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2025 DIGILAW 660 (JHR)

State of Jharkhand, through the Secretary/Principal Secretary, School Education and Literacy Department, Ranchi v. Diwakar Pandey, son of Sri Mahesh Pandey

2025-02-27

DEEPAK ROSHAN, M.S.RAMACHANDRA RAO

body2025
JUDGMENT : (M.S. Ramachandra Rao, C.J.) I.A. No.5758 of 2024 1. This application is filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act , 1963 to condone the delay of 283 days in filing the Letters Patent Appeal challenging the judgment dt. 29.08.2023 of the learned Single Judge in W.P. (S) No. 5631 of 2022. 2. In the application seeking condonation of delay, it is contended that the fact of disposal of the said Writ petition was informed to the applicants’ Department; after receiving a letter on 24.04.2024, the case file was put up before the Assistant Director of the applicants’ Department for perusal; he directed the Retainer Advocate for preparing the grounds of appeal; and after several rounds of discussions between them, a decision was taken to prefer appeal. 3. It was further stated that after preparation of grounds of appeal, it was put up before the competent authority to take a final decision on filing of appeal; thereafter it was put up before the Joint Secretary of the Department for approval, and after such approval, the District Superintendent of Education, Koderma was authorised to file appeal. 4. As per the application, the Advocate General also gave his opinion on 01.05.2024 and thereafter the appeal was filed on 12.06.2024 through the Sr. Standing Counsel-I. 5. Subsequently, a supplementary affidavit was filed adding more details to the events which transpired after the judgment was delivered in the writ petition on 29.08.2023. 6. It is stated that the District Education Establishment Committee, Koderma on 26.10.2023 decided to file an appeal challenging the judgment of the learned Single Judge; on 23.02.2024 new District Superintendent of Education, Koderma took charge of the said post; on 09.03.2024, present District Superintendent of Education, Koderma took charge of the district of Koderma and he was assigned additional charge of District Superintendent of Education, Koderma and after joining the said post, the present District Superintendent of Education-cum-District Education Officer, Koderma took the matter seriously. 7. It is stated that during Lok Sabha Election 2024, he was assigned the duty of Assistant Nodal Officer for Manpower Management, Karmik Koshang and Nodal Officer of the Training Cell till 20.05.2024. 8. 7. It is stated that during Lok Sabha Election 2024, he was assigned the duty of Assistant Nodal Officer for Manpower Management, Karmik Koshang and Nodal Officer of the Training Cell till 20.05.2024. 8. According to the applicants, the Retainer Counsel of the applicants’ Department was directed to prepare the grounds of appeal on 09.04.2024 which was then prepared and placed before the Director of the School Education and Literacy Department, Government of Jharkhand (Primary Education). 9. Through a letter dt. 09.04.2024 and another letter dt. 24.04.2024, the Director of School Education and Literacy Department sought permission to file appeal; the file was then placed before the Assistant Director on 24.04.2024 to take steps for filing appeal; on next day the Section Officer of the Department forwarded the file to the Joint Secretary of the applicants’ Department; on the following day, the Joint Secretary of the applicants’ Department after examining the grounds of appeal approved for filing of the appeal and placed it before the Director. 10. It is stated that thereafter on 29.04.2024, the Director of the applicants’ Department sought opinion from the Advocate General for filing appeal and on 01.05.2024, the Advocate General advised for filing of appeal through the Senior Standing Counsel No.1 and thereafter, the present appeal was filed on 12.06.2024. 11. It is also mentioned that a Contempt application being Cont. Case (Civil) No. 276 of 2024 was also filed by the respondent seeking implementation of the order passed by the learned Single Judge. 12. We have noted the contentions of the counsel for the applicants. 13. When the order of the learned Single Judge was passed on 29.08.2023 and the applicants’ Department was well aware of the judgment, it appears that the papers were moved from one table to another table, from one office to another office, in a very casual manner which ultimately resulted in inordinate delay in filing of appeal by 283 days, on 12.06.2024. 14. The plea about the Officer getting involved in the Lok Sabha 2024 election has no relevance, because, the said election was held in May 2024 – long after the order was passed by the learned Single Judge. 15. At every stage of the matter, there was lethargy and negligence shown by the applicants in taking steps to file the appeal within time. 16. In Postmaster General and others Vs. 15. At every stage of the matter, there was lethargy and negligence shown by the applicants in taking steps to file the appeal within time. 16. In Postmaster General and others Vs. Living Media India Limited and another , [ (2012) 3 SCC 563 ] , the Supreme Court held: “25. We have already extracted the reasons as mentioned in the “better affidavit” sworn by Mr Aparajeet Pattanayak, SSRM, Air Mail Sorting Division, New Delhi. It is relevant to note that in the said affidavit, the Department has itself mentioned and is aware of the date of the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court in Office of the Chief Postmaster v. Living Media India Ltd. as 11-9-2009. Even according to the deponent, their counsel had applied for the certified copy of the said judgment only on 8-1-2010 and the same was received by the Department on the very same day. There is no explanation for not applying for the certified copy of the impugned judgment on 11-9- 2009 or at least within a reasonable time. The fact remains that the certified copy was applied for only on 8- 1-2010 i.e. after a period of nearly four months. 26. In spite of affording another opportunity to file better affidavit by placing adequate material, neither the Department nor the person- incharge has filed any explanation for not applying the certified copy within the prescribed period. The other dates mentioned in the affidavit which we have already extracted, clearly show that there was delay at every stage and except mentioning the dates of receipt of the file and the decision taken, there is no explanation as to why such delay had occasioned. Though it was stated by the Department that the delay was due to unavoidable circumstances and genuine difficulties, the fact remains that from day one the Department or the person/persons concerned have not evinced diligence in prosecuting the matter to this Court by taking appropriate steps. 27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us. 28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government.”(emphasis supplied) 17. These observations equally apply to the instant case where the applicants have acted in a similar manner as in the said case. 18. The said judgment has been followed by the Supreme Court in several cases such as Commissioner of Customs Chennai vs. M/s Volex Interconnect (India) Pvt. Ltd. , [ (2022) 3 SCC 159 ] , Pr. Commissioner Central Excise Delhi-1 vs. Design Dialogues India Pvt. Ltd. , [ (2022) 2 SCC 327 ] , Union of India vs. Central Tibetan Schools Administration & Others , [ (2021) 11 SCC 557 ] , Union of India & Others vs. Vishnu Aroma Pouching Private Limited and another , [ (2022) 9 SCC 263 ] , and State of Uttar Pradesh & Others vs. Sabha Narain & others , [ (2022) 9 SCC 266 ] 19. In Union of India Vs. In Union of India Vs. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his legal heir , 2024 INSC 262 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489 , the Supreme Court held that it is not permissible to look into the merits of the matter as long as it is not convinced that sufficient cause has been made out for condonation of long and inordinate delay; that it hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or Union of India when it comes to condoning gross delay of more than 12 years; length of delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not; from the tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation; once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his long inaction, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. It was reiterated while considering plea for condonation of delay, Court must not start with the merits of the main case and the Court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It declared that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. 20. This was also reiterated in State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Ramkumar Choudhary , Special Leave Petition (C) Diary No. 48636 of 2024 dt.29.11.2024 21. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the above decisions of the Supreme Court, we are satisfied that sufficient cause has not been shown by the applicants for condonation of delay of 283 days in filing the appeal. 22. Accordingly, this application is dismissed. Consequently, the Letters Patent Appeal is also dismissed. 23. Pending Interlocutory Applications, if any, stand disposed of.