JUDGMENT & ORDER : S.K. Medhi, J. 1. The instant appeal has been preferred from jail against a judgment and order dated 21.01.2020 passed by the Sessions Judge, Hailakandi in Sessions Case No. 08/2019 registered under Section 302 IPC with R.I. for life and a fine of Rs.10,000/-. 2. The criminal law was set into motion by lodging of an Ejahar by the PW1 on 30.07.2018 alleging, inter alia, that on the previous evening at about 6 p.m., his mother was assaulted by his step-brother (the appellant) leading to her death. It has been alleged that following a disagreement over of certain family issue, the appellant, with an intention to kill his mother assaulted her on various parts of her body by means of a lathi causing injuries and thereby killed her at the place of occurrence. He had accordingly raised a hue and cry and other members of the family had come to the place of occurrence and confined the accused whereafter the police had come and took the dead body of the mother as well as the accused to the police station. 3. Based on the aforesaid Ejahar, the formal F.I.R. was registered as Lala P.S. Case No. 331/2018 under section 302 IPC. The investigation was accordingly done in which statements of the relevant witnesses were recorded, sketch map prepared, post-mortem done and after completion of the investigation, the charge sheet was laid before the learned Court. The charge was accordingly framed against the appellant and on its denial, the trial had begun in which the prosecution had adduced witnesses through 9 numbers of PWs. 4. PW 1 is the informant, who is the step-brother of the appellant. He had deposed that on the fateful evening when he was returning home, he heard a hue and cry from the house of his mother and on going there, found his mother lying on the ground with head injuries and the appellant was standing with a stick in his hand. On his asking, the appellant had replied that he had assaulted his mother. Thereafter, the police was informed and the mother was declared dead. He had accordingly lodged the Ejahar which was proved as Ext. 1. During the investigation, the police had seized the stick which is a heavy piece of split betel nut tree in his presence and the seizure list was proved as Ext. Thereafter, the police was informed and the mother was declared dead. He had accordingly lodged the Ejahar which was proved as Ext. 1. During the investigation, the police had seized the stick which is a heavy piece of split betel nut tree in his presence and the seizure list was proved as Ext. 2 in which the signature of the informant was also taken. He had also narrated an earlier incident of causing of injuries by a dao by the appellant on his wife in which his wife was badly injured. He had also deposed that in the year 2001, the appellant had assaulted one teacher, namely, Jamir Master who had died of the assault and the expenses of the litigation in the Juvenile Court was borne by him. In the cross-examination, he had stated that the house in which his mother was staying with the appellant comprised of only one room. He was given a suggestion that there was certain land dispute which led to giving false evidence which was however denied by him. 5. PW 2 is a neighbour who had deposed that on the fateful day, at about 6 pm, he had heard hue and cry in the house of the accused person and when he had gone there, he found many people gathered and the appellant was standing there with a heavy piece of stick of a betel nut tree and his mother was lying on the ground of the veranda. He had also narrated that in the year 2016, the appellant had brutally assaulted his sister-in-law by means of a sharp dao and in the said injury, the sister-in-law had somehow escaped from her death in connection with which a police case was also registered. In the cross examination, he had clarified that he was a neighbour and the appellant and the informant were brothers from the same mother whose fathers were however different. The suggestion regarding land dispute to be the reason has been denied and rather he had deposed that the appellant had confessed his offence before the police. 6. PW 3 is also a person from the same locality who had deposed in similar terms as PW 2. The suggestion regarding land dispute to be the reason has been denied and rather he had deposed that the appellant had confessed his offence before the police. 6. PW 3 is also a person from the same locality who had deposed in similar terms as PW 2. He had stated that on the fateful evening, he had heard hue and cry from the house of the accused person and on reaching there, he had heard that the accused-appellant had killed his mother. He had also deposed that the accused had said that he had killed his mother. In his cross- examination, he had deposed regarding the previous assault by the appellant on his sister-in-law and the suggestion regarding land dispute has been denied. 7. PW 4 is the Doctor, who had conducted the postmortem on the deceased. He had deposed that on 30.07.2018, the postmortem was done and the injuries were stated to be as follows: “ (i) abrasion of size 3 cm x 1cm on L3 vertebrae (waist), direction -oblique (ii) abrasion of size 2 cm x 1 cm on C3, C4 vertebrae (neck), (iii) abrasion of size 2 cm x 1 cm in upper part of neck, direction – oblique, (iv) soft tissue swelling of size 3 cm x 1 cm x 1cm on left upper side of the frontal bone just above the left eye and in the opinion of the Doctor, the cause of death is due to massive MI along with grievous injury on head. Also found presence of one large clot on the heart in descending branch of left coronary artery, collection of 100 ml of blood in extra dural space in left frontal region with hairline fracture of left frontal bone and according to him, the cause of death was due to massive heart attack along with grievous head injury. The Doctor further opined that the deceased was perhaps suffering from hypertension and old aged ailing problems including heart diseases and she was badly affected due to the injuries inflicted upon her, which resulted her death.” 