ORDER : 1. These batch of writ petitions are directed against the demand notices issued by the respondent-Gram Panchayat levying property tax on the industrial property of the petitioners located within the notified industrial area established and maintained by the respondent-Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board (KIADB). 2. The petitioners in these batch of writ petitions have called in question the demand notices issued by respondent - the Gram Panchayat contending that the said notices are without jurisdiction. They rely on the provisions of Section 37 of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 (for short, "the KIAD Act") read with Section 47 , which vests exclusive authority in the KIADB for planning, development, and maintenance of industrial areas. The petitioners specifically assert that Section 37 stipulates that the provisions of the Karnataka Municipalities Act or the Panchayat Raj Act can apply to an industrial area only upon its withdrawal from the purview of the KIADB by way of an express notification issued by the State Government. It is submitted that, in the present batch of petitions, no such notification has been issued. The petitioners also place reliance on a letter issued by the Chief Executive Officer of respondent – KIADB addressed to the State Government, wherein it is stated that the power to collect property tax on land and buildings and levy license fees within KIADB industrial areas exclusively vests with respondent-KIADB. On that basis, the petitioners submit that the Gram Panchayat lacks the jurisdiction to issue the impugned demand notices. 3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners have reiterated the above contentions, emphasizing that the petitioners’ industrial establishments are situated within notified industrial areas. It is submitted that, in the absence of any notification issued under Section 37 of the KIAD Act withdrawing these areas from the jurisdiction of KIADB, respondent - Gram Panchayat has no authority to impose property tax. They further rely on Schedule-IV introduced by way of amendment under Act No.44 of 2015 to the Karnataka Gram Swaraj and Panchayat Raj Act, 1993 , which stipulates that the Gram Panchayat shall have the power to levy property tax only if jurisdiction is conferred by a specific notification issued by the State Government. In the absence of such a notification, the petitioners contend that respondent - Gram Panchayat has no jurisdiction to levy the impugned taxes. 4. In the absence of such a notification, the petitioners contend that respondent - Gram Panchayat has no jurisdiction to levy the impugned taxes. 4. Respondent – KIADB has filed statement of objections affirming the stand taken by the petitioners. It is categorically asserted that the industrial establishments in question fall within the limits of notified industrial areas and that no notification has been issued by the State Government under Section 37 withdrawing the said area from the jurisdiction of KIADB. 5. Respondent – Gram Panchayat has filed a detailed statement of objections asserting that it is the local body providing basic civic amenities and infrastructure to the concerned industrial plots. In that context, respondent - Gram panchayat claims that it is authorized under Schedule-IV to the Panchayat Raj Act to levy property tax on industrial establishments. It is therefore contended that the impugned demand notices are lawful and do not warrant interference by this Court. 6. Learned counsel for respondent - Gram Panchayat has raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the writ petitions on the ground that the petitioners have an efficacious statutory remedy of appeal under Section 201 of the Panchayat Raj Act. Placing reliance on Rule 37 of the Karnataka Grama Swaraj and Panchayat Raj (Taxes, Rates and Fees of Grama Panchayats) Rules, 2021, it is argued that the appellate authority is the Chief Executive Officer of the Zilla Panchayat, and the petitioners ought to be relegated to avail such remedy. The counsel submits that under the said Rule, the appeal requires deposit of 50% of the tax amount demanded. 7. In support of this contention, respondent - Gram Panchayat has placed reliance on the judgment of a coordinate Bench in M/s. Sanghvi Foods Pvt. Ltd. vs. The Panchayat Development Officer & Another , W.P. No. 13613 of 2022 dated 03.01.2023 , as well as the decision rendered in M/s. Satrac Engg. Pvt. Ltd. vs. The Secretary/Panchayat Development Officer & Another , W.P. No. 52181 of 2013 dated 22.09.2022 , where it was held that, under Section 199 read with Schedule-IV of the Karnataka Gram Swaraj Act, 1993, every Gram Panchayat is authorized to levy property tax. It is further submitted that the amendment to Schedule-IV, brought in by Act No.44 of 2015 and made effective from 20.05.2016, has been upheld and the levy of property tax has been held to be valid prospectively. It is further submitted that the amendment to Schedule-IV, brought in by Act No.44 of 2015 and made effective from 20.05.2016, has been upheld and the levy of property tax has been held to be valid prospectively. The counsel also refers to a judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Bangalore International Airport Area Planning Authority vs. Birla Super Bulk Terminal (Now a unit of Ultra Tech Cement Ltd.) and others , Civil Appeal No. 9684 of 2011 and two Government Circulars dated 23.09.2019 and 16.07.2024 in support of his argument. 