JUDGMENT : SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM, J. 1. The captioned appeals are by a common objector in O.S.Nos.71/2021 and 76/2021 assailing the order of the Executing Court rejecting the application filed under Order XXI Rule 97 of CPC. 2. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to as per their rank before the Executing Court. 3. During the pendency of the execution proceedings in Ex. Nos.922 and 924/2024, a third-party objector filed application in both the suits under Order XXI Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, asserting possessory rights over the schedule property. The objector contended that the decree-holder had executed an agreement to sell in his favour and, therefore, the execution of the ejectment decree in O.S. No.71 and 76/2021 would seriously prejudice his rights. The applications were strongly opposed by the decree-holder, who contended that the objector is a total stranger to the proceedings and has no locus standi to maintain an application under Order XXI Rule 97 of CPC. The decree- holder further submitted that the objector had taken contradictory stands on one hand claiming to be an agreement holder, and on the other asserting tenancy rights under the decree-holder. 4. Upon consideration of the pleadings and material on record, the Executing Court held that the objector was relying on an unregistered agreement to sell, which cannot confer possessory rights enforceable in execution proceedings. The Court observed that if the objector seeks to enforce such an agreement, the appropriate remedy lies in instituting an independent suit for specific performance. Accordingly, the applications filed under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC in the both the suits were rejected. 5. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant-objector vehemently argued that the Executing Court erred in rejecting the application summarily, without providing the objector an opportunity to lead evidence in support of his claim. He submitted that such a summary rejection amounts to denial of procedural fairness and violation of the principles of natural justice. It was further contended that the objector, having been misadvised, invoked Order XXI Rule 97 CPC based on an agreement to sell; however, the correct legal position is that he is a lawful tenant inducted by the decree-holder. He argued that the decree-holder, under the guise of executing a decree passed in an ejectment suit, is illegally attempting to dispossess a lawful tenant. 6. He argued that the decree-holder, under the guise of executing a decree passed in an ejectment suit, is illegally attempting to dispossess a lawful tenant. 6. The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the finding of the Executing Court regarding the applicability of res judicata is wholly misconceived, especially in light of the liberty granted by this Court in W.P.No.1682/2024. He placed reliance on the following judicial pronouncements in support of his submissions: 1. Asgar and Others vs. Mohan Varma and Others, (2020) 16 SCC 230 2. Noorduddin vs. Dr. K.L. Anand, (1995) 1 SCC 242 3. Smt. Naney Pais vs. S. Surendra and Another, ILR 2010 KAR 629 4. M.G. Chandrashekar vs. P. Kanakambara Rao and Others, RFA No. 1007/2009 5. S. Vignesh Shishir vs. D.S. Paramesh and Another, W.P. No. 2967/2024 7. In response, the learned Senior Counsel for the decree-holder contended that the objection is wholly malafide and a clear attempt to frustrate the execution of a lawful decree. He submitted that the original judgment debtor against whom the decree was passed is the father of the present objector. He drew attention to the lease deed executed in favour of the judgment debtor, which is a registered document covering the period from 01.06.2019 for three years. It is argued that the objector, being the son of the judgment debtor, cannot independently claim to be a tenant based on an alleged oral lease from 2018. He also submitted that the objector had earlier filed a similar application which was dismissed. Therefore, the liberty reserved by this Court in W.P. No.1682/2024 cannot be construed as a licence to file successive applications. Reference was made to the trial Court's order sheet, which records the rejection of the earlier application. 8. Having heard the learned Senior Counsel on both sides and upon perusal of the affidavit filed in support of the application under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC, the following points arise for consideration: (i) Whether the objector is entitled to a full-fledged enquiry in view of the liberty granted by this Court in W.P.No.1682/2024? (ii) Whether the Executing Court was justified in summarily rejecting the application filed under Order XXI Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908? (ii) Whether the Executing Court was justified in summarily rejecting the application filed under Order XXI Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908? (iii) Whether the objector can seek adjudication of his alleged rights arising out of an agreement to sell in an execution proceeding where the decree-holder is seeking to enforce a decree for ejectment passed in O.S.No.71/2021? (iv) What order? FINDING ON POINT No. (i): 9. The co-ordinate Bench while disposing of the writ petition filed by the objector in W.P.1682/2024 issued directions and reserved liberty to obstructer to seek adjudication at the hands of the executing Court. The directions issued by the Co-Ordinate Bench would be relevant and the same are extracted as under: "ORDER i. The writ petition is hereby disposed of. ii. The impugned order dated 26.10.2023 passed on I.A. No.VII