JUDGMENT : RAVI NATH TILHARI, J. 1. Heard Sri A. Radha Krishna, learned counsel for the petitioner. None appeared for the respondent. I. Facts : 2. This civil revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioner/defendant challenging the order dated 08.07.2024, passed in R.C.C.No.4 of 2020 (in short, R.C.C), pending in the court of Rent Controller-cum-IV Additional Junior Civil Judge, Visakhapatnam, (learned Court) rejecting I.A.No.833 of 2024 filed by the petitioner under Order XIV Rule 1 Code of Civil Procedure (for short, C.P.C) read with Section 151 C.P.C, to decide land lord and tenant relationship and the jurisdiction of the Court as a preliminary issue as the Rent Court/Rent Tribunal under the Andhra Pradesh/Telangana Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (for short, “the Act, 1960”) was not constituted. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in the title of the C.R.P as also the impugned order, it is wrongly mentioned that the petitioner is the plaintiff and the respondent is the defendant. The correct fact is that the petitioner is the defendant and the respondent is the plaintiff in the Rent Control Case. He submitted that a memo to that effect has also been filed. 4. The respondent is the plaintiff. He filed R.C.C.No.4 of 2020 under Section 10 (i)(ib) 3(iii)(a) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent And Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (for short, the Act, 1960) against the petitioner to vacate the petition schedule premises and deliver the vacant possession, on the plea of, the petitioner being the tenant and the respondent being the landlord. 5. In R.C.C, the petitioner filed I.A.No.833 of 2023 to decide the issue of “landlord and tenant relationship” and the jurisdiction of the IV Additional Junior Civil Judge-Rent Controller court as preliminary issues. It was submitted inter alia that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. The execution of the rent agreement dated 06.09.2018 was denied. The same was said to be forged and fabricated document. 6. The jurisdiction of the court was also challenged on the plea that, the Act, 1960 had been repealed. New Act namely A.P. Residential and Non Residential Premises Tenancy Act, 2017 (Act No.10 of 2018) (for short, the Act, 2018), came into force with effect from 28.03.2018 under which jurisdiction had been conferred on the Rent Court/Tribunal. 6. The jurisdiction of the court was also challenged on the plea that, the Act, 1960 had been repealed. New Act namely A.P. Residential and Non Residential Premises Tenancy Act, 2017 (Act No.10 of 2018) (for short, the Act, 2018), came into force with effect from 28.03.2018 under which jurisdiction had been conferred on the Rent Court/Tribunal. The remedy of the respondent was pleaded to be to file a regular suit in the civil court as under the Act No.10 of 2018, the Rent Court/Tribunal had not been constituted. Plea was taken that the remedy could not be under the Act, 1960. The Court of Rent Controller, as such, had no jurisdiction. 7. The respondent filed counter to I.A No.833 of 2023, submitting inter alia that the I.A. had no merit. It was liable to be dismissed. The R.C.C was coming up for cross-examination of P.W.1 and to delay the proceedings, the I.A was filed. As the Rent Court/Tribunal had not been constituted under the Act, 2018, the Rent Control Court constituted under the Act, 1960 had the jurisdiction. II. Order of the Court of Rent Controller dated 08.07.2024: 8. The learned Court of Rent Controller rejected the I.A.No.833 of 2023, holding that the Rent Court/Tribunal was not constituted under the Act No.10 of 2018. So, under the existing mechanism as per the Act, 1960, the dispute could be entertained and adjudicated. It referred to the judgment in Devathi Ramachandra Rao vs. Kella Dhanalakshmi , 2019 (5) ALD 1 and Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Dhadi Sahu , 1994(TLS) SCC 10653. III. Submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner: 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the question of jurisdiction had been incorrectly decided. The learned court of Rent Controller had no jurisdiction. Under the Act No.10 of 2018, the jurisdiction was conferred on the Rent Court/Rent Tribunal which had not been constituted. Further, in view of the repeal of the Act, 1960, the Rent Controller could not have jurisdiction, even if the Rent Court/Rent Tribunal had not been constituted under the Act No.10 of 2018. 10. Placing reliance in Mara Venkata Lingam vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, rep. Further, in view of the repeal of the Act, 1960, the Rent Controller could not have jurisdiction, even if the Rent Court/Rent Tribunal had not been constituted under the Act No.10 of 2018. 10. Placing reliance in Mara Venkata Lingam vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, rep. by its Principal Secretary, Law Department and others , 2019 SCC OnLine AP 272 , learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Courts which are vested with the jurisdiction to entertain the civil suit can also entertain the suits filed by the lessees stating injustice and for relevant reliefs. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner next submitted that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the respondent and the petitioner. So, there was no jurisdiction in the court of Rent Controller. He submitted that the question of relationship deserved to be decided as a preliminary issue, but had not been decided by the Rent Controller. IV. Points for determination: 12. Following points arise for consideration and determination by this Court: (A) Whether the court of the Rent Controller-cum-IV Additional Junior Civil Judge-Rent Controller Court, Visakhapatnam had no jurisdiction in the matter? and (B) Whether the question of relationship of landlord and tenant between the respondent and the petitioner was required to be decided as a preliminary issue? (C) Whether the impugned order is legal and justified or it calls for interference? V. Analysis: 13. I have considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the material on record. Point-A: 14. This Court would first refer to Dhadi Sahu (supra), which has been referred in the impugned order and some later pronouncements of Hon’ble the Apex Court. 