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2025 DIGILAW 680 (MP)

Tikendra Singh v. Madanlal

2025-12-08

PRANAY VERMA

body2025
ORDER 1. This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been preferred by the petitioners being aggrieved by the order dated 23.10.2020 (Annexure P/2) passed by the Sub Divisional Officer (Revenue), Sub Division Jaora, District Ratlam as affirmed by order dated 21.4.2022 (Annexure P/1) passed by the Collector, District Ratlam. 2. The facts of the case in brief are that on 9.1.1975, a sale deed with respect to the disputed land was executed by Late Nandram, grandfather of respondents, in favour of petitioner No.1 for a consideration of Rs.500/-. On strength of the sale deed, petitioner No.1 was mutated over the land in the year 1984. In 2020, the respondents filed an application under section 5 of the M.P. Samaj Ke Kamjor Vargon Ke Krishi Bhumi Dharko Ka Udhar Dene Valo Ke Bhumi Hadapne Sambandhi Kuchakro Se Paritran Tatha Mukti Adhiniyam, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Adhiniyam, 1976'). They submitted that the disputed land was mortgaged with petitioner No.1 by their grandfather by way of execution of the sale deed with an understanding that the same is by way of security for a loan raised and that whenever the loan amount is repaid, the sale deed will be cancelled and the land will be returned. 3. Upon filing of the application, a report was called for from the Revenue Inspector by the Sub Divisional Officer under section 6 of the Adhiniyam, 1976. On entering appearance, the petitioners filed an application under Order 7 rule 11 of the CPC for rejection of the application filed under the Adhiniyam, 1976 submitting that the same is barred by time. Reply was filed by the respondents to the said application. However, it appears that the said application remained undecided and eventually by order dated 23.10.2020, the Sub Divisional Officer held the transaction between the parties to be a prohibited transaction of loan as per the Adhiniyam, 1976. The said order has been affirmed by the Additional Collector by way of the impugned order in appeal preferred by the petitioners. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the application filed by respondents ought to have been rejected since the same had not been filed by a person who was a party to the alleged transaction but by his grandchildren, who were not parties thereof. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the application filed by respondents ought to have been rejected since the same had not been filed by a person who was a party to the alleged transaction but by his grandchildren, who were not parties thereof. The application preferred by the respondents was barred by time hence ought to have been dismissed on that ground alone. The respondents had utterly failed to prove that the transaction in question was a prohibited transaction of loan hence their application could not have been allowed. 5. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that upon enquiry having been conducted under section 6 of the Adhiniyam, 1976, the Sub Divisional Officer clearly recorded a finding that the transaction in question was a prohibited transaction as defined under the Adhiniyam, 1976 which has been affirmed by the Additional Collector. The orders are concurrent and are based upon pure findings of facts hence are not liable to be interfered with in a Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The application which was preferred by the respondents was well within time as per the amended provisions of the Adhiniyam, 1976 and the Rules framed thereunder namely, M.P. Samaj Ke Kamjor Vargon Ke Krishi Bhumi Dharko Ka Udhar Dene Valo Ke Bhumi Hadapne Sambandhi Kuchakro Se Paritran Tatha Mukti Niyam, 1978. The application has hence rightly been entertained and decided by the Sub Divisional Officer on merits. It is hence submitted that the petition deserves to be dismissed. Reliance has been placed on the decision of the apex Court in Bhavsingh (Dead) by LRs v. Keshar Singh and Others, 2003 (8) SCC 263 and of this Court in Vijay Singh v. Shyamlal, 2000 (2) MPLJ 131 . 6. I have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. 7. Since an issue of limitation, amongst others, has been raised by the petitioners, it would be appropriate to decide the said issue first before dealing with the other issues. The sale deed in question was executed by grandfather of respondents in favour of petitioner No.1 on 9.1.1975 i.e. when the Adhiniyam, 1976 had not come into force. When the said Adhiniyam came into force, Section 5 thereof did not provide for any limitation for filing an application thereunder. The sale deed in question was executed by grandfather of respondents in favour of petitioner No.1 on 9.1.1975 i.e. when the Adhiniyam, 1976 had not come into force. When the said Adhiniyam came into force, Section 5 thereof did not provide for any limitation for filing an application thereunder. It only stated that the application may be made within such time as may be prescribed. Subsequently, rule 3 of the Niyam, 1978 came into force with effect from 12.5.1978 which provided that the application under section 5 shall be made within a period of 12 months. The said rule was substituted on 31.1.1983 and it provided that the application under Section 5 shall be made on or before 31.1.1984. Admittedly, no application was preferred by the respondents or their predecessors within the period as prescribed in the aforesaid rule 3, either unamended or amended. Thereafter, section 15(2) was inserted in the Adhiniyam, 1976, which provided that where the transaction was entered into after 31.1.1977 but prior to commencement of the Amendment Act, 1988, which amended the Act, 1976 application could be made within five years of such commencement. It further provided that when such transaction is entered into after commencement of the said Act within six years of the date of such transaction. However, in the present case, the transaction in question was entered into much prior to 31.1.1977 hence the provisions of section 15(2) of the Act and Rule 3 of the Niyam, 1978 would not be applicable. 