Indira Devi Surana W/o Sri Raj Karan Surana v. Roopchand Kucheria S/o Late Moolchand Kucheria
2025-04-30
DEVASHIS BARUAH
body2025
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT AND ORDER (ORAL) DEVASHIS BARUAH, J. Heard Mr. B. D. Deka, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner and Mr. A. Sancheti, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents. 2. This is a case where a tenant who had suffered a decree of ejectment in order to nullify the same, have resorted to all litigative acrobatics and the present one, through one of the joint decree holders. 3. The petitioner herein who was one of the joint decree holders had approached this Court challenging the order dated 06.02.2025 whereby an application filed by the petitioner under Section 47 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, ‘the Code’) was dismissed by the learned Executing Court, i.e. the Court of the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Bongaigaon as well as non-consideration of the application filed under Order XXI Rule 15 of the Code. 4. The present application is filed invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court rather than the revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code. It is well settled by the Supreme Court in the case of Virudhunagar Hindu Nadargal Dharma Paribalana Sabai & Others vs. Tuticorin Educational Society and Others , reported in (2019) 9 SCC 538 , that when the Code provides a remedy, the High Court should not merely as a measure of self-imposed restriction, but as a matter of discipline deter from exercising its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 5. It is also settled that when an application under Section 47 of the Code is rejected and more particularly when it challenges the Execution proceedings, the remedy available is under Section 115 of the Code. However, as the petitioner’s counsel inspite of being asked submitted that he would confine his case only under Article 227 of the Constitution, the present proceedings on this count alone is required to be dismissed. 6. Be that as it may, the present application being a collusive attempt to nullify a judgment and decree passed by this Court and in order to put at rest the objections so raised before the learned Executing Court, this Court finds it apt to deal with the merits. 7.
6. Be that as it may, the present application being a collusive attempt to nullify a judgment and decree passed by this Court and in order to put at rest the objections so raised before the learned Executing Court, this Court finds it apt to deal with the merits. 7. The predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner along with the respondent Nos.1 & 2 herein filed a suit before the Court of the learned Munsiff at Bongaigaon which was registered as Title Suit No.2/2000 seeking eviction of the defendant, namely, M/s Bongaigaon Stores and its proprietor. The learned Trial Court, i.e. the Court of the Munsiff at Bongaigaon vide the judgment and decree dated 05.08.2010 decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff. The learned Trial Court decreed the suit upon arriving at a conclusion that the tenants/defendants were defaulters in payment of the rent as well as on bonafide requirement of the plaintiffs in respect to the suit premises. The defendants as appellants being aggrieved, preferred an Appeal before the learned Court of the Civil Judge, Bongaigaon which was registered and numbered as Title Appeal No.35/2010. The learned First Appellate Court vide the judgment and decree dated 05.11.2013, affirmed the judgment and decree dated 05.08.2010. It is however relevant to note that the learned First Appellate Court interfered with the finding that the defendants/tenants were defaulters in payment of rent. However, on the aspect of bonafide requirement, the learned First Appellant Court affirmed the findings of the learned Trial Court and consequently upheld the decree of the learned Trial Court. 8. The defendants/tenants thereupon filed an application under Section 115 of the Code before this Court which was registered and numbered as CRP No.77/2014. This Court vide an order dated 03.11.2016, reversed the judgment and decree of the learned First Appellate Court on the ground of non-compliance to the provisions of Order XLI Rule 31 of the Code and remanded the matter back to the learned First Appellate Court for a fresh decision on the issues by discussing the evidence available on record and keeping in mind the principle embodied in Order XLI Rule 31 of the Code. 9. In pursuance to the directions passed by this Court in CRP No.77/2014, the learned First Appellate Court vide the judgment and decree dated 22.09.2017, dismissed the suit.