14.1. In Dhadi Sahu (supra), a change in forum came to be made during pendency of the proceedings before one forum, Inspecting Assistant Commissioner which initially had the jurisdiction, under the Income Tax Act when the matter was referred. The Hon’ble Apex Court held that the general principle is that a law which brings about a change in the forum does not affect pending actions, unless intention to the contrary is clearly shown. One of the modes by which such an intention is shown is by making a provision for change-over of proceedings, from the court or the tribunal where they are pending to the court or the tribunal which under the new law gets jurisdiction to try case. 14.2. One of the modes by which such an intention is shown is by making a provision for change-over of proceedings, from the court or the tribunal where they are pending to the court or the tribunal which under the new law gets jurisdiction to try case. 14.2. The Hon’ble Apex Court further held that, no litigant has any vested right in the matter of procedural law, but where the question is of change of forum it ceases to be a question of procedure only. The forum of appeal or proceedings is a vested right as opposed to pure procedure to be followed before a particular forum. The right becomes vested when the proceedings are initiated in the tribunal or the court of first instance and unless the legislature has by express words or by necessary implication clearly so indicated, that vested right will continue, in spite of the change of jurisdiction of the different tribunals or forums. With respect to forum being vested right as opposed to pure procedure and change of forum ceasing to be a question of procedure only as held in Dadhi Sahu (supra), the same was recently considered and discussed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Neena Aneja and another vs. Jai Prakash Associates Limited , [ (2022) 2 SCC 161 ]. 14.3 Paras 41 to 44 of Neena Aneja (supra) deserve to be reproduced as under: “41. Now, in this backdrop, it becomes necessary to consider the 1992 decision of a two judge Bench of this Court in Dhadi Sahu (supra) and several decisions which adverted to it. This was a case where the assessee had preferred appeals to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal allowed the appeals and set aside the penalties holding that in view of the amendment made to Section 274(2) of the Income Tax Act 1961 with effect from 1 April 1971, the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner34 lost his jurisdiction. The power of the Income Tax Officer to impose a penalty under Section 271 was subject to Section 274. As a result of the amending Act which came into force on 1 st April 1971, the amount of income allegedly concealed had to exceed twenty- five thousand rupees. The power of the Income Tax Officer to impose a penalty under Section 271 was subject to Section 274. As a result of the amending Act which came into force on 1 st April 1971, the amount of income allegedly concealed had to exceed twenty- five thousand rupees. The effect of this amendment was that the Assistant Commissioner did not have jurisdiction over the assessee as the concealed “Dhadi Sahu”; “IAC” PART-C amount was lesser than the minimum amount prescribed by the subsequent amendment. 42. Yogeshwar Dayal, J speaking for the two judge Bench premised the judgment on "the general principle of law" that a change of forum does not affect pending actions unless a contrary intent is shown: “18. It may be stated at the outset that the general principle is that a law which brings about a change in the forum does not affect pending actions unless intention to the contrary is clearly shown. One of the modes by which such an intention is shown is by making a provision for change-over of proceedings, from the court or the tribunal where they are pending to the court or the tribunal which under the new law gets jurisdiction to try them.” 43. This Court held that the amending Act did not make any provision that references validly pending before IAC shall be returned without passing any final order if the amount of income in respect of which particulars have been concealed did not exceed rupees twenty five thousand. This, in the view of the Court, supported the inference that the IAC continued to have jurisdiction to impose a penalty on pending references. The previous operation of Section 274(2) as it stood before 1 April 1971 and anything done under it, continued to have effect under Section 6(b) for the General Clauses Act enabling the IAC to pass orders imposing a penalty in a pending reference. If the reference was made before 1 April 1971, it would be governed by Section 274(2) as it stood before that date and the IAC would continue to have jurisdiction. However, in paragraph 21 of the decision, this Court observed: “21. It is also true that no litigant has any vested right in the matter of procedural law but where the question is of change of forum it ceases to be a question of procedure only. However, in paragraph 21 of the decision, this Court observed: “21. It is also true that no litigant has any vested right in the matter of procedural law but where the question is of change of forum it ceases to be a question of procedure only. The forum of appeal or proceedings is a vested right as opposed to pure procedure to be followed before a particular forum. The right becomes vested when the proceedings are initiated PART-C in the tribunal or the court of first instance and unless the legislature has by express words or by necessary implication clearly so indicated, that vested right will continue in spite of the change of jurisdiction of the different tribunals or forums.” 44. This Court in Dhadi Sahu (supra) then adverted to the decision in Manujendra Dutt(supra) and Mohd. Idris(supra) and observed that "amending an Act does not show that the pending proceedings before the court on reference abate". Therefore, the decision of the two judge Bench in Dhadi Sahu(supra) held that a litigant had a crystallized right to a forum when proceedings have been initiated and are pending. Such a right vested, in the view of the Court, is distinct from a pure procedure to be followed before the forum concerned. In taking this view, the two judge Bench in Dhadi Sahu(supra) did not consider a three judge bench decision in New India Assurance(supra) as well as a previous co-ordinate Bench decision in Maria Cristina(supra), which relied on common law jurisprudence and Section 6 of the General Clauses Act to hold that a change in forum is purely a procedural matter which operates retrospectively in the absence of a contrary legislative mandate. The latter principle has since been followed in the decisions in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur (supra); Sudhir G Angur (supra).” 