8. The upshot of the aforesaid discussion is that to the transaction in question, no period of limitation would be applicable. As per unamended as well as amended rule 3 of the Niyam, 1978, an application under section 5 could be preferred on or before 31.1.1984. No application was preferred by the respondents or their predecessors up to that day hence the period of limitation fixed for filing the application expired. The respondents would also not get any benefit of the provisions of section 15(2) of the Adhiniyam, 1976 since it deals with transactions effected on and after 31.1.1977 whereas the transaction in the present case is of the year 1975. The limitation for challenging the same expired on 31.1.1985 hence the application preferred by the respondents was clearly barred by time. 9. The limitation for challenging the same expired on 31.1.1985 hence the application preferred by the respondents was clearly barred by time. 9. Even assuming for the sake of arguments that there was no limitation for the respondents to file such an application but it has been laid down by this Court in Chote Lal v. Mulabai 2007 (3) MPHT 37 relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners that for exercising suo moto powers under section 6 of the Act, no period of limitation is prescribed but such power has to be exercised within a reasonable period of time which would depend upon facts and circumstances of each case. It has been held as under: "7. On a deep scrutiny of the provisions of the Act it is revealed that for exercising sue motu powers under section 6 of the Act no period of limitation is prescribed. it is now well settled that when no period of limitation has been prescribed for exercising suo motu powers of revision, such powers has to be exercised within a reasonable period of time. What would be a reasonable period will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. See State of gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha and others, AIR 1969 SC 1297 , State of H. P. and others v. Rajkumar Brijender Singh and others. AIR 2004 SC 3218 , State of M. P. and another v. Board of Revenue, Gwalior and others, 2006. (2) M. P. H. T. 440 and State of M. P. and others v. Harcharan Singh, 2001 (3) MPLj 389 . 8. From the facts as stated above, it is clear that the transaction was entered into between the petitioner and Karodilal husband of the first respondent on 4-5-. 1979. The said Karodilal died on 8.7.1992. During his life tune he did not challenge the transaction entered into between him and the petitioner. After more than 12 years of his death and after 25 years from the date of the said transaction the first respondent approached to the second respondent by filing an application under section 5 of the Act. In the said proceedings the second respondent decided to exercise suo motu powers provided under section 6 of the Act. In my considered view, the delay of 25 years in exercising the suo motu powers can by no stretch of imagination be termed as a reasonable period. In the said proceedings the second respondent decided to exercise suo motu powers provided under section 6 of the Act. In my considered view, the delay of 25 years in exercising the suo motu powers can by no stretch of imagination be termed as a reasonable period. After a lapse of 25 years, the second respondent cannot be permitted to invoke suo motu powers. The delay being unreasonable, the orders impugned cannot be allowed to sustain." 10. In the present case also, it is seen that the transaction in question was entered into between petitioner No.1 and grandfather of respondents on 9.1.1975. During his lifetime, grandfather of the petitioners did not challenge the said transaction. Even after his death, the transaction was not challenged by father of the petitioners. After a considerable period of time i.e. after 45 years from the date of transaction, the respondents approached the Sub Divisional Officer by filing an application under section 5 of the Adhiniyam, 1976. Even assuming that the Sub Divisional Officer decided to exercise suo moto powers provided under section 6 of the Adhiniyam, 1976, the delay of 45 years in exercising such powers can by no stretch of imagination be termed as a reasonable period. After a lapse of 45 years, no application could have been preferred by the respondents, nor could the Sub Divisional Officer have invoked the suo moto powers. The delay on part of the respondents in filing the application was unreasonable and has remained totally unexplained. That being so, it is clear that the application preferred by the respondents was barred by time in view of which the impugned orders cannot be sustained. 11. Since it has been held that the application preferred by the respondents was barred by time, it is not necessary for this Court to go into the merits of the application preferred by the respondents. As a result, the order dated 21.4.2022 passed by the Collector and the order dated 23.10.2020 passed by the Sub Divisional Officer cannot be sustained and are hereby quashed and the application preferred by the respondents under section 5 of the Adhiniyam, 1976 stands dismissed. 12. The petition is accordingly, allowed and disposed off.