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2025 DIGILAW 686 (KER)

Federal Bank Ltd. v. A. C. chummar

2025-03-21

NITIN JAMDAR, S.MANU

body2025
JUDGMENT : S.MANU, J. The protracted legal battle between the parties, a bank and a group of borrowers commenced two decades ago, proceeds further with these appeals. 2. By the impugned judgment in W.P(C)No.31683 of 2011, order dated 16 November 2011 in R.A.(SA) No. 76 of 2009 of the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal (DRAT) was set aside and the order of the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT) in S.A.No.9 of 2008 was restored. The DRT had set aside sale of secured assets mainly on the ground that the requirement of minimum thirty days’ notice under Rule 9 of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 was violated. In W.A.No.1802 of 2016, the secured creditor Bank is the Appellant. W.A.No.2124 of 2016 is filed by the auction purchaser. W.A.No.2079 of 2016 was filed by the borrower. We will refer to the parties as they are arrayed in the cause title in W.A.No.1802 of 2016. 3. The learned Single Judge found that the sale proceeded on the basis of the notice dated 23 December 2007 by which the sale was scheduled on 29 December 2007. The same was found illegal by the learned Single Judge as Rule 9(1) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules stipulates 30 days notice. Though the learned Single Judge noted that the borrowers never fulfilled any of their commitments and made every possible endeavour to defeat sale of secured asset, the failure on the part of the Bank to ensure 30 days notice was considered as a grave violation vitiating the sale. Issue regarding computation of the dues was kept open to be agitated before the DRT and a direction was issued that even if proceeding is initiated by the borrowers against fresh sale notice no stay shall be granted if the procedure in the Enforcement Rules were complied with. O.P. (DRT)No.262/2010 was closed as W.P.(C)No.31683/2011 was allowed. 4. We heard Mr.Raju Ramachandran, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr.Mohan Jacob George, the learned Standing Counsel for the Bank, Mr.P.B.Krishnan, learned Senior Counsel for the borrowers and Mr.Manoj Chandran, learned counsel appearing for the auction purchaser. 5. Mr.Raju Ramachandran, the learned Senior Counsel focussed his submissions to the core issue of the requirement under Rule 9 of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules of having 30 days notice. 5. Mr.Raju Ramachandran, the learned Senior Counsel focussed his submissions to the core issue of the requirement under Rule 9 of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules of having 30 days notice. The learned Senior Counsel, referring to the umpteen number of legal proceedings and other steps taken by the borrowers over a long period of time, argued that their intention was only to thwart the sale of the secured assets at any cost. He pointed out that each time the Bank proceeded for the sale by issuing notices, attempts were made by approaching this Court and the Tribunal, making promises of settlement and also of clearing dues to stall the sale. The learned Senior Counsel contended that last sale notice pursuant to which the sale ultimately happened cannot be considered as a notice in isolation and it has to be construed as one issued in the course of the process commenced much earlier. He also contended that insistence of a minimum period of 30 days in Rule 9 of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules is not to be mechanically applied and literally understood without reference to the facts. Purpose of providing minimum time of 30 days is to be understood and that purpose was already served with previous notices issued in the case at hand. He also pointed out that the Bank, as a financial institution which advanced funds to the borrowers long time ago had to undertake an exhausting struggle to recover the dues and the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition without taking into account such relevant circumstances. The learned Senior Counsel relied on various judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and contended that when the sale could not be held on account of reasons solely attributable to the borrowers, there is no necessity to provide 30 days time in subsequent sale notices. He placed heavy reliance on the observations and conclusions of a bench of three judges of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S.Karthik and others v. N.Subhash Chand Jain and others, [ (2022) 10 SCC 641 ].The learned Senior Counsel referred to the following judgments also:- 1.General Manager, Sri Siddeshwara Cooperative Bank Limited and Anr. Vs. Ikbal and Others., [ (2013) 10 SCC 83 ]. 