14.4. In Neena Aneja (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court concluded on the position of law with respect to change of Forum in paragraphs 72 and 73 which reads as under:- “72. In considering the myriad precedents that have interpreted the impact of a change in forum on pending proceedings and retrospectivity- a clear position of law has emerged: a change in forum lies in the realm of procedure. Accordingly, in compliance with the tenets of statutory interpretation applicable to procedural law, amendments on matters of procedure are retrospective, unless a contrary intention emerges from the statute . Accordingly, in compliance with the tenets of statutory interpretation applicable to procedural law, amendments on matters of procedure are retrospective, unless a contrary intention emerges from the statute . This position emerges from the decisions in New India Assurance(supra), Maria Cristina(supra), Hitendra Kumar Thakur(supra), Ramesh Kumar Soni(supra) and Sudhir G Angur(supra). More recently, this position has been noted in a three judge Bench decision of this Court in Manish Kumar v. Union of India51. However, there was a deviation by a two judge bench decision of this Court in Dhadi Sahu(supra), which overlooked the decision of a larger three judge bench in New India Assurance(supra) and of a co-ordinate two judge bench in Maria Cristina(supra). The decision in Dhadi Sahu(supra) propounded a position that “no litigant has any vested right in the matter of procedural law but where the question is of change of forum it ceases to be a question of procedure only. The forum of appeal or proceedings is a vested right as opposed to pure procedure to be followed before a particular forum. The Writ Petition (C) No. 26 of 2020, decided on 19 January 2021 (Supreme Court of India) PART C right becomes vested when the proceedings are initiated in the tribunal.” In taking this view, the two judge bench did not consider binding decisions. Dhadi Sahu(supra) failed to consider that the saving of pending proceedings in Mohd. Idris(supra) and Manujendra Dutt(supra) was a saving of vested rights of the litigants that were being impacted by the repealing acts therein, and not because a right to forum is accrued once proceedings have been initiated. Thereafter, a line of decisions followed Dhadi Sahu(supra), to hold that a litigant has a crystallized right to a forum once proceedings have been initiated. A litigant’s vested right (including the right to an appeal) prior to the amendment or repeal are undoubtedly saved, in addition to substantive rights envisaged under Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. This protection does not extend to pure matters of procedure. Repeals or amendments that effect changes in forum would ordinarily affect pending proceedings, unless a contrary intention appears from the repealing or amending statute. 73. This protection does not extend to pure matters of procedure. Repeals or amendments that effect changes in forum would ordinarily affect pending proceedings, unless a contrary intention appears from the repealing or amending statute. 73. It is relevant to note in this context that the decision in Ambalal Sarabhai (supra) saved proceedings in relation to a benefit which although not vested, accrued to the landlord to evict the tenant by virtue of a proviso to a Section which accorded protection to the tenant from ejectment. This Court reasoned that since the right of the landlord flows from a Section which protects the tenant, it cannot be enlarged into a vested right. However, Ambalal Sarabhai(supra) did not enunciate an absolute proposition that the right to institute proceedings at a particular forum is an accrued right, let alone a vested right. The dictum that a change of forum is a procedural matter is not altered by the decision of this Court in Ambalal Sarabhai(supra) which sought to PART C differentiate between vested rights and accrued rights, the latter being protected under Section 6(c) of the General Clauses Act, the proceedings in relation to which are protected under Section 6(e). 14.5 In Mumtaz Yarud Dowla Wakf vs. Badam Balakrishna Hotel Pvt., Limited and others , [2023 SCC OnLine SC 1378] , the Hon’ble Apex Court considered the issue of retrospective application and change of Forum. It was held that when a statute is amended on an issue pertaining to a forum for adjudication, it being procedural, takes effect retrospectively. A party to a lis does not have any vested right of forum as against action. In the absence of any substantive right being subsumed by a particular forum, one has to give retrospective application. 14.6. In Mumtaz Yarud Dowla Wakf (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that there was a subtle difference in dealing with a case involving quorum non judicie. The principle governing lack of jurisdiction to a forum might differ from a case where two or more forums deal with the same issue along with the rights and liabilities of the parties. To make the position clear, one had to see as to whether there was any change in the rights and liabilities of the parties by choosing one forum as against the other. To make the position clear, one had to see as to whether there was any change in the rights and liabilities of the parties by choosing one forum as against the other. As an example, taking the case of eviction of a tenant, it was held that if he was to be evicted only under the Rent Control Act which extended a certain right to the tenant, who could not be evicted otherwise than under the provisions contained therein, a common law remedy could not be invoked by way of a suit as against a proceeding before the Rent Controller. Para 17 of Mumtaz Yarud Dowla Wakf (supra) deserves to be reproduced which reads as under:- “17. There is a subtle difference when we deal with a case involving coram non-judice. The principle governing lack of jurisdiction to a forum may differ from a case where two or more forums deal with the same issue along with the rights and liabilities of the parties. To make the position clear, one has to see as to whether there is any change in the