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2025 DIGILAW 673 (GUJ)

Satishbhai Viriyabhai Gamit v. Union Of India

2025-07-07

D.N.RAY, SUNITA AGARWAL

body2025
JUDGMENT : THE CHIEF JUSTICE MRS. JUSTICE SUNITA AGARWAL 1. By means of the present petition, the petitioners (35 in number) are seeking the following reliefs:- “9.1 Be pleased to declare and hold that Sections 3G(5) and 3G(6) of the NATIONAL HIGHWAYS ACT , 1956 as being unconstitutional and ultra vires to Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India; 9.2 Be pleased to quash and set aside the award dated 15.02.2011 (Annexure-P/1), award dated 15.02.2012 (Annexure-P/2) and the supplementary award dated 03.07.2012 (Annexure-P/3) passed by the Competent Authority and Deputy Collector, Vyara to the extent it does not grant solatium and interest amount to petitioners and further be pleased to direct the Competent Authority and Deputy Collector, Vyara to grant solatium and interest amount to petitioners in light of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Union of India v. Tarsem Singh, (2019) 9 SCC 304 ; 9.3 Be pleased to direct the Competent Authority and Deputy Collector, Vyara to grant solatium and interest amount to petitioners in light of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Union of India v. Tarsem Singh, (2019) 9 SCC 304 ; 9.4 Be pleased to dispense with the certified copies of the award dated 15.02.2011 (Annexure-P/1), award dated 15.02.2012 (Annexure-P/2) and the supplementary award dated 03.07.2012 (Annexure-P/3) passed by the Competent Authority and Deputy Collector, Vyara; 9.5 Pending hearing, admission and final disposal of this Petition be pleased to stay the operation, effect and implementation of Sections 3G(5) and 3G(6) of the NATIONAL HIGHWAYS ACT , 1956; 9.6 Costs of this Petition.” 2. At the outset, we may note that the proceedings of acquisition of the lands in question under the NATIONAL HIGHWAYS ACT , 1956, has been concluded with the making of the awards, as per own case of the petitioners herein, in the year 2011 and 2012. The challenge to the constitutionality of Sections 3G(5) and 3G(6) by the petitioners landholders on various grounds raised in the writ petition, seem to be academic as there is no averment in the writ petition as to how these provisions would prejudice the petitioners herein. The writ petition is completely silent as to whether the petitioners have taken recourse to Section 3G(5), to challenge the award passed by the competent authority, approaching the arbitrator. 3. The writ petition is completely silent as to whether the petitioners have taken recourse to Section 3G(5), to challenge the award passed by the competent authority, approaching the arbitrator. 3. The assertions in the writ petition are to the effect that notices under Section 3(e) of the NATIONAL HIGHWAYS ACT , 1956 were received by the petitioners after the awards were made in the year 2011 – 2012 directing them to handover the possession of their lands and asking them to collect the compensation amount. There is no disclosure as to when the petitioners have received compensation under the award declared in the year 2011 – 2012 and when the possession of the lands in question had been taken. In fact, the entire writ petition has been drafted on the basis of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Union of India Vs. Tarsem Singh , [ (2019) 9 SCC 304 ] dated 19.09.2019, wherein while considering the challenge to the 1997 Amendment Act, Section 3(j) of the NATIONAL HIGHWAYS ACT introduced by 1997 Amendment, has been declared as unconstitutional being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 4. It is stated by the petitioner in the writ petition that in some writ petitions filed in the year 2015 such as Special Civil Application No.5504 of 2015 and other connected matters, vide judgment and order dated 29.08.2023, this Court was pleased to permit all petitioners therein to approach the competent authority by moving a proper application to claim for grant of benefits accrued by the Apex Court in Tarsem Singh (supra) 5. The main grounds taken in the writ petition are on the issue of non-award of solatium and interest apart from other grounds with regard to validity of Sections 3G(5) and (6) of the NATIONAL HIGHWAYS ACT and the entire framework of the Amendment Act 16 of 1997 starting from the Notifications under Sections 3A to 3J being unworkable, discriminatory and thus, unconstitutional. 6. 6. Mr.Masoom Shah, the learned advocate for the petitioner, during the course of argument has insisted that the reliefs as granted to the petitioners in the writ petitions filed in the year 2015 onwards, shall be granted to the petitioners herein as they are similarly situated and as such, are to held entitled for the benefit of solatium and interest in light of the decision of the Apex Court in Tarsem Singh (supra). 7. The submission is that the petitioners are entitled for interest on the unpaid amount of solatium from the date of taking possession of the land in question, inasmuch as, the decision of the Apex Court in Tarsem Singh (supra) holding Section 3J as unconstitutional is nothing but recognition of the right of the landholders existing on the date of acquisition. 