JUDGMENT : Siddhartha Varma, J. Civil Misc. Application No.4 of 2022 (Under Order VI Rule 16 CPC) AND Civil Misc. Application No.5 of 2022 (Under Order VII Rule 11(a) CPC read with Section 86 (1) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951) 1. The instant Election Petition was filed by the election petitioner to declare the election of the respondent-returned candidate as Member of Legislative Assembly from 262 Allahabad North Assembly Constituency, Prayagraj (Allahabad) null and void and also to set-aside the election. When the petition was filed, the respondent i.e. the elected Member of Legislative Assembly filed an application under Order VI Rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the striking off paragraph nos.7, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 24A, 27(I), 27(II), 28(II), 28(IV), 28(V)(a), 28(V)(b), 28(V)(c), 28(V)(d), 28(V)(e), 28(V)(f), 28(V) (g), 28(V)(h), 28(V)(i), 28(V)(j), 28(V)(k), 28(V)(l), 28(V)(m), 28(V)(n), 29(I), 29(II), 29(III), 29(IV), 30, 30(I), 30(II), 30(III), 30(IV), 31(I), 31(III), 31(IV), 32(I), 32(III), 32(IV) and 32(V). A further prayer was made that Annexure Nos. 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 15-A be also struck off. Still further, the ground Nos.C, D and F were also prayed to be deleted from the record of the election petition. 2. The grounds taken for the striking off various paragraphs, annexures and the Grounds were that they were frivolous, vexatious, unnecessary, irrelevant and scandalous and that they were an abuse of the process of the Court. Another application was filed under Order VII Rule 11(a) CPC read with section 86(1) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the "1951 Act" ) for the rejection of the plaint itself. 3. While pressing the application under section 86(1) of the 1951 Act, Sri Manish Goyal, learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the returned candidate assisted by Sri Ravi Anand Agrawal, Sri Anup Kumar, Sri Ayush Shankar and Mithilesh Kumar Rai argued that an election petition which did not comply with the provisions of section 81 or section 82 of the 1951 Act or with the provisions of Section 117 of the 1951 Act had to be dismissed. While further pressing the application, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that every election petition had to be accompanied by as many copies there of as there were respondents mentioned in the petition and that every such copy had to be attested by the petitioner under his own signature stating it to be a true copy of the petition. While further pressing the application, he argued that the election petitioner had not supplied a true copy of the election petition to the respondent/returned candidate inasmuch as : (a) the affidavits mentioned in paragraph 28(IV) i.e. the ones which were dated 4.2.2017 and 24.12.2012 bearing annexure-7 to the election petition had not been supplied or appended or marked as annexure-7 in the respondent's copy; (b) page 161 of the election petition was totally illegible and blank; and (c) the affidavits did not contain the name; seal and the endorsement of the Oath Commissioner. 4. With regard to the decisions of the Supreme Court, bolstering the case of the respondent-returned candidate, learned counsel for the respondent relied upon (1984) 3 SCC 339 : Rajendra Nath Singh vs. Usha Rani . He further relied upon a decision of the Allahabad High Court reported in 1992 (3) AWC 1538 : Narendra vs. Sukhdeo & Ors. and the third decision which he cited was the one which was reported in (1996) 5 SCC 181 : Dr. Shipra (Smt.) vs. Shanti Lal Khoiwal & Ors. Learned counsel for the returned candidate very fairly also showed to the Court the judgment of the Supreme Court in T.M. Jacob vs. C. Poulose & Ors. reported in (1999) 4 SCC 274 and submitted that the judgment in Dr. Shipra (supra) was confined to the factual situation as existed in that case and referring to paragraph 40 of that judgment submitted that in the opinion of the Supreme Court not every minor variation in the pleading but only a vital defect in substance could lead to a finding of non-compliance of section 81(3) of the 1951 Act. 5. Shipra (supra) was confined to the factual situation as existed in that case and referring to paragraph 40 of that judgment submitted that in the opinion of the Supreme Court not every minor variation in the pleading but only a vital defect in substance could lead to a finding of non-compliance of section 81(3) of the 1951 Act. 5. Learned counsel for the returned candidate also pressed his application under Order VI Rule 16 CPC and submitted as follows :- (a) The ground which was taken by the election petitioner for declaring the election void under section 100(1)(d)(i) of the 1951 Act did not state material facts and that the facts as were stated were vexatious/vague and, therefore, were liable to be struck off by this Court. Learned counsel referred to paragraph 7 of the election petition and thereafter he referred to paragraph nos.11 to 16, 18, 19 and thereafter 24-A of it and submitted that none of those paragraphs referred to anything which could be remotely considered as "material facts". (b) Learned counsel for the returned candidate thereafter drew the attention of the Court to paragraph no.26 wherein grounds "A", "B", "C", "D", "E" and "F" were referred to and he submitted that ground "A" did not raise any "material fact" which could, if taken into consideration, set-aside the election of the returned candidate. Since paragraph nos.27(I), 27(II), 27(III) and 27(IV) were pleaded in support of ground "A", learned counsel for the respondent-returned candidate took one paragraph at a time and submitted as to why the same ought to be struck off. With regard to paragraph no.27(I), learned counsel for the returned candidate submitted that if the respondent was in the habit of misleading voters by making false statements in every nomination then definitely it was not a "material fact" which had been pleaded and therefore it required to be struck off. With regard to paragraph 27(II), he had submitted that the qualifications as were given by the election petitioner of the winning candidate which had found place in various nomination papers of the years 2007, 2012, 2017 and 2022 were of no consequence. He, in fact, only admitted that the adequate qualification mentioned vis.-a-vis. the year 2022 alone was of relevance and the narration of other years was required to be struck off. He, in fact, only admitted that the adequate qualification mentioned vis.-a-vis. the year 2022 alone was of relevance and the narration of other years was required to be struck off. So far as paragraph no.27(III) is concerned, learned counsel for the returned candidate submitted that paragraph 27(III) was also with regard to elections of previous years and thus they were vague pleadings and definitely did not contain any "material facts". With regard to paragraph no.27(IV), again learned counsel for the returned candidate submitted that the pleadings were vague and of no consequence. (c) Ground "B" as was taken by the election petitioner was as follows : "B) Because, the respondent committed corrupt practice under Section 123(2) of the said Act by interfering in free exercise of the electoral rights of the electors by not disclosing his liabilities as well as correct educational qualifications in his affidavit of nomination paper." Learned counsel for the returned candidate submitted that ground "B" was again a bundle of vexatious pleadings and definitely it could not be established if the petitioner intended to say that the returned candidate committed a corrupt practice under section 123(2) of the 1951 Act. In paragraph no.28(I) which was pleaded in support of Ground "B", the petitioner had alleged that the returned candidate had submitted a "No Objection Certificate" which was provided by the Tehsildar on 8.2.2022 in which there was a mention that there were no dues against the returned candidate