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2025 DIGILAW 67 (KER)

Thankappan S/o Ikkiran v. State of Kerala

2025-01-15

P.V.BALAKRISHNAN

body2025
JUDGMENT “CR” Raja Vijayaraghavan, J. This appeal is preferred by the accused Nos. 1 and 2 in S.C.No. 19 of 2008 on the file of the Additional Sessions Judge-II, Pathanamthitta, challenging the finding of guilt, conviction, and sentence passed by the learned Sessions Judge. In the above case, the appellants, along with one Rajeev, were charged for having committed offences punishable under Sections 323, 201, 302 r/w. Section 34 of the IPC. Short Facts: 2. Peethambaran, the deceased in the instant case, is the husband of Valsala (PW2). The prosecution allegation is that on 12.06.2006, at 6:00 p.m., due to the enmity that the deceased refused to join the Kerala Democratic Party, accused Nos. 2 and 3 inflicted bodily injuries on Peethambaran with intent to murder him. Thereafter, the 1st accused stabbed Peethambaran on his neck with a budding knife leading to his death. Registration of Crime and Investigation 3. One Brijendralal (PW1), a Law Student, appeared before the Sub-Inspector of Police, Adoor Police Station, and lodged Ext.P1 FI Statement at 8:00 p.m. on 12.06.2006, based on which Crime No. 386 of 2006 was registered under Section 302 r/w. 34 of the IPC. The investigation was taken over by PW12, the Circle Inspector of Police, Adoor Police Station on 13.06.2006. He prepared the inquest over the dead body and seized the items that were found on the body of the deceased. On the same day, he prepared Ext.P6 Scene Mahazar. At the time of preparation of the Scene Mahazar, the red shirt as well as the weapon used for the commission of the offence along with blood-stained soil and grass were seized by the Investigating Officer. He identified the scene of the crime, and on 14.06.2006, at about 5:00 a.m., the 3rd accused was arrested, in terms of Ext.P7 arrest memo. Based on the disclosure statement given by him, the clothes worn by him at the time of the occurrence of the crime were seized, as per Ext.P8 recovery Mahazar. Thereafter, the accused Nos. 1 and 2 were arrested at 5:30 a.m. on 15.06.2006, while they were standing near the Elamannur Junction. Based on the disclosure statement given by the 1st accused, the clothes worn by him at the time of the commission of the offence were seized, as per Ext.P13 Mahazar. Thereafter, the accused Nos. 1 and 2 were arrested at 5:30 a.m. on 15.06.2006, while they were standing near the Elamannur Junction. Based on the disclosure statement given by the 1st accused, the clothes worn by him at the time of the commission of the offence were seized, as per Ext.P13 Mahazar. Later, Ext.P15 report was submitted before the Court furnishing the address and other details of the accused, and a separate report incorporating Section 201 of the IPC was incorporated. The items that were seized from the scene of the crime were forwarded to the Forensic Science Laboratory and Ext.P18 report was later obtained. The investigation was then taken over by CW18, who at the time of trial had gone abroad. After completion of the investigation, the final report was laid before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Adoor. After complying with the formalities, committal proceedings were initiated, and the accused were committed to the Court of Session. The case was then made over to the Additional Sessions Court, Pathanamthitta for trial and disposal. Evidence Tendered 4. The prosecution examined 15 witnesses as PWs 1 to 15 to prove its case, and through them, Exts.P1 to P22 were exhibited and marked. MOs 1 to 10 series were produced and identified. The incriminating materials arising out of the prosecution evidence were put to the accused under Section 313 of the Code. He emphatically denied the circumstances. He contended that the accused picked up a quarrel with Sundareshan and when he refused to interfere, a false case was framed against him. On finding that the accused could not be acquitted under Section 232 of the Cr.P.C, he was called upon to enter his defence but no evidence either oral or documentary was adduced. The sentence imposed 5. The learned Sessions Judge, after a careful evaluation of the entire evidence, came to the conclusion that the prosecution was able to establish without any manner of doubt that the 1st accused had inflicted the stab injury and the 2nd accused facilitated the crime. However, the 3rd accused was extended the benefit of doubt and he was acquitted of all charges. The Court also held that there was no reliable evidence to find that the offence under Section 201 of the IPC was committed by the 1st accused. The accused Nos. However, the 3rd accused was extended the benefit of doubt and he was acquitted of all charges. The Court also held that there was no reliable evidence to find that the offence under Section 201 of the IPC was committed by the 1st accused. The accused Nos. 1 and 2 were accordingly found guilty under Section 302 r/w. Section 34 of the IPC, and they were sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty thousand only) each and in default to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for a period of six months under Section 302 of the IPC. 6. During the pendency of the appeal, the 2nd accused passed away and his legal heirs were impleaded as additional appellants. 