2. Vasu P. Shetty Vs. Hotel Vandana Palace and Others., [ (2014) 5 SCC 660 ]. 3. Mathew Varghese Vs. Vs. Ikbal and Others., [ (2013) 10 SCC 83 ]. 2. Vasu P. Shetty Vs. Hotel Vandana Palace and Others., [ (2014) 5 SCC 660 ]. 3. Mathew Varghese Vs. M. Amritha Kumar and Others., [ (2014) 5 SCC 610 ] 4. ITC Limited Vs. Blue Coast Hotels Limited and Others., [ (2018) 15 SCC 99 ] 5. Shakeena and Another Vs. Bank of India and Others., [ (2021) 12 SCC 761 ] 6. Aree Polymers Private Limited Vs. Alphine Pharmaceuticals Private Limited and Others., [ (2022) 2 SCC 221 ] 7. IDBI Bank Ltd. Vs. Ramswaroop Daliya., [2024 KHC 6563] . 6. Mr.P.B.Krishnan, learned Senior Counsel for the borrowers submitted that the Bank failed to follow the procedure as provided under the SARFAESI Act and the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules in proceeding with the sale of the secured assets. The learned counsel referring to the figures mentioned in various documents contended that the amounts shown in the sale notices were incorrect and inflated. He justified the long drawn legal battle by the borrowers contending that they were unfairly handled by the Bank and hence they had to repeatedly approached this Court and also the DRT for redressal of grievances at various stages. He pointed out that the son of the 1 st Respondent participated in the auction held on 18 December 2007 but the Bank rejected his bid and decided to re-auction the property. The learned Senior Counsel contended that rejection of the bid of the son of the 1 st Respondent was improper. The Bank thereafter issued fresh sale notice on 22 December 2007 to conduct the sale on 29 December 2007. 23 December 2007 was a Sunday and 25 December 2007 was a public holiday on account of Christmas. Therefore, within the very short time between the date of publication of the sale notice and the auction, two days were holidays. The Bank was not justified in any view of the matter to conduct the sale in such a manner. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that the DRT found that the sale was improper and illegal for various reasons including violation of the mandate of Rule 9 of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules. He submitted that the DRAT by setting aside the order of the DRT committed a serious error. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that the DRT found that the sale was improper and illegal for various reasons including violation of the mandate of Rule 9 of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules. He submitted that the DRAT by setting aside the order of the DRT committed a serious error. He contended that the learned Single Judge approached the issue with a proper perspective and found that the non-compliance of the mandatory requirement to ensure 30 days time under Rule 9 was violated. The learned Senior Counsel however took exception to the observations and directions of the learned Single Judge in the nature of criticizing the borrower and pre-empting the DRT from granting interim orders. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that those observations and directions amount to excess of jurisdiction and are hence liable to be set aside. The learned Senior Counsel relied on the following judgments:- “1. Transcore Vs. Union of India and Others, [ (2008) 1 SCC 125 ] 2. Mardia Chemicals v Union of India , [ (2004) 4 SCC 311 ] 3. Mathew Varghese vs. M. Amritha Kumar & others , [ (2014) 5 SCC 610 ] 4. J. Rajiv Subramaniyan & Anr. Vs M/s. Pandiyas, [ (2014) 5 SCC 651 ] 5. T. V. Babu vs The Calicut Co-Operative Urban Bank , [ 2018 (5) KHC 345 ] 7. The learned counsel for the auction purchaser Mr.Manoj Chandran adopted the contentions of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Bank and further submitted that the auction purchaser deposited the entire amount offered, ie., 13,34,50,000/- on time after participating in the auction conducted on 29 December 2007. Sale certificate was issued and the possession of the property was also delivered. By the impugned judgment, the learned Single Judge set aside the sale in 2016 and the irreparable injury and loss sustained by the auction purchaser was not taken into account by the learned Single Judge. Apart from granting a meager interest, the learned Single Judge did not protect the auction purchaser who for no fault on his part suffered much because of the unmerited litigation at the instance of the borrowers. He prayed that the judgment of the learned Single Judge may be set aside and the order of the DRAT may be upheld. 8. Apart from granting a meager interest, the learned Single Judge did not protect the auction purchaser who for no fault on his part suffered much because of the unmerited litigation at the instance of the borrowers. He prayed that the judgment of the learned Single Judge may be set aside and the order of the DRAT may be upheld. 