with regard to any loan and, therefore, it was a false statement which was made and furthermore it was a certificate to indicate that the candidate was loan free. Learned counsel for the returned candidate had submitted that in what manner the ground of a "No Objection Certificate" by the Tehsildar had affected the voters to cast vote in his favour was not clear. (d) Next, the learned counsel for the returned candidate submitted that paragraph no.28(II) was also having baseless averments, in as much as it had given out a letter written by the Circle Head of the Punjab National Bank addressed to the Prime Minister's Office and various other authorities with regard to the fact that the respondent was having loans and that he had defaulted. To this paragraph, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that a letter written in the year 2017 could not be considered to be a 'material fact' for the 2022 Assembly Election. Still further, no particulars had been provided in the paragraph as to whether the returned candidate was a Director of any company or whether he was managing that company and, therefore, he submitted that in the absence of full particulars, the paragraph be struck off. With regard to paragraph nos.28(III) and 28(IV) which stated that the respondent had stated in his affidavit dated 8.2.2022 that he owned half part of "2, Minto Park House, Kydganj, Prayagraj" on the basis of a registered agreement and that there were no loans with regard to its purchase, learned counsel for the respondent has stated that there were no specific averments with regard to the case which was being taken by the election petitioner. Further, with regard to paragraphs 28(V), 28(V)(a), 28(V)(b), 28(V)(c), 28(V)(d), 28(V)(e), 28(V)(f), 28(V)(g), 28(V)(h), 28(V)(i), 28(V)(j), 28(V)(k), 28(V)(l), 28(V)(m) and 28(V)(n) wherein the election petitioner had stated that he had information that the returned candidate had stated a falsehood in various affidavits that he had interest over half part of "2, Minto Park House, Kydganj, Prayagraj" was of no consequence and that a falsehood had been stated. He, therefore, submitted that those paragraphs be struck off. Learned counsel for the returned candidate also pointed out to the averments made in the paragraphs, mentioned above, that the returned candidate had unauthorized possession over the property in question and he had also got installed an electricity connection without any authority. Learned counsel for the returned candidate submitted that if the affidavit dated 8.2.2022 is perused, it becomes clear that only an interest in the property had been mentioned. He submits that an individual would have just that much interest in the property as the law would permit and, therefore, in the affidavit he had stated no falsehood. With regard to the electricity connection also, learned counsel for the returned candidate stated that there was no particular on record to show that the electricity connection was taken surreptitiously and that it at all materially affected the election under section 123(2) of the 1951 Act. With regard to the electricity connection also, learned counsel for the returned candidate stated that there was no particular on record to show that the electricity connection was taken surreptitiously and that it at all materially affected the election under section 123(2) of the 1951 Act. Who entered into an agreement to sell with whom was also of no consequence as the respondent had only stated that he had interest in half of the property. He did not say that he owned half of the property. (e) With regard to ground 'C', learned counsel for the returned candidate submitted that the paragraphs which supported the ground 'C' were paragraph nos.29(I), 29(II), 29(III), 29(IV), 29(V), 29(VI), 29(VII), 29(VIII). By pleading paragraph nos.29(I) to 29(VIII) the election petitioner had tried to establish that the respondent had indulged in corrupt practices as were mentioned in section 123(4) of the 1951 Act. With regard to paragraph no.29(I), learned counsel for the respondent submits that such contents as had mentioned about the nominations of the years 2007, 2012 and 2017 were of no relevance. With regard to paragraph no.29(II), learned counsel for the returned candidate once again submitted that what had been submitted in the nomination papers of 2007, 2012 and 2017 elections were of no relevance. With regard to the qualification for the year 2022 elections, there was absolutely no concealment. With regard to paragraph no.29(III), learned counsel for the returned candidate states that filing any affidavit in the court of law was not a publication which came under the purview of section 123(4) of the 1951 Act. With regard to paragraph no.29(IV), learned counsel for the returned candidate submitted that what had been submitted in the earlier nomination papers were of no consequence. With regard to paragraph nos.29(V), 29(VI) and 29(VII) again learned counsel for the returned candidate submitted that what had been stated in the nomination papers of the earlier years was of no consequence for the nomination which was filed in the year 2022. With regard to paragraph no.29(VIII) wherein it has been stated that the returned candidate had submitted a false affidavit by mentioning "lagu nahi" against Columns 11 and 12 learned counsel stated that the petitioner had stated a falsehood and, therefore, the averments were required to be struck off. With regard to paragraph no.29(VIII) wherein it has been stated that the returned candidate had submitted a false affidavit by mentioning "lagu nahi" against Columns 11 and 12 learned counsel stated that the petitioner had stated a falsehood and, therefore, the averments were required to be struck off. (f) With regard to Ground "D" and the supporting paragraph nos.30, 30(I), 30(II), 30(III), 30(IV), 30(V), 30(VI) and 30(VII), the election petitioner had stated that the respondent had given a false affidavit with regard to his educational qualification. While submitting that these paragraphs be struck off, learned counsel for the returned candidate stated that this was the very same ground taken in the earlier paragraph no.29 and they were repetition of the contents stated earlier. (g) With regard to ground "E", which are substantiated by paragraph nos.31(I), 31(II), 31(III) and 31(IV), learned counsel for the respondent submitted that ground "E" was with regard to corrupt practices mentioned in section 123(7)(g) of the 1951 Act and the Ground "E" as also the supporting paragraphs were not stating any material facts and deserved to be struck off. In paragraph 31(I), the petitioner had submitted that as per paragraph 4.2(h) of the "Handbook of Counting Agent, Feb. 2019 issued by the Election Commission of India", it was mentioned that Government Pleaders/Additional Government Pleaders could not be appointed as counting agents for a candidate. To this paragraph, learned counsel for the returned candidate states that the Handbook for Counting Agents did not have any statutory force and, therefore, could not be a ground envisaged under section 123(7)(g) of the 1951 Act. With regard to paragraph no.31(II) wherein it was stated that Atul Kumar Srivastava who was a counting agent and was Standing Counsel in the High Court and Amit Sharma who was a Brief Holder in the High Court were illegally appointed as agents, learned counsel for the returned candidate has submitted that there was no provision under which they could have been ousted from becoming election agents. Next, learned counsel for the respondent drew the attention of the Court to paragraph no.31(III) and 31(IV) wherein Rules 12 and 13 of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 were referred to. To this paragraph, learned counsel for the returned candidate states that no specific mention was there with regard to what was the irregularity committed by the returned candidate. Next, learned counsel for the respondent drew the attention of the Court