8. PW 5 is a cousin of the informant, who had deposed that he had heard hue and cry from the house of the accused and rushed and saw the mother of the accused was lying on the ground of the veranda and the accused was standing there with a lathi in his hand. PW 5 is a cousin of the informant, who had deposed that he had heard hue and cry from the house of the accused and rushed and saw the mother of the accused was lying on the ground of the veranda and the accused was standing there with a lathi in his hand. He had also deposed that he had heard from the other people that the accused had killed his mother. The time however which he had narrated was about 3 pm. In his cross examination, he had clarified that he did not see the accused assaulting the mother and only saw him standing with a lathi near his mother. 9. PW 6 is also a person of the locality who had deposed of hearing hue and cry and accordingly went to the house and found the mother of the accused lying on the ground inside the house and the accused was armed with a small lathi made of betel nut tree and was shouting that his mother had died. He had also deposed that from the condition of the accused, he could realize that the accused-appellant had himself killed his mother and he was a person of very hot temperament and previously also indulged in such type of incident. He had also deposed regarding seizure of the lathi in his presence and the seizure list was proved as Ext. 2 containing his signature. The PW 6 was subjected to cross examination and he had explained that his house was very near to the house of the accused which was at a distance of about 10 meters. 10. PW 7 is a neighbor who had deposed that he came to know that the appellant had killed his mother. PW 7 however appears to be a hearsay witness and therefore may not be very relevant. 11. PW 8 is a neighbor who had deposed that on that evening on hearing hue and cry he went to the house of the accused and saw his mother lying dead on the floor of the veranda of the house and there was a piece of betel nut tree in the hand of the accused and the accused was shouting not to come near his mother otherwise he would kill them. He also saw the accused dragging his mother from the veranda to inside of the house. He also saw the accused dragging his mother from the veranda to inside of the house. He had also deposed about the previous incident of killing of one Jamir Master by the appellant and regarding the brutal assault by the appellant over his sister-in-law with a dao in which she had somehow survived. In his cross-examination he had explained that the distance from his house to the house of the accused is about 50 meters. The suggestion of giving false evidence has been denied by the said PW 8. 12. PW 9 is the IO who had investigated the case. He had deposed that on 29.07.2018 at about 8.30 pm, a telephone call was received by which the information of killing of the deceased by the appellant was received and accordingly, GD Entry 16 dated 29.07.2018 was made which was proved as Ext. 4. Thereafter, he had visited the place of occurrence and found the appellant confined by the people in his house. The dead body of the deceased was also found lying on the ground of the house with head injury and there was profuse bleeding and a stick was also found lying near the dead body. The stick was accordingly seized vide seizure list which was proved as Ext. 2 in presence of witnesses and he had examined certain witnesses. The body was accordingly sent for post mortem and on the next date, the inquest was done through the Executive Magistrate which was proved as Ext. 5 containing the signature of the said Magistrate. He had also deposed regarding preparation of the rough Sketch Map which was proved as Ext. 7 and the Charge Sheet which was laid under Section 302 of the IPC was proved as Ext. 8. The PW 9 - IO was subjected to cross-examination in which however he had deposed that PW 2, PW 3 and PW 6 did not state before him the narration which they had done as witnesses before the Court. 13. Upon completion of the deposition by the prosecution witnesses, the incriminating materials in the form of questionnaires were put to the appellant in his examination under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. The appellant had however answered almost all the questions admitted his guilt. 13. Upon completion of the deposition by the prosecution witnesses, the incriminating materials in the form of questionnaires were put to the appellant in his examination under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. The appellant had however answered almost all the questions admitted his guilt. With regard to the motive, the answer given to Q No. 15 would throw some light in which he had stated that he had killed his mother as she had refused to hand over the BPL card to him. The opportunity to adduce defense witness which was given to him was answered in the negative. 14. Based on the materials on record, the examination under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. and the other relevant materials, the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence has been passed which is the subject matter of challenge in the present appeal. 