9. In pursuance to the directions passed by this Court in CRP No.77/2014, the learned First Appellate Court vide the judgment and decree dated 22.09.2017, dismissed the suit. Being aggrieved, the plaintiffs approached this Court by filing a proceeding under Section 115 of the Code which was registered and numbered as CRP No.19/2018. It is very pertinent to mention at this stage that during the pendency of CRP No.19/2018, the plaintiff No.1 expired and he was substituted by the petitioner and the respondent No.3 herein who were the legal representatives of the plaintiff No.1 along with the respondent Nos.1 & 2 herein. Similarly, the defendant No.2 expired and he was substituted by his legal representatives who were arrayed as respondent Nos.2.1; 2.2 and 2.3 to CRP No.19/2018. 10. This Court vide the judgment and decree dated 05.06.2023 in CRP No.19/2018 interfered with the judgment and decree dated 22.09.2017 passed by the Court of the learned Civil Judge, Bongaigaon in Title Appeal No.35/2010 and affirmed the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court by holding that the defendant was a defaulter in payment of rent as well as the plaintiffs had bonafide requirement of the suit premises. 11. This Court further finds it relevant to take note of that upon decreeing the suit in favour of the petitioners in CRP No.19/2018, they were therefore entitled to recovery of khas possession by ejectment of the defendants from the suit premises. 12. The counsel who represented the defendants/tenants in CRP No.19/2018 submitted before this Court at the time of dictating the judgment and order dated 05.06.2023 in the open Court that as the tenants were carrying on business over the suit premises for a considerable period of time, some time may be granted as it would cause serious irretrievable injury to the tenants if they are immediately evicted from the suit premises. This Court considering the same, granted 6 months time to the tenants to vacate the suit premises provided they submitted an undertaking before the learned Trial Court within 20.06.2023 to the effect that they shall vacate the suit premises within a period of six months from the date of the judgment, i.e. on or before 06.12.2023. It was also observed that failure to submit any undertaking within the period, the petitioners who were the plaintiffs would be entitled to initiate execution proceedings for evicting the defendants.
It was also observed that failure to submit any undertaking within the period, the petitioners who were the plaintiffs would be entitled to initiate execution proceedings for evicting the defendants. Paragraph Nos.23 to 25 of the said judgment and order dated 05.06.2023 is reproduced herein below:- “23. In view of the above, the Plaintiffs therefore are entitled to eviction of the Defendants from the Schedule Premises. Taking into consideration that the defendants have been carrying on the business of clothes since long, Mr. B. J. Mukherjee, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Defendants submits that if the Defendants are immediately evicted serious irretrievable injury would be caused as it would be very difficult to immediately find an alternative location for carrying out its business. The materials on record shows that the Defendants have been carrying on their business in the suit premises for more than 55 years. It would be just and reasonable in the opinion of this Court to grant the Defendants 6 (six) months time to vacate the suit premises provided that they submit an undertaking before the Trial Court within 20.06.2023 to the effect that they shall vacate the suit premises within a period of 6 (six) months from the date of the instant judgment, i.e. on or before 06.12.2023. Failure to submit the undertaking within the period, the Plaintiffs/Petitioners shall be entitled to initiate execution proceedings for evicting the Defendants. 24. It is clarified that during this period of 6 (six) months, the Defendants shall continue to make payment of the amount of Rs.280/- per month in the form of compensation to the Petitioners/Plaintiffs. 25. It is further observed that granting of extension of the period of six months subject to filing the undertaking as aforementioned and the payment of compensation of Rs.280/- per month during the period of 6 (six) months shall not create any right or interest in favour of the Defendants/respondents herein in respect to the Schedule Premises. It is also clarified that during this period, the Defendants shall remain in possession of the suit premises as the custodian of the Plaintiffs and shall not do any act or acts which may effect the rights of the Plaintiffs over the suit premises in any manner whatsoever. This aspect of the matter shall also be mentioned in the undertaking to be filed by the Defendants before the Trial Court.” 13.
This aspect of the matter shall also be mentioned in the undertaking to be filed by the Defendants before the Trial Court.” 13. The contents of the above quoted paragraphs are very pertinent to the instant dispute in as much as time was granted upto 06.12.2023 to the defendants/tenants subject to the submission of an undertaking before the learned Trial Court. The undertaking so required to be submitted should contain that the defendants/tenants would vacate the suit premises on or before 06.12.2023. Further, this Court made it clear that the defendants/tenants shall during the said period, i.e. from 05.06.2023 to 06.12.2023 shall remain in possession as custodian of the plaintiffs and shall not do any act or acts which may affect the rights of the plaintiffs over the suit premises in any manner whatsoever. 14. What subsequently followed thereafter reminds this Court of the judgment of His Lordship V. R. Krishna Iyer J. (as His Lorship then was) rendered in the case of T. Arvindanam vs. T. V. Satyapal and Another , reported in (1977) 4 SCC 467 wherein also taking advantage of the time being granted to vacate the suit premises, the tenant took recourse to litigative acrobatics in order to nullify the judgment and decree. Similarly, in the instant case, the tenants/defendants in order to nullify the judgment and decree surreptitiously entered into an agreement for fresh tenancy with the petitioner herein through a partner-cum- constituted attorney of M/s Bongaigaon Stores, who was the defendant No.1 in the suit. This was done behind the back of the respondents herein who were the co-plaintiffs. 15. At this stage, it is relevant to observe certain important developments which occurred prior and post the judgment and decree dated 05.06.2023 passed by this Court. Late Mool Chand Kucheria prior to his death on 05.01.2023 had executed a Will dated 13.08.2023 by which the suit premises was bequeathed in favour of the respondent No.1 herein. A proceedings being Misc. (Probate) Case No.25/2023 was filed seeking probate of the said Will of Late Mool Chand Kucheria on 04.07.2023. Notice in the said proceedings was issued by the learned Probate Court.