8. As already noticed, the learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petition on the ground that the mandate of 30 day’s time under Rule 9 was not followed. Rule 9 of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules is extracted hereunder for ready reference:- “9. Time of sale, issue of sale certificate and delivery of possession, etc. (1) No sale of immovable property under these rules, in first instance shall take place before the expiry of thirty days from the date on which the public notice of sale is published in newspapers as referred to in the proviso to sub-rule (6) of rule 8 or notice of sale has been served to the borrower: PROVIDED FURTHER that if sale of immovable property by any one of the methods specified by sub rule (5) of rule 8 fails and sale is required to be conducted again, the authorized officer shall serve, affix and publish notice of sale of not less than fifteen days to the borrower, for any subsequent sale. (2) The sale shall be confirmed in favour of the purchaser who has offered the highest sale price in his bid or tender or quotation or offer to the authorized officer and shall be subject to confirmation by the secured creditor: PROVIDED that no sale under this rule shall be confirmed, if the amount offered by sale price is less than the reserve price, specified under sub-rule (5) of rule 8: PROVIDED FURTHER that if the authorized officer fails to obtain a price higher than the reserve price, he may, with the consent of the borrower and the secured creditor effect the sale at such price. (3) On every sale of immovable property, the purchaser shall immediately, i.e. on the same day or not later than next working day, as the case may be, pay a deposit of twenty-five per cent of the amount of the sale price, which is inclusive of earnest money deposited, if any, to the authorized officer conducting the sale and in default of such deposit, the property shall be sold again. (4) The balance amount of purchase price payable shall be paid by the purchaser to the authorized officer on or before the fifteenth day of confirmation of sale of the immovable property or such extended period as may be agreed upon in writing between the purchaser and the secured creditor, in any case not exceeding three months. (5) In default of payment within the period mentioned in sub-rule (4), the deposit shall be forfeited to the secured creditor and the property shall be resold and the defaulting purchaser shall forfeit all claims to the property or to any part of the sum for which it may be subsequently sold. (6) On confirmation of sale by the secured creditor and if the terms of payment have been complied with, the authorized officer exercising the power of sale shall issue a certificate of sale of the immovable property in favour of the purchaser in the Form given in Appendix-V to these rules. (7) Where the immovable property sold is subject to any encumbrances, the authorized officer may, if he thinks fit, allow the purchaser to deposit with him the money required to discharge the encumbrances and any interest due thereon together with such additional amount that may be sufficient to meet the contingencies or further cost, expenses and interest as may be determined by him: PROVIDED that if after meeting the cost of removing encumbrances and contingenices there is any surplus available out of the money deposited by the purchaser such surplus shall be paid to the purchaser within fifteen days from the date of finalisation of the sale. (8) On such deposit of money for discharge of the encumbrances, the authorized officer shall issue or cause the purchaser to issue notices to the persons interested in or entitled to the money deposited with him and take steps to make the payment accordingly. (8) On such deposit of money for discharge of the encumbrances, the authorized officer shall issue or cause the purchaser to issue notices to the persons interested in or entitled to the money deposited with him and take steps to make the payment accordingly. (9) The authorized officer shall deliver the property to the purchaser free from encumbrances known to the secured creditor on deposit of money as specified in sub-rule (7) above. (10) The certificate of sale issued under sub-rule (6) shall specifically mention that whether the purchaser has purchased the immovable secured asset free from any encumbrances known to the secured creditor or not.” 9. Though the learned Senior Counsel for the Bank Mr.Raju Ramachandran and also the learned Senior Counsel for the borrowers Mr.P.B.Krishnan relied on various reported judgments as we have noted above, on a careful reading of all of them we are of the opinion that the judgment of the three judge bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S.Karthik's case provides ample guidance to