to paragraph no.31(III) and 31(IV) wherein Rules 12 and 13 of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 were referred to. To this paragraph, learned counsel for the returned candidate states that no specific mention was there with regard to what was the irregularity committed by the returned candidate. (h) So far as Ground "F" and paragraphs 32(I), 32(II), 32(III), 32(IV) and 32(V) are concerned, learned counsel for the returned candidate submitted that they were again with reference to section 123(7)(g) of the 1951 Act and he submits that the Standing Counsel and the Brief Holder who were referred to in the above paragraphs were not covered under the relevant sections and, therefore, the averments made were irrelevant and were required to be struck off. 6. Learned counsel for the returned candidate with regard to the striking off the various grounds and paragraphs relied upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in Dhartipakar Madan Lal Agarwal vs. Shri Rajiv Gandi reported in AIR 1987 SC 1577 ; Anugrah Narain Singh vs. (Dr.) Narendra Kumar Singh Gaur & Ors. reported in 2005 (5) ADJ 526; Rajesh Singh vs. Bhism Shankar @ Kushal Tiwari reported in 2011 (8) ADJ 401 and Sharad Tripathi vs. Bhishm Shankar & Ors. reported in 2011 (9) ADJ 390 . Learned counsel for the respondent further submitted that the election petitioner had not verified in his affidavit paragraph nos.28(V)(d), 31(I) and 28(V)(k). 7. Learned counsel for the respondent, therefore, submitted that under Order VII Rule 11(a) CPC, the election petition be rejected as it did not disclose a cause of action. He submitted that as per section 83 of the 1951 Act, the petition definitely did not contain a concise statement of "material facts" on which the petitioner was relying upon. 8. He submitted that an amendment application for rectifying the mistake was filed but the petitioner did not press the same and, therefore, the Amendment Application was dismissed as not pressed. 9. Sri Shailendra, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the election petitioner assisted by Sri Shiv Sagar Singh, Sri Ravindra Singh, Sri Abhiuday Mehrotra, Sri Subhanshu, Sri Harsh Deep Kushwaha, Ms. He submitted that an amendment application for rectifying the mistake was filed but the petitioner did not press the same and, therefore, the Amendment Application was dismissed as not pressed. 9. Sri Shailendra, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the election petitioner assisted by Sri Shiv Sagar Singh, Sri Ravindra Singh, Sri Abhiuday Mehrotra, Sri Subhanshu, Sri Harsh Deep Kushwaha, Ms. Richa Mishra, Sri Ashwanee Kumar Srivastav and Sri Rahul Dev Singh, Advocates in reply to the arguments made by learned counsel for the returned candidate submitted that the application filed under Order VI Rule 16 CPC was based on misconceived and baseless grounds. He submits that the election petition had been filed with "material facts" necessary for the filing of an election petition and that the election petitioner had complied with the provisions of sections 81 and 82 and other relevant sections of the 1951 Act. He submits that the petition was filed in compliance of Rule 5 Chapter 16-A of the Allahabad High Court Rules. Learned counsel for the election petitioner further submitted that the provisions of section 86 of the 1951 Act as per the High Court Rules could be seen at the stage of pre- issuance of notice and once the notice was issued to the election petitioner, the further compliance of section 86 of the 1951 Act did not arise. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, therefore, be also rejected as it did not in any manner provide as to how the election petition did not disclose a cause of action. Learned counsel for the petitioner took the court through the various pleadings in the election petition and he specifically had stated that the contents of paragraph 7 of the election petition were such that it went to establish for sure that the respondent was a schizophrenic and that he had a default of a substantial character. He was of such a nature that he was habitually lying and, therefore, he submitted that the contents of paragraph 7 of the election petition were important. So far as paragraphs 11 to 16 were concerned, learned counsel for the petitioner had submitted that since swearing of false affidavit could be taken as a corrupt practice by which the candidate was trying to influence the voters, the paragraphs became important. So far as paragraphs 11 to 16 were concerned, learned counsel for the petitioner had submitted that since swearing of false affidavit could be taken as a corrupt practice by which the candidate was trying to influence the voters, the paragraphs became important. Learned counsel for the petitioner relying upon two judgments of the Supreme Court namely People's Union For Civil Liberties (PUCL) & Anr. vs. Union of India & Anr. reported in (2003) 4 SCC 399 and Resurgence India vs. Election Commission of India & Anr. reported in (2014) 14 SCC 189 has submitted that as of today it was a recognized right of a voter to know his/her candidate. Learned counsel for the election petition from the judgment of People's Union For Civil Liberties (PUCL) & Anr. vs. Union of India & Anr. : (2003) 4 SCC 399 specifically referred to paragraphs 78, 123 and 131 of that judgment. The contents of paragraphs 78 of the judgment are the sum and substance of the judgment of Hon'ble Mr. Justice M.B. Shah in that case. Paragraph 123 was the judgment of Hon'ble Mr. Justice P. Venkatarama Reddi and paragraph 131 was the judgment and opinion of Hon'ble Mr. Justice D.M. Dharmadhikari and he submits that in effect the Supreme Court had held that securing of information on basic details which concerned a candidate contesting an election was a part of 'right to information' and it formed an integral part of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. He further submitted that the 'right to vote' was a constitutional right and not merely a statutory right and the casting of a vote in favour of one or the other candidate marked an accomplishment of 'freedom of expression' of a voter and, therefore, was an integral part of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. The next proposition which the Supreme Court had enunciated in those judgments was that a more holistic view had to be taken and adopted. He submitted that the right to information provided for by the Parliament under section 33-A of the 1951 Act with regard to the pending criminal cases and with regard to disclosure of assets and liabilities and also with regard to educational qualifications were all moving towards the fulfillment of the right which was guaranteed to a voter under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. 10. 10. So far as the judgment of the Supreme Court in Resurgence India vs. Election Commission of India & Anr. : reported in (2014) 14 SCC 189 was concerned, learned counsel for the election petitioner submitted that it was the elementary right of a voter to know full particulars of a candidate who was to represent the voter in the Parliament/Assemblies. Since, learned counsel for the election petitioner heavily relied upon paragraph 29 of the same, it is being reproduced here as under : " 29. What emerges from the above discussion can be summarized in the form of the following directions: 29.1 The voter has the elementary right to know full particulars of a candidate who is to represent him in Parliament/Assemblies and such right to get information is universally recognized. Thus, it is held that right to know about the candidate is a natural right flowing from the concept of democracy and is an integral part of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. 29.2 The ultimate purpose of filing of affidavit along with the nomination paper is to effectuate the fundamental right of the citizens under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. The citizens are supposed to have the necessary information at the time of filing of nomination paper and for that purpose, the Returning Officer can very well compel a candidate to furnish the relevant information. 