8. The contention is that denial of solatium to the landholders for compulsory acquisition of the lands by 1997 Amendment Act has been held to be infraction of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 9. It was noted by the Apex Court that solatium and interest were awarded to landowners for compulsory acquisition of their lands for the purpose of National Highways until the promulgation of the 1997 Amendment Act. The previous decision of the Apex Court elaborating on the meaning of expression “solatium” in Sunder V. Union of India [ (2001) 7 SCC 211 ] was noted to record that the solatium that is paid to a landowner is on account of the fact that a landowner, who may not be willing to part with his land, has now to do so, for the compulsory nature of acquisition, and that too at a value fixed legislatively and not through negotiation. Compulsory nature of acquisition, thus, is to be distinct from voluntary sale or transfer. The solatium envisaged in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is “in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition” and, thus, is not the same as damages on account of the disinclination to part with the land acquired.” It was, thus, noted that “solatium” is part and parcel of compensation that is payable for compulsory acquisition of the land. 10. The solatium envisaged in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is “in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition” and, thus, is not the same as damages on account of the disinclination to part with the land acquired.” It was, thus, noted that “solatium” is part and parcel of compensation that is payable for compulsory acquisition of the land. 10. Noticing the above, the Apex Court has further proceeded to record that after repeal of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 has come into force which contains Section 105 empowering the Central Government to direct that any of the provisions of the 2013 Act relating to determination of compensation in accordance with the First schedule and rehabilitation and resettlement specified in the second and third schedule being absolute to the affective families, shall apply to the cases of land acquisition under the enactments specified in the Fourth schedule. The First schedule to the Act’ 2013 provides that solatium equivalent to 100% of the market value multiplied by various factors, depending upon whether the land situated in a rural and urban area, constitutes part of the minimum compensation package to be given to those, whose lands have been acquired. The Fourth schedule read with Section 105 , expressly includes under Item No. ‘7’, the NATIONAL HIGHWAYS ACT , 1956. By a Central Government Notification dated 28.08.2015 issued under Section 105 read with Section 113 of the 2013 Act, it is provided that the 2013 Act compensation provisions will apply to acquisitions that take place under the NATIONAL HIGHWAYS ACT . The result is that both before the 1997 Amendment Act and after coming into force of the 2013 Act, solatium and interest are payable to landowner(s) whose property is compulsorily acquired for purposes of National Highways. It is, then, noted by the Apex Court that this is one other very important circumstance to be borne in mind when judging the constitutional validity of the 1997 Amendment Act for the interregnum period from 1997 to 2015. 11. Having said so, the Apex Court has dealt with the arguments of the learned counsels for the parties extended about the implication of Article 31 (c) and 39(b) of the Constitution of India providing for saving of certain laws made by the State. 12. 11. Having said so, the Apex Court has dealt with the arguments of the learned counsels for the parties extended about the implication of Article 31 (c) and 39(b) of the Constitution of India providing for saving of certain laws made by the State. 12. While considering the object and reasons of 1997 Amendment of the NATIONAL HIGHWAYS ACT , it was stated in Paragraph No. ‘21’ as under:- “ 21. When we examine the Objects and Reasons which led to the 1997 Amendment of the NATIONAL HIGHWAYS ACT , we do not find mentioned therein of any object relating to distribution of the material resources of the community. The object of the Amendment Act has no relationship whatsoever to the directive principles contained in Article 39(b), inasmuch as its limited object is to expedite the process of land acquisition by avoiding inordinate delays therein. The object of the Amendment Act was not to acquire land for the purpose of National Highways as, pre-amendment, the Land Acquisition Act provided for this. The object of the Amendment Act was fulfilled by providing a scheme different from that contained in the Land Acquisition Act, making it clear that the stage of offer of an amount by way of compensation is removed altogether; vesting takes place as soon as the Section 3-D notification is issued; and most importantly, the tardy court process is replaced by arbitration. Obviously, these objects have no direct and rational nexus with the directive principles contained in Article 39(b). Article 31-C is, therefore, out of harm's way. Even otherwise, on the assumption that Article 31-C is attracted to the facts of this case, yet, as was held by Bhagwati, J. in Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India [Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (1980) 3 SCC 625 : (1981) 1 SCR 206 ] : (SCC p. 716, para 114 : SCR pp. 