rights and liabilities of the parties by choosing one forum as against the other. As an example, we can take the case of eviction of a tenant. If he is to be evicted only under the Rent Control Act which extends a certain right to the tenant, who cannot be evicted otherwise than under the provisions contained therein, a common law remedy cannot be invoked by way of a suit as against a proceeding before the Rent Controller. In that view of the matter, certainly the question of prejudice would arise. However, in a case involving same rights and liabilities but the question is only with respect to the forum being judicial or quasi- judicial, the issue of jurisdiction would pale into insignificance when it is sought to be raised as a last straw at a very belated stage. Therefore, when the process becomes the same for both parties who undertake the said route willingly, the question of jurisdiction cannot be put against each other after it has attained finality, unless it is demonstrated that the rights of the party who suffered the decree are obliterated.” 15. The law, therefore, is well settled that a change in Forum lies in the realm of procedure. The law, therefore, is well settled that a change in Forum lies in the realm of procedure. Amendments on matters of procedure are retrospective unless a contrary intention emerges from the statute. The repeals or amendments that effect changes in forum would ordinarily affect pending proceedings, unless a contrary intention appears from the repealing or amending statute. 16. Section 47 in Andhra Pradesh Residential and Non- Residential Premises Tenancy Act, 2017 “ 47. Repeal and savings. (1) The Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 is hereby repealed. (2) Notwithstanding such repeal and subject to the provisions of this Act all cases and other proceedings under the said Act pending, at the commencement of this Act, shall be continued and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the said Act, as if the said Act had continued in force and this Act had not been passed :Provided that the plaintiff within a period of 180 days of coming into force of this Act shall be entitled to withdraw any suit or appeal or any other proceeding pending under the repealed Act with liberty to file fresh application in respect of the subject-matter of such suit or appeal or any other proceeding under and in accordance with the provisions of this Act, and for the purposes of limitation, such application if it is filed within a period of 270 days from the commencement of this Act be deemed to have been filed on the date of filing of the suit which was withdrawn and in case of withdrawal of appeal or other proceedings on the date on which the suit was filed out of which such appeal or proceeding originated.” 17. Section 47 of the Act No.10 of 2008 which repeals the Act, 1960, provides that notwithstanding such repeal and subject to the provisions of the Act or cases and other proceedings under the Act, 1960, pending at the commencement of the Act of 2018 shall be continued and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the said Act, as if the said Act had continued in force and the Act, 2018 had not been passed. 18. 18. So, with respect to the pending matter, under the Act of 1960, pending on the date of enforcement of the Act No.10 of 2018, care has been taken with respect to the forum, i.e that, those shall be continued in the same forum, as if the Act No.10 of 2018 had not been enacted and the Act of 1960 had not been repealed. Further, under Section 47 (2), option has been given to the plaintiff within the specified period of 180 days of the, Act No.10 of 2018 coming into force, permitting him to withdraw the suit or proceeding under the Act, 1960, with opportunity to file fresh application in respect of the subject matter under the Act No.10 of 2018. 19. However, with respect to the fresh proceedings Act No.10 of 2018 provides for new forum of Rent Court under Section 2(h) to be constituted under Section 30 and for the appeal to Rent Tribunal under Section 2(j), constituted under Section 31 of the Act 10 of 2018. 20. Section 2(h),(j), 30 and 31 of the Act No.10/2018 are as under:- “2(h) “Rent Court” means a Rent Court constituted under Section 30 ; 2(j) “Rent Tribunal” means Rent Tribunal constituted under Section 31 ;” “30. Constitution of Rent Court. – (1) The State Government may, by notification, constitute such number of Rent Courts in as many urban areas as may be deemed necessary by it. (2) Where two or more Rent Courts are constituted for any urban area, the State Government may, by general or special order, regulate the distribution of business among them. (3) A Rent Court may consist of one person only (hereinafter referred to as the Presiding Officer) to be appointed by the State Government in consultation with the High Court. (4) No person shall be eligible to be appointed as Presiding Officer of the Rent Court unless he is member of the State Higher Judicial Service. (5) The State Government may, in consultation with the High Court, authorize the Presiding Officer of one rent Court to discharge the functions of the Presiding Officer of another Rent Court also.” “31. Constitution of Rent Tribunal. – (1) The State Government may, by notification, constitute such number of Rent Tribunals at such places as may be deemed necessary by it. Constitution of Rent Tribunal. – (1) The State Government may, by notification, constitute such number of Rent Tribunals at such places as may be deemed necessary by it. (2) Where two or more Rent Tribunals are constituted for any area, the State Government may, by general or special order, regulate the distribution of business among them. (3) The Rent Tribunal shall consist of one person only (hereafter referred to as the presiding officer of the rent Tribunal) to be appointed by the State Government in consultation with the High Court. (4) No person shall be eligible to be appointed as the presiding officer of the Rent Tribunal unless he has been High Court Judge.” 21. So, far the Rent Court/Tribunal under Act No.10 of 2018 have not been established. 22. Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) provides as under: “The Courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained)have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. Explanation [I ].