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2025 DIGILAW 685 (AP)

P. Prabhakar, S/o. P. Ravi v. Union of India, Rep. by Its Secretary, Department of Law & Justice, Legislative

2025-06-02

MAHESWARA RAO KUNCHEAM

body2025
ORDER: 1. These matters are taken up today for hearing by Way of House Motion through online. 2. ln both these writ petitions, the Petitioners Seek to assail the validity of Notification No.1/Mega DSC-TRC-1/2025, dated 20.04.2025 issued by the Government of Andhra Pradesh, School Education Department, on identical grounds. 3. The grounds for attack are that-1) the impugned Notification was issued without conducting Teacher Elig'lbility Test (TET) twice in a year in terms of G.O.Ms.51, dated 16.04.2011, 2) the eligibility criteria does not extend permission to the final year students of D.EI.Ed. and B.Ed. to appear for the examination and 3) the impugned Notification provides only 45 days of preparation time to the applicants, Which iS COntrary tO the state's own policy of allowing 90 days of structured coaching under earlier recruitment cycles. 4. As an interim measure, the petitioners in both the Writ Petitions pray for grant of interim suspension/stay of all further proceedings pursuant to the impugned Notification. 5. Heard Sri Mulla Basha, Sri Prahas and Sri A.Sai Naveen, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, and Smt. S. Pranathi, learned Special Government Pleader the State. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioners, while reiterating the grounds urged in the writ petitions, would submit that - a) As per G.O.Ms.No.51 dated 16.04.2011, Teacher Eligibility Test (TET) has to be conducted every year twice for all persons who aspire to become teachers for classes 1 to VIIl in schools (Govt./ZP/MP/ Municipal/Pvtl Aided), but the State has failed to adhere tO the Same and in the year 2024, it was conducted only once and in the year 2025, it has not even been conducted. b) It I'S further Submitted that earlier, during DSC-2018, the State has permitted the candidates of fl-nal year of D.El.Ed. and B.Ed. to appear for the examination, whereas the said approach has not been followed in the instant Mega DSC-2025, and the said action of the State in deviating from their earlier policy violates the doctrine of legitimate expectation. c) It is also contended that the impugned Notification provides only 45 days of preparation time from the date of issue of Notification upto the date of examination, which is unreasonable and against the State's own initiative of offering 90 days' free coaching to the aspirants.It is, therefore, prayed to grant stay of all further proceedings pursuant to the impugned Notification. 7. 7. Per cot,fro, learned Special Government Pleader for the State would submit that - a) The guidelines for conducting TET issued in G.O.Ms.No.51 dated 16.04.2011 have been subsequently amended and vide G.O.Ms.No.23 dated 17.03.2021, it was decided that the TET may be conducted once in year. It is further submitted that though as per G.O.Ms.No.23 dated 17.03.2021, conducting TET once in a year is sufficient, the State has conducted TET twice in the year 2024, i.e., in February and October, 2024. b) So far as the contention of not providing 90 days time for preparation is concerned, it is submitted that there is no rule framed or prescribed by the State to that effect and even otherwise, the syllabus for the DSC-2025 has been notified and uploaded in the official website of the Department in the month of November, 2024 itself and the impugned Notification has been issued in the month of April, 2025, and thus, ample time has been provided to ttle aspirants for preparation. lt is further submitted that the State has right to determine or take a policy decision in the matter of recruitment and there is no legal right accrued on the petitioners to claim inclusion of final year students of D.EI.Ed. and B'Ed. in the eligibility criteria. c) lt is further argued that the impugned Notification was issued in accordance with the Rules formulated in G.O.Ms.No.15 dated 19.04.2025 and without laying a challenge to the said G.O., the petitiners have approached the court belatedly challenging the impugned Notification and since hall-tickets have already been issued and all necessary arrangements were made for conducting the exam, it is prayed that no Interim relief may be granted intercepting the Proceedings. 8. This Court has considered the submissions made on either side and perused the record. Consideration of the Court: 9. At the outset, it may be noted that the impugned Notificaation has been issued in pursuance of the orders issued by the Government vide G.O.Ms.No.15, School Education (services) Department, dated 19.04.2025, whereunder the Government has framed the Rules called Andhra pradesh Teacher Recruitment Test (AP TRT) Rules for the posts of school Asslstants (A), Secondary Grade Teachers (SGT), Trained Graduate Teachers (TGT-Special Education in Special Schools), secondary Grade Teachers (SGT-Special Education in special schools) and physical Education Teachers (PET) Scheme of selection Rules, 2025 (for brevity, fthe AP TRT Rules, 2025). The said Rules were framed to fill up the different categories of Teacher posts in Government, Zilla Parishad, Mandal Parishad, Municipality, Municipal Corporation Schools, Tribal Welfare Ashram Schools, Department of Juvenile Welfare Department Schools and Department for the Welfare of Differently Abled Schools and to such other categories of teacher posts in such other schools as may be notified by the Government from time to time. The said Rules came into effect from 19.04.2025. 