338-39) “114. … it is not every provision of a statute, which has been enacted with the dominant object of giving effect to a directive principles, that is entitled to protection, but only those provisions of the statute which are basically and essentially necessary for giving effect to the directive principles are protected under the amended Article 31-C.” 13. It was further observed in paragraph Nos. ‘23’ and ‘24’ as under:- “ 23. It was further observed in paragraph Nos. ‘23’ and ‘24’ as under:- “ 23. The test of Article 31-C's protection being accorded only to those provisions which are basically and essentially necessary for giving effect to the objects of Article 39(b) is lifted from Akadasi Padhan v. State of Orissa [Akadasi Padhan v. State of Orissa, 1963 Supp (2) SCR 691 : AIR 1963 SC 1047 ] , where this Court held, with reference to Article 19(6), that qua laws passed creating a State monopoly, it is only those essential and basic provisions which are protected by the latter part of Article 19(6). This Court stated the test thus : (SCR p. 707 : AIR p. 1054, para 17) “17. In dealing with the question about the precise denotation of the clause “a law relating to”, it is necessary to bear in mind that this clause occurs in Article 19(6) which is, in a sense, an exception to the main provision of Article 19(1)(g). Laws protected by Article 19(6) are regarded as valid even though they impinge upon the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g). That is the effect of the scheme contained in Article 19(1) read with clauses (2) to (6) of the said Article. That being so, it would be unreasonable to place upon the relevant clause an unduly wide and liberal construction. “A law relating to” a State monopoly cannot, in the context, include all the provisions contained in the said law whether they have direct relation with the creation of the monopoly or not. In our opinion, the said expression should be construed to mean the law relating to the monopoly in its absolutely essential features. If a law is passed creating a State monopoly, the Court should enquire what are the provisions of the said law which are basically and essentially necessary for creating the State monopoly. It is only those essential and basic provisions which are protected by the latter part of Article 19(6). If there are other provisions made by the Act which are subsidiary, incidental or helpful to the operation of the monopoly, they do not fall under the said part and their validity must be judged under the first part of Article 19(6). It is only those essential and basic provisions which are protected by the latter part of Article 19(6). If there are other provisions made by the Act which are subsidiary, incidental or helpful to the operation of the monopoly, they do not fall under the said part and their validity must be judged under the first part of Article 19(6). In other words, the effect of the amendment made in Article 19(6) is to protect the law relating to the creation of monopoly and that means that it is only the provisions of the law which are integrally and essentially connected with the creation of the monopoly that are protected. The rest of the provisions which may be incidental do not fall under the latter part of Article 19(6) and would inevitably have to satisfy the test of the first part of Article 19(6).” 24. Even if the 1997 Amendment Act be regarded as an Act to carry out the purposes of Article 39(b), the object of the Amendment Act is not served by removing solatium and interest from compensation to be awarded. It is obvious, therefore, that the grant of compensation without solatium and interest is not basically and essentially necessary to carry out the object of the 1997 Amendment Act, even if it is to be considered as an acquisition Act pure and simple, for the object of the said Amendment Act as we have seen is to obviate delays in the acquisition process of acquiring land for National Highways. On application of this test as well, it is clear that the grant of compensation without solatium and interest, not being basically and essentially necessary to carry out the object of the Amendment Act, would not receive the protective umbrella of Article 31-C and, therefore, any infraction of Article 14 can be inquired into by the Court.” 14. It was, thus, held by the Apex Court that the Amendment Act’ 1997 was brought with the object to avoid delays in acquisition process of acquiring land for National Highways. The grant of compensation without solatium and interest, not being basically and essentially necessary to carry out the object of the Amendment Act, would not receive the protective umbrella of Article 31-C and therefore, any infraction of Article 14 can be inquired into by the Court. 15. The grant of compensation without solatium and interest, not being basically and essentially necessary to carry out the object of the Amendment Act, would not receive the protective umbrella of Article 31-C and therefore, any infraction of Article 14 can be inquired into by the Court. 