy for compensation for miscarriage of justice on account of wrongful prosecution, incarceration or conviction finds its roots in the Constitution of India . The Supreme Court has, through its expansive interpretation of Article 21 , developed a jurisprudence of compensation for violation of fundamental rights, including wrongful detention, prosecution and conviction. Several landmark judgments have recognized the right of a wrongfully accused or convicted person to be compensated. 12. The Supreme Court has, through its expansive interpretation of Article 21 , developed a jurisprudence of compensation for violation of fundamental rights, including wrongful detention, prosecution and conviction. Several landmark judgments have recognized the right of a wrongfully accused or convicted person to be compensated. 12. One of the earlier cases where the Supreme Court dealt with the issue of compensation for violations of life and liberty under Article 21 was Khatri & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors . ( AIR 1981 SC 928 ) wherein it was held that the court is not helpless to grant relief in a case of violation of the right to life and personal liberty, and it should be prepared 'to forge new tools and devise new remedies' for the purpose of vindicating these precious fundamental rights. It was also indicated that the procedure suitable in the facts of the case must be adopted for conducting the inquiry, needed to ascertain the necessary facts, for granting relief, as the available mode of redress, for the enforcement of the guaranteed fundamental rights. In that case, it was alleged that the police had blinded certain prisoners and that the State was liable to pay compensation to them. The Supreme Court directed the State to meet the medical expenses of the victims and house the blinded victims in a blind home in Delhi. In Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar ( AIR 1983 SC 1086 ), the Supreme Court, while exercising its power under Article 32, ordered the Bihar Government to pay ?30,000/- for detaining the petitioner for fourteen years after his acquittal. The then Chief Justice, Y.V. Chandrachud, CJ, speaking for a Bench of three learned Judges of the Supreme Court had observed that, "One of the telling ways in which the violation of that right can reasonably be prevented and due compliance with the mandate of Article 21 secured, is to mulct its violators in the payment of monetary compensation." Emphasising the need to compensate the victims of wrongful arrests, incarceration, etc., by awarding suitable monetary compensation, the Supreme Court in Bhim Singh, MLA v. State of J&K & Ors. [ (1985) 4 SCC 677 ] opined that the mischief, malice or invasion of an illegal arrest and imprisonment cannot just be "washed away or wished away" by setting free the person so arrested or imprisoned. Compensation of Rs. [ (1985) 4 SCC 677 ] opined that the mischief, malice or invasion of an illegal arrest and imprisonment cannot just be "washed away or wished away" by setting free the person so arrested or imprisoned. Compensation of Rs. 50,000/- was awarded for illegal detention. In Sebastian M. Hongray v. Union of India ( AIR 1984 SC 1026 ), the Supreme Court awarded Rs. 1 lakh compensation to the families of those who never returned after being picked up by the Army. A crucial judgment often credited with crystallising the principle of vicarious liability of the State, underlining the above-discussed cases and that of the principle of sovereign immunity vis-à-vis violation of fundamental rights by the State officials, was delivered in Neelabati Behera v. State of Orissa and Others ( AIR 1993 SC 1960 ). It was held that in case of violation of fundamental rights by the State’s instrumentalities or servants, the Supreme Court and the High Court have the power and obligation to direct the State to pay compensation to the victim or his heir by way of ‘monetary amends’ and redressal. The Supreme Court in that case observed that the award of compensation in writ proceedings is a remedy under public law, based on strict liability for contravention of fundamental rights, and that the principle of sovereign immunity is inapplicable in cases involving violation of fundamental rights, though available as a defence under private law in an action based on tort. The principle of strict liability of the State was also upheld in the landmark decision on the issue of 'police atrocities and awarding of compensation' in D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal [ (1997) 1 SCC 416 ] . It was held that the award of compensation for established infringement of the indefeasible rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution is a remedy available in public law since the purpose of public law is not only to civilise the public but also to assure the citizens that they live under a legal system wherein their rights and interest shall be protected and preserved. In S. Nambi Narayanan v. Sibi Mathews and Others [ (2018) 10 SCC 804 ], the Supreme Court while awarding compensation of Rupees Fifty Lakhs to Mr. In S. Nambi Narayanan v. Sibi Mathews and Others [ (2018) 10 SCC 804 ], the Supreme Court while awarding compensation of Rupees Fifty Lakhs to Mr. Narayanan, a former scientist of ISRO, due to his illegal arrest and custodial torture, reiterated that the award of compensation against the State is an appropriate and effective remedy for redress of an established infringement of a fundamental right under Article 21 , by a public servant. It was observed that the award of such compensation will not come in the way of the aggrieved person claiming additional compensation in a civil Court in the enforcement of the private law remedy in tort. Recently in Mahabir and Others v. State of Haryana ( 2025 SCC OnLine SC 184 ), it was held that that in cases where there can be no dispute of facts, the constitutional courts have the power to award compensation in case where a person has been wrongfully implicated and tried in criminal prosecution and thus deprived of his life and personal liberty without following procedural formalities. Thus, it is now well settled that the Constitutional Courts, being the protectors of the civil liberties of the citizen, have not only the power and jurisdiction but also an obligation to direct the State to award monetary compensation to the accused, in appropriate case, for the infringement of his life and liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution due to wrongful prosecution, detention or conviction notwithstanding his right to the private law remedy for tortious action. Acquitting victims of wrongful conviction does not redeem the State from its liability to pay compensation. 