15. We have heard Shri A. Tewari, learned Amicus Curiae for the appellant. We have also heard Ms. B. Bhuyan, learned Senior Advocate & Addl. Public Prosecutor, Assam assisted by Ms. R. Das, the learned counsel. 16. Shri Tewari, the learned Amicus Curiae has submitted that the present is a case of circumstantial evidence as there is no eyewitness available and therefore there is a heavy burden to be discharged by the prosecution that the circumstances form a continuous chain without any break in the link which leads to only one conclusion of guilt of the appellant and none else. He had submitted that though the informant as PW1 had stated that on hearing hue and cry he had gone to the house of the accused, none of the other witnesses had stated the presence of PW1 at the place of occurrence when they had also visited the same. He therefore submits that the version of PW1 may not be wholly reliable. He has also submitted that the aspect of confining the appellant in his house is contradictory inasmuch as PW 8 had stated that they could not go near the appellant out of fear as he had threatened them with dire consequences with the lathi in his hand. 17. On the aspect of admission in his examination under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., the learned Amicus Curiae has submitted that the answers given in such an examination are not under any oath and therefore cannot be the sole basis for conviction. 17. On the aspect of admission in his examination under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., the learned Amicus Curiae has submitted that the answers given in such an examination are not under any oath and therefore cannot be the sole basis for conviction. He has however fairly submitted that such answers can be taken as a corroborative material by the material. In this connection the learned Amicus Curiae has relied upon the case of Premchand vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (2023) 5 SCC 522 in which the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph 15 has been pressed into service which reads as follows. “15. What follows from these authorities may briefly be summarized thus: a. section 313, Cr. In this connection the learned Amicus Curiae has relied upon the case of Premchand vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (2023) 5 SCC 522 in which the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph 15 has been pressed into service which reads as follows. “15. What follows from these authorities may briefly be summarized thus: a. section 313, Cr. P.C. [clause (b) of sub-section 1] is a valuable safeguard in the trial process for the accused to establish his innocence; b. section 313, which is intended to ensure a direct dialogue between the court and the accused, casts a mandatory duty on the court to question the accused generally on the case for the purpose of enabling him to personally explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him; c. when questioned, the accused may not admit his involvement at all and choose to flatly deny or outrightly repudiate whatever is put to him by the court; d. the accused may even admit or own incriminating circumstances adduced against him to adopt legally recognized defences; e. an accused can make a statement without fear of being cross- examined by the prosecution or the latter having any right to cross-examine him; f. the explanations that an accused may furnish cannot be considered in isolation but has to be considered in conjunction with the evidence adduced by the prosecution and, therefore, no conviction can be premised solely on the basis of the section 313 statement(s); g. statements of the accused in course of examination under section 313, since not on oath, do not constitute evidence under section 3 of the Evidence Act, yet, the answers given are relevant for finding the truth and examining the veracity of the prosecution case; h. statement(s) of the accused cannot be dissected to rely on the inculpatory part and ignore the exculpatory part and has/have to be read in the whole, inter alia, to test the authenticity of the exculpatory nature of admission; and i. if the accused takes a defence and proffers any alternate version of events or interpretation, the court has to carefully analyze and consider his statements; j. any failure to consider the accused's explanation of incriminating circumstances, in a given case, may vitiate the trial and/or endanger the conviction. 16. 16. Bearing the above well-settled principles in mind, every criminal court proceeding under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 313 has to shoulder the onerous responsibility of scanning the evidence after the prosecution closes its case, to trace the incriminating circumstances in the evidence against the accused and to prepare relevant questions to extend opportunity to the accused to explain any such circumstance in the evidence that could be used against him. Prior to the amendment of section 313 in 2009, the courts alone had to perform this task. Instances of interference with convictions by courts of appeal on the ground of failure of the trial court to frame relevant questions and to put the same to the accused were not rare. For toning up the criminal justice system and ensuring a fair and speedy trial, with emphasis on cutting down delays, the Parliament amended section 313 in 2009 and inserted sub- section (5), thereby enabling the court to take the assistance of the Public Prosecutor and Defence Counsel in preparing such questions [the