8. In view of the rival contentions, the following points arise for consideration: (i) Whether respondent - Gram Panchayat has jurisdiction to levy property tax in respect of properties situated within industrial areas notified under the KIAD Act, in the absence of a notification under Section 37 withdrawing the said area? (ii) Whether the impugned demand notices issued by respondent - Gram Panchayat are without authority of law and liable to be quashed? (iii) Whether the objection raised by respondent - Gram panchayat that the writ petitions are not maintainable in view of the alternate remedy of appeal under Section 201 of the Panchayat Raj Act and Rule 37 of the Taxation Rules can be sustained? Findings on Point Nos. 1 and 2: 9. Before addressing the core issue concerning the jurisdiction of the Gram Panchayat to levy property tax, this Court considers it appropriate to first refer to the relevant statutory provisions under the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 , namely Sections 23 , 37, and 47. For ease of reference and to facilitate a proper understanding of the statutory scheme, the said provisions are extracted below: " 23. Expenditure from funds.- (1) The Board shall have the authority to spend such sums as it thinks fit for the purposes authorised under this Act from out of the Board's fund. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the power conferred by sub-section (1), the Board may contribute such sums as it thinks fit towards expenditure incurred or to be incurred by any local authority or statutory public undertaking in the performance, in relation to any of its industrial estates or industrial areas, of any of the statutory functions of such authority or undertaking, including expenditure incurred in the acquisition of land. 37. 37. Withdrawal of area or estate or part thereof.- Where the State Government is satisfied that in respect of any industrial area or any part thereof, the purpose for which the Board was established under this Act has been substantially achieved so as to render the continued existence of such area of part thereof under the Board unnecessary, the State Government may, by notification, declare that such industrial area, or part thereof, has been removed from the jurisdiction of the Board. The State Government may also make such other incidental arrangements for the administration of such area or part thereof as the circumstances necessitate. 47. Effect of provisions inconsistent with other laws.- The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law." 10. This Court also deems it fit to cull out Schedule- IV to the Karnataka Panchayat Raj Act as amended by Act No.44 of 2015 which reads as under: "Schedule -IV (See Section 199 ) 11. It is not in dispute that the petitioners’ industrial establishments are situated within an industrial area that has been duly notified under the KIAD Act. The land in question was acquired and developed by the respondent – KIADB by invoking powers under Section 6(1) of the KIAD Act, and thereafter allotted to the petitioners for establishing industrial units. It is also an admitted fact that the area where the petitioners’ properties are located has not been withdrawn or de-notified by the State Government under Section 37 of the KIAD Act. Therefore, the industrial area continues to fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the KIADB. 12. Section 23 of the KIAD Act, which has been extracted hereinabove, authorizes the Board (KIADB) to incur expenditure for purposes enumerated under the Act. More importantly, sub-section (2) of Section 23 clarifies that the Board may, at its discretion, contribute towards the expenditure incurred by any local authority in discharging its statutory obligations in relation to any industrial area. This implies that the Gram Panchayat or any other local body has no automatic right to impose or recover taxes from units within industrial areas unless specifically authorized by the KIADB or through statutory mechanism. Section 37 of the Act provides the legal basis for transferring jurisdiction from KIADB to other authorities. This implies that the Gram Panchayat or any other local body has no automatic right to impose or recover taxes from units within industrial areas unless specifically authorized by the KIADB or through statutory mechanism. Section 37 of the Act provides the legal basis for transferring jurisdiction from KIADB to other authorities. It explicitly states that the State Government may, upon being satisfied that the purposes for which the industrial area was constituted have been substantially fulfilled, withdraw such area or part thereof from the jurisdiction of the Board through a formal notification. Until such notification is issued, the jurisdiction of KIADB remains intact and exclusive. Further, Section 47 of the Act gives overriding effect to the provisions of the KIAD Act over any other law that is inconsistent with its provisions. The statutory scheme therefore leaves no room for implied or incidental exercise of jurisdiction by any local authority including Gram Panchayats. 