-A suit in which the right to property or to an office is contested is a suit of a civil nature, notwithstanding that such right may depend entirely on the decision of questions as to religious rites or ceremonies. [ Explanation II .-For the purposes of this section, it is immaterial whether or not any fees are attached to the office referred to in Explanation I or whether or not such office is attached to a particular place.]” 23. It is well settled in law that exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil Court is not to be readily inferred. But it can be excluded by specific provision or may also follow by necessary implication. In the present case, Act 10/2018 exclusively bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in respect of the matter under the Act 10/2018. 24. The jurisdiction of the Civil Court is also barred. Section 40 of the Act No.10 of 2018 reads as under:- “40. Jurisdiction of civil Courts barred in respect of certain matters. – (1) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, no civil Court shall entertain any suit or proceeding insofar as it relates to the provisions of this Act.” 25. The jurisdiction of the Civil Court is also barred. Section 40 of the Act No.10 of 2018 reads as under:- “40. Jurisdiction of civil Courts barred in respect of certain matters. – (1) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, no civil Court shall entertain any suit or proceeding insofar as it relates to the provisions of this Act.” 25. A perusal of Section 40 of the Act No.10 of 2018, clearly shows that save as otherwise provided, no civil court shall entertain any suit or proceedings in so far as it relates to the provisions of the Act No.10 of 2008. So, Section 40 clearly bars the jurisdiction of the civil court with respect to the matters relating to the provisions of the Act No.10 of 2008. 26. The Hon’ble Apex Court held in Mumtaz Yarud Dowla Wakf (supra) that When a specialized forum is made available under a statute, a civil court should normally entertain a dispute which would otherwise not be amenable before the said Forum. Therefore, rights and liabilities of the parties arising from an enactment ought to be adjudicated upon in tune with the mechanism provided thereunder. The reason being that the provisions of the enactment ought to be given effect to through such forums and therefore to the exclusion of a civil court whose jurisdiction is otherwise to be inferred. Para 27 is reproduced as under: “27. When a specialized forum is made available under a statute, a civil court should normally entertain a dispute which would otherwise not be amenable before the said forum. Therefore, rights and liabilities of the parties arising from an enactment ought to be adjudicated upon in tune with the mechanism provided thereunder. The reason being that the provisions of the enactment ought to be given effect to through such forums and therefore to the exclusion of a civil court whose jurisdiction is otherwise to be inferred. J. Willes in Wolverhampton New Waterworks Co. v. Hawkesford [1859] 6 C.B. (NS) 336, “One is where there was a liability existing at common law, and that liability is affirmed by a Statute which gives a special and peculiar form of remedy different from the remedy which existed at common law: there, unless the Statute contains words which expressly or by necessary implication exclude the common law remedy the party suing has his election to pursue either that or the statutory remedy. The second class of cases is, where the Statute gives the right to sue merely, but provides, no particular form of remedy: there, the party can only proceed by action at common law. But there is a third class, viz., where a liability not existing at common law is created by a Statute which at the same time gives a special and particular remedy for enforcing it ........ The remedy provided by the Statute must be followed and it is not competent to the party to pursue the course applicable to cases of the second class.” (emphasis supplied)” 27. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Mumtaj Yarud Dowla Wakf (supra) further held that as a principle of law, the powers of the civil court, being plenary in nature, the onus lies on the party who contends that it lacked jurisdiction and further that, would not take away the duty of the civil court to check its own jurisdiction, more so when a specialized forum had come into being as a creature of a statute. Para 28 is reproduced as under: “28. As a principle of law, the powers of the civil court, being plenary in nature, the onus lies on the party who contends that it lacks jurisdiction. However, this does not take away the duty of the civil court to check its own jurisdiction, more so when a specialized forum has come into being as a creature of a statute. Of course, there may be certain exceptions when fundamental principles governing common law, including the one pertaining to the principle of natural justice, stand violated. To deal with the said issue one has to take into consideration the objective behind the enactment, along with the provisions contained thereunder. Dhulabhai etc. v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Another, (1968) 3 SCR 662 : AIR 1969 SC 78 , “32. Neither of the two cases of Firm of Illuri Subayya, 1964-1 SCR 752 = ( AIR 1964 SC 322 ) or Kamla Mills, 1966 1 SCR 64 = ( AIR 1965 SC 1942 ) can be said to run counter to the series of cases earlier noticed. Neither of the two cases of Firm of Illuri Subayya, 1964-1 SCR 752 = ( AIR 1964 SC 322 ) or Kamla Mills, 1966 1 SCR 64 = ( AIR 1965 SC 1942 ) can be said to run counter to the series of cases earlier noticed. The result of this inquiry into the diverse views expressed in this Court may be stated as follows: (1) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special tribunals the civil courts' jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil courts would normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. (2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil court. Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in civil courts are prescribed by the said statute or not. xxxxx (7) An exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court is not readily to be inferred unless the conditions above set down apply.” 28. xxxxx (7) An exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court is not readily to be inferred unless the conditions above set down apply.” 