in O.S.No.76 of 2021 on the file of the XX Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru City, is modified. iii. I.A. No.VII is disposed of by directing that any judgment, decree, order, etc., passed / to be passed in O.S. No.76 of 2021 would not be biding upon the petitioner nor will it affect his alleged right, title, interest, possession, etc. over the suit schedule property. iv. Liberty is reserved in favour of the petitioner to file appropriate application(s) in the execution proceedings to be instituted by the respondents pursuant to the judgment and decree to be passed by the Trial Court. v. All rival contentions of the petitioner and the respondents in the present petition, in the suit as well as in the execution proceedings to be instituted in future, are kept open and no opinion is expressed on the same. 10. Though liberty was reserved by the Co-Ordinate Bench, the decree-holder has produced the order sheet dated 17.7.2023 in O.S.No.71/2021. This Court deems it fit to cull out the same which reads as under: "Case is advanced by the Learned Counsel for impleading applicant and hence matter is taken up for today's board. Counsel for the plaintiff and impleading applicant present. Counsel for impleading applicant files I.A.No.VIII U/o 1 rule 10 r/w/s CPC and also files list of documents (Xerox). Counsel for the plaintiff submits that the impleading applicant has already filed similar application on 22.04.2022 and the same is rejected by this court. Hence, this court cannot entertain the same application and it shall be rejected. Counsel for impleading applicant files I.A.No.VIII U/o 1 rule 10 r/w/s CPC and also files list of documents (Xerox). Counsel for the plaintiff submits that the impleading applicant has already filed similar application on 22.04.2022 and the same is rejected by this court. Hence, this court cannot entertain the same application and it shall be rejected. Perused the order sheet dated 22.04.2022. On perusal it is found that the impleading applicant filed the similar application and which was rejected by this court. Now, the case is posted for Judgment the applicant files the similar application, this court of the opinion that similar application cannot be entertain again rejected and it shall be rejected. Hence, the application filed by the impleading applicant is rejected. Call on for Judgment by 18.07.2023." 11. The extracted portion of the record, as noted above, clearly indicates that the objector had earlier filed a similar impleading application during the pendency of the original suit. The trial Court, while considering the second impleading application filed by the objector at a later stage, has categorically recorded that the earlier application was rejected by order dated 22.04.2022. This crucial fact namely, the dismissal of the prior application was not disclosed by the objector at the time of seeking liberty before the Co-ordinate Bench in W.P. No.1682/2024. The liberty granted by the Co-ordinate Bench, which permitted the objector to pursue remedies available in execution proceedings, appears to have been obtained without placing this material fact on record. Such suppression of relevant facts amounts to an abuse of process and disentitles the objector from claiming any equitable relief based on the liberty so granted. 12. In light of the above, this Court is of the considered view that the principle of res judicata squarely applies to the present proceedings. The earlier rejection of the objector’s impleading application in the suit proceedings, which attained finality, bars the maintainability of a similar claim in the execution stage, especially when it is founded on identical assertions. Consequently, the liberty granted by the Co-ordinate Bench, having been obtained by suppression of material facts, cannot be relied upon to reopen an issue that stands concluded. Accordingly, Point No.1 is answered in the Negative FINDING ON POINT Nos. (ii) and (iii): 13. Consequently, the liberty granted by the Co-ordinate Bench, having been obtained by suppression of material facts, cannot be relied upon to reopen an issue that stands concluded. Accordingly, Point No.1 is answered in the Negative FINDING ON POINT Nos. (ii) and (iii): 13. Before this Court proceeds to examine the rival contentions, it is crucial to first consider the averments made in the affidavit filed in support of the application under Order XXI Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Paragraphs 2 to 5 of the said affidavit are particularly relevant for the adjudication of the present controversy and are accordingly extracted below for ready reference: "2) I state that I had filed an application under order 1 rule 10 CPC before the trial court in O.S.no.71/2021 and this Hon'ble court had dismissed the I.A. for impleading and I had approached the Hon'ble High court of Karnataka at Bengaluru by filing W.P.no.2967/2024 and the Hon'ble High court has passed order dismissing the writ petition but reserved liberty to me to file applications in the execution proceedings. 3) I am in possession of the suit schedule property by way of being put in possession by the decree holder on the basis of an agreement to sell. I state that the judgment and decree is passed without giving me an opportunity to bring forth the fact of I being in possession on the strength of the sale agreement. 4) I state that the decree holder is in a hurry to execute the decree and I will be evicted in the process of execution of delivery warrant. 