13. The High Court of Delhi in Babloo Chauhan Dabloo vs. State Govt. of NCT of Delhi , [247 (2018) DLT 31 ] , expressed grave concern about the state of innocent persons being wrongfully prosecuted, incarcerated for crimes that they did not commit. The Court highlighted the urgent need for a legislative framework for providing relief and rehabilitation to victims of wrongful prosecution and incarceration and asked the Law Commission to undertake a comprehensive examination of the aforesaid issues and make a recommendation thereon to the Government of India. The Law Commission of India submitted its Report No. 277 titled ‘Wrongful Prosecution (Miscarriage of Justice): Legal Remedies’ to the Government of India on 30 th August 2018. The Law Commission of India submitted its Report No. 277 titled ‘Wrongful Prosecution (Miscarriage of Justice): Legal Remedies’ to the Government of India on 30 th August 2018. The Report gives an overview of the remedies available under the existing laws and discusses their inadequacies. The Commission recommended enactment of a specific legal provision for redressal of cases of wrongful prosecution – to provide relief to the victims of wrongful prosecution in terms of monetary and non-monetary compensation (such as counselling, mental health services, vocational/ employment skills development, etc.) within a statutory framework. The Report enumerates the core principles of the recommended framework- defining ‘wrongful prosecution’ i.e., cases in which a claim for compensation can be filed, designation of a Special Court to decide these claims of compensation, nature of proceedings – the timeline for deciding the claim, etc., financial and other factors to be considered while determining the compensation, provisions for interim compensation in certain cases, removal of disqualification on account of wrongful prosecution/conviction etc. A draft Bill articulating the aforesaid was annexed with the Report as the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Bill, 2018. However, the said bill has not seen the light of day. Though the Commission recommended amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure , 1973, to give compensation in cases of miscarriage of justice resulting in wrongful prosecution of persons, they do not find a place in the new BNSS. It is high time to implement the recommendations of the Law Commission in its 277 th Report to set up a legal framework to compensate victims prosecuted wrongfully. 14. Coming to the facts of the case, as stated already, further investigation revealed that the accused (including the petitioners) in Crime No.205/1994 were not the real culprits, and the crime was actually committed by nine other identified persons. It was concluded that the petitioners were falsely implicated, prosecuted and convicted. They had to undergo the ordeal of prosecution and the trauma of trial for a pretty long period, though ultimately, they were acquitted. They had to suffer the ignominy of unlawful prosecution and wrongful conviction. They were denied their liberty, dignity and reputation as they were branded as criminals till they were acquitted. Therefore, the petitioners are entitled to adequate compensation for the infringement of their life and personal liberty due to wrongful prosecution and conviction. The petitioner in W.P.(C). They had to suffer the ignominy of unlawful prosecution and wrongful conviction. They were denied their liberty, dignity and reputation as they were branded as criminals till they were acquitted. Therefore, the petitioners are entitled to adequate compensation for the infringement of their life and personal liberty due to wrongful prosecution and conviction. The petitioner in W.P.(C). No.23348/2013 has produced Ext.P7 communication issued by the investigating officer in Crime No.205/1994 to him dated 29.8.2024. In Ext. P7, it is stated that the investigating officer has made recommendations to the State Government to give adequate compensation to the petitioners for the hardships faced, the injuries and damage sustained by them on account of the false implication in the crime. It is also stated that the investigating officer has made a further recommendation to initiate appropriate legal action against the officers who were responsible for the false implication of the petitioners in the crime. In these circumstances, these writ petitions can be disposed of with directions to the Government to take an appropriate decision on the compensation entitled by the petitioners based on the recommendations of the investigating officer. Hence, these writ petitions are disposed of as follows: (i) The 1 st respondent is directed to take a decision on the recommendation made by the investigating officer as stated in Ext.P7 to grant adequate compensation to the petitioners for their false implication in Crime No. 205/1994 within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. (ii) The 1 st respondent shall also take a decision on the recommendations of the investigating officer to take appropriate action against the officers who were responsible for the false implication of the petitioners in Crime No.205/1994. (iii) The petitioners are free to approach this Court or to initiate appropriate legal action of their choice if they are aggrieved by the decision of the Government on the recommendation of the investigating officer to grant compensation to them and to initiate appropriate action against the officers who were responsible for falsely implicating them in the crime. (iv) The petitioners are also entitled to initiate suitable legal action if they are dissatisfied with the quantum of compensation.