first part of sub-section (5)]. Ideally, with such assistance (which has to be real and not sham to make the effort effective and meaningful), one would tend to believe that the courts probably are now better equipped to diligently prepare the relevant questions, lest there be any infirmity. However, judicial experience has shown that more often than not, the time and effort behind such an exercise put in by the trial court does not achieve the desired result. This is because either the accused elects to come forward with evasive denials or answers questions with stereotypes like 'false', 'I don't know', 'incorrect', etc. Many a time, this does more harm than good to the cause of the accused. For instance, if facts within the special knowledge of the accused are not satisfactorily explained, that could be a factor against the accused. Though such factor by itself is not conclusive of guilt, it becomes relevant while considering the totality of the circumstances. A proper explanation of one's conduct or a version different from the prosecution version, without being obliged to face crossexamination, could provide the necessary hint or clue for the court to have a different perspective and solve the problem before it. A proper explanation of one's conduct or a version different from the prosecution version, without being obliged to face crossexamination, could provide the necessary hint or clue for the court to have a different perspective and solve the problem before it. The exercise under section 313 instead of being ritualistic ought to be realistic in the sense that it should be the means for securing the ends of justice; instead of an aimless effort, the means towards the end should be purposeful. Indeed, it is optional for the accused to explain the circumstances put to him under section 313, but the safeguard provided by it and the valuable right that it envisions, if availed of or exercised, could prove decisive and have an effect on the final outcome, which would in effect promote utility of the exercise rather than its futility. 17. Once a written statement is filed by the accused under subsection (5) of section 313, Cr. P.C. and the court marks it as an exhibit, such statement must be treated as part of the accused's statement under sub-section (1) read with sub-section (4) thereof. In view of the latter sub-section, the written statement has to be considered in the light of the evidence led by the prosecution to appreciate the truthfulness or otherwise of such case and the contents of such statement weighed with the probabilities of the case either in favour of the accused or against him.” 18. The learned Amicus Curiae has submitted that the materials before the Court may not be sufficient to come to a conclusion of guilt and even if the aspect of causing death is assumed to be established, the motive being absent and the death being out of cardiac failure and not because of the injuries directly, the sentence may be converted to one under Section 304 Part-II of the IPC. 19. Per contra, Ms. B. Bhuyan, the learned Addl. Public Prosecutor, Assam has submitted that though the evidence is circumstantial in nature, the chain of evidence is so complete and unbroken that the culpability of the appellant has been fully established. She has highlighted that so far as witnessing the appellant with a stick near the body of the deceased is concerned, the same has been deposed by PW1, PW2, PW3, PW5, PW6 and PW8. She has highlighted that so far as witnessing the appellant with a stick near the body of the deceased is concerned, the same has been deposed by PW1, PW2, PW3, PW5, PW6 and PW8. She has also highlighted that PW1 had also deposed regarding extrajudicial confession wherein the appellant had shouted that he had killed his mother. PW6 had also talked about the past conduct of the appellant wherein he was involved in the brutal assault of his sister-in-law and also the killing of one teacher. The aforesaid aspect was also deposed by PW1 and PW2 and in fact PW2 had also given the details of the police case which was registered on the aspect of causing brutal assault to the sister-in-law by the appellant. 20. The learned Addl. Public Prosecutor has also submitted that in the examination under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., the appellant has clearly admitted his guilt and the motive is also reflected in the answer to Q No. 15 which was stated to be the refusal of the mother to hand over the BPL card to him. She has submitted that though the answers to the examination under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. may not be the sole piece of evidence for convicting a person, such materials can be taken to substantiate and corroborate the other evidence. 21. The learned Addl. Public Prosecutor has also submitted that the conduct of the appellant post commission of the offence is also a relevant factor and in this connection she has relied upon the decision of Chenda Alias Chanda Ram vs. State of Chhattisgarh reported in (2013) 12 SCC 110 . For ready reference, the relevant observation is extracted herein below. “19. In Gurmukh Singh vs. State of Haryana (2009) 15 SCC 635 after scanning all the previous decisions where the death was caused by a single blow, this Court indicated, though not exhaustively, a few factors to be taken into consideration while awarding the sentence. To quote: “23. These are some factors which are required to be taken into consideration before awarding appropriate sentence to the accused. These factors are only illustrative in character and not exhaustive. Each case has to be seen