13. The amended Schedule-IV to the Karnataka Panchayat Raj Act, 1993, introduced by Act No.44 of 2015, recognizes the authority of Gram Panchayats to levy property tax, including on buildings situated within industrial areas such as KIADB industrial estates. However, a critical reading of the Schedule shows that such power is not absolute or automatic. The language used in the Schedule is clear: the power to impose tax on properties within KIADB or other notified industrial areas is subject to Government notification. The phrase “subject to notification” is a legislative condition precedent and must be interpreted harmoniously with the provisions of the KIAD Act, particularly Section 37 . In the absence of a statutory notification by the State Government withdrawing such area from KIADB and conferring jurisdiction upon the Gram Panchayat, the latter cannot unilaterally impose property tax. Any such exercise would be ultra vires and without authority of law. 14. Respondent No.1/State vide Circular dated 16.07.2024 has issued directives informing all Panchayats, Municipalities, Municipal Corporations and other local bodies that they do not possess power to sanction development plans, layout plans, building plans, commencement certificates, occupancy certificates, etc. in areas designated as industrial areas, estates of SUCs approved by the KIADB. Additionally, KSSIDC shall be the building plan approval authority for the industrial estates developed by KSSIDC. The relevant extract of the Circular is extracted which reads as under: 15. in areas designated as industrial areas, estates of SUCs approved by the KIADB. Additionally, KSSIDC shall be the building plan approval authority for the industrial estates developed by KSSIDC. The relevant extract of the Circular is extracted which reads as under: 15. In view of the admitted position that no notification has been issued under Section 37 of the KIAD Act withdrawing the subject industrial area from the jurisdiction of KIADB, the jurisdiction of respondent – Gram Panchayat to levy property tax simply does not arise. The impugned demand notices issued by respondent No.2, therefore, lack statutory foundation and are liable to be declared ultra vires and void. The levy of tax in absence of a specific enabling provision or notification amounts to colorable exercise of power. The KIAD Act, being a special legislation enacted for the planned development and administration of industrial areas, will override general laws such as the Panchayat Raj Act in the event of conflict. Even if it is assumed arguendo that the Panchayat Raj Act purports to extend to such areas, the special provisions under the KIAD Act, particularly Section 47 , will prevail due to the doctrine of generalia specialibus non derogant. Hence, unless and until the industrial area is formally de-notified, no other local authority, including respondent - Gram Panchayat, can assume fiscal jurisdiction over the said area. 16. The reliance placed by respondent - Gram panchayat on the decision of the Coordinate Bench in support of the legality of the demand notices is misplaced. The judgments relied upon do not consider or examine the interplay between Sections 23 , 37, and 47 of the KIAD Act. Additionally, those judgments have not analysed the legal implication of the expression “subject to notification” as found in Schedule-IV of the Panchayat Raj Act. This Court finds that the issue of jurisdiction of the Gram Panchayat to levy tax within notified industrial areas under the KIAD Act was not placed before the Coordinate Bench. Therefore, the observations made in the said judgments cannot be treated as binding precedents in the present context. Since the validity of the very exercise of jurisdiction by the Gram Panchayat is under challenge based on the specific statutory framework of the KIAD Act, the issue is distinguishable and requires independent adjudication. 17. Therefore, the observations made in the said judgments cannot be treated as binding precedents in the present context. Since the validity of the very exercise of jurisdiction by the Gram Panchayat is under challenge based on the specific statutory framework of the KIAD Act, the issue is distinguishable and requires independent adjudication. 17. Article 265 of the Constitution of India mandates that “no tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law.” This constitutional safeguard ensures that no public authority can exercise taxing powers unless such power is derived from a valid statutory provision. In the present case, respondent - Gram Panchayat has failed to establish the existence of any such authority or notification permitting it to levy property tax in KIADB industrial areas. 18. Though the learned counsel appearing for the Gram Panchayat has placed reliance on several documents in an attempt to substantiate the authority of the Gram Panchayat to levy taxes, this Court finds justification to be legally untenable. In particular, reliance is placed on a lease-cum-sale agreement executed by the respondent– KIADB, which allegedly contains a recital permitting local authorities to collect taxes. However, this Court is of the considered view that such a recital, by itself, cannot be construed as sufficient compliance with the mandatory provisions of Section 37 of the KIAD Act. Statutory power to levy taxes must necessarily flow from an express legislative provision or a valid statutory delegation, and cannot be inferred from a contractual clause or incidental recital in a private arrangement such as a lease-cum-sale agreement. 19. Furthermore, the reliance placed on earlier circulars by the counsel for the Gram Panchayat also does not assist their case. The State Government, by its most recent circular dated 16.07.2024, has categorically clarified the legal position. The circular unequivocally states that the KIADB alone is the competent authority for sanctioning development plans, layout plans, and building plans within designated industrial areas or estates. It further mandates that all local bodies, including Gram Panchayats, Municipalities, and Corporations, shall refrain from exercising jurisdiction over such industrial areas in matters of planning approval and taxation. Thus, any reliance on previous circulars stands displaced by this authoritative clarification issued by the State. 20. It further mandates that all local bodies, including Gram Panchayats, Municipalities, and Corporations, shall refrain from exercising jurisdiction over such industrial areas in matters of planning approval and taxation. Thus, any reliance on previous circulars stands displaced by this authoritative clarification issued by the State. 