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2025 DIGILAW 662 (RAJ)

State of Rajasthan v. Paramjeet Singh Andanr

2025-03-07

MANOJ KUMAR GARG

body2025
ORDER : MANOJ KUMAR GARG, J. 1. Instant criminal appeal has been filed by the appellant/State against the judgment and order dated 23.11.2016, passed by learned Addl. Sessions Judge No.2, Sriganganagar, in Sessions Case No.36/2012 (22/2007) whereby the learned trial court acquitted the respondent No.1 for offence under Section 307 /34 IPC and Section 3/25(1)(B)(A) of Arms Act and respondent No.2 for offence under Section 307 /34 , 279 /34 of IPC and Section 3/25(1)(B)(A) of Arms Act . 2. Briefly stated, the prosecution case as set up is that on 18.02.2007, Sub Inspector Manoj Machra submitted a seizure memo, to the effect that he received a secret information that some illegal activities are conducted. Upon arriving at the location, it was observed that a white Ambasador car parked outside with the respondent No.2 and unloading a box. They quickly left the box upon seeing the Police Jeep and fled in the car with the driver. Upon inspection, the box contained 12 bottles of liquor. The Police seized the box and pursued the car, which sped away recklessly towards Karanpur. The occupants of the car attempted to attack the Police with intention to kill. On the basis of the said report, Police registered a case against the accused-respondents and started investigation. 3. On completion of investigation, the police filed challan against the accused-respondents. Thereafter, the trial court framed charges for offences under Sections 19/54 of Rajasthan Excise Act and Sections 307 , 307/34, 353, 353/34 , 279 , 279 /34 of IPC and Section 3/25(1)(B)(A) of Arms Act against the accused respondents, who pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. 4. During the course of trial, the prosecution examined as many as 10 witnesses in support of its case and exhibited certain documents. Thereafter, statements of the accused respondents were recorded under section 313 Cr.P.C. In defence, the accused- respondents did not examined any witness. 5. Upon conclusion of the trial, the learned trial court vide impugned judgment dated 23.11.2016 acquitted the accused- respondents respondent No.1 for offence under Section 307/34 IPC and Section 3/25(1)(B)(A) of Arms Act and respondent No.2 for offence under Section 307/34 , 279 /34 of IPC and Section 3/25(1)(B)(A) of Arms Act and convicted the respondent No.1 for Sections 353/34 & 279 IPC and Section 19/54 of Excise Act and respondent No.2 for offence under Section 353/34 IPC and Section 19/54 of Rajasthan Excise Act . Hence, this appeal on behalf of the appellant against the acquittal. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that learned trial court has committed grave error in acquitting the accused- respondents for the aforesaid offences, despite the fact that the prosecution has proved its case beyond all reasonable doubts. Counsel submits that there is ample evidence available on record against the accused-respondents for commission of aforesaid offences. Yet, the trial court did not consider these aspects of the matter and acquitted the accused respondent No.1 for offence under Section 307 /34 IPC and Section 3/25(1)(B)(A) of Arms Act and respondent No.2 for offence under Section 307 /34 and 279/34 of IPC and Section 3/25(1)(B)(A) of Arms Act . Thus, it is prayed that the impugned judgment may be quashed to the extent of acquitting the accused-respondents for offence and they may be convicted. 7. Learned counsel for the accused-respondents submits that the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court is just and proper and does not warrant any interference from this Court. 8. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the evidence of the prosecution as well as defence and the judgment passed by the trial court. 9. On perusal of the impugned judgment, it appears that the learned trial court while passing the impugned judgment has considered each and every aspect of the matter and also considered the evidence produced before it in its right perspective. The prosecution has failed to prove its case against the accused- respondents beyond all reasonable doubts and thus, the trial court has rightly acquitted the accused-respondent No.1 for offence under Section 307 /34 IPC and Section 3/25(1)(B)(A) of Arms Act and respondent No.2 for offence under Section 307 /34 and 279/34 of IPC and Section 3/25(1)(B)(A) of Arms Act . 10. In the case of 'Mrinal Das & others v. The State of Tripura, : 2011(9) SCC 479 ,' decided on September 5, 2011, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, after looking into many earlier judgments, has laid down parameters, in which interference can be made in a judgment of acquittal, by observing as under: “An order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are "compelling and substantial reasons",for doing so. If the order is "clearly unreasonable", it is a compelling reason for interference. If the order is "clearly unreasonable", it is a compelling reason for interference. When the trial Court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declaration/report of ballistic experts etc.,the appellate court is competent to reverse the decision of the trial Court depending on the materials placed. Similarly, in the case of State of Rajasthan v. Shera Ram alias Vishnu Dutta , reported (2012) 1 SCC 602 ,' the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under:-- “A judgment of acquittal has the obvious consequence of granting freedom to the accused. This Court has taken a consistent view that unless the judgment in appeal is contrary to evidence, palpably erroneous or a view which could not have been taken by the court of competent jurisdiction keeping in view the settled canons of criminal jurisprudence, this Court shall be reluctant to interfere with such judgment of acquittal.” 11. There is a very thin but a fine distinction between an appeal against conviction on the one hand and acquittal on the other. The preponderance of judicial opinion is that there is no substantial difference between an appeal against acquittal except that while dealing with an appeal against acquittal the Court keeps in view the position that the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused has been fortified by his acquittal and if the view adopted by the trial Court is a reasonable one and the conclusion reached by it had grounds well set out on the materials on record, the acquittal may not be interfered with. 12. In the light of aforesaid discussion, the appellant has failed to show any error of law or on facts on the basis of which interference can be made by this Court in the judgment under challenge. 13. Hence, the present criminal appeal has no substance and the same is hereby dismissed.