10. In pursuance of the AP TRT Rules, 2025 framed under G.O.Ms.No.15 dated 19.04.2025, the Government has issued the impugned Notification dated 20.04.2025, for recruitment to the vacant posts of School Assistants (SA) Languages, Non-Languages, Physical Education and Secondary Grade Teachers (SGT) in Government, Zilla Parishad, Mandal Parishad, Municipality Schools, Municipal Corporation Schools, Tribal Welfare Department Ashram Schools, and for the posts of Second Grade Teachers (SGT) and Physical Education Teachers in the Juvenile Welfare Department Schools and Trained Graduate Teachers (TGT- Special Education), Secondary Grade Teachers (SGT- SpeciaI Education) and Physical Education Teachers (PET) in the Department for the Welfare of Differently Abled Schools in the State of Andhra Pradesh. 11. Admittedly, the petitioners have not challenged the aforesaid AP TRT Rules, 2025, which are the basis for the impugned Notification. In the absence of challenge to the said AP TRT Rules, 2025, which prescribed the eligibility criteria, prima facie, it is not open for the petitioners to challenge the impugned Notification issued in pursuance of the said AP TRT Rules, 2025. 12. Further, though the petitioners contend that the impugned Notification has been issued arbitrarI'Iy without conducting TET twice a year as mandated in G.O.Ms.No.51 dated 16.04.2011, it has been brought to the notice of this Court by the learned Special Government Pleader that the guidelines for conducting TET have been subsequently amended and vide G.O.Ms.No.23, School Education (Exams) Department, dated 17.03.2021, the Government has decided that the TET may be conducted once in year. It is also brought to the notice of this Court that though conducting the TET once in a year is sufficient as per G.O.Ms.No.23 dated 17.03.2021, the Government has conducted.TET twice in the year 2024, i.e., in February and October, 2024, in order to benefit the aspirants. 13. It is also brought to the notice of this Court that though conducting the TET once in a year is sufficient as per G.O.Ms.No.23 dated 17.03.2021, the Government has conducted.TET twice in the year 2024, i.e., in February and October, 2024, in order to benefit the aspirants. 13. Though the learned counsel for the petitioners point out that G.O.Ms.No.23 dated 17.03.2021 does not expressly state that it supersedes G.O.Ms.No.51 dated 16.04.2011, the fact remains that the Government, vide G.O.Ms.No.23 dated 17.03.2021, as a policy decision, has decided to conduct TET once in a year and yet, in a gesture to benefit aspirants, conducted the TET twice in 2024. 14. With regard to the contention that 90 days time for preparation was not provided, it is to be noted that the petitioners do not possess a legal right to claim a specific period for preparation. Though the petitioners contend that providing only 45 days from the date of issue of Notification up{o the date of examination is unreasonable and against the State's own initiative of offering 90 days' free coaching to the aspirants, according to the learned Special Government Pleader, the syllabus for the DSC-2025 has been notified and uploaded in the official website of the Department as early as I-n the month of November, 2024, while the impugned Notification has been issued Ion the month of April, 2025. This fact has not been disputed by the learned counsel for the petitioners. Thus, the fact remains that the syllabus had been made available nearly six months prior to the issuance of the Notification, thereby giving sufficient time to the petitioners or aspirants to prepare for the examination. 15. So far as the otherground urged by the petitioners that the action of the State Government in not permitting the final year students of D.El.Ed. and B.Ed. to appear for DSC-2025 is contrary to the earlier POIicy of the Government whereby it has permitted the final year students of the aforesaid courses to appear for DSC-2018 and DSC- 2024 and it violates the doctrine of legitimate expectation, as already statecd the impugned Notification has been issued in pursuance of the A.P. TRT Rules, 2025 framed under G.O.Ms.No.15 dated 19.04.2025 and without laying a challenge to the said Rules, prima facie, it is not open for the petitioners to question the eligibility criteria fixed in the impugned Notification in accordance with the Said Rules. 16. lt is important to note that the State retains the right to make policy decisions regarding recruitment. Though the doctrine of legitimate expectation ensures that individuals can have reasonable expectations based on established policies, but it does not take away power of the recruiting authorities to lay down a policy or withdraw it with regard to the sustability of candidates. ln the landmark Case of Tej Prakash pathak v. Rajasthan High Court (2025) 2 SCC 1 Five-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble supreme court, while dealing with the doctrine of legitimate expectation, has held as under:- " ....25. Candidates participating in a recruitment process have legitimate expectation that the process of selection will be fair and non-arbitrary. The basis of doctrine of legitimate expectation in public law iS founded on the principles of fairness and non- arbitrariness in government dealings with individuals. lt recognises that a public authority's promise or past conduct will give rise to a legitimate expectation. This doctrine is premised on the notion that public authorities, while performing their public duties, ought to honour their promises or past practices. The legitimacy of an expectation can be inferred if it is rooted in law, custom, or established procedure. 