28. In such a situation, in Devathi Ramachandra Rao (supra), where the suit for eviction was filed in the court of the Principal Junior Civil Judge, Tenali and the plaint was returned for presentation before the proper Forum, considering that the Act No.10 of 2018 came into force with effect from 28.03.2018, which contained, express bar to entertain the suit by the civil court, under Section 40 (1) and Section 32, also provided that only the Rent Control Court and no civil court shall have jurisdiction to hear and decide the applications relating to disputes between the landlord and the tenant, and the matters connected with and rent ancillary thereto, covered under the Act No.10 of 2018, this court observed that the provisions of Sections 40 and 32 created express bar to entertain any suit by the civil court, but under the Act No.10 of 2018, no Tribunal was constituted. This Court referring to the judgment of the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad, in W.P.No.9681 of 2008 dated 11.11.2008, ( Sri Udasin Mutt rep by its Mahant Sri Arundas Udasin, R/o Udasin Mutt H. No. 203311 Hussaini Alam Hyderabad and The Deputy Commissioner of Endowments, Endowments Department Hyderabad Andhra Pradesh) allowed the revision and directed the learned court of Principal Junior Civil Judge to entertain the suit. 29. The relevant part of para 6 in Devathi Ramachandra Rao (supra), reads as under: “Learned Counsel for the petitioner for the purpose guiding this Court has submitted the ruling of the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh, at Hyderabad in Writ Petition No. 9681 of 2008, dated11.11.2008, wherein this Court in the similar situation held as follows by relying on the judgment of the Honourable Apex Court.” "If is not uncommon that the Tribunal or agencies are constituted to adjudicate the disputes arising under the relevant enactments, While in some cases, the arrangement is made at the initial stage itself, in the other cases, they are made by way of amendment. Wherever the adjudicatory procedure or process is amended, the known principle is that till the agency contemplated under the law becomes functional, the existing arrangement must continue. In fact, that is the purport of the relevant provisions of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Wherever the adjudicatory procedure or process is amended, the known principle is that till the agency contemplated under the law becomes functional, the existing arrangement must continue. In fact, that is the purport of the relevant provisions of the General Clauses Act, 1897. In COMMISSIONER Of INCOME TAX v DHADI SAHU [1994 (TLS)SCC 10853] , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that if) the adjudicatory machinery contemplated under an enactment is brought into existence, the arrangement that has been functional prior to it would continue, Similar view was taken in the earlier judgments also." 30. Similarly in Mara Venkata Lingam (supra), also the question was when the Rent Court/Tribunal as envisaged in Section 3 0 of the Act No.10 of 2018 was not constituted, what would be the remedy, and whether the civil court could entertain the suit for injunction till such rent court was constituted. There also, the suit was filed by the plaintiff contending that he was a statutory tenant and could not be evicted from the shop in tenancy, without following the due process of law. The plaint was returned referring to Section 40 of the Act 10 of 2018. Challenging the said order, the petition was filed. This Court observed that the Act 10 2018, repealed the Act of 1960. The Act No.10 of 2018 came into force from 28.03.2018 vide G.O.Ms.No.118 (Municipal Administration and Urban Development) Department dated 28.03.2018, issued as per Section 1(3) of the Act 10 of 2018. It was observed that in view of Section 40 , the jurisdiction of the civil court was barred, in respect of the matters relating to the provisions under the Act No.10 of 2010. However, this court held that since the Rent Court/Tribunals were not constituted in terms of Section 3 0 of the Act No.10 of 2018, the citizens could not be left remediless, in the interregnum period. Referring to W.P.No.9681 of 2008 (supra) Mara Venkata Lingam (supra) was also disposed of setting aside the order of the civil court of return of plaint holding that, the civil courts were vested with the jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 31. The relevant part of para 8 from Mara Venkata Lingam (supra) reads as under: “8. Referring to W.P.No.9681 of 2008 (supra) Mara Venkata Lingam (supra) was also disposed of setting aside the order of the civil court of return of plaint holding that, the civil courts were vested with the jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 31. The relevant part of para 8 from Mara Venkata Lingam (supra) reads as under: “8. In W.P.No.9681 of 2008, the learned single in this regard referred the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Commissioner of Income Tax's case referred supra, wherein it was held by the Apex Court that till the adjudicatory machinery contemplated under an enactment is brought into existence, the arrangement that has been functional prior to it would continue.” 32. In both the aforesaid judgments, Devathi Ramachandra Rao (supra) and Mara Venkata Lingam (supra), this Court referred to the order dated 11.11.2008 in W.P.No.9681 of 2008. 33. In W.P.No.9681 of 2008 vide order dated 11.11.2008 ( Sri Udasin Mutt, represented by its Mahant Sri Arundas Udasin vs. Deputy Commissioner of Endowments, Endowments Department, Hyderabad and others , a Coordinate Bench of this Court observed that It is not uncommon that the Tribunal or agencies are constituted to adjudicate the disputes arising under the relevant enactments. While in some cases, the arrangement is made at the initial stage itself, in the other cases, they are made by way of amendment. Wherever the adjudicatory procedure or process is amended, the known principle is that till the agency contemplated under the law becomes functional the existing arrangement must continue. It was further observed that whatever be the reason, the hiatus could not permitted to continue. 