15. Further, applying the test of equality under Article 14 of the Constitution of India, it was noted in paragraph Nos. ‘46’, ‘47’ and ‘48’ as under:- “ 46. It is worthy of note that even in acquisitions that take place under the NATIONAL HIGHWAYS ACT and the 1952 Act, the notification of 2015 under the new Acquisition Act of 2013 makes solatium and interest payable in cases covered by both Acts. In fact, with effect from 1-1-2015, Amendment Ordinance 9 of 2014 was promulgated amending the 2013 Act. Section 10 of the said Amendment Ordinance states as follows: “10. In the principal Act, in Section 105 — (i) for sub-section (3), the following sub-section shall be substituted, namely— ‘(3) The provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation in accordance with the First Schedule, rehabilitation and resettlement in accordance with the Second Schedule and infrastructure amenities in accordance with the Third Schedule shall apply to the enactments relating to land acquisition specified in the Fourth Schedule with effect from 1-1-2015;’ (ii) sub-section (4) shall be omitted.” 47. It is only when this Ordinance lapsed that the Notification dated 28-8-2015 was then made under Section 113 of the 2013 Act. It is only when this Ordinance lapsed that the Notification dated 28-8-2015 was then made under Section 113 of the 2013 Act. This notification is important and states as follows: “MINISTRY OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT ORDER New Delhi, 28-8-2015 S.O. 2368(E).—Whereas, the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (30 of 2013) (hereinafter referred to as “the RFCTLARR Act”) came into effect from 1-1-2014; And whereas, sub-section (3) of Section 105 of the RFCTLARR Act provided for issuing of notification to make the provisions of the Act relating to the determination of the compensation, rehabilitation and resettlement applicable to cases of land acquisition under the enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule to the RFCTLARR Act; And whereas, the notification envisaged under sub-section (3) of Section 105 of the RFCTLARR Act was not issued, and the RFCTLARR (Amendment) Ordinance, 2014 (9 of 2014) was promulgated on 31-12-2014, thereby, inter alia, amending Section 105 of the RFCTLARR Act to extend the provisions of the Act relating to the determination of the compensation and rehabilitation and resettlement to cases of land acquisition under the enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule to the RFCTLARR Act; And whereas, the RFCTLARR (Amendment) Ordinance, 2015 (4 of 2015) was promulgated on 3-4-2015 to give continuity to the provisions of the RFCTLARR (Amendment) Ordinance, 2014; And whereas, the RFCTLARR (Amendment) Second Ordinance, 2015 (5 of 2015) was promulgated on 30-5-2015 to give continuity to the provisions of the RFCTLARR (Amendment) Ordinance, 2015 (4 of 2015); And whereas, the replacement Bill relating to the RFCTLARR (Amendment) Ordinance, 2015 (4 of 2015) was referred to the Joint Committee of the Houses for examination and report and the same is pending with the Joint Committee; And whereas, as per the provisions of Article 123 of the Constitution, the RFCTLARR (Amendment) Second Ordinance, 2015 (5 of 2015) shall lapse on the 31st day of August, 2015 and thereby placing the landowners at the disadvantageous position, resulting in denial of benefits of enhanced compensation and rehabilitation and resettlement to the cases of land acquisition under the 13 Acts specified in the Fourth Schedule to the RFCTLARR Act as extended to the landowners under the said Ordinance; And whereas, the Central Government considers it necessary to extend the benefits available to the landowners under the RFCTLARR Act to similarly placed landowners whose lands are acquired under the 13 enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule; and accordingly the Central Government keeping in view the aforesaid difficulties has decided to extend the beneficial advantage to the landowners and uniformly apply the beneficial provisions of the RFCTLARR Act, relating to the determination of compensation and rehabilitation and resettlement as were made applicable to cases of land acquisition under the said enactments in the interest of the landowners; Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub- section (1) of Section 113 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (30 of 2013), the Central Government hereby makes the following Order to remove the aforesaid difficulties, namely: 1. (1) This Order may be called the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 2015. (2) It shall come into force with effect from the 1st day of September, 2015. 2. The provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, relating to the determination of compensation in accordance with the First Schedule, rehabilitation and resettlement in accordance with the Second Schedule and infrastructure amenities in accordance with the Third Schedule shall apply to all cases of land acquisition under the enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule to the said Act. [F. No. 13011/01/2014-LRD] K.P. Krishnan, Addl. Secy.” 48. It is thus clear that the Ordinance as well as the notification have applied the principle contained in Nagpur Improvement Trust [Nagpur Improvement Trust v. Vithal Rao, (1973) 1 SCC 500 ] , as the Central Government has considered it necessary to extend the benefits available to landowners generally under the 2013 Act to similarly placed landowners whose lands are acquired under the 13 enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule, the NATIONAL HIGHWAYS ACT being one of the aforesaid enactments. This