decide the legal issue involved in this case. Hon'ble Supreme Court has referred to and analysed the law laid down in a number of earlier judgments including many of the judgments relied on by the learned Senior Counsel on either side in S.Karthik's case. Observations and conclusions in Mathew Varghese v. M. Amritha Kumar, [ (2014) 5 SCC 610 ] , referred extensively by the learned Senior Counsel for borrowers was considered and discussed by the Hon’ble Court. It is gainful to refer to the discussion regarding the judgment in Mathew Varghese by the three Judge Bench in S.Karthik. We extract the same hereunder: “55. The most relevant observation of this Court could be found in para 53 of the judgment in Mathew Varghese [Mathew Varghese v. M. Amritha Kumar, (2014) 5 SCC 610 : (2014) 3 SCC (Civ) 254], which reads thus : (SCC pp. 643-44) “53. We, therefore, hold that unless and until a clear 30 days' notice is given to the borrower, no sale or transfer can be resorted to by a secured creditor. 643-44) “53. We, therefore, hold that unless and until a clear 30 days' notice is given to the borrower, no sale or transfer can be resorted to by a secured creditor. In the event of any such sale properly notified after giving 30 days' clear notice to the borrower did not take place as scheduled for reasons which cannot be solely attributable to the borrower, the secured creditor cannot effect the sale or transfer of the secured asset on any subsequent date by relying upon the notification issued earlier. In other words, once the sale does not take place pursuant to a notice issued under Rules 8 and 9, read along with Section 13(8) for which the entire blame cannot be thrown on the borrower, it is imperative that for effecting the sale, the procedure prescribed above will have to be followed afresh, as the notice issued earlier would lapse. In that respect, the only other provision to be noted is sub-rule (8) of Rule 8 as per which sale by any method other than public auction or public tender can be on such terms as may be settled between the parties in writing. As far as sub-rule (8) is concerned, the parties referred to can only relate to the secured creditor and the borrower. It is, therefore, imperative that for the sale to be effected under Section 13(8), the procedure prescribed under Rule 8 read along with Rule 9(1) has to be necessarily followed, inasmuch as that is the prescription of the law for effecting the sale as has been explained in detail by us in the earlier paragraphs by referring to Sections 13(1), 13(8) and 37, read along with Section 29 and Rule 15. In our considered view any other construction will be doing violence to the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, in particular Sections 13(1) and (8) of the said Act.” (emphasis supplied) 56. This Court in Mathew Varghese , in unequivocal terms, held that unless and until a clear 30 days' notice is given to the borrower, no sale or transfer can be resorted to by a secured creditor. This Court in Mathew Varghese , in unequivocal terms, held that unless and until a clear 30 days' notice is given to the borrower, no sale or transfer can be resorted to by a secured creditor. It further held that in the event of any such sale properly notified after giving a 30 days' clear notice to the borrower did not take place as scheduled for reasons, which cannot be solely attributable to the borrower, the secured creditor cannot effect the sale or transfer of the secured asset on any subsequent date by relying upon the notification issued earlier. This Court held that once the sale does not take place pursuant to a notice issued under Rules 8 and 9, read with Section 13(8) for which the entire blame cannot be thrown on the borrower, it is imperative that for effecting the sale, the procedure prescribed will have to be followed afresh. …............................................................................................... 93. It will be relevant to note that this Court in Mathew Varghese itself has held that in the event of any such sale properly notified after giving a 30 days' clear notice to the borrower does not take place as scheduled for the reasons, which are not solely attributable to the borrower, then the secured creditor cannot effect the sale and he will have to initiate the procedure de novo. Therefore, the question, that will have to be considered, is, as to whether the sale, which was notified as per the notice dated 21-1-2012, could not take place on the date scheduled in the said notice for the reasons, which are solely attributable to the guarantors or not. ................................................................................................... 