29.3 Filing of affidavit with blank particulars will render the affidavit nugatory. 29.4 It is the duty of the Returning Officer to check whether the information required is fully furnished at the time of filing of affidavit with the nomination paper since such information is very vital for giving effect to the ‘right to know’ of the citizens. If a candidate fails to fill the blanks even after the reminder by the Returning Officer, the nomination paper is fit to be rejected. We do comprehend that the power of the Returning Officer to reject the nomination paper must be exercised very sparingly but the bar should not be laid so high that the justice itself is prejudiced. 29.5 We clarify to the extent that Para 73 of People’s Union for Civil Liberties case (supra) will not come in the way of the Returning Officer to reject the nomination paper when affidavit is filed with blank particulars. 29.5 We clarify to the extent that Para 73 of People’s Union for Civil Liberties case (supra) will not come in the way of the Returning Officer to reject the nomination paper when affidavit is filed with blank particulars. 29.6 The candidate must take the minimum effort to explicitly remark as "NIL" or "Not Applicable" or "Not known" in the columns and not to leave the particulars blank. 29.7 Filing of affidavit with blanks will be directly hit by Section 125-A(i) of the RP Act. However, as the nomination paper itself is rejected by the Returning Officer, we find no reason why the candidate must be again penalized for the same act by prosecuting him/her." 11. Learned counsel for the election petitioner thereafter also relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in Mairembam Prithviraj Alias Prithviraj Singh vs. Pukhrem Sharatchandra Singh reported in (2017) 2 SCC 487 and submitted that any wrong information went a long way to affect the decision making process of a voter and, therefore, a candidate could not escape by saying that any wrong information given was a clerical error. In this regard, learned counsel for the election petitioner relied heavily upon paragraph 19 of the judgment and, therefore, the same is being reproduced here as under :- "19. The contention of the appellant that the declaration relating to his educational qualification in the affidavit is a clerical error cannot be accepted. It is not an error committed once. Since 2008, the appellant was making the statement that he has an MBA degree. The information provided by him in the affidavit filed in Form 26 would amount to a false declaration. The said false declaration cannot be said to be a defect which is not substantial. He was given an opportunity by the Returning Officer to produce the relevant document in support of his declaration. At least at that point of time he should have informed the Returning Officer that an error crept into the declaration. He did not do so. The false declaration relating to his educational qualification cannot be stated to be not of a substantial character. It is no more res integra that every candidate has to disclose his educational qualification to subserve the right to information of the voter. He did not do so. The false declaration relating to his educational qualification cannot be stated to be not of a substantial character. It is no more res integra that every candidate has to disclose his educational qualification to subserve the right to information of the voter. Having made a false declaration relating to his educational qualification, the appellant cannot be permitted to contend that the declaration is not of a substantial character. For the reasons stated supra, we uphold the findings recorded by the High Court that the false declaration relating to the educational qualification made by the appellant is substantial in nature." 12. Learned counsel for the election petitioner thereafter relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Thangjam Arunkumar vs. Yumkham Erabit Singh & Ors. reported in AIR 2023 SC 4531 and submitted that the requirement to file an affidavit under the proviso to section 83(1)(c) of the 1951 Act was not mandatory and if there was a substantial compliance of the provision then it met the requirements of the 1951 Act. He submitted that the election petition contained an affidavit and also a verification and, therefore, there was no defect and if there was one, by any chance, it was curable. Then, relying upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in A. Manju vs. Prajwal Revanna Alias Prajwal R & Ors. reported in (2022) 3 SCC 269 learned counsel for the election petitioner submitted something very similar to what he had submitted while relying upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Thangjam Arunkumar (supra). 13. Learned counsel for the election petitioner, thereafter relying upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Madiraju Venkata Ramana Raju vs. Peddireddigari Ramachandra Reddy & Ors. reported in (2018) 14 SCC 1 submitted that the pleadings and particulars i.e. "material facts" or pleadings were distinguishable from full particulars (or evidence). Since learned counsel for the election petitioner relied upon paragraphs 39 and 40 of the judgment, the same are being reproduced here as under :- " 39. On reading the election petition as a whole, we have no hesitation in taking a view that the High Court misdirected itself in concluding that the election petition did not disclose any cause of action with or without Paras 2 and 9 to 11 of the election petition. On reading the election petition as a whole, we have no hesitation in taking a view that the High Court misdirected itself in concluding that the election petition did not disclose any cause of action with or without Paras 2 and 9 to 11 of the election petition. Indeed, the pleadings of the election petition should be precise and clear containing all the necessary details and particulars as required by law. “Material facts” would mean all the basic facts constituting the ingredients of the grounds stated in the election petition in the context of relief to declare the election to be void. It is well established that in an election petition, whether a particular fact is material or not and as such required to be pleaded, is a question which depends on the nature of the grounds relied upon and the special circumstances of the case. Particulars, on the other hand, are the details of the case set up by the party. The distinction between “material facts” and “full particulars” has been delineated in Mohan Rawale v. Damodar Tatyaba : (1994) 2 SCC 392 . This judgment has been adverted to in the reported decision relied on by the parties. The Court noted thus : (SCC pp. 397-99, paras 10-18) “10. We may take up the last facet first. As Chitty, J. observed, “There is some difficulty in affixing a precise meaning to” the expression “discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence”. He said : “In point of law … every cause of action is a reasonable one.” (See Republic of Peru v. Peruvian Guano Co. [(1887) LR 36 Ch D 489]. A reasonable cause of action is said to mean a cause of action with some chances of success when only the allegations in the pleading are considered. But so long as the claim discloses some cause of action or raises some questions fit to be decided by a Judge, the mere fact that the case is weak and not likely to succeed is no ground for striking it out. The implications of the liability of the pleadings to be struck out on the ground that it discloses no reasonable cause of action are quite often more known than clearly understood. It does introduce another special demurrer in a new shape. The implications of the liability of the pleadings to be struck out on the ground that it discloses no reasonable cause of action are quite often more known than clearly understood. It does introduce another special demurrer in a new shape. The failure of the pleadings to disclose a reasonable cause of action is distinct from the absence of full particulars. The distinctions among the ideas of the “grounds” in Section 81 (1); of “material facts” in Section 83 (1)(a) and of “full particulars” in Section 83 (1)(b) are obvious. The provisions of Section 83 (1)(a) and (b) are in the familiar pattern of Order 6 Rules 2 and 4 and Order 7 Rule 1(e) of the Code of Civil Procedure. There is a distinction amongst the “grounds” in Section 81 (1); the “material facts” in Section 83 (1)(a) and “full particulars” in Section 83 (1)(b). 