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2025 DIGILAW 660 (KAR)

Lokamma W/o. K. S. Veerappa v. Basavaraj S/o. Kuchappa Korchar

2025-06-30

M.G.S.KAMAL

body2025
JUDGMENT : M.G.S. KAMAL, J. 1. This appeal is filed by plaintiff Nos.1 and 2, being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 6 th April 2016, passed in R.A. No.25/2014 by the Senior Civil Judge, Sirsi (for short “the First Appellate Court”). By this judgment, the First Appellate Court, while partly allowing the appeal filed by defendants / respondents herein, set aside the judgment and decree dated 27 th March 2013, passed in O.S. No.125/2006 by the Prl. Civil Judge, Sirsi (for short “the trial Court”) insofar as it pertained to Schedule “A” property, holding that the plaintiffs are not entitled to a share in the said property. However, the Court further held that the plaintiffs are entitled to a 1/5 th share in schedule “B” property. 2. The above suit in O.S. No.125/2006 was filed by the plaintiffs seeking partition and separate possession of their 1/5 th share in the plaint schedule property, consisting of land bearing Sy.No.63 measuring 5 acres 36 guntas, as described in schedule “A” of the plaint, and a residential house bearing VPC No.59 situated at Badangode Village in Sirsi Taluka described as schedule “B” of the plaint. 3. The case of the plaintiffs is that one Kuchappa, son of Venktappa Korchar, was the propositus and was first married to one Ummakka. Plaintiff Nos.1 and 2 were born to Kuchappa and his said first wife Ummakka. After the demise of said Ummakka, Kuchappa married to Subbamma and from this second marriage, defendant Nos.1, 2 and 4, as well as the mother of defendant No.3, were born. During his life time, Kuchappa owned and possessed the suit schedule properties. The schedule “A” property was granted to him pursuant to an order dated 26.10.1985 passed under the provisions of Karnataka Land Reforms Act. Kuchappa passed away on 02.11.1985, leaving behind the plaintiffs and defendants as his legal heirs, each being entitled to a 1/5 th share. That when the request of the plaintiffs for partition was denied, they were constrained to file the present suit for partition. 4. Defendant Nos.1 and 2 filed the written statement contending that their mother by name Subbamma was the legally wedded wife of Kuchappa. After the death of first wife, Kuchappa Korchar married Subbamma out of said wedlock one Nagamma and Puttamma along with defendants were born. 4. Defendant Nos.1 and 2 filed the written statement contending that their mother by name Subbamma was the legally wedded wife of Kuchappa. After the death of first wife, Kuchappa Korchar married Subbamma out of said wedlock one Nagamma and Puttamma along with defendants were born. That the name of the defendant No.1 was entered into the revenue records of the suit schedule properties with the consent of the plaintiffs ever since then defendants are in possession and enjoyment of the suit properties denying the right of the plaintiffs from 02.11.1985 and 02.05.1988. That the defendant No.1 has got right over the “B” schedule property and the plaintiffs and the defendants are not residing to joint family. The plaintiffs have no share, right, title and interest in the property hence, sought for dismissal of the suit. 5. Based on the pleadings, the trial Court framed the following issues for its consideration: (1) Whether the plaintiffs prove that the suit schedule properties are their joint family properties and they are in possession of the same? (2) Whether the plaintiffs further prove that they are having ½ share in the suit properties? (3) Whether the plaintiffs prove that they are entitled for the relief of partition and ½ separate share in the suit properties as sought? (4) Whether the defendants prove that this Court has no pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain this suit as contended in para 11 of the written statement? (5) What order or decree? 6. Plaintiff No.1 examined himself as PW1 and produced 4 documents, which were marked as Exs.P1 to P4. Defendant No.1 examined himself as DW1 and produced 5 documents, marked as Exs.D1 to D5. 7. The trial Court answered issue No.1 in the affirmative, issue Nos.2 and 3 partly in the affirmative, and issue No.4 in the negative. Consequently, it partly decreed the suit as sought for, granting a 1/5 th share each to the plaintiffs and the defendants. 8. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the defendants preferred an appeal in R.A. No.25/2014. 9. Based on the grounds urged, the First Appellate Court framed the following points for its consideration: (1) Whether the plaintiffs prove that the suit properties are the joint family properties and in their joint possession? (2) Whether the defendants prove that the first defendant has perfected his right over the suit properties independently to the knowledge of the plaintiffs? 9. Based on the grounds urged, the First Appellate Court framed the following points for its consideration: (1) Whether the plaintiffs prove that the suit properties are the joint family properties and in their joint possession? (2) Whether the defendants prove that the first defendant has perfected his right over the suit properties independently to the knowledge of the plaintiffs? (3) Whether the defendants further prove that the documents produced along with I.A. No.II could not be produced by them before the trial Court inspire of exercise of due diligence and that the same are relevant to decide the present appeal? (4) Whether the trial Court has erred in appreciating the evidence on record in a proper perspective? (5) If so, whether the impugned judgment and decree under appeal calls for interference by this Court? (6) What order or decree? 