97. It could thus be seen that the second sale notice dated 9-7-2012 was in continuation of the proceedings of the first sale notice dated 21-1-2012, which sale could not be effected only on account of the interim orders passed by DRT, Chennai, on the representation made by the appellants and Respondents 2 to 4. It could further be seen that even in view of the law laid down by this Court in Mathew Varghese, since the sale scheduled on 27-2-2012, as per the first sale notice dated 21-1-2012, could not be held due to the reasons attributable solely to the guarantors, there was no necessity of again following the same procedure of providing a 30 days' clear notice. In any case, the respondent Bank issued a fresh second sale notice on 9-7-2012 to the appellants, scheduling the sale on 20-7-2012. There is a substantial distinction of facts in the present case as compared to those in Mathew Varghese. 98. In Mathew Varghese after the dismissal of SA, the respondent Bank had surreptitiously accepted the tender of the auction-purchaser on the very next day of dismissal of SA without issuing a notice to the guarantors/borrowers and also confirmed the sale, and only after the confirmation of sale and receipt of the entire amount, informed the borrowers/guarantors about the sale being confirmed. It is not the case here. In the present case, after the SA was dismissed on 2-7-2012, the respondent Bank again issued a fresh notice on 9-7-2012 scheduling the sale on 20-7-2012. 99. The facts in Mathew Varghese are also distinguishable inasmuch as though between the date of publication of notice in the newspapers and the date scheduled for sale, a clear 30 days' period was provided, but insofar as the individual notice to the borrowers/guarantors and the date scheduled for sale, a 30 days' clear period was not provided. And this was with regard to the very first notice. 100. On the aforesaid premise, this Court in Mathew Varghese held that the word “or” used in Rule 9 of the said Rules will have to be read as “and”, and that there should be a clear 30 days' period between the date of publication of notice in the newspapers as well as individual notice to the borrower/guarantor and the date scheduled for sale. Clearly, in the present case, there has been compliance with the same, insofar as the first notice is concerned, whereas in Mathew Varghese, there was no 30 days' period between individual notice and the date of sale.” 10. After referring to the facts involved in detail, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Karthik's case held against the guarantors noticing that the sale in the said case could not be held earlier on account of reasons solely attributable to them and further held that there was hence no necessity to provide 30 days period in the second sale notice, which was in continuation of the first sale notice. 11. 11. It is also apposite to refer to the following observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Karthik's case made with reference to the object and purpose of the SARFAESI Act:- “119. We will have to take into consideration the purpose with which the SARFAESI Act came to be enacted. Unlike international banks, the banks and financial institutions in India did not have power to take possession of securities and sell them. It was, therefore, noticed, that it had resulted in slow pace of recovery of defaulting loans and mounting levels of non-performing assets of banks and financial institutions. 120. It was also noticed that there were certain areas in which the banking and financial sector did not have a level playing field as compared to other participants in the financial markets in the world. It was further noticed that the existing legal framework relating to commercial transactions had not kept pace with the changing commercial practices and financial sector reforms. As such, the SARFAESI Act was enacted with the purpose for securitisation and empowering banks and financial institutions to take possession of the securities and to sell them without the intervention of the Court. 121. If we look at the facts in the present case, it would show that every attempt has been made to frustrate the purpose of the SARFAESI Act. The respondent Bank was required to indulge in three rounds of litigations, out of which, the two have reached up to this Court.” 12. Keeping this position of law at the forefront, we will now examine the contentions of the borrowers. This case has a long history of various rounds of legal struggles undertaken before this Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court apart from the DRT and DRAT. Now we will analyse the factual background. 13. During the period from 1998 to 2001, the borrowers obtained a total amount of ?10.31 Crores in the name of three different entities from the Bank. On account of default of repayment, notices under Section 13(2) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act (SARFAESI Act) were issued on 17 July 2003. The long-drawn fight between the Bank and the borrowers started with these notices. W.P.