11. Referring to the importance of pleadings a learned author says: ‘Pleadings do not only define the issues between the parties for the final decision of the court at the trial, they manifest and exert their importance throughout the whole process of the litigation. … They show on their face whether a reasonable cause of action or defence is disclosed. They provide a guide for the proper mode of trial and particularly for the trial of preliminary issues of law or fact. They demonstrate upon which party the burden of proof lies, and who has the right to open the case. They act as a measure for comparing the evidence of a party with the case which he has pleaded. They determine the range of the admissible evidence which the parties should be prepared to adduce at the trial. They delimit the relief which the court can award. …’ [See : Jacob: “The Present Importance of Pleadings” (1960) Current Legal Problems, at pp. 175-76.] 12. Further, the distinction between “material facts” and “full particulars” is one of degree. The lines of distinction are not sharp. “Material facts” are those which a party relies upon and which, if he does not prove, he fails at the time. 13. …’ [See : Jacob: “The Present Importance of Pleadings” (1960) Current Legal Problems, at pp. 175-76.] 12. Further, the distinction between “material facts” and “full particulars” is one of degree. The lines of distinction are not sharp. “Material facts” are those which a party relies upon and which, if he does not prove, he fails at the time. 13. In Bruce v. Odhams Press Ltd. [(1936) 1 KB 697 : (1936) 1 All ER 287 (CA)] Scott L.J. said : “The word ‘material’ means necessary for the purpose of formulating a complete cause of action; and if any one ‘material’ statement is omitted, the statement of claim is bad.” The purpose of “material particulars” is in the context of the need to give the opponent sufficient details of the charge set up against him and to give him a reasonable opportunity. 14. Halsbury refers to the function of particulars thus: ‘The function of particulars is to carry into operation the overriding principle that the litigation between the parties, and particularly the trial, should be conducted fairly, openly and without surprises, and incidentally to reduce costs. This function has been variously stated, namely either to limit the generality of the allegations in the pleadings, or to define the issues which have to be tried and for which discovery is required.’ (See : Pleadings Vol. 36, para 38) 15. In Bullen and Leake and Jacob's “Precedents of Pleadings” 1975 Edn. at p. 112 it is stated: ‘The function of particulars is to carry into operation the overriding principle that the litigation between the parties, and particularly the trial, should be conducted fairly, openly and without surprises and incidentally to save costs. The object of particulars is to “open up” the case of the opposite party and to compel him to reveal as much as possible what is going to be proved at the trial, whereas, as Cotton L.J. has said [Spedding v. Fitzpatrick, (1888) LR 38 Ch D 410 (CA)] , ‘the old system of pleading at common law was to conceal as much as possible what was going to be proved at the trial’.’ 16. The distinction between “material facts” and “particulars” which together constitute the facts to be proved — or the facta probanda — on the one hand and the evidence by which those facts are to be proved — facta probantia — on the other must be kept clearly distinguished. In Philipps v. Philipps [(1878) LR 4 QBD 127 at p. 133 (CA)] , Brett, L.J. said: ‘I will not say that it is easy to express in words what are the facts which must be stated and what matters need not be stated. … The distinction is taken in the very rule itself, between the facts on which the party relies and the evidence to prove those facts. Erle, C.J. expressed it in this way. He said that there were facts that might be called the allegata probanda, the facts which ought to be proved, and they were different from the evidence which was adduced to prove those facts. And it was upon the expression of opinion of Erle, C.J. that Rule 4 [now Rule 7(1)] was drawn. The facts which ought to be stated are the material facts on which the party pleading relies.’ 17. Lord Denman, C.J. in Williams v. Wilcox (1838) 8 Ad & E1 314 : 112 ER 857 said: ‘It is an elementary rule in pleading that, when a state of facts is relied it is enough to allege it simply, without setting out the subordinate facts which are the means of proving it, or the evidence sustaining the allegations.’ 18. An election petition can be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11(a) CPC if it does not disclose a cause of action. Pleadings could also be struck out under Order 6 Rule 16, inter alia, if they are scandalous, frivolous or vexatious. The latter two expressions meant cases where the pleadings are obviously frivolous and vexatious or obviously unsustainable.” (emphasis supplied) 40. In Harkirat Singh v. Amrinder Singh, [ (2005) 13 SCC 511 ], this Court once again reiterated thus : (SCC p. 526-28, paras 46-48) “46. From the above provisions, it is clear that an election petition must contain a concise statement of “material facts” on which the petitioner relies. In Harkirat Singh v. Amrinder Singh, [ (2005) 13 SCC 511 ], this Court once again reiterated thus : (SCC p. 526-28, paras 46-48) “46. From the above provisions, it is clear that an election petition must contain a concise statement of “material facts” on which the petitioner relies. It should also contain “full particulars” of any corrupt practice that the petitioner alleges including a full statement of names of the parties alleged to have committed such corrupt practice and the date and place of commission of such practice. Such election petition shall be signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”) for the verification of pleadings. It should be accompanied by an affidavit in the prescribed form in support of allegation of such practice and particulars thereof. 47. All material facts, therefore, in accordance with the provisions of the Act, have to be set out in the election petition. If the material facts are not stated in a petition, it is liable to be dismissed on that ground as the case would be covered by clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 83 of the Act read with clause (a) of Rule 11 of Order 7 of the Code. 48. The expression “material facts” has neither been defined in the Act nor in the Code. According to the dictionary meaning, “material” means “fundamental”, “vital”, “basic”, “cardinal”, “central”, “crucial”, “decisive”, “essential”, “pivotal”, “indispensable”, “elementary” or “primary”. Burton's Legal Thesaurus (3rd Edn.), p. 349.] The phrase “material facts”, therefore, may be said to be those facts upon which a party relies for its claim or defence. In other words, “material facts” are facts upon which the plaintiff's cause of action or the defendant's defence depends. What particulars could be said to be “material facts” would depend upon the facts of each case and no rule of universal application can be laid down. It is, however, absolutely essential that all basic and primary facts which must be proved at the trial by the party to establish the existence of a cause of action or defence are material facts and must be stated in the pleading by the party.” (emphasis supplied) Again in paras 51 and 52, this Court observed thus : (SCC pp. 527-28) “51. 