26. However, the doctrine of legitimate expectation does not impede or hinder the power of the public authorities to lay down a policy or withdraw it. The public authority has the discretion to exercise the full range of choices available within lots executive power. The public authority often has to take into consideration diverse factors, concerns, and interests before arriving at a particular policy decision. The courts are generally cautious in interfering with a bona fide decision of public authorities which denies legitimate expectation provided such a decision is taken in the larger public interest. Thus, public interest serves as a limitation on the application of the doctrine of legitimate expectation. . . . . . .......51. What is clear from above is that the object of any process of selection for entry into a public service is to ensure that a person most suitable for the Post is selected. What is suitable for one post may not be for the other. . . . . . .......51. What is clear from above is that the object of any process of selection for entry into a public service is to ensure that a person most suitable for the Post is selected. What is suitable for one post may not be for the other. Thus, a degree of discretion is necessary to be left to the employer to devise its method/procedure to select a candidate most suitable for the post albeit subject to the overarching princl-ples enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution as also the rules/statute governing service and reservation. . . . . . ." 17. In the light of the above, the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the petitioners on the doctine of legitimate expectation does not come to the aid of the petitioners. 18. Further, in Bedanga Talukdar v. saifudaullah Khan, (2011) 12 SCC 85 the Hon'ble supreme court has held as under:- ".......29. We have cons,-dered the entire matter in deta in our opinion it is too well settled to need any further reiteration that all appointments to pubic office have to be made in conformity with Article 14 of the constitution of India. In other words, there must be no arbitrarlness resulting from any undue favour belng shown to any candidate Therefore, the selection process has to be conducted strictly in accordance with the stipulated selection procedure consequently, when a particular schedule is mentioned in an advertisement. the same has to be scrupulously maintained. There cannot be any relaxation in the terms and conditions of the advertisement unless such a power is specifically reserved such a power could be reserved in the relevant statutory rules Even if power of relaxat, on is provided on the rules, it must stil be mentioned in the advertisement in the absence of such power in the rules, It Could still be provided in the advertisement However, the power of relaxation, of exercised, has to be given due publicity. This would be necessary to ensure that those candidates who become eligible due to the relaxation, are afforded an equal opportunlty to apply and compete. Relaxation of any condition in advertisement without due publication would be contrary to the mandate of equality contained in Articles 14 and 16 of the constitution of India... " 19. This would be necessary to ensure that those candidates who become eligible due to the relaxation, are afforded an equal opportunlty to apply and compete. Relaxation of any condition in advertisement without due publication would be contrary to the mandate of equality contained in Articles 14 and 16 of the constitution of India... " 19. Another facet involved in the lis that the public Interest will be jeopardised ln the event of granting an interim order. In this scenario, it is approprlate to refer to the well-settled legal principle held by the Divison Bench of the erstwhile High Court of Andhra pradesh at Hedrabad in B. Nageswara Rao and others v. Government of A.P. and others, 2006 SCC Online AP 468 wherein, the court emphasised that mere existence of Prima facie Case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury found in favour of applicant are not sufficient for passing interim orders and also further held that larger public interest should be taken into consideration. Relevant portion of the said judgment reads as under: ".....10. The sum and substance of the above discussion is that, in matters involving challenge to the process of selection/recruitment, appointment, promotion, seniority etc., the element of public interest is always against the grant of interim injunction, which may operate as a stumbling block and which may adversely affect the functioning of the department or public institution. Only intrarest of rare case, the Tribunal may pass an order of interim injunction, if it is fully convinced that the action complained against is Per Se violative, of the constitutional or statutory provisions or is tainted by mala fides... .." 20. In view of the above discussion, this court is of the considered opinion that the petitioners have failed to make out a pr,-ma fac,-e case for grant of interim relief. In the absence of any J-uStifiable grounds and keeping in view the larger public interest, this court is not inclined to stall the proceedings at this advanced stage, where hall-tickets have already been issued and all necessary arrangements are stated to have been made for conducting the examinatl-on. More so, it is brought to the notice of this Court that granting any interim stay would significantly disrupt and affect the academic year of the school students across the State. 21. Hence, the prayer for interim relief is hereby rejected and I.As. are, accordingly, dismissed.