7. We have heard Smt. Lakshmi N Kaimal, the learned counsel appearing for the appellants and the learned Public Prosecutor. Contentions of the appellants 8. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants pointed out that the genesis of the incident is suspect as PW1, the person who set the law in motion, deposed before the court that he did not provide the information contained in the First Information Statement. She further contended that the prosecution had failed to establish the precise location where the incident began, progressed, and concluded. Much emphasis was placed on the evidence of PW2, the wife of the deceased, to argue that the prosecution version cannot be believed. She referred to Ext.P4 (Scene Plan) and Ext.P3 (Inquest Report) and asserted that an evaluation of the evidence tendered by PWs 2 and 3 would reveal that the alleged incident did not occur at the time and place claimed by the prosecution. It was argued that there was a deliberate attempt to alter the scene of crime and on this ground alone, the prosecution case ought to be disbelieved. To substantiate her contentions, she relied on the observations made by the Apex Court in Syed Ibrahim v. State Of Andhra Pradesh, 2006 (10) SCC 601 . The learned counsel further argued that the reliance placed by the learned Sessions Judge on the testimonies of PWs 2, 3, and 4 was misplaced. She highlighted the inconsistencies in their evidence and termed the same as irreconcilable. The evidence of PWs 2 and 3, if believed, conflicts with the testimony of PW4. The learned counsel further argued that the reliance placed by the learned Sessions Judge on the testimonies of PWs 2, 3, and 4 was misplaced. She highlighted the inconsistencies in their evidence and termed the same as irreconcilable. The evidence of PWs 2 and 3, if believed, conflicts with the testimony of PW4. It was pointed out that during cross-examination, PW2 explicitly stated that PW4 was not present at the scene of the crime when the incident occurred. However, PW4, in his testimony, claimed to have been present and witnessed the incident. These discrepancies, according to the counsel, demonstrate that PWs 2 and 4, being related witnesses, provided false accounts to secure the conviction of the accused. She also argued that the prosecution failed to prove that MO1, the weapon of offence was actually used by the accused during the incident. The prosecution claimed that the weapon was a budding knife, a tool commonly used by budding employees in the area. In view of the said fact, the court was not justified in concluding that the 1st accused used this weapon to inflict the injury. Lastly, the learned counsel submitted that even if the prosecution's version is accepted as true, the facts do not warrant a conviction under Section 302 of the IPC. According to her, the evidence clearly established that the incident arose from a sudden quarrel between the accused and the deceased, resulting in a mutual fight and exchange of blows. If this is the case, Exception (4) to Section 300 of the IPC would apply, and the Sessions Judge's finding of guilt under Section 302 of the IPC cannot be sustained. She relied on the observations of the Apex Court in Surinder Kumar v. Union Territory Chandigarh, (1989) 2 SCC 217 ) to support her submissions. Submissions of the learned Public Prosecutor 9. Smt.Neema, the learned Public Prosecutor submitted that there is no reason to disbelieve the evidence of PW2, the wife of the deceased, who undisputedly was present at the spot when the incident had taken place. She had provided a detailed and vivid account of how the 1st accused inflicted the stab injury on the deceased. She has also referred to the testimony of PW3, arguing that PWs 2 and 3 presented a consistent version regarding the commencement, continuation, and conclusion of the incident. She had provided a detailed and vivid account of how the 1st accused inflicted the stab injury on the deceased. She has also referred to the testimony of PW3, arguing that PWs 2 and 3 presented a consistent version regarding the commencement, continuation, and conclusion of the incident. It was further submitted that, despite thorough cross-examination, the defence was unable to challenge the credibility of their testimony or create any significant doubt about their version of events. The learned counsel also referred to the judgment of the Apex Court in Anda and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan , AIR 1966 SC 148 submitting that unless the defence is able to clearly bring the case within the scope of Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC, this Court would not be justified in extending any benefit to the accused. Moreover, the contention that there was a mutual fight between the accused and the deceased cannot be accepted, as the evidence clearly establishes that the deceased was solely on the receiving end of the injuries inflicted by accused Nos. 1 to 3. 