527-28) “51. A distinction between “material facts” and “particulars”, however, must not be overlooked. “Material facts” are primary or basic facts which must be pleaded by the plaintiff or by the defendant in support of the case set up by him either to prove his cause of action or defence. “Particulars”, on the other hand, are details in support of material facts pleaded by the party. They amplify, refine and embellish material facts by giving distinctive touch to the basic contours of a picture already drawn so as to make it full, more clear and more informative. “Particulars” thus ensure conduct of fair trial and would not take the opposite party by surprise. 52. All “material facts” must be pleaded by the party in support of the case set up by him. Since the object and purpose is to enable the opposite party to know the case he has to meet with, in the absence of pleading, a party cannot be allowed to lead evidence. Failure to state even a single material fact, hence, will entail dismissal of the suit or petition. Particulars, on the other hand, are the details of the case which is in the nature of evidence a party would be leading at the time of trial.” (emphasis supplied) And again in para 72, the Court noted thus : (SCC p. 535) “72. The Court, however, drew the distinction between “material facts” and “particulars”. According to the Court, “material facts” are facts, if established would give the petitioner the relief prayed for. The test is whether the Court could have given a direct verdict in favour of the election petitioner in case the returned candidate had not appeared to oppose the election petition on the basis of the facts pleaded in the petition.” (emphasis supplied)" 14. Learned counsel for the election petitioner also relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ashraf Kokkum vs. K.V. Abdul Khader & Ors. reported in (2015) 1 SCC 129 and submitted that if the election petition discloses a triable cause of action/issue then the election petition should not be thrown out at the threshold. Similarly, he relied heavily upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in T.M. Jacob vs. C. Poulose & Ors. reported in (2015) 1 SCC 129 and submitted that if the election petition discloses a triable cause of action/issue then the election petition should not be thrown out at the threshold. Similarly, he relied heavily upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in T.M. Jacob vs. C. Poulose & Ors. reported in (1999) 4 SCC 274 which had specifically distinguished the decision in Shipra (Dr.) vs. Shanti Lal Khoiwal reported in (1996) 5 SCC 181 and submitted that any defect or non-compliance with section 83(1) of the 1951 Act was a curable defect. 15. After having cited these judgments, learned counsel for the election petitioner thereafter stated that no case was made out for the striking out of any of the paragraph nos.7, 11 to 16, 18, 19, 24A, 27(I), 27(II), 28(II), 28(IV), 28(V)(a), 28(V)(b), 28(V)(c), 28(V)(d), 28(V)(e), 28(V)(f), 28(V)(g), 28(V)(h), 28(V)(i), 28(V) (j), 28(V)(k), 28(V)(l), 28(V)(m), 28(V)(n), 29(I), 29(II), 29(III), 29(IV), 30, 31(I), 30(II), 30(III), 30(IV), 31(I), 31(III), 31(IV), 32(I), 32(III), 32(IV), 32(V) and annexure 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 15-A as well as Grounds C, D and F from the records of the election petition as had been prayed for by the respondent. 16. Learned counsel for the election petitioner has submitted that paragraphs 27, 28 and all their sub-paragraphs were such paragraphs which contained material facts which supported the Grounds 'A' and 'B' and since Grounds 'A' and 'B' had not been challenged in the prayer clause of the application under Order VI Rule 16 CPC, the paragraphs 27 and 28 could not be done away with. However, he submitted that even if the respondent was not challenging the Grounds 'A' and 'B' and if he was challenging the paragraphs 27 and 28 and their sub-paragraphs then the election petitioner could challenge the election of the respondent. 17. So far as paragraph 28 and its sub-paragraphs were concerned, learned counsel for the election petitioner stated that a 'No Objection Certificate' given by a Tehsildar in the face of the fact that the respondent had many other loans was a triable issue. Also, he submitted that when the respondent was not an owner of half part of 2, Minto Park House, Kydganj, Prayagraj then he had made a false averment and, therefore, the paragraphs stating so were required to be contained in the plaint. 18. Also, he submitted that when the respondent was not an owner of half part of 2, Minto Park House, Kydganj, Prayagraj then he had made a false averment and, therefore, the paragraphs stating so were required to be contained in the plaint. 18. With regard to paragraph 28(V)(k), learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that an unauthorised possession over any property could be considered a disqualification for a person to contest an election. 19. So far as paragraph 29 and its sub-paragraphs of the election petition were concerned, learned counsel for the election petitioner submitted that the contents of paragraph 29 were in support of the Ground 'C' stating that the petitioner had given a false affidavit with regard to his nomination of the years 2007, 2012 and 2017 and thereafter in the year 2022. He again submitted that a person who had lied once cannot be trusted and therefore his election of the year 2022 be also done away with. 20. With regard to paragraph 29(VIII) of the election petition, learned counsel for the election petitioner submitted that when the petitioner had stated "Lagu Nahi" with regard to various social- media platforms then he had lied inasmuch as he was very much on the social-media platforms. 21. With regard to the contents of paragraph 30 and its sub- paragraphs, learned counsel for the election petitioner states that when the respondent had given descriptions with regard to his various degrees as had been submitted by him in his nominations for the previous election then how the degrees of B.Tech. from the University of Sheffield, England as also the degree of B.Eng. 2003 in Software Engineering from the University of Sheffield, England could have been obtained by the respondent. Learned counsel for the election petition states that this was essential for the respondent to prove and establish. 22. So far as paragraph 31 is concerned, learned counsel for the election petitioner submitted that when it was prohibited for a Standing Counsel to participate as a counting agent and if he had so participated then the election of the respondent could be set at naught. Similar was the case with Advocate Amit Sharma and therefore, he submitted that the contents of all the paragraphs till paragraph 32 and its sub-paragraphs were important for the decision of the election petition. 23. Similar was the case with Advocate Amit Sharma and therefore, he submitted that the contents of all the paragraphs till paragraph 32 and its sub-paragraphs were important for the decision of the election petition. 23. Taking the Court through the averments made in these paragraphs, learned counsel for the election petitioner submitted that Grounds 'A' and 'B' had not been prayed for being struck off. With regard to Ground 'C', he submitted that wrong information given in the nomination of earlier years i.e. in the years 2007, 2012 and 2017 which was done knowingly and deliberately had caused interference in the free exercise of the electoral rights of the electors. He, therefore, submitted that the Ground 'C' which was supported by paragraph 29 and its sub-paragraphs also had to stay on in the plaint. Similarly he submitted that Grounds "D", "E" and "F" had to be retained. 24. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, the Court is of the view that the application under Order VI Rule 16 CPC and that under Order VII Rule 11(a) CPC had been filed essentially on the following grounds :- (a) The election petition did not contain any "material fact" or particulars and that the allegations made in the petition were vague and general. They lacked the requisite facts, details and particulars of corrupt practices which were alleged in the petition. (b) The petitioner had referred to certain declarations which were made in the nominations of the previous election years i.e. in the years 2007, 2012 and 2017 which were not to be taken as declarations for the current year and, therefore, the respondent's counsel had submitted that all such paragraphs were to be struck off. (c) Submission with regard to debarring of the Standing Counsel or the Brief Holder participating as authorized agents was not based on substantial rules or regulations and therefore that portion of the pleadings was also to be struck off. (d) There was a mis-statement made with regard to a property called 2, Minto Park, Prayagraj and that the returned candidate in fact was having illegal possession over it was also a figment of imagination of the election petitioner and, therefore, the averments made with regard to those facts had to be struck off. (d) There was a mis-statement made with regard to a property called 2, Minto Park, Prayagraj and that the returned candidate in fact was having illegal possession over it was also a figment of imagination of the election petitioner and, therefore, the averments made with regard to those facts had to be struck off. (e) Also, with regard to the fact that the petitioner had stated "Lagu Nahi" with regard to certain social-media platforms was also a misstatement and, therefore, the statement made with regard to that issue also be set-aside. 25. With regard to the pleadings and the absence of 'material facts', suffice it to say that as per the judgments of the Supreme Court in Thangjam Arunkumar vs. Yumkham Erabit Singh & Ors. reported in AIR 2023 SC 4531 ; A. Manju vs. Prajwal Revanna Alias Prajwal R & Ors. reported in (2022) 3 SCC 269 ; Madiraju Venkata Ramana Raju vs. Peddireddigari Ramachandra Reddy & Ors. reported in (2018) 14 SCC 1 Ashraf Kokkum vs. K.V. Abdul Khader & Ors. reported in (2015) 1 SCC 129 and T.M. Jacob vs. C. Poulose & Ors. reported in (1999) 4 SCC 274 it was clear that the omissions, if there are any, could be rectified. However, only if the Court found that there were absolutely no 'material facts' on the basis of which the election petition was filed, then alone the dismissal of the election petition under section 86 of the 1951 Act had to be done. 26. So far as the cause of action is concerned, the Court relies upon the meaning of "cause of action" as has been explained by the Supreme Court in the case of A.B.C. Laminart Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. vs. A.P. Agencies Salem reported in (1989) 2 SCC 163 and paragraph 12 of it becomes important and, therefore, it is being reproduced here as under :- "12. A cause of action means every fact, which if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the court. In other words, it is a bundle of facts which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. It must include some act done by the defendant since in the absence of such an act no cause of action can possibly accrue. In other words, it is a bundle of facts which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. It must include some act done by the defendant since in the absence of such an act no cause of action can possibly accrue. It is not limited to the actual infringement of the right sued on but includes all the material facts on which it is founded. It does not comprise evidence necessary to prove such facts, but every fact necessary for the plaintiff to prove to enable him to obtain a decree. Everything which if not proved would give the defendant a right to immediate judgment must be part of the cause of action. But it has no relation whatever to the defence which may be set up by the defendant nor does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff." CONCLUSION 27. So far as application under Order VI Rule 16 CPC is concerned, the Court orders as follows : (i) Paragraph 7 which relates to certain declarations made by the returned candidate in the nomination papers of the years 2007, 2012 and 2017 were absolutely irrelevant for the adjudication of the declaration made in the year 2022 and, therefore, the paragraph 7 of the election petition is struck off. (ii). Paragraphs 11 to 16 refer to certain sections of the 1951 Act and, therefore, if the paragraphs remain, there would be no prejudice caused to any party. (iii). Paragraphs 18, 19 and 24A of the election petition again state the provisions of law and, therefore, if they remain in the plaint then no prejudice would be caused to any party. (iv). So far as paragraph 27 and its sub-paragraphs are concerned, we would take up every paragraph one by one: (a). Paragraph 27(I) of the plaint is a paragraph which is vague and definitely it requires to be struck off. (b). So far as paragraph 27(II) is concerned, the Court is of the view that the paragraph is essentially with regard to the statements made in the nomination papers of 2007, 2012 and 2017 and, therefore, no useful purpose would be served by retaining this paragraph in the plaint and, therefore, it is struck off. (c). Paragraphs 27(III) and 27(IV) have not been prayed to be deleted. They are being retained. (c). Paragraphs 27(III) and 27(IV) have not been prayed to be deleted. They are being retained. Otherwise also they require to be there as the averments therein would help in thrashing out the controversy as to whether, in the light of the fact that the elected candidate had stated to be having so many degrees, he actually had the one which he claims in his 2022 nomination paper. (v). Paragraphs 28(I) and 28(II) are again having such contents which are palpably vague. In paragraph 28(I) there was a mention with regard to a 'No Objection Certificate' provided by a Tehsildar on 8.2.2022. Whether this certificate is correct or not; for what purpose it was filed and what is the advantage which the respondent got out of it, nothing is clear and, therefore, paragraph 28(I) is struck off. The Court is striking off this paragraph even when its striking off was not prayed for. So far as the contents of paragraph 28(II) are concerned, again it is a letter of Punjab National Bank of the year 2017 and, therefore, it would not in any manner be of any importance to the election of 2022 which is now under challenge. The same is, therefore, struck off (v-a). So far as paragraph 28(III) is concerned, the Court had enquired from the learned counsel for the election petitioner as to what exactly was mentioned in the affidavit which the election petitioner had filed and the election petitioner had showed that affidavit to the Court and from it the Court was made aware that with regard to 2, Minto Park House, Kydganj, Prayagraj, the respondent had only stated that there was an agreement to sell with regard to half part of it in his favour and, therefore, for the election petitioner to say that the respondent had stated that he had owned half part of 2, Minto Park House, Kydganj, Prayagraj was a wrong averment made in paragraph 28(III) and, therefore, it would be in the interest of justice that paragraph 28(III) be also struck off and is, accordingly, struck off. The striking off this paragraph was also not prayed for but is being struck off. (v-b). The striking off this paragraph was also not prayed for but is being struck off. (v-b). With regard to paragraph 28(IV), the Court finds that the averments made in the affidavits with regard to elections of the years 2012 and 2017 had been brought to the fore and, therefore, no useful purpose would be served by keeping them on record. The paragraph 28(IV) is also, thus, struck off. (v-c). Paragraph 28(V) is also irrelevant as it only