34. The relevant part in W.P.No.9681 of 2008, reads as under:- “It is not uncommon that the Tribunal or agencies are constituted to adjudicate the disputes arising under the relevant enactments. While in some cases, the arrangement is made at the initial stage itself, in the other cases, they are made by way of amendment. Wherever the adjudicatory procedure or process is amended, the known principle is that till the agency contemplated under the law becomes functional, the existing arrangement must continue. In fact, that is the purport of the relevant provisions of the General Clauses Act, 1897. In Dhadi Sahu (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that till the adjudicatory machinery contemplated under an enactment is brought into existence, the arrangement that has been functional prior to it would continue. In fact, that is the purport of the relevant provisions of the General Clauses Act, 1897. In Dhadi Sahu (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that till the adjudicatory machinery contemplated under an enactment is brought into existence, the arrangement that has been functional prior to it would continue. Similar view was taken in the earlier judgment also.” 35. The Act, 10 of 2018 came into force on 28, March, 2018. The jurisdiction under the said Act has been conferred on the Rent Courts and the Rent Tribunal. Those should have been constituted immediately. This Court finds that In Mara Venkata Lingam (supra), para 5, it was observed and recoded as under: “5. Sri Syed Khader Mastan, counsel representing the Advocate General Office, on instructions would submit that steps are now under afoot for establishment of the Rent Courts as laid down under Section 30 of the Act and within a reasonable time the Rent Courts will be established in consultation with Hon'ble High Court.” The aforesaid shows that way back on 18.06.2019, the statement was made, that within a reasonable time the Rent Courts will be established. Since then, almost six years are about to elapse but the rent courts/Tribunals have not come into existence, giving rise to a situation that there are no Rent Courts/Tribunals constituted under the Act 10 of 2018. The Civil Courts jurisdiction is barred under Sections 32 and 40 of the Act 10/2018. The Act also does not provide for the mechanism to be followed till the constitution of such rents courts/rent tribunal. 36. The party having the right to take recourse, under the Act, 2018 has not been provided the Forum. The Executive by its inaction cannot take away the right conferred by the statute on the landlord seeking redressal against the tenant or on the tenant to enforce certain obligations of the landlord. It cannot be that though the party aggrieved has the remedy provided by the statute, but not the Forum to approach for redressal of grievance and seek such remedy. This Court is of the view that, therefore, under the circumstances, the Forum constituted under the Act, 1960, for redressal of the grievance of the landlord or/and tenant, which are almost of the same nature under the Act 10/2018, can very well address the grievances, till constitution of the Forum as provided under the Act No.10/2018. This Court is of the view that, therefore, under the circumstances, the Forum constituted under the Act, 1960, for redressal of the grievance of the landlord or/and tenant, which are almost of the same nature under the Act 10/2018, can very well address the grievances, till constitution of the Forum as provided under the Act No.10/2018. For the grievance under the Act No.10/2018 and its redressal, the land lord or/and tenant can approach under the existing Forum created under the Act, 1960, which still continues and shall have jurisdiction to decide the disputes under the Act No. 10/2018 as well. It is provided that the orders passed by such forum shall not be treated as without jurisdiction on that count. Point-B: 37. So far as the submission of the petitioner’s counsel that the learned court has not decided the issue of landlord and tenant relationship as a preliminary issue, this Court is of the view that such issue could not be decided as a preliminary issue. Any provision under the Act, 1960 or Act No. 10/2018 could not be shown about the applicability of Order 14 Rule 2 C.P.C, nor any independent provision under the aforesaid Act like Order 14 Rule 2 CPC. 38. However, this Court proceeds to deal with the aforesaid submission considering the scope of Order 14 Rule 2 CPC. 39. Order 14 Rule 2 CPC reads as under: “2. Court to pronounce judgment on all issues. (1) Notwithstanding that a case may be disposed of on preliminary issue, the Court shall, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2), pronounce judgment on all issues. (2) Where issues both of law and of fact arise in the same suit, and the Court is of opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on an issue of law only, it may try that issue first if that issue relates to- (a) the jurisdiction of the Court, or (b) a bar to the suit created by any law for the time being in-force. and for that purpose may, if it thinks fit, postpone the settlement of the other issues until after that issue has been determined, and may deal with the suit in accordance with the decision on that issue.” 40. and for that purpose may, if it thinks fit, postpone the settlement of the other issues until after that issue has been determined, and may deal with the suit in accordance with the decision on that issue.” 40. In Kandregula Rama Babu and others vs. Kondapalli Venkata Lakshmi and others , [2024 SCC OnLine AP 5739] , this Court held in paragraphs13,14,15, 16, 18 and 19 as under: “13. In Ramesh B.Desai v. Bipin Vadilal Mehta , [(2006) 5 Superme Court Cases 638] , the Hon’ble Apex Court held that the Code confers no jurisdiction upon the court to try a suit on mixed issues of law and fact as a preliminary issue and where the decision on issue of law depends upon decision of fact, it cannot be tried as a preliminary issue. 