20. Upon careful examination of the additional documents produced by the learned counsel for the Gram Panchayat, this Court is of the clear view that none of the materials placed on record confer any statutory authority on the Panchayat to levy or collect taxes in respect of industrial establishments located within areas notified and developed by the KIADB under the provisions of the KIAD Act. Mere execution of a lease-cum-sale agreement or any administrative communication cannot vest such power in the Gram Panchayat in the absence of express delegation or statutory backing. 21. In this backdrop, any reliance on previous circulars is misplaced and unsustainable in law. Consequently, the power to regulate and approve development activities, including the right to levy and collect tax within such industrial estates, vests exclusively with the KIADB. The Gram Panchayat cannot usurp such authority in the absence of a specific statutory conferment. 22. In light of the binding circular dated 16.07.2024 issued by the State Government, which places the responsibility for planning and development approval solely with the KIADB, the claim of the Panchayat to continue exercising fiscal powers over such areas is clearly misconceived and without legal foundation. 23. The impugned demand notices, therefore, do not pass the test of legality and are clearly unsustainable in law. In the absence of jurisdiction vested by a valid notification under Section 37 of the KIAD Act, the levy amounts to arbitrary exercise of power and is liable to be set aside. Accordingly, point Nos.1 and 2 framed for consideration are answered in the negative and affirmative , respectively. Finding on Point No. 3: 24. As regards the objection raised by respondent - Gram panchayat regarding availability of alternate remedy under Section 201 of the Karnataka Panchayat Raj Act, this Court has considered the decision of the Coordinate Bench in M/s. Sanghvi Foods Pvt. Ltd. (supra). In the said case, the Court examined the maintainability of a writ petition where a statutory appeal was available. However, the present case stands on a different footing. In the said case, the Court examined the maintainability of a writ petition where a statutory appeal was available. However, the present case stands on a different footing. This Court has, while answering point Nos.1 and 2, categorically held that respondent - Gram Panchayat has no jurisdiction to impose property tax on properties situated within a notified industrial area governed by the KIAD Act, absent a notification under Section 37 . Where the very assumption of jurisdiction is challenged as being ultra vires and constitutionally invalid, the existence of an appellate remedy does not act as a bar to invoking writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Since the tax demand is wholly without authority of law, relegating the petitioners to an appellate forum would be both futile and unjustified. 25. Furthermore, the impugned demand notices, being premised solely on the amended Schedule-IV of the Panchayat Raj Act, also cannot stand judicial scrutiny. The phrase “subject to notification” in Schedule-IV makes it abundantly clear that the power to levy tax in KIADB industrial areas is not conferred upon the Gram Panchayat unless expressly authorized by the Government through a formal notification. In the absence of such notification, the Gram Panchayat lacks initial jurisdiction to pass any assessment order. Consequently, the appellate authority contemplated under Section 201 of the Act would also be incompetent to adjudicate on questions involving interpretation and precedence of provisions under the KIAD Act. Therefore, this Court is not inclined to direct the petitioners to exhaust the remedy of appeal. The statutory challenge in this case involves the vires and jurisdictional competence of the assessing authority itself. Accordingly, point No.3 is answered in the negative 26. In the findings recorded supra, this Court is of the view that the jurisdiction of a statutory authority to levy tax must be firmly rooted in express statutory sanction, and any imposition of tax without such authority is unconstitutional. It is a settled principle of law that no tax can be levied or collected except by authority of law, as mandated under Article 265 of the Constitution of India. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Birla Cotton, Spinning and Weaving Mills , AIR 1968 SC 1232 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court emphatically held that “a tax cannot be imposed by inference or analogy or by presuming any intention. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Birla Cotton, Spinning and Weaving Mills , AIR 1968 SC 1232 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court emphatically held that “a tax cannot be imposed by inference or analogy or by presuming any intention. It must be imposed in accordance with the express language of the statute.” Similarly, in India Cement Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu , (1990) 1 SCC 12 , the Court reiterated that the power to tax is a legislative function and must be exercised strictly within the confines of the enabling statute. Any deviation from this principle renders the levy unconstitutional and ultra vires. Thus, unless the statute explicitly confers the power to levy and collect tax, any such action by a statutory body, including local authorities, is liable to be struck down as being without jurisdiction. 27. For the foregoing reasons, this Court proceeds to pass the following: ORDER : (i) Writ petitions are allowed