(C)No.28891 of 2003 was filed by the borrower and further proceedings were stayed by this Court. O.A.No.135 of 2004 was filed by the Bank claiming a total amount of ? The long-drawn fight between the Bank and the borrowers started with these notices. W.P.(C)No.28891 of 2003 was filed by the borrower and further proceedings were stayed by this Court. O.A.No.135 of 2004 was filed by the Bank claiming a total amount of ? 14,75,29,473.79/- with future interest. On 2 June 2004, W.P.(C)No.28891 of 2003 was dismissed. The 1 st Respondent filed W.P(C)No.16939 of 2005 which was disposed of by a judgment dated 10 June 2005 directing the Bank to consider the request of the borrower for ‘One Time Settlement’ and permitting the Bank to proceed in case of default in making payments by the borrower. The borrower deposited rupees one crore and submitted proposal for One Time Settlement. The Bank considered the proposal and offered facility of One Time Settlement. However, the borrower did not comply with the terms of the settlement offered by the Bank on 18 June 2005. The Bank therefore, filed W.ANo.1449 of 2005 as a measure of abundant caution challenging the judgment in W.P.(C)No.16939 of 2005. A Division Bench of this Court stayed the operation of the impugned judgment and directed that if the conditions mentioned in the letter dated 18 June 2005 are complied with, the sale of the property shall not be resorted to. The Division Bench further directed the borrower to pay rupees three crores more on or before 30 September 2005. 14. Borrower again approached this Court in W.P.(C)No.19945 of 2006. By judgment dated 4 August 2006, the Writ Petition was disposed of. The borrower again offered to pay the amounts demanded by the Bank, however, reserving the rights to dispute the quantum of the amount demanded. The Bank was directed to return the documents by moving the DRT on receipt of the amounts. A further direction was issued to the Bank to communicate the exact amounts claimed, to the borrower. Period of six weeks was granted for complying with the conditions. On 14 August 2006, W.A No.1449 of 2005 was disposed of as infructuous. Before the Division Bench, the Bank agreed that it will not object any other financial institution taking over the liability. Later, it issued a communication to that effect. Nevertheless, the borrower did not act in terms of his promise and on 19 September 2006, the Bank issued notice for taking possession of the secured asset. Before the Division Bench, the Bank agreed that it will not object any other financial institution taking over the liability. Later, it issued a communication to that effect. Nevertheless, the borrower did not act in terms of his promise and on 19 September 2006, the Bank issued notice for taking possession of the secured asset. On 19 September 2006, possession of 180 cents of property was taken over and the notice was affixed in the building situated in the property and also on the board, as the 1 st Respondent and his son refused to accept notice though they were present. Notices were thereafter sent to the 1 st Respondent and co-borrowers by registered post. On 21 September 2006, publication in newspaper was also made. On 28 October 2006, after fixing reserve price, sale notice dated 26 October 2006 was published in some newspapers inviting tender. Notice was affixed in the property and residence of the 1 st Respondent. The date fixed for the sale was 30 November 2006. 15. In the meanwhile, the 1 st Respondent filed W.A.No.1918 of 2006 challenging the judgment in W.P.(C)No.19945 of 2006. On 18 October 2006, the appeal was dismissed. An application was filed before the learned Single Judge for extension of time to comply with the directions in the judgment. It was dismissed by order dated 31 October 2006. A Review Petition was filed thereafter which was dismissed on 9 November 2006. Contempt Case No.1362 of 2006 was also filed by the 1 st Respondent which was dismissed on 8 November 2006. 16. Borrower thereafter, rushed to the DRT and filed S.A.No.73 of 2006. A Transfer Application was filed before the DRAT stating that there was no presiding officer in the DRT. The DRAT granted stay of sale scheduled on 30 November 2006. Later, the Appellate Tribunal relegated the borrower to agitate the case before the DRT. Bank approached this Court in W.P.