being the case, it is clear that the Government has itself accepted that the principle of Nagpur Improvement Trust [Nagpur Improvement Trust v. Vithal Rao, (1973) 1 SCC 500 ] would apply to acquisitions which take place under the NATIONAL HIGHWAYS ACT , and that solatium and interest would be payable under the 2013 Act to persons whose lands are acquired for the purpose of National Highways as they are similarly placed to those landowners whose lands have been acquired for other public purposes under the 2013 Act. This being the case, it is clear that even the Government is of the view that it is not possible to discriminate between landowners covered by the 2013 Act and landowners covered by the NATIONAL HIGHWAYS ACT , when it comes to compensation to be paid for lands acquired under either of the enactments. The judgments delivered under the 1952 Act as well as the Defence of India Act, 1971, may, therefore, require a re-look in the light of this development. The judgments delivered under the 1952 Act as well as the Defence of India Act, 1971, may, therefore, require a re-look in the light of this development. [ The Defence of India Act, 1971, was a temporary statute which remained in force only during the period of operation of a proclamation of emergency and for a period of six months thereafter — vide Section 1(3) of the Act. As this Act has since expired, it is not included in the Fourth Schedule of the 2013 Act.] In any case, as has been pointed out hereinabove, Chajju Ram [Union of India v. Chajju Ram, (2003) 5 SCC 568 ] , has been referred to a larger Bench. In this view of the matter, we are of the view that the view of the Punjab and Haryana High Court [Union of India v. Tarsem Singh, 2018 , SCC OnLine P&H 6036] [Jang Bahadur v. Union of India, , 2018 SCC OnLine P&H 6034] [Union of India v. Abhinav Cotspin Ltd., 2016 SCC OnLine P&H 19319] is correct, whereas the view of the Rajasthan High Court [Banshilal Samariya v. Union of India, 2005 SCC OnLine Raj 572 : 2005-06 Supp RLW 559] is not correct.” 16. The conclusion drawn by the Apex Court in holding the provisions of Section 3J violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India to the extent of denial of solatium and interest is in paragraph No. ‘52’ as under:- “ 52. There is no doubt that the learned Solicitor General, in the aforesaid two orders, has conceded the issue raised in these cases. This assumes importance in view of the plea of Shri Divan that the impugned judgments should be set aside on the ground that when the arbitral awards did not provide for solatium or interest, no Section 34 petition having been filed by the landowners on this score, the Division Bench judgments that are impugned before us ought not to have allowed solatium and/or interest. Ordinarily, we would have acceded to this plea, but given the fact that the Government itself is of the view that solatium and interest should be granted even in cases that arise between 1997 and 2015, in the interest of justice we decline to interfere with such orders, given our discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. Ordinarily, we would have acceded to this plea, but given the fact that the Government itself is of the view that solatium and interest should be granted even in cases that arise between 1997 and 2015, in the interest of justice we decline to interfere with such orders, given our discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. We therefore declare that the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act relating to solatium and interest contained in Sections 23(1-A) and (2) and interest payable in terms of Section 28 proviso will apply to acquisitions made under the NATIONAL HIGHWAYS ACT . Consequently, the provision of Section 3-J is, to this extent, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, declared to be unconstitutional. Accordingly, appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 9599 of 2019 is dismissed.” 17. Taking note of the above, we may note that the Court has recorded that even the Government is of the view that in cases that arose between 1997 and 2015, the landholders were entitled to solatium, which were part of the package of compensation to be offered to the landholders in view of the compulsory nature of acquisition. The solatium which was part of the compensation package, admittedly, has not been paid to the landholders whose lands were acquired after 1997 Amendment uptil the decision of the Apex Court dated 19.09.2019 in the case of Tarsem Singh (supra) 18. Taking note of the above, suffice it to record that in view of the decision of the Apex Court in Tarsem Singh (supra) where the provisions of Section 3J are held violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners herein whose lands were acquired with respect to which compensation was determined in the year 2011 – 2012 in light of Section 3J of the NATIONAL HIGHWAYS ACT being on the statute book, deserve the benefit of solatium and interest as has been granted by the Apex Court in Tarsem Singh (supra) 19. It may not be out of place to note here that a clarification application filed by the National Highways Authority to seek modification of the judgment of the Apex Court dated 19.07.2019 in Tarsem Singh (supra) , for making it prospective has been rejected vide judgment dated 04.02.2025, which reads as