10. The defendants also filed an application in I.A. No.2, seeking permission to produce additional documents. 11. Upon re-appreciation of the evidence, the First Appellate Court answered point No.1 partly in the affirmative, but only with respect to the schedule “B” property; point Nos.2 and 3 in the negative; and point Nos.4 and 5 partly in the affirmative. By its judgment and order, it partly allowed the appeal, holding that, in light of the decision of this Court in Nimbavva and others Vs. Chennaveerayya and others , [ 2015 (1) KCCR 205 (DB)] , daughters who were married prior to the grant of the tenanted land were not entitled to a share in it. Accordingly, the First Appellate Court declined to grant any relief in respect of schedule “A” property, but granted a share in the schedule “B” property. 12. Being aggrieved, the plaintiffs have approached this Court by filing the present Regular Second Appeal. 13. This Court admitted the appeal by order dated 24.04.2017 for consideration of the following substantial question of law: “Whether the First Appellate Court is justified in law in holding that the plaintiffs cannot seek partition in respect of suit schedule “A” property, which is a tenanted land, as they being married daughters of the propositus do not come within the definition of the family as mentioned under Section 2 (12) of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 ?” 14. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants/plaintiffs taking this Court through the records submitted that the only ground on which the First Appellate Court declined to grant relief to the plaintiffs in respect of schedule “A” property was the judgment passed by a Division of this Court in the case of Nimbavva and others (Supra). 15. He further submits that the question regarding the entitlement of married daughters to a share in tenanted land is no longer res integra in the light of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of N.Padmamma and others Vs. S.Ramakrishna Reddy and others , [ (2015) 1 SCC 417 ] , which has been followed by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Sri Arvind S/o. Narasimha Kamat and another Vs. Smt. Sunanda W/o. Janardhan Shanbhag , [RFA No.100149/2014, DD: 13th January 2020] . As such, he submits that the First Appellate Court erred in partly allowing the appeal and in rejecting the claim of the plaintiffs. Hence, he contends that the substantial question of law deserves to be answered accordingly. 16. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents, while not disputing the legal position, submits that the respondents / defendants had filed an application in I.A. No.2 of 2016 under Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC before the First Appellate Court, seeking to produce certain revenue records to include certain additional lands in the suit. She submits that the First Appellate Court rejected the said application without any justification. She further contends that, as per Exs.D1 to D3, the plaintiffs had relinquished their rights in respect of item No.1 of the suit property, as far back as 02.08.1980 and since they did not challenge the same, in terms of Section 133 of the Land Revenue Act, the presumption arising from the revenue entries must be drawn in favour of defendants. Accordingly, she prays for dismissal of the appeal. 17. Heard. Perused the records. 18. The relationship between the parties is not in dispute. The grant of occupancy rights in favour of the propositus, namely Kuchappa, who is the father of the parties, is also not in dispute. Accordingly, she prays for dismissal of the appeal. 17. Heard. Perused the records. 18. The relationship between the parties is not in dispute. The grant of occupancy rights in favour of the propositus, namely Kuchappa, who is the father of the parties, is also not in dispute. The only contention raised by the defendants as regards the property in suit item No.A is that in terms of Ex.D1, D2 and D3, the plaintiffs had relinquished their share, right, title and interest in favour of the defendants, as such, the plaintiffs had no share, right, title and interest over the suit property. 19. A perusal of Ex.D1 indicates that the same is a letter addressed by the plaintiffs and the defendants to the Revenue Authorities in which it is mentioned that upon the demise of Kuchappa his six legal representatives were Lokamma, Sujata, Puttamma, Basavaraj, Bhimakka and Nagamma and that since Basavaraj the 4 th legal representative was managing the properties, they had requested Khata to be made in his name for the purpose of convenience. Based on the said request, the revenue entries were affected in the name of defendant No.1. In the cross examination, upon a suggestion being made regarding relinquishment having being made, PW1 has replied that the said request was made for the purpose of convenience to cultivate the land and nothing else. 20. In terms of Section 17 of the Registration Act, relinquishment of right, title and interest in respect of immovable property having value of more than Rs.100/- can be made only by registering the instrument. In the absence of any such acceptable legal material evidence with regard to the plaintiffs having relinquished their right title, interest in the suit property, the trial Court has rightly come to the conclusion that Exs.D1, D2 and D3 would not amount to creating any right title and interest, in favour of the defendants and there was no relinquishment in a manner known to law. No error can be found in this aspect of matter. 