10. We have carefully considered the submissions advanced and have meticulously gone through the records presented by the prosecution and the accused. Whether the death of Peethambaran is homicidal? 11. In order to substantiate that the deceased has died of homicide, the prosecution examined PW15, the Resident Medical Officer in the District Hospital, Kozhencherry. As a matter of fact, the autopsy was conducted by Dr. Umesh. However, he had passed away. PW15 in his evidence, stated that he is acquainted with the signature of Dr. M.S. Umesh, and he has also identified his signature in the Postmortem Certificate, which was marked as Ext.P21. A perusal of the postmortem report would reveal that the fatal injury found on the body was a deep incised wound (Stab wound) on the right side of neck 2.5 cm x 1 cm in size, situated 2 cm outer to midline of front of neck and 1.5 cm above inner end of Collar bone. The lower end of the injury was splited, and upper end sharply cut. The margins of injury were regular. The injury was obliquely placed. The injury made cut on the underlying muscle and internal jugular vein. The injury then cut the suprapleural membrane and made a cut on the apex of right lung. The lower end of the injury was splited, and upper end sharply cut. The margins of injury were regular. The injury was obliquely placed. The injury made cut on the underlying muscle and internal jugular vein. The injury then cut the suprapleural membrane and made a cut on the apex of right lung. The Doctor has opined that the deceased died due to stab wound sustained to the neck. In the light of the evidence adduced by PW15, there cannot be any doubt that the death of Peethambaran was a case of homicide. Evidence of prime prosecution witnesses: 12. The prosecution has relied on the evidence of PWs 2 and 3 to prove its case. It needs to be mentioned that the first information was furnished by a student. He was, however, not a witness to the incident. Even then, when he entered the box, he stated that he had signed a document, which he thought was the inquest. He denied that he had provided the contents of the statement. 13. PW2, the wife of the deceased, stated that the incident occurred on 12.06.2006, near the Panthalathu shop. She testified that at around 6:00 p.m., after alighting from a bus at Puthumala Junction, she was walking east towards her house, carrying two plastic chairs. According to her, one Sundareshan abused her husband by calling his caste name. Subsequently, the 1st accused arrived at the scene and assaulted her husband, causing him to fall. She, along with Gopalan @ Podimon (PW3), persuaded her husband to leave with them, and they started walking towards the east. However, the accused followed them and again attacked her husband, who fell once more. At that moment, the 1st accused took a knife from his pocket and inflicted a stab injury on her husband. Despite her cries and pleas for the accused to stop by holding his hand, the 1st accused stabbed her husband in the neck. She, along with PW3, transported her husband to the hospital in an autorickshaw. When the autorickshaw broke down, they transferred him to a jeep and continued to the hospital. She later learned that her husband had succumbed to his injuries. PW2 identified the weapon used in the commission of the offence, the clothes her husband was wearing at the time, and the accused standing in the dock, whom she stated were known to her. She later learned that her husband had succumbed to his injuries. PW2 identified the weapon used in the commission of the offence, the clothes her husband was wearing at the time, and the accused standing in the dock, whom she stated were known to her. During cross-examination, she was questioned about the first phase of the incident involving her husband, Sundareshan, and Ramanan. She testified that she arrived at the scene at the end of the first phase of the incident. She also stated that after sustaining the stab injury, her husband did not speak to her. She denied suggestions that she did not witness the stabbing. 14. PW3, Gopalan @ Podimon, a coolie, corroborated the timeline of the version spoken to by PW1 and asserted that the incident occurred at 6:00 p.m. on 12.06.2006. He explained that the deceased had been digging a well at his house earlier that day and went to Kodumon Junction at around 3:30 p.m. According to PW3, Sundareshan and the deceased Peethambaran had animosity between them. At Kodumon Junction, an altercation arose when Sundareshan called the deceased by his caste name. A physical altercation ensued, during which time, the accused Nos. 1 to 3 were sitting on a nearby culvert. PW3 intervened, separating the deceased and taking him eastward towards their homes. As they walked, 1st accused attacked Peethambaran, causing him to fall. PW2, who was returning home carrying two plastic chairs, witnessed this and pleaded with the accused to stop. Despite her intervention, the accused continued the assault. The 1st accused then took out a budding knife and inflicted a stab injury near the deceased's shoulder. PW3 testified that PW2 used the deceased's dhoti to tie the wound and lay him on the roadside before stopping an autorickshaw to transport him to the hospital. PW3 identified the accused and the knife used in the offence. During cross-examination, he confirmed the location of the incident near the road leading east from Karuneelakuzhi Junction, surrounded by paddy fields. He denied allegations that the deceased had initiated the physical altercation by grabbing Ramanan's throat. He reiterated that the 3rd accused assisted in taking the injured to the hospital but did not participate in the attack. 