under:- “16. It may not be out of place to note here that a clarification application filed by the National Highways Authority to seek modification of the judgment of the Apex Court dated 19.07.2019 in Tarsem Singh (supra) , for making it prospective has been rejected vide judgment dated 04.02.2025, which reads as under:- “16. At the outset, it is essential to briefly refer to the ratio espoused in Tarsem Singh (supra), which, after considering the relevant facts, applicable laws, and precedents, held that Section 3J of the NHAI Act, by excluding the applicability of the 1894 Act and thereby denying ‘solatium’ and ‘interest’ for lands acquired under the NHAI Act, is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. To this end, the decision in Tarsem Singh (supra) took notice of the eleven grounds raised on behalf of the NHAI and the Union of India, and dealt with those grounds by segregating the appeals therein into eleven groups and outlining them in seriatim. 17. Regardless, the prayer in the instant Application expressly seeks clarification that the decision in Tarsem Singh (supra) should be deemed to operate prospectively only. However, in our considered view, granting such a clarification would effectively nullify the very relief that Tarsem Singh (supra) intended to provide, as the prospective operation of it would restore the state of affairs to the same position as it was before the decision was rendered. 18. We say so for the reason that the broader purpose behind Tarsem Singh (supra) was to resolve and put quietus upon the quagmire created by Section 3J of the NHAI Act, which led to the unequal treatment of similarly situated individuals. The impact of Section 3J was short-lived, owing to the applicability of the 2013 Act upon the NHAI Act from the date of 01.01.2015. As a result, two classes of landowners emerged, devoid of any intelligible differentia : those whose lands were acquired by the NHAI between 1997 and 2015, and those whose lands were acquired otherwise. 19. This must be viewed in the light of the principle that when a provision is declared unconstitutional, any continued disparity strikes at the core of Article 14 and must be rectified, particularly when such disparity affects only a select group. 19. This must be viewed in the light of the principle that when a provision is declared unconstitutional, any continued disparity strikes at the core of Article 14 and must be rectified, particularly when such disparity affects only a select group. To illustrate, rendering the decision in Tarsem Singh (supra) as prospective would create a situation where a landowner whose land was acquired on 31.12.2014 would be denied the benefit of ‘solatium’ and ‘interest’, whereas a landowner whose land was acquired the very next day, 01.01.2015—the date on which the Ordinance was promulgated, to read the 2013 Act into the NHAI Act, would be entitled to these statutory benefits. 20. Be that as it may, even if we were to assume that the decision in Tarsem Singh (supra) suffers from the vice of vagueness, the absence of a judicial directive or an explicit legislative mandate should not result in the creation of an artificial classification among a homogeneous group by the same State exercising powers under the same Statute. In this specific instance, the landowners have no discretion or choice regarding the date of land acquisition or the surrender of possession. Thus, both equity and equality demand that no such discrimination be permitted, as allowing it would be unjust. 21. That being so, the decision in Tarsem Singh (supra) also cannot be assailed on the grounds that it opens a Pandora's Box or contravenes the doctrine of immutability, as it merely allows for the grant of ‘solatium’ or ‘interest’, which are inherently embedded as compensatory benefits under an expropriating legislation. This exercise cannot be equated to reopening of cases or revisiting the decisions that have already attained finality. Similarly, the restoration of these twin benefits does not invite reconsideration of the merits of a decided case, re-evaluation of the compensation amount, or potentially declaring the acquisition process itself to be unlawful. Instead, the ultimate outcome of Tarsem Singh (supra) is limited to granting ‘solatium’ and ‘interest’ to aggrieved landowners whose lands were acquired by NHAI between 1997 and 2015. It does not, in any manner, direct the reopening of cases that have already attained finality. 22. On the contrary, modifying or clarifying the judgment in Tarsem Singh (supra) would lend itself to violating the doctrine of immutability, undermining the finality of the decision. It does not, in any manner, direct the reopening of cases that have already attained finality. 22. On the contrary, modifying or clarifying the judgment in Tarsem Singh (supra) would lend itself to violating the doctrine of immutability, undermining the finality of the decision. In fact, what the Applicant seeks to achieve, indirectly, is to evade responsibility and further delay the resolution of a settled issue where the directions given are unequivocal—Quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo, prohibetur et per obliquum i.e. ‘what cannot be done directly should also not be done indirectly’. This Court has, on several occasions, disapproved of the practice of filing Miscellaneous Applications as a strategic litigation tactic aimed at neutralising judicial decisions and seeking a second opportunity for relief. 