14. Para No.13 of Ramesh B.Desai (supra), reads as under: .. “13. Sub-rule (2) of Order XIV Rule 2 CPC lays down that where issues both of law and of fact arise in the same suit, and the Court is of opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on an issue of law only, it may try that issue first if that issue relates to (a) the jurisdiction of the Court, or (b) a bar to the suit created by any law for the time being in force. The provisions of this Rule came up for consideration before this Court in Major S.S. Khanna vs. Brig. F.J. Dillon AIR 1964 SC497, and it was held as under:- "Under O. 14 R. 2 where issues both of law and of fact arise in the same suit, and the Court is of opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on the issues of law only, it shall try those issues first, and for that purpose may, if it thinks fit, postpone the settlement of the issues of fact until after the issues of law have been determined. The jurisdiction to try issues of law apart from the issues of fact may be exercised only where in the opinion of the Court the whole suit may be disposed of on the issues of law alone, but the Code confers no jurisdiction upon the Court to try a suit on mixed issues of law and fact as preliminary issues. The jurisdiction to try issues of law apart from the issues of fact may be exercised only where in the opinion of the Court the whole suit may be disposed of on the issues of law alone, but the Code confers no jurisdiction upon the Court to try a suit on mixed issues of law and fact as preliminary issues. Normally all the issues in a suit should be tried by the Court: not to do so, especially when the decision on issues even of law depends upon the decision of issues of fact, would result in a lop-sided trial of the suit." Though there has been a slight amendment in the language of Order XIV Rule 2 CPC by the Amending Act, 1976, but the principle enunciated in the above quoted decision still holds good and there can be no departure from the principle that the Code confers no jurisdiction upon the Court to try a suit on mixed issue of law and fact as a preliminary issue and where the decision on issue of law depends upon decision of fact, it cannot be tried as a preliminary issue. 41. In Sathyanath v. Sarojamani , [ (2022) 7 SCC 644 ] , the Hon’ble Apex Court observed and held as under: “21. The provisions of Order 14 Rule 2 are part of the procedural law, but the fact remains that such procedural law had been enacted to ensure expeditious disposal of the lis and in the event of setting aside of findings on preliminary issue, the possibility of remand can be avoided, as was the language prior to the unamended Order 14 Rule 2. If the issue is a mixed issue of law and fact, or issue of law depends upon the decision of fact, such issue cannot be tried as a preliminary issue. In other words, preliminary issues can be those where no evidence is required and on the basis of reading of the plaint or the applicable law, if the jurisdiction of the court of the bar to the suit is made out, the court may decide such issues with the sole objective for the expeditious decision. In other words, preliminary issues can be those where no evidence is required and on the basis of reading of the plaint or the applicable law, if the jurisdiction of the court of the bar to the suit is made out, the court may decide such issues with the sole objective for the expeditious decision. I Thus, if the court lacks jurisdiction or there is a statutory bar, such issue is required to be decided in the first instance so that the process of civil court is not abused by the litigants, who may approach the civil court to delay the proceedings on false pretext 23. The different judgments of the High Court referred to above are in consonance with the principles laid down by this Court in Ramesh B. Desai( 2006(5) SCC 638 ) that not all issues of law can be decided as preliminary issues. Only those issues of law can be decided as preliminary issues which fell within the ambit of clause (a) relating to the "jurisdiction of the Court" and (b) which deal with the bar to the suit created by any law for the time being in force" The reason to substitute Rule 2 is to avoid piecemeal trial, protracted litigation and possibility of remand of the case, where the appellate court differs with the decision of the trial court on the preliminary issues upon which the trial court had decided.” 42. In Mongia Realty and Buildwell Private Limited v. Manik Sethi , [ (2022) 11 SCC 572 ] , the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that when issues in both law and facts arise in the same suit, the court may dispose of the suit by trying the issue of law first. For this purpose, the provision specifies two questions of law, which are 1) jurisdiction of the court; and 2) a bar to the suit created by any law for the time being in force. The Hon’ble Apex Court observed that the issue of limitation can also be determined as a preliminary issue under Order XIV Rule 2 CPC, if the issue of limitation is based on admitted fact. However, if the facts surrounding the issue of limitation are disputed, it cannot be decided as a preliminary issue. 43. The Hon’ble Apex Court observed that the issue of limitation can also be determined as a preliminary issue under Order XIV Rule 2 CPC, if the issue of limitation is based on admitted fact. However, if the facts surrounding the issue of limitation are disputed, it cannot be decided as a preliminary issue. 43. It is thus well settled in law that it is only the pure questions of law, that can be decided as preliminary issues and not the questions of fact or even mixed questions of law and fact. Those require the determination on the basis of the evidence adduced during trial/proceedings. 44. It is also settled in law that in case of dispute as to facts, it is necessary to be determined, to give a finding on a question of law, such question cannot be decided as a preliminary issue. In a case, where the facts are disputed and the question of law is dependent upon the outcome of the investigation of facts, such question would not be a pure question of law and cannot be decided as preliminary issue.” 45. In view of the aforesaid, the question of relationship of landlord and tenant which is a factual dispute, has rightly not been decided at this stage of proceedings as a preliminary issue. Point-C: 46. In view of the consideration made in Points A & B above, the impugned order does not suffer from any illegality and calls for no interference. Result: 47. In the result, the civil revision petition is dismissed. No order as to costs. 48. Let the copy of this judgment be sent to the Chief Secretary to the Government, Government of Andhra Pradesh, to the Secretary Law to Government of Andhra Pradesh and to the learned Advocate General for the State of Andhra Pradesh for necessary action, for constitution of Rent Court and Rent Tribunal under the ANDHRA PRADESH RESIDENTIAL AND NON-RESIDENTIAL PREMISES TENANCY ACT , 2017 (Act No.10 of 2018) also considering para 35 and 36 of this judgment. Miscellaneous Petitions, if any, pending in this matter, shall also stand closed.