from its special perspective. To quote: “23. These are some factors which are required to be taken into consideration before awarding appropriate sentence to the accused. These factors are only illustrative in character and not exhaustive. Each case has to be seen from its special perspective. The relevant factors are as under: (a) Motive or previous enmity; (b) Whether the incident had taken place on the spur of the moment; (c) The intention/knowledge of the accused while inflicting the blow or injury; (d) Whether the death ensued instantaneously or the victim died after several days; (e) The gravity, dimension and nature of injury; (f) The age and general health condition of the accused; (g) Whether the injury was caused without premeditation in a sudden fight; (h) The nature and size of weapon used for inflicting the injury and the force with which the blow was inflicted; (i) The criminal background and adverse history of the accused; (j) Whether the injury inflicted was not sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death but the death was because of shock; (k) Number of other criminal cases pending against the accused; (l) Incident occurred within the family members or close relations; (m) The conduct and behaviour of the accused after the incident. Whether the accused had taken the injured/the deceased to the hospital immediately to ensure that he/she gets proper medical treatment? These are some of the factors which can be taken into consideration while granting an appropriate sentence to the accused. “ 22. She has also relied upon the decision of Dharnidhar vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. reported in (2010) 7 SCC 759 on the aspect of the relevancy of the examination under section 313 of the Cr.P.C. For ready reference, the relevant observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court are extracted herein below. “28. It is a settled principle of law that the statement made by the accused under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. can be used by the Court to the extent that it is in line with the case of the prosecution. The same cannot be the sole basis for convicting an accused. In the present case, the statement of accused before the Court, to some extent, falls in line with the case of the prosecution and to that extent, the case of the prosecution can be substantiated and treated as correct by the Court. The same cannot be the sole basis for convicting an accused. In the present case, the statement of accused before the Court, to some extent, falls in line with the case of the prosecution and to that extent, the case of the prosecution can be substantiated and treated as correct by the Court. The legislative intent behind this section appears to have twin objects. Firstly, to provide an opportunity to the accused to explain the circumstances appearing against him. Secondly, for the Court to have an opportunity to examine the accused and to elicit an explanation from him, which may be free from the fear of being trapped for an embarrassing admission or statement. 29. The proper methodology to be adopted by the Court while recording the statement of the accused under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. is to invite the attention of the accused to the circumstances and substantial evidence in relation to the offence, for which he has been charged and invite his explanation. In other words, it provides an opportunity to an accused to state before the Court as to what is the truth and what is his defence, in accordance with law. It was for the accused to avail of that opportunity and if he fails to do so then it is for the Court to examine the case of the prosecution on its evidence with reference to the statement made by the accused under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. 30. In Hate Singh Bhagat Singh vs. State of Madhya Bharat [AIR1953 SC 468], while dealing with Section 342 of the old Cr.P.C. equivalent to Section 313 of the present Cr.P.C. observed that answer of the accused given can be used in other enquiries or trials for other offences. 31. In the case of Narayan Singh vs. State of Punjab [ (1963) 3 SCR 678 a Three Judge Bench of this Court held as under: "Under Section 342 of the Cr.P.C. of Criminal Procedure by the first Sub-section, insofar as it is material, the Court may at any stage of the enquiry or trial and after the witnesses for the prosecution have been examined and before the accused is called upon for his defence shall put questions to the accused person for the purpose of enabling him to explain any circumstance appearing in the evidence against him. Examination under Section 342 is primarily to be directed to those matters on which evidence has been led for the prosecution to ascertain from the accused his version or explanation if any, of the incident which forms the subject matter of the charge and his defence. By Sub-section (3), the answers given by the accused may "be taken into consideration" at the enquiry or the trial. If the accused person in his examination under Section 342 confesses to the commission of the offence charged against him the Court may, relying upon that confession, proceed to convict him, but if he does not confess and in explaining circumstance appearing in the evidence against him sets up his own version and seeks to explain his conduct pleading that he has committed no offence, the statement of the accused can only be taken into consideration in its entirety. 