5) I state that if the delivery warrant is executed, I will be put to great hardship and irreparable loss." [Emphasis supplied by me] 14. Upon a careful reading of the above-extracted paragraphs of the affidavit, it becomes evident that the objector is primarily seeking adjudication of his alleged rights flowing from an agreement to sell. In this context, it is also necessary to refer to Clause 13 of the said agreement, which in the opinion of this Court, is decisive in resolving the controversy between the parties. Clause 13 directly impacts the objector’s claimed right to seek adjudication in an execution proceeding arising out of a decree for ejectment. The said clause is extracted below for ready reference: "13. Clause 13 directly impacts the objector’s claimed right to seek adjudication in an execution proceeding arising out of a decree for ejectment. The said clause is extracted below for ready reference: "13. The Vendor shall pay up to date taxes and levies and all payments that are incidental to the Vendor's ownership to the Schedule-B- Property. The Vendor shall handover the original documents of the Schedule-B-Property and the copies of the Schedule-A-property to the Purchaser at the time of execution of the Sale deed in favour of the Purchaser or his nominee/s or assign in term thereof, or earlier as may be mutually agreed by the Vendor, and Purchaser in that regard. The Physical possession of the Schedule-B-property will be delivered at the time of execution and registration of the absolute sale deed in favour of the Purchaser or his nominee or on payment of the full payment. The Vendor hereby convent that the original documents related to the Schedule-A-property are handed over to the Association." [Emphasis supplied by me] 15. A plain reading of Clause 13 of the agreement to sell makes it abundantly clear that the objector was never placed in possession of the property pursuant to the said agreement. The clause specifically states that physical possession of the Schedule-B property would be handed over at the time of execution and registration of the absolute sale deed or upon full payment of the consideration. There is no assertion or proof of either event having taken place. Therefore, the objector’s claim to possession based on the agreement to sell is unsubstantiated and untenable. What further weakens the objector's case is the complete shift in his stand before this Court. Having initially claimed rights as an agreement holder, the objector has now taken a diametrically opposite position by asserting leasehold rights, without any supporting pleadings or documents. Such an attempt to alter the foundational basis of the claim is impermissible and clearly falls outside the scope of an application under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC. 16. Even assuming, arguendo, that the objector was inducted into possession as a tenant, there are absolutely no pleadings or materials on record to support this version. The objector’s father, the original judgment debtor, was inducted into possession under a registered lease deed dated 01.06.2019 for a fixed period of three years. 16. Even assuming, arguendo, that the objector was inducted into possession as a tenant, there are absolutely no pleadings or materials on record to support this version. The objector’s father, the original judgment debtor, was inducted into possession under a registered lease deed dated 01.06.2019 for a fixed period of three years. The objector has not placed any independent document evidencing a separate tenancy in his favour. On the contrary, the entire appeal memo proceeds on the footing that the objector is asserting rights through an agreement to sell. The plea that he is a tenant since 2018 has been raised for the first time before this Court and is clearly an afterthought. It is also contrary to Clause 13 of the agreement and stands in stark contradiction to his own pleadings. Hence, this stand deserves to be outrightly rejected. 17. In light of the above facts, what now falls for consideration is whether the objector could have validly invoked the jurisdiction of the Executing Court by filing an application under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC. The answer to this question is a resounding 'No'. The settled position of law is that for an application under Order XXI Rule 97 of CPC to be entertained and taken to trial, the objector must assert an independent, legally recognizable right to possession either through ownership, leasehold, or any lawful title superior to or independent of the decree-holder. 18. The Supreme Court in Brahmdeo Chaudhary vs. Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal , (1997) 3 SCC 694 , has authoritatively held that when a third party in possession raises an objection to the execution of a decree, the Executing Court is duty- bound to adjudicate upon the rival claims in terms of Rules 101 and 103 of Order XXI of CPC, provided the claim is based on a bona fide and independent title. Similarly, in Silverline Forum Pvt. Ltd. vs. Rajiv Trust & Anr. (1998) 3 SCC 723 the Apex Court reiterated that if the resistance is made by a person in possession claiming independent rights, the Executing Court must decide such rights after conducting a full-fledged enquiry. However, the Court also emphasized that frivolous or collusive objections, or objections raised without pleadings or legal foundation, do not warrant such enquiry. 19. (1998) 3 SCC 723 the Apex Court reiterated that if the resistance is made by a person in possession claiming independent rights, the Executing Court must decide such rights after conducting a full-fledged enquiry. However, the Court also emphasized that frivolous or collusive objections, or objections raised without pleadings or legal foundation, do not warrant such enquiry. 