15. PW4, Binesh, the deceased’s brother-in-law, did not disclose his relationship with the deceased during his chief examination. He denied allegations that the deceased had initiated the physical altercation by grabbing Ramanan's throat. He reiterated that the 3rd accused assisted in taking the injured to the hospital but did not participate in the attack. 15. PW4, Binesh, the deceased’s brother-in-law, did not disclose his relationship with the deceased during his chief examination. However, it was brought out during cross-examination that he is married to Sajini, the sister of the deceased. PW2, while tendering evidence, had unequivocally stated that PW4 was not present at the crime scene when the incident occurred. PW3 also did not speak about the presence of PW4 at or near the place of occurrence. We are of the view that it would not be safe to rely on the evidence of PW4. 16. PW5, Ramanan, who according to the prosecution, was present at the spot did not support the case. PW6, the autorickshaw driver, confirmed that he had transported the injured to the hospital but stated that his vehicle broke down en route. PW7, the driver of the jeep used to transfer the injured from the autorickshaw to the hospital, corroborated this sequence of events. PW9, the Village Officer, prepared Ext. P4 Scene Plan. PW10, the Sub-Inspector of Police at Adoor Police Station, registered Ext.P5 FIR. Analysis 17. The law was set in motion by PW1. However, when he was examined before the court, he refused to support the case of the prosecution. The fact remains that PW1 was not a person who had witnessed the incident. The learned Sessions Judge has also not placed any reliance upon his evidence. Nothing turns on his evidence. The contention of the learned counsel that the genesis of the incident would become suspect cannot therefore be accepted. 18. The next contention is with regard to the omissions and discrepancies in the evidence of PWs 2 to 4. We have carefully evaluated the evidence tendered by PW2, the wife of the deceased, and PW3. Their version is consistent with regard to the entire sequence of events. The evidence tendered by them would reveal that PW2 was present during the first phase of the incident. In the said phase, there was an altercation between Peethambaran and Sundaresan when abuses were hurled at the deceased. Remanan also was with Sundareshan when this altercation occurred. At this point in time, PW2 was not present. The evidence tendered by them would reveal that PW2 was present during the first phase of the incident. In the said phase, there was an altercation between Peethambaran and Sundaresan when abuses were hurled at the deceased. Remanan also was with Sundareshan when this altercation occurred. At this point in time, PW2 was not present. When the above altercation was taking place, accused Nos. 1 to 3 were sitting on a nearby culvert. Then the second phase began. The accused then went after the deceased. Both PWs 2 and 3 managed to escort the deceased towards his house which was some distance to the east. After they had gone a short distance, the accused came towards them and assaulted Peethambaran. On receiving the blows, Peethambaran fell down. The 1st accused then took MO1 knife from his pocket and plunged it down the neck of the deceased. Though PW2 tried to dissuade him and tried to hold his hand, she was not in a position to prevent the 1st accused from inflicting the stab injury. The evidence tendered by PW2 with regard to the above is consistent and believable. 19. The main contention advanced by the learned counsel to persuade us to reject the evidence of PW2 and PW3 is that they are interested witnesses, and their evidence should be rejected. We find that both PW2 and PW3 remained unshaken despite the fact that they were subjected to incisive cross-examination. There can be no cavil over the proposition that when the witnesses are related and interested, their testimony should be closely scrutinized, but as we find, nothing has been elicited in the cross-examination to discredit their version. On a studied scrutiny of their evidence, it can be said with certitude that they have lent support to each other's version in all material particulars. There are some minor contradictions and omissions that have been emphasised by the learned counsel. We are of the view that such discrepancies and minor contradictions are bound to occur and it cannot be expected that two persons coming from different backgrounds and perspectives witnessing the same incident should narrate the sequence of events in an exact fashion. That apart, their evidence also finds support from the medical and forensic evidence. We are of the view