23. In all fairness, the only defense that may perhaps seem appealing is the claim of a financial burden amounting to Rupees 100 crores. However, this argument does not persuade us for several reasons : First, if this burden has been borne by the NHAI in the case of thousands of other landowners, it stands to reason that it should also be shared by the NHAI in this instance, in order to eliminate discrimination. Second, the financial burden of acquiring land cannot be justified in the light of the Constitutional mandate of Article 300A. Third, since most National Highways are being developed under the Public Private Partnership model, the financial burden will ultimately be passed on to the relevant Project Proponent. Fourth, even the Project Proponent would not have to bear the compensation costs out of pocket, as it is the commuters who will bear the actual brunt of this cost. Ultimately, the burden is likely to be saddled onto the middle or upper-middle-class segment of society, particularly those who can afford private vehicles or operate commercial ventures. We are thus not inclined to entertain the plea for prospectivity on this limited tenet. 24. Lastly, as regards the decision in Sunita Mehra (supra), which is claimed to have prohibited the grant of ‘solatium’ or ‘interest’ in concluded cases, we find that this position has already been addressed and clarified in Tarsem Singh (supra). Given that the Government, through the then Solicitor General, had conceded this issue at that time, it cannot now retract its stance and seek to reargue the same bone of contention. Hence, this assertion too, stands rejected. E. CONCLUSION 25. Given that the Government, through the then Solicitor General, had conceded this issue at that time, it cannot now retract its stance and seek to reargue the same bone of contention. Hence, this assertion too, stands rejected. E. CONCLUSION 25. In view of the foregoing analysis, we find no merit in the contentions raised by the Applicant, NHAI. We reaffirm the principles established in Tarsem Singh (supra) regarding the beneficial nature of granting ‘solatium’ and ‘interest’ while emphasising the need to avoid creating unjust classifications lacking intelligible differentia. Consequently, we deem it appropriate to dismiss the present Miscellaneous Application.” 20. Considering the above, the petitioners herein are held entitled to the benefits of solatium and interest as has been awarded by the Apex Court to the similarly situated landholders whose lands have been acquired between the year 1997 and 2015. 21. However, one objection raised by Mr.Maulik G. Nanavati, the learned advocate on the grant of interest until the date of deposit for the fact that the present writ petition has been filed in January 2024, needs consideration. 22. The submission of the learned counsel for the NHAI is that though the petitioners may be held entitled to interest on the unpaid Solatium amount with effect from the date of possession but interest may be awarded only till the date of filing of the writ petition in, asmuch as, direction to pay interest till the date of deposit would be onerous to the acquiring body. It was argued that once benefits have been made admissible by the Apex Court with the declaration made on 19.09.2019 in the case of Tarsem Singh (supra), it was required for the petitioners / landholders to bring their own action and to seek for solatium and interest at the earliest. There is no averment in the writ petition that the petitioners have even approached the competent authority for grant of benefit of Solatium and interest in view of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Tarsem Singh (supra) by moving any application at all. They have come for the first time in the month of January 2024 by filing the present petition raising an issue of denial of benefits awarded by the Apex Court in Tarsem Singh (supra). They have come for the first time in the month of January 2024 by filing the present petition raising an issue of denial of benefits awarded by the Apex Court in Tarsem Singh (supra). The said benefits may not have been held prospective by the Apex Court, but the landholders cannot be permitted to sleep-over their rights and then approach this Court at their own convenience. For the latches on the part of the petitioners, they may not be held entitled to get interest beyond 2019 when the Apex Court has made declaration of the law. 23. Considering the above, suffice it to record that with the declaration of law holding Section 3J introduced in the NATIONAL HIGHWAYS ACT by Amendment Act No.16 of 1997, as unconstitutional to the extent of denial of solatium and interest to the landholders, it would mean that the said provision was never on the Statute book and would stand obliterated for all times. The position, as such, continues that the landholders, whose lands have been acquired under the NATIONAL HIGHWAYS ACT were always entitled for solatium and interest even post-1997 Amendment. With the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Tarsem Singh (supra) , the said benefit which continues to exist on the Statute book as if never deleted are to be accorded to the landholders. 24. The question is about denial of statutory benefits to the landholders. 