19. In the present case, the objector is admittedly claiming through the decree-holder under an agreement to sell and has not shown any independent or superior title to the property. Moreover, Clause 13 of the agreement completely negates the claim of possession. The subsequent plea of tenancy is not supported by any document and stands wholly contradicted by the record. The execution petition arises from a decree for ejectment, and the objector, being the son of the judgment debtor, cannot be permitted to take inconsistent and conflicting stands merely to delay the process of law. This Court is therefore of the firm opinion that the objector has no locus to resist the decree under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC. His remedy, if any, lies in instituting a separate suit for enforcement of contractual rights under the agreement to sell, in accordance with law. 20. Once the objector admits that his rights emanate through the decree-holder and arise out of a contractual obligation embodied in the agreement to sell, the proper legal course is to seek enforcement of that contract before a civil Court. Such a claim does not clothe the objector with the right to obstruct the execution of a lawful ejectment decree. The Supreme Court in Ashan Devi and another vs. Phulwasi Devi and others , (2003) 12 SCC 219 , observed that possession by a licensee or someone holding permissive possession cannot constitute a valid objection under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC. The claim must be independent, lawful, and supported by cogent evidence, none of which is forthcoming in the present case. 21. This Court cannot overlook the collusive and calculated conduct of the objector and his father, the original judgment debtor in their continuing effort to unlawfully retain possession of the suit property despite the decree for ejectment having attained finality. The records clearly disclose that the father was inducted as a tenant under a registered lease deed, which had a fixed term commencing from 01.06.2019. The records clearly disclose that the father was inducted as a tenant under a registered lease deed, which had a fixed term commencing from 01.06.2019. The objector, who is none other than the son of the judgment debtor, is now attempting to obstruct the execution of the decree by alternately claiming rights under an unregistered agreement to sell and, inconsistently, as a tenant in his own right. Such contradictory stands, devoid of any credible documentary support, clearly reveal a mala fide intent to frustrate the lawful enforcement of the decree. The strategy adopted by the objector is nothing but an abuse of the process of law, aimed at perpetuating unauthorized occupation and delaying justice. 22. In these circumstances, the Executing Court was fully justified in summarily rejecting the application under Order XXI Rule 97 of CPC. The scope of an obstruction proceeding is not meant to entertain frivolous and collusive claims, particularly when the objector fails to assert any independent or superior legal right to possession. Permitting such obstruction applications to proceed to trial without a foundational basis would defeat the very purpose of execution proceedings and embolden judgment debtor to resort to dilatory tactics. As rightly observed by the Supreme Court in Periyammal (Dead) through LRs & Ors. v. V. Rajamani & Anr. 2025 SCC OnLine SC 507 , the execution of a decree is not a mere formality but an integral part of the adjudicatory process, and undue delay in execution undermines the rule of law. 23. The enforcement of a decree for ejectment must be swift, effective, and insulated from frivolous interferences. Courts must remain vigilant to ensure that judgment-debtors and their associates do not squat over the property with impunity under the guise of legal remedies. Leniency towards such conduct would not only reward dishonesty but also erode the sanctity of judicial determinations. Therefore, this Court affirms that the Executing Court acted well within its jurisdiction and discretion in summarily rejecting the obstruction application and proceeding to enforce the decree in accordance with law. 24. In view of the admitted and undisputed facts, the Executing Court was justified in summarily rejecting the application filed under Order XXI Rule 97 of CPC. This is not a case that warranted relegation of the parties to trial. 24. In view of the admitted and undisputed facts, the Executing Court was justified in summarily rejecting the application filed under Order XXI Rule 97 of CPC. This is not a case that warranted relegation of the parties to trial. A full-fledged enquiry under Order XXI Rules 101 and 103 of CPC is warranted only where there are conflicting claims of independent title supported by pleadings and documents. In the absence of such material, summary dismissal of the obstruction application was not only appropriate but necessary to prevent abuse of process. Accordingly, point No.(ii) is answered in the affirmative and point No.(iii) is answered in the Negative. Finding on Point No. (iv): 25. In light of the detailed findings recorded on Points 1 to 3, this Court is of the considered view that the appeals preferred by the objector is wholly devoid of merit and do not warrant any interference. The obstructer's attempt to resist the decree under the garb of either an agreement to sell or leasehold rights is untenable and collusive in nature. The judgments cited by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the objector are distinguishable on facts and do not apply to the present cases. 26. Hence, this Court proceeds to pass the following: ORDER : The appeals are dismissed.