that such discrepancies and minor contradictions are bound to occur and it cannot be expected that two persons coming from different backgrounds and perspectives witnessing the same incident should narrate the sequence of events in an exact fashion. That apart, their evidence also finds support from the medical and forensic evidence. We find that there is no inconsistency in their version and on a perusal of the said evidence, we find there is absolutely no inconsistency which will compel a court of law to discard their version. Furthermore, it is not the law that the evidence of an interested witness should be equated with that of tainted evidence or that of an approver so as to require corroboration as a matter of necessity. The evidence of an interested witness does not suffer from any infirmity as such, but the courts require as a rule of prudence, not as a rule of law, that the evidence of such witnesses should be scrutinized with a little care. Once that approach is made and the court is satisfied that the evidence of interested witnesses has a ring of truth such evidence could be relied upon even without corroboration. Indeed there may be circumstances where only interested evidence may be available and no other, e.g., when an occurrence takes place at midnight in the house, the only witnesses who could see the occurrence may be the family members. In such cases, it would not be proper to insist that the evidence of the family members should be disbelieved merely because of their interests. (See: Sarwan Singh And Others v. State Of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2304 ) 20. The next contention advanced by the learned counsel is with regard to the exact place of occurrence and the identification of the knife. It is contended that most of the individuals in the area are rubber plantation workers and they all carry budding knives with them in connection with their employment. The FSL report (Ext. P18) confirmed that the knife (Item 3) and the dry grass and soil (Item 9), both collected from the scene, had human blood stains of group ‘O’, matching the blood group of the deceased (O + ). The weapon of offence was found near the place of occurrence. The evidence of the eye witnesses also speaks with certainty the place where the incident had taken place. The weapon of offence was found near the place of occurrence. The evidence of the eye witnesses also speaks with certainty the place where the incident had taken place. The site plan clearly reveals the exact place of occurrence which in fact is corroborated by the eyewitnesses as well. In that view of the matter, the contention advanced by the learned counsel is only to be rejected. 21. The learned counsel submitted that the appellant committed the offence on the spur of the moment when a quarrel ensued between the appellant and the deceased. According to her, it was on the spur of the moment and in the heat of passion, and that too without premeditation that the appellant inflicted injuries on the deceased. He had no intention to cause the particular injuries, which proved to be fatal. Since he had no intention to cause such injury as is likely to cause the death and there was no pre-meditation, nor intention to kill, the case would fall under Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC. Having given our anxious consideration and the facts and circumstances do indicate that there are no merits in either contention. 22. Culpable homicide is murder when the accused causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing death, or causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death. If the accused intentionally causes bodily injury which is found to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death it would attract clause Thirdly of Section 300 IPC. If the accused knows that the act he causes is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury it would attract clause Fourthly. It would be murder unless it is brought in any one of the exceptions. In a given case even if the case does not fall in any of the exceptions, still if the ingredients of clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 are not satisfied, then it would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304 either clause (1) or clause (2). In a given case even if the case does not fall in any of the exceptions, still if the ingredients of clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 are not satisfied, then it would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304 either clause (1) or clause (2). It is the duty of the prosecution to prove the offence of murder. 23. Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC reads as under: “Exception 4 - Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offenders having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. Explanation - It is immaterial in such cases which party offers the provocation or commits the first assault.” 24. In order to bring the case within the ambit of Exception 4 all the conditions enumerated therein must be satisfied. The act must be committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion; (2) upon a sudden quarrel; (3) without the offender's having taken undue advantage; (4) and the accused had not acted in a cruel or unusual manner. 