32. Following the law laid down in Narayan Singh's case (supra) the Apex Court in State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdeo Singh [1992 CriLJ 3454] further dealt with the question whether a statement recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. can constitute the sole basis for conviction and recorded a finding that the answers given by the accused in response to his examination under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. of 1973 can be taken into consideration in such an inquiry or trial though such a statement strictly is not evidence and observed in paragraph 52 thus: Even on the first principle we see no reason why the Court could not act on the admission or confession made by the accused in the course of the trial or in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C.....” It is thus well established in law that admission or confession of accused in the statement under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. recorded in the course of trial can be acted upon and the Court can rely on these confessions to proceed to convict him.” 23. The learned Addl. Public Prosecutor accordingly submits that the impugned judgment and order of the learned Trial Court has been passed by taking into consideration all the relevant materials and therefore no interference is called for. 24. The rival submissions have been duly considered and the materials, including the LCRs placed before this Court have been carefully examined. 25. The learned Addl. Public Prosecutor accordingly submits that the impugned judgment and order of the learned Trial Court has been passed by taking into consideration all the relevant materials and therefore no interference is called for. 24. The rival submissions have been duly considered and the materials, including the LCRs placed before this Court have been carefully examined. 25. Admittedly, the present is a case wherein which is based on circumstantial evidence and therefore it is the duty of this Court to look into the aspect as to whether the circumstances form a complete chain without any break so as to come to the only conclusion of guilt of the appellant and none others. 26. To examine the said aspect, it would be apposite to remind us the five golden principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the celebrated case of Sharad Biridhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (1984) 4 SCC 116 wherein the following observations were made. “151. Before discussing the cases relied upon by the High Court we would like to cite a few decisions on the nature, character and essential proof required in a criminal case which rests on circumstantial evidence alone. The most fundamental and basic decision of this Court is Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1952 SCR 1091 . This case has been uniformly followed and applied by this Court in a large number of later decisions up-to-date, for instance, the cases of Tufail v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1969) 3 SCC 198 and Ramgopal vs State of Maharashtra, AIR 1972 SC 656 . It may be useful to extract what Mahajan, J. has laid down in Hanumant's case (at pp. 345-46 of AIR) (supra) : "It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established and all the facts so established should be consisent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused." 7. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established : (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned 'must or should' and not 'may be' established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between 'may be proved' and 'must be or should be proved' as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahebrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793 where the following observations were made : "certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a Court can convict and the mental distance between 'may be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions." (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency. (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. 8. These five golden principles, if we may say so, constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence.” 27. The FIR was lodged on 30.07.2018 at 10 AM which is the very next morning of the date of occurrence which was 29.07.2018 and the time of occurrence was about 6 PM. 8. These five golden principles, if we may say so, constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence.” 27. The FIR was lodged on 30.07.2018 at 10 AM which is the very next morning of the date of occurrence which was 29.07.2018 and the time of occurrence was about 6 PM. The FIR was lodged by the PW1 who is the brother of the appellant through the same mother. PW1 had stated in the FIR that after the death of his father, his mother had remarried his paternal uncle and the appellant is the son of the said paternal uncle and his mother. He had stated that he was residing separately in the same house. On the fateful evening, with an intention to kill his mother, the appellant has assaulted her on various parts of her body with a lathi, causing her death at the place of occurrence itself. 