25. The result is that it is not possible for us to create a class of two regimes of Pre-Tarsem Singh and Post-Tarsem Singh, i.e. the landholders cannot be classified in two categories, (i) of those who had approached this Court in the Pre- Tarsem Singh period challenging Section 3J and whose petitions were pending till the decision of the Apex Court came on 19.09.2019, and (ii) those who are seeking benefits granted by the Apex Court in Tarsem Singh (supra) during Post-Tarsem Singh period. 26. Such a classification would be creating an artificial class among a homogenous class of landholders who were otherwise eligible for the benefits of solatium at the time of declaration for the original award. 26. Such a classification would be creating an artificial class among a homogenous class of landholders who were otherwise eligible for the benefits of solatium at the time of declaration for the original award. Further, as the possession of the land acquired under the 2013 Act cannot be taken without deposit of compensation determined the award in view of Section 3E of the NATIONAL HIGHWAYS ACT ’ 1956, the petitioners are entitled for the interest on the unpaid amount of compensation from the date of taking possession, where compensation is not paid or deposited before taking possession of such lands. 27. The result is that the petitioners cannot be denied benefits of the decision of the Apex Court in the decision of Tarsem Singh (supra) . However, the fact remains that there has been a delay or latches on the part of the petitioners herein in approaching this Court. The landholders who are petitioners before us even do not state that they have approached the competent authority for grant of benefits after the declaration of law on 19.09.2019 in Tarsem Singh (supra) . For the gap on account of the latches on the part of the petitioners, liability of interest cannot be saddled upon the acquiring body namely the National Highways Authority herein. 28. Considering the above, balancing the interest of the parties, we are of the further view that some reasonable period ought to be provided to the landholders after the declaration of law by the Apex Court in Tarsem Singh (supra), so as to approach the competent authority or the Constitutional courts seeking benefits accorded therein. In our considered opinion, three years period from the date of the decision in Tarsem Singh (supra) dated 19.09.2019, would have to be considered to be a reasonable period for the landholders to approach either the competent authority or this Court, for claiming benefits accorded therein. 29. In view of the above, we hold that the petitioners – landholders herein are entitled to the benefits of Solatium and interest as per the decision of the Apex Court in Tarsem Singh (supra) . However, interest on the unpaid amount of Solatium is to be computed with effect from the date of taking possession till the month of September 2022, i.e. for the period of three more years after the declaration of the law by the Apex Court in Tarsem Singh (supra) 30. However, interest on the unpaid amount of Solatium is to be computed with effect from the date of taking possession till the month of September 2022, i.e. for the period of three more years after the declaration of the law by the Apex Court in Tarsem Singh (supra) 30. At this stage, we may simply note that as per the scheme of the NATIONAL HIGHWAYS ACT , the acquiring body namely the National Highway Authority is entitled to take possession of the acquired land only after deposit of the compensation determined by the competent authority in view of Section 34 of the NATIONAL HIGHWAYS ACT ’ 1956 and there is no dispute about the compensation determined under the award of 2011 / 2012 for the lands in question in the case of the present petitioners and deposit thereof by the National Highway Authority before taking possession of the lands in question. 31. We, therefore, direct the competent authority to make a proper computation of the benefits admissible to the petitioners strictly in accordance with the observations and directions given hereinabove, after giving due notice and opportunity to both the landholders and the National Highway Authority. Both the parties are expected to cooperate in the process of computation of compensation. The computation sheet prepared by the competent authority shall be duly provided to the landholders and the representatives of the NHAI before finalizing the same. The entire exercise of computation and declaration of the additional award in terms of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Tarsem Singh (supra) and the directions given hereinabove, shall be completed, as expeditiously as possible, preferably within the period of six weeks from the date of receipt of the copy of this order. The acquiring body namely the National Highway Authority of India shall be under obligation to make the deposits at the earliest and the disbursement of compensation shall be duly made by the competent authority after due verification of the entitlement of the landholders within the shortest possible time, thereafter. Any further unexplained delay in making the deposits by the acquiring body (NHAI) may hold them liable to pay interest for such period of delay. 32. With the above, the present petition stands disposed of. No order as to costs.