25. It therefore presupposes that there must be a mutual fight or exchange of blows on each other. And however slight the first blow, or provocation, every fresh blow becomes a fresh provocation. The blood is already heated or warms up at every subsequent stroke. The voice of reason is heard on neither side in the heat of passion. Therefore, it is difficult to apportion between them respective degrees of blame with reference to the state of things at the commencement of the fray but it must occur as a consequence of a sudden fight i.e., mutual combat and not one side track. It matters not what the cause of the quarrel is, whether real or imaginary or who draws or strikes first. The strike of the blow must be without any intention to kill or seriously injure the other. If two men start fighting and one of them is unarmed while the other uses a deadly weapon, the one who uses such weapon must be held to have taken an undue advantage denying him the entitlement to Exception 4. The strike of the blow must be without any intention to kill or seriously injure the other. If two men start fighting and one of them is unarmed while the other uses a deadly weapon, the one who uses such weapon must be held to have taken an undue advantage denying him the entitlement to Exception 4. True the number of wounds is not the criterion, but the position of the accused and the deceased with regard to their arms used, and the manner of combat must be kept in mind when applying Exception 4. When the deceased was not armed but the accused was and caused injuries to the deceased with fatal results, Exception 4 engrafted to Section 300 is excepted and the offences committed would be one of murder. (See: Kikar Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (1993) 4 SCC 238 ) ) 26. An evaluation of the evidence reveals that the deceased, who was unarmed, was initially involved in an altercation with Sundareshan. PW3 intervened and pushed the deceased away, while PW2 pleaded with the 1st accused not to harm the deceased. Despite this, the 1st accused followed the deceased, assaulted him, and inflicted a fatal stab injury to his neck. The fight was entirely one-sided, with the deceased neither retaliating nor raising his hand. Ignoring PW2's pleas, the 1st accused plunged a sharp budding knife into the deceased’s neck. The injury, inflicted with significant force and ferocity, caused damage to vital areas, including the internal jugular vein, suprapleural membrane, and the apex of the right lung, as noted in the autopsy report. Given that the deceased was unarmed and did not raise his hand against the appellant, the act of inflicting a fatal injury with a sharp weapon amounts to the accused taking undue advantage, thereby precluding the applicability of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC. For Exception 4 to apply, the fight must not only be sudden, but the parties must also be on equal footing in terms of defense, at least at the onset. In cases where the deceased is unarmed, causes no injury to the accused, and the accused follows a quarrel by inflicting fatal injuries with a sharp weapon, Exception 4 cannot be invoked. In cases where the deceased is unarmed, causes no injury to the accused, and the accused follows a quarrel by inflicting fatal injuries with a sharp weapon, Exception 4 cannot be invoked. The application of Exception 4 depends not on the number of wounds inflicted but on the relative positions of the accused and the deceased, the weapons used, and the manner of the attack. 27. When the factual background established by the materials on record is tested with the legal principles indicated, the inevitable conclusion is that the plea of the 1st appellant that he is entitled to Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC is without merit. 28. Now coming to the role played by the 2nd accused/2nd appellant, who is now no more. The stab injury was inflicted by the 1st accused. It was the 1st accused, who had followed the deceased and despite the plea of PW2, had inflicted the injury. The 2nd accused, who is now no more, though was with the 1st accused, does not appear to have shared any common intent. PW2 and PW3 has also no consistent case as regards the role played by the 2nd accused. There is no evidence to suggest that the 2nd accused had in any way promoted or facilitated the commission of the crime by the 1st accused. In that view of the matter, we are of the view that the learned Sessions Judge was not justified in holding the 2nd accused guilty of the offence under Section 302 of the IPC. At the most, he could have been held guilty of the offence under Section 323 of the IPC. Resultantly, this appeal is partly allowed. The appeal, insofar as it concerns the 1st appellant/1st accused, is dismissed, confirming the finding of guilt, conviction, and sentence passed by the learned Sessions Judge. The finding of guilt, conviction, and sentence passed against the 2nd appellant/2nd accused under Section 302 r/w. Section 34 of the IPC is set aside, and he is acquitted of all charges.