28. The deposition of the informant as PW1 is consistent with the narration made by him as the informant in the case. He had deposed regarding the hearing of hue and cry while returning home in the evening and found the mother lying on the ground injured and the appellant was standing near her with a stick. He has specifically explained the stick to be a heavy piece of split up betel nut tree, whereafter the other people had also gathered. The deposition of PW1 was supported by PW2, PW3, PW5, PW6 and PW8. The said witnesses had clearly deposed of hearing hue and cry from the house of the deceased and had reached the house whereupon they had seen the dead body of the mother of the informant and the appellant standing with the stick in his hand. The aspect of extrajudicial confession has also been deposed by PW1 which is supported by PW 3 and PW8. The defence in the cross examination had put suggestion that the depositions were false in as much as there was a land dispute which was however denied by the prosecution witnesses. The aspect of extrajudicial confession has also been deposed by PW1 which is supported by PW 3 and PW8. The defence in the cross examination had put suggestion that the depositions were false in as much as there was a land dispute which was however denied by the prosecution witnesses. On the other hand, the prosecution witnesses PW1, PW2, PW3, PW6 and PW8 had also deposed regarding the past conduct of the appellant in which a police case was registered regarding the brutal assault on his sister-in-law where she had somehow managed to survive and another incident of killing of a teacher while the appellant was a juvenile. PW1 had clearly deposed that he had borne the expenses of the said litigation regarding the killing of a teacher by the appellant as PW1 was his stepbrother. The conduct of the appellant being hot tempered and aggressive has also been proved by PW 6. 29. The depositions made by the aforesaid witnesses could not be shaken by the defence in the cross examination. 30. So far as the nature of injuries as described by the aforesaid witnesses are concerned, the same are corroborated by the evidence of PW4, who is the Doctor who had conducted the postmortem. The postmortem report which was exhibited as Ext. 3 had clearly contained the opinion regarding the death and the description of the injuries sustained seen on the body of the deceased matches with the description of the weapon used which is more explained to be a heavy piece of split up betel nut tree. In fact, PW 8 had also deposed that while the appellant was still found standing by holding the said stick, he had also threatened the said witnesses not to come near him. 31. What is also equally important is the response of the appellant in his examination under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. As fairly pointed out by the learned Amicus Curiae, the appellant had admitted his guilt. We are conscious of the provision of law regarding Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. in which such response cannot be held to be the sole piece of evidence for conviction but in the instant case, the other evidence stand corroborated with the response made by the appellant under such examination. We are conscious of the provision of law regarding Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. in which such response cannot be held to be the sole piece of evidence for conviction but in the instant case, the other evidence stand corroborated with the response made by the appellant under such examination. The response is inculpatory in nature and even the motive for such offence stands demonstrated by response to Q No. 15 which is extracted herein below: “Q 15. Whether you have anything more to say? Ans:- I have killed my mother as she refused to hand over her B.P.L. card to me.” 32. The learned Amicus Curiae has been fair in taking us to the aspect of the response on the sentencing part in which the appellant had responded that he had told the truth and therefore, he should be treated leniently. 33. The aspect of Section 313 Cr.P.C. has been fully explained in the case of Premchand (supra). As regards the past conduct of the appellant, though the same may not be the sole factor to come to a conclusion of guilt qua the offence in question, the same would also have a relevance. Further in the case of Chenda (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has also observed that the conduct of the accused after the commission of the offence would also be one of the factors to be taken into consideration while examining a case of the present nature. 34. As pointed out above, in a case which is based on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances should be such that a complete chain is established without any break which leads to only one conclusion regarding the guilt of the appellant and none else. In the instant case, the materials on record including the medical evidence and the description of the weapon used fully corroborate with each other and the extrajudicial confession made by the appellant before PW1 and PW3 coupled with his response to his examination under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. leave no room of doubt that it is the appellant who is guilty of the offence. 35. In the conspectus of the aforesaid discussion and the materials on record, we are of the view that the conclusion arrived at by the learned Sessions Judge, Hailakandi in convicting and sentencing the appellant in Sessions Case No. 08/2019 vide judgment dated 21.01.2020 does not warrant any interference. 36. 35. In the conspectus of the aforesaid discussion and the materials on record, we are of the view that the conclusion arrived at by the learned Sessions Judge, Hailakandi in convicting and sentencing the appellant in Sessions Case No. 08/2019 vide judgment dated 21.01.2020 does not warrant any interference. 36. The appeal accordingly stands dismissed. 37. Send back the LCRs. 38. Before parting, we put on record our appreciation for the assistance rendered by Shri A. Tewari, the learned Amicus Curiae, who would be entitled to the prescribed fee.