(C)No.7519 of 2007 aggrieved by the order passed by the DRAT. By interim order dated 15 March 2007, this Court granted time till 31 March 2007 to the borrower to make payment under the Settlement Scheme and clarified that the Bank would be free to proceed for sale after due notice on 1 April 2007 or any day near to that. By interim order dated 15 March 2007, this Court granted time till 31 March 2007 to the borrower to make payment under the Settlement Scheme and clarified that the Bank would be free to proceed for sale after due notice on 1 April 2007 or any day near to that. The Bank filed an application for clarification of the order in which it was clarified that the Bank was free to publish notification immediately and limitation was only in regard to the date of sale which could be on any date after 1 April 2007. 17. In the light of the clarification as above, the Bank issued a sale notice on 23 March 2007 and date of sale was fixed as 12 April 2007. The said notice was challenged before the DRT through an I.A filed in S.A.No.73 of 2006. The application was dismissed by the DRT. Appeal was filed against the order of the DRT. In the appeal, the borrower undertook to make payments in a time bound manner. An application for review and a Special Leave Petition before the Hon'ble Supreme Court were also filed by the borrower, which did not yield any results. 18. On 8 December 2007, the Bank published fresh sale notification fixing the sale date as 18 December 2007. Son of the 1 st Respondent submitted a bid with conditions. That was rejected by the Bank. Hence the sale did not take place as there were no other bidders. On 23 December 2007, another sale notice was published fixing the date of sale as 29 December 2007. The 1 st Respondent filed I.A.No.2185 of 2007 in S.ANo.73 of 2006 against the sale fixed on 29 December 2007. The DRT did not grant any stay. W.P.(C)No:38237of 2007 was filed to interdict the sale. This Court also did not grant any stay. On 29 December 2007, the auction was held and the Appellant in W.A.No.2124 of 2016 was the highest bidder. It is relevant to mention that, in between, the borrower had filed O.S.No.744 of 2007 before the Sub Court, Thrissur and obtained injunction order against the sale of the secured asset. The Sub Court however vacated the interim order on 4 December 2007. 19. The tender was confirmed in favour of the Appellant in W.A.No.2124 of 2016, subject to the outcome of the Writ Petition No.38237 of 2007. The Sub Court however vacated the interim order on 4 December 2007. 19. The tender was confirmed in favour of the Appellant in W.A.No.2124 of 2016, subject to the outcome of the Writ Petition No.38237 of 2007. S.A.No.9 of 2008 was filed thereafter and S.A.No.73 of 2006 was withdrawn. Sale notices dated 8 December 2007 and 22 December 2007 were challenged in S.A.No.9 of 2008 alleging violation of Rule 9(1) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules. Son of the 1 st Respondent filed S.A.No.10 of 2008. 1 st Respondent filed W.P.(C)No.2855 of 2008 contending that the presiding officer of DRT Ernakulam was on leave. On 12 February 2008, the Writ Petition was disposed of. Bank filed appeal before the Division Bench and the appeal was disposed of on 10 March 2008, as SA.No.9 of 2008 filed by the 1 st Respondent was scheduled for hearing before the DRT. On 31 March 2008, the S.A was dismissed for default. Later it was restored. In the meantime, the Bank issued sale certificate to the Appellant in W.A.No.2124 of 2016, the auction purchaser. Thereafter, a Writ Petition was filed by the auction purchaser for a direction to hear the S.A urgently, which was opposed by the 1 st Respondent. The S.A was later posted before the DRT, Madurai and the auction purchaser filed W.P.(C)No.25575 of 2008 in which the hearing was stayed. On 5 June 2008, the DRAT dismissed the appeal filed against the sale notice. 1 st Respondent filed W.P.(C)No.30585 of 2008 and an interim order not to alienate the property was passed. In the challenge made in W.A.No.547 of 2009, Division Bench of this Court directed S.A.No.9 of 2008 be heard and disposed of on or before 30 April 2009. This time limit was extended on 22 May 2009. Finally by order dated 4 June 2009, the DRT allowed S.A.No.9 of 2008 and the sale was set aside. The Appellant – Bank approached the DRAT in R.A (S.A)No.76 of 2009 aggrieved by the order of the DRT. In O.A No. 135 of 2004 pending before the DRT, Bank filed I.A.No.1864 of 2010, which was dismissed as misconceived since the sale was set aside in S.A.No.9 of 2008. Against the dismissal of the I.A, Bank filed O.P(DRT)No.262 of 2010 before this Court. On 16 November 2011, the DRAT allowed the Appeal filed by the Bank. In O.A No. 135 of 2004 pending before the DRT, Bank filed I.A.No.1864 of 2010, which was dismissed as misconceived since the sale was set aside in S.A.No.9 of 2008. Against the dismissal of the I.A, Bank filed O.P(DRT)No.262 of 2010 before this Court. On 16 November 2011, the DRAT allowed the Appeal filed by the Bank. Thus the order passed by the DRT by which the sale was nullified was set aside. 1 st Respondent filed W.P.