states with regard to the efforts made by the election petitioner and, therefore, it is struck off. (v-d). So far as paragraphs 28(V)(a), 28(V)(b), 28(V)(c), 28(V)(d), 28(V)(e), 28(V)(f), 28(V)(g), 28(V)(h), 28(V)(i), 28(V) (j), 28(V)(k), 28(V)(l), 28(V)(m), 28(V)(n) are concerned, the Court is of the view that the election petitioner had tried to convey that the original lease deed of Survey No.111/17, Kydganj was executed on 5.7.1946 by the Governor General in favour of one Rai Sahab Hari Ram Agarwal for a term of 19 years, 4 months and 15 days with effect from 5.7.1946. In the Covenant No.6 of the lease it was stated that the lessee shall not make any altercation in the plan or elevation of the dwelling house situate over the land. Further from the averments made in the paragraphs which are being considered, it is stated that Covenant No.6 of the lease said that upon every assignment, transfer or sub-lease of the premises, a notice would be sent to the Cantonment Board, Allahabad. The further allegation in the paragraphs which are being considered was that the first renewal took place on 16.10.1971 and that the last renewal was done on 18.2.2010 for a period of 30 years which expired on 19.11.2025. In paragraph 28(V)(f) it had been stated that, however, quite in contravention of the Covenants of the lease deed of 17.2.2010, one of the heirs of the original lessee Sri Apoorva Agarwal executed an agreement to sell in favour of the respondent and one Sri Ashok Kumar Bajpai. It has been stated that subsequently other heirs of the original lessees had also entered into various agreements to sell those and the respondent. In paragraph 28(V)(k), the averment is that the returned candidate and one Sri Ashok Kumar Bajpai had taken unauthorized possession over the premises 2, Minto Park House, Kydganj, Prayagraj and had also got an electricity connection installed over it. In paragraph 28(V)(k), the averment is that the returned candidate and one Sri Ashok Kumar Bajpai had taken unauthorized possession over the premises 2, Minto Park House, Kydganj, Prayagraj and had also got an electricity connection installed over it. In paragraphs 28(V)(l) and 28(V)(m), it has been stated that there was no lease executed yet in favour of the respondent and Sri Ashok Kumar Bajpai and yet it has been stated by the respondent that it was a self-acquired immovable property and, therefore, he states that the statement was false. Having considered all the statements made in paragraph 28 and its sub-paragraphs, the Court is of the view that the returned candidate had clearly stated that he had an agreement to sell in his favour with regard to the property in question and if there was an agreement to sell then definitely he had a right in the property to the extent the rights flowed out of the agreement to sell. Definitely if he was in possession and the original lessees and their successors had not objected to the possession, then it could be said that the respondent had not, in any manner, told any falsehood when he had filed his nomination and had sworn the affidavit. The paragraphs 28(V)(a), 28(V)(b), 28(V)(c), 28(V)(d), 28(V)(e), 28(V)(f), 28(V)(g), 28(V)(h), 28(V)(i), 28(V)(j), 28(V)(k), 28(V)(l), 28(V)(m), 28(V)(n) are, therefore, struck off. (vi). So far as paragraph 29 and its sub-paragraphs are concerned, the Court was taken through those paragraphs and the following is the finding :- (a). With regard to paragraph 29(I), the Court has to observe that if any averment was to be made in the nomination papers of earlier years of 2012 and 2017 then no adverse inference can be drawn against the respondent and, therefore, paragraphs 29(I), 29(II), 29(III) and 29(IV) are being struck off. However, the other sub-paragraphs of para 29 are retained in as much as the averments made in paragraphs 29(V), 29(VI) and 29(VII) would enable the parties to thrash out as to when and which degree the respondent earned in the year 2003. Also, paragraphs 29(VIII) is being retained as it would help in resolving the issue with regard to the swearing of Columns 11 and 12 of the affidavit filed at the time of nomination. (vii). Also, paragraphs 29(VIII) is being retained as it would help in resolving the issue with regard to the swearing of Columns 11 and 12 of the affidavit filed at the time of nomination. (vii). Paragraphs 30, 30(I), 30(II), 30(III), 30(IV) and 30(V) are also being struck off since they also mention about the facts given out in the earlier nomination papers. However, paragraphs 30(VI) and 30(VII) are being retained as they question the B.Tech. degree from the University of Sheffield, England and this fact if was given out in the nomination of 2022 Assembly Elections, should be resolved. In the background of the fact that the petitioner had stated that till the year 2007 he had continuously got various degrees, it becomes necessary to examine how he had done his BE/B.Tech. degrees in the year 2003. (viii). Paragraphs 31(I), 31(II), 31(III), 31(IV) and paragraphs 32(I), 32(II), 32(III) 32(IV) and 32(V) which are with regard to the fact as to who could become an election agent and a counting agent, raise a substantial issue stating that Atul Kumar Srivastava, son of Satish Chandra Srivastava, R/o 318, New Mumfordganj, Allahabad was a counting agent despite the fact that he was working as a Standing Counsel in the Allahabad High Court and this, learned counsel for the election petitioner had stated, was against the guidelines contained in "Handbook for Counting Agent, Feb. 2019 issued by the Election Commission of India". This issue requires to be resolved and therefore, paragraphs 31(I), 31(II), 31(III), 31(IV), 32, 32(I), 32(II), 32(III), 32(IV) and 32(V) are being retained. 28. The plaint of the election petition, after the paragraphs which have been ordered to be struck off would now continue to be "the plaint" and since the plaint now discloses the specific causes of action, the petition cannot be thrown out as such and, therefore, the plaint cannot be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(a) CPC. 29. All the Grounds and the annexures corresponding to the paragraphs which are retained are being maintained as part of the plaint. 30. The net result is that paragraphs nos. 7, 27(I), 27(II), 28(I), 28(II), 28(III), 28(IV), 28(V), 28(V)(a), 28(V)(b), 28(V)(c), 28(V)(d), 28(V)(e), 28(V)(f), 28(V)(g), 28(V)(h), 28(V)(i), 28(V) (j), 28(V)(k), 28(V)(l), 28(V)(m), 28(V)(n), 29(I), 29(II), 29(III), 29(IV), 30(I), 30(II), 30(III), 30(IV) and 30(V) are struck off. 30. The net result is that paragraphs nos. 7, 27(I), 27(II), 28(I), 28(II), 28(III), 28(IV), 28(V), 28(V)(a), 28(V)(b), 28(V)(c), 28(V)(d), 28(V)(e), 28(V)(f), 28(V)(g), 28(V)(h), 28(V)(i), 28(V) (j), 28(V)(k), 28(V)(l), 28(V)(m), 28(V)(n), 29(I), 29(II), 29(III), 29(IV), 30(I), 30(II), 30(III), 30(IV) and 30(V) are struck off. All Grounds and the annexures corresponding to the paragraphs which have been retained would be a part of the plaint. 31. Learned counsel for the returned candidate had laid much stress on the judgment of the High Court dated 12.9.2022 passed in Election Petition No.10 of 2017 (Anugrah Narayan Singh vs. Harsh Vardhan Bajpayee) and had stated that such issues which were put to rest in that judgment could not be raked up again. However, the Court has been shown the order dated 20.2.2023 passed by the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal Diary No.31469 of 2022 which reads as follows : "Needless to say, any observation contained in the order which is impugned will not stand in the way of the High Court dealing with an election petition in case filed on its own merits." and, therefore, the Court has proceeded with the matter. 32. The applications under Order VI Rule 16 CPC and under Order VII Rule 11 CPC read with section 86 of the 1951 Act are thus disposed of. 33. The parties may submit their draft issues and the case, along with other connected Election Petitions, be listed on 05.05.2025 for framing of issues.