21. The other reason which the First Appellate Court has assigned for allowing the appeal is the judgment in the case of Nimbavva and others (supra). The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Sri Arvind S/o Narasimha Kamat and another Vs. No error can be found in this aspect of matter. 21. The other reason which the First Appellate Court has assigned for allowing the appeal is the judgment in the case of Nimbavva and others (supra). The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Sri Arvind S/o Narasimha Kamat and another Vs. Smt. Sunanda W/o. Janardhan Shanbhag and others in RFA No.100149/2014 dated 13.01.2020 relying upon the judgement of the Apex Court in the case of N. Padmamma and Others Vs. S. Ramakrishna Reddy and others reported in (2015) 1 SCC 417 wherein the Apex Court has held as under:- “The suit in the present case was filed after the grant of occupancy rights. The question here is whether the grant of such rights is for the benefit of one of the members of the joint family or for all the heirs left behind by Ramachandra Reddy. Our answer to that question is in favour of the appellants. In our opinion, the grant of such occupancy rights in favour of Respondent 1 was for the benefit of all the legal heirs left behind by Ramachandra Reddy. Reliance upon Lokraj case (Lokraj v. Kishan Lal, (1995) 3 SCC 291 ), therefore, is of no assistance to the respondents. We are also of the view that the decision in Lokraj case, does not correctly apply the earlier decision of this Court in Bhubaneshwar Prasad Narain Singh Case (Bhubaneshwar Prasad Narain Singh v. Sidheswar Mukherjee, (1971) 1 SCC 556 ). With utmost respect to the Hon’ble Judges who delivered the decision in Lokraj case, the law was not correctly laid down, if the same was meant to say that even in the absence of a plea of ouster, a co-heir could merely on the basis of grant of the occupancy rights in his name exclude the other co-heirs from partition of the property so granted.” 22. Relying upon the aforesaid judgment of the Apex Court, the Division Bench of this Court on the facts held that the married daughters would be entitled for share in the tenanted land and the definition of word “family”, as provided in terms of Sub-Section (12) of Section 2 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, would not be a bar to claim share in the said property. In the light of the aforesaid settled position of law and in the light of the admitted facts of the case namely that the occupancy rights were granted in the name of propositus Kuchappa Korchar and the grant having been made on 26.10.1991 and he passing away on 02.11.1985 his legal heirs including the plaintiffs would be entitled for their share in the property, this Court do not see any reason to interfere with the judgement and decree passed by the trial Court. The judgement and order passed by the First Appellate Court reversing the judgment and decree of the trial Court is therefore unsustainable and is requires to be set aside. 23. As regards the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondents-defendants, regarding the First Appellate Court not allowing the application for production of documents to bring on records the other joint family properties, it is necessary to note that the defendants contended that the plaintiffs possess certain lands which were acquired from the joint family funds. Objections were filed to the said application by the defendants wherein a specific contention is raised that the said properties were acquired out of the earnings of plaintiff No.1 and her husband and the family of the plaintiffs and the defendants have no concern over the same. The revenue records in the nature of RTC extract produced to indicate that the name of plaintiff No.1 had been mutated in the revenue records during the year 2012-13 which is during the pendency of the regular appeal. The learned counsel for the defendants vehemently submits that the matter requires remand enabling the parties to lead evidence and for production of additional documents in respect of the other family properties. 24. The aforesaid submission also cannot be countenanced in view of the fact that in the written statement, a specific plea was raised by the defendants contending that the suit schedule properties were his absolute properties and that the plaintiffs had relinquished their share, right, title and interest as far back as on 02.08.1980, as such, they were not entitled for any share in the property. If this is the stand taken by the defendants in the written statement, the question of plaintiffs purchasing the property in the year 2012-13 purportedly from and out of the joint family funds as now sought to be contended by the defendants would not arise. If this is the stand taken by the defendants in the written statement, the question of plaintiffs purchasing the property in the year 2012-13 purportedly from and out of the joint family funds as now sought to be contended by the defendants would not arise. The First Appellate Court though rejected application for defendants not providing the details of the properties, the said application nonetheless deserves to be rejected for the aforesaid reason. No purpose would be served in allowing the said application as the same do not require for disposing the suit as contemplated under Order 41 Rule 27 of Code of Civil Procedure. The substantial question of law raised is answered accordingly. 25. Accordingly, appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court, declining to grant the share in schedule “A” property is set aside. The judgment and decree passed by the trial Court is confirmed.