(C)No.31683 of 2011 against the order passed by the DRAT. The Writ Petition was heard along with OP(DRT)No.262 of 2010 filed by the Bank and the impugned common judgment was passed on 26 July 2016. 20. The facts narrated by us in the foregoing paragraphs would clearly show that the borrowers were making every possible attempt to avoid proper repayment and to foil the proceedings initiated under the SARFAESI Act. Each time the sale notice was issued, attempts were made to defeat the sale and borrowers succeeded in several rounds. The sale could not be held on all previous occasions due to the resistance by the borrowers who rushed to the DRT or this court under the pretext of attempting to settle the matter or seeking further time for payment. Close scrutiny of the facts and circumstances would show that even the participation of the son of the 1 st Respondent in the sale scheduled on 18 December 2007 with an offer to purchase a part of the secured asset was also another attempt without bonafides, to thwart the sale. His conduct needs to be noted this connection. He had approached the Sub Court Thrissur in O.S.No.774 of 2007 against the 1 st Respondent, none other than his father, and the Authorised Officer claiming rights on the basis of an alleged lease deed executed in his favour by the 1 st Respondent. IA 4456 of 2007 was filed for injunction against sale of the secured asset. Though an order was initially passed in his favour, the same was vacated and IA was dismissed on 4 December, 2007. Collusive nature of the suit and lack of bonafides were apparent and the civil court elaborately considered the issues before rejecting the IA. After failing in the attempt to stall the sale through the intervention of civil court, he participated in the sale but the bid which was not acceptable to the bank. Collusive nature of the suit and lack of bonafides were apparent and the civil court elaborately considered the issues before rejecting the IA. After failing in the attempt to stall the sale through the intervention of civil court, he participated in the sale but the bid which was not acceptable to the bank. Hence in this case, the sale could not be conducted on all previous occasions solely for reasons attributable to the borrowers. 21. In the impugned judgment, the learned Single Judge had also taken note of the deplorable conduct of the borrowers. We extract the relevant observations of the learned Single Judge hereunder:- “21. Before leaving the matter, it has to be noticed that the borrower has been consistently making undertakings, before the Bank and before this Court, and not acting in compliance with the same. In that circumstance, there would be absolutely no impediment in the Bank proceeding with the sale immediately but however, in accordance with the SARFAESI Act and the Enforcement Rules. Considering the long passage of time and the delay caused, mainly due to the recalcitrant attitude of the borrowers, it is made clear that the sale conducted would have to go through and the reservation would only be with respect to the computation, for which the borrowers would be entitled to seek appropriate remedies in which there could definitely be no interdiction of the sale as such. ..................................................................... .............................................................................” The learned Single Judge also thus took note of the refractory approach and tactics adopted by the borrowers and held that the process should go on, though the impugned sale was set aside on the ground that 30 days time was not ensured after publication of notice. 22. In the light of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Karthik's case, we have to hold that the sale held on 29 December 2007 cannot be held as vitiated for not providing 30 days’ notice as on the previous occasions sale could not be conducted entirely on account of the attempts of the borrowers to stall the process. The inevitable conclusion therefore is that the impugned judgment cannot be sustained in view of the position of law laid down later in S.Karthik's case. We therefore set aside the impugned judgment. W.P.(C)No.31683/2011 will stand dismissed. W.A.Nos.1802 and 2124/2016 are allowed. 23. The inevitable conclusion therefore is that the impugned judgment cannot be sustained in view of the position of law laid down later in S.Karthik's case. We therefore set aside the impugned judgment. W.P.(C)No.31683/2011 will stand dismissed. W.A.Nos.1802 and 2124/2016 are allowed. 23. In W.A.No.2079/2016 filed by the borrowers the grievance raised is regarding the preemptive directions in the impugned judgment and observations against the borrowers. As we have found that the writ petition was without merits and allowed the connected appeals by setting aside the judgment, reliefs sought in W.A. No.2079/2016 would not survive. It is hence dismissed.