A proceedings being Misc. (Probate) Case No.25/2023 was filed seeking probate of the said Will of Late Mool Chand Kucheria on 04.07.2023. Notice in the said proceedings was issued by the learned Probate Court. It is relevant to mention that on 14.11.2023, the petitioner herein filed an objection in the said probate proceedings and one day earlier, i.e. 13.11.2023, the petitioner claimed that she was handed over the possession by the defendant No.1, i.e. M/s Bongaigaon Stores and on that very day, the petitioner and the defendant No.1 entered into an agreement dated 13.11.2023 and the possession was again handed over to M/s Bongaigaon Stores on 13.11.2023 itself by the petitioner herein. 16. It is also pertinent to mention that though in the judgment and order dated 05.06.2023, at the request of the counsel appearing on behalf of the tenants/defendants this Court permitted the tenants/defendants to remain in possession subject to filing undertaking before the learned Trial Court, but neither such undertaking was filed nor the vacant possession was handed over. Under such circumstances, the respondents herein filed an application seeking execution for recovery of arrear rents. The said application was registered and numbered as Title Execution No.4/2024. 17. When such application seeking execution was filed, the learned Executing Court issued a writ for delivery of possession on 30.01.2024. It came to the notice of the respondents herein that in the Execution Application, there was no prayer for recovery of khas possession of the suit premises, and as such, an application was filed seeking amendment to the Execution Application which was registered and numbered as Petition No.409/2024. This application was filed on 19.02.2024. On the same date, one Ram Kishan Mantri @ Maheswari filed an application under Section 47 of the Code stating inter- alia that on the basis of the judgment and order dated 05.06.2023, the said Ram Kishan Mantri @ Maheswari handed over the possession of the suit premises to the petitioner herein on 13.11.2023 and on that very day, the petitioner entered into an agreement with the said Ram Kishan Mantri @ Maheswari granting him a lease for 12 months. This application was registered and numbered as Misc.(J) Case No.28/2024. The learned Executing Court vide two separate orders allowed the application seeking amendment and dismissed the application filed by the said Ram Kishan Mantri @ Maheswari. 18.
This application was registered and numbered as Misc.(J) Case No.28/2024. The learned Executing Court vide two separate orders allowed the application seeking amendment and dismissed the application filed by the said Ram Kishan Mantri @ Maheswari. 18. Against the order dated 19.02.2024 allowing the application seeking amendment, the said Ram Kishan Mantri @ Maheswari approached this Court by filing an application under Article 227 of the Constitution which was registered and numbered as CRP(IO) No.92/2024. This application was dismissed by this Court holding inter-alia that there was no jurisdictional error committed by the learned Executing Court in allowing the application seeking amendment. 19. This Court now finds it relevant to take note of the contents of the application filed under Section 47 of the Code by the petitioner which was registered as Misc.(J) Case No.56/2024. It is the case of the petitioner that her father Late Mool Chand Kucheria, during his lifetime had expressed his desire verbally that the suit premises would be bequeathed in favour of the petitioner so that the petitioner is able to earn rental income after his demise by entering into fresh agreement. The petitioner accordingly informed the judgment debtors who handed over the possession of the suit premises to the petitioner and the petitioner thereupon entered into a fresh agreement with the judgment debtors for a monthly rent of Rs.12,000/- with a condition for 10% increase after three years. The agreement was st made effective from 1 November, 2023. It was therefore the case of the petitioner that the Execution proceedings could not have continued after entering into the fresh agreement with the petitioner by the judgment debtor, and as such, the said proceedings should be closed. 20. The respondents herein filed written objections to the Application filed by the petitioner raising various objections to the maintainability of the said Application and deny to the contents of the said Application. 21. The learned Executing Court vide its order dated 06.02.2025 impugned in the present proceedings rejected the said Application filed by the petitioner. 22. It is relevant to take note of further events as stated in the application filed before this Court. It is seen from the application that the person, namely, Shri Ram Kishan Mantri @ Maheswari handed over the suit premises to the petitioner on 01.04.2025 and the agreement dated 13.11.2023 was terminated. The said document is Annexure-15 to the instant application.
It is relevant to take note of further events as stated in the application filed before this Court. It is seen from the application that the person, namely, Shri Ram Kishan Mantri @ Maheswari handed over the suit premises to the petitioner on 01.04.2025 and the agreement dated 13.11.2023 was terminated. The said document is Annexure-15 to the instant application. The petitioner had enclosed as Annexure-18 certain photographs to show that the judgment debtors had shifted and the suit premises is under the possession of the petitioner. It further transpires from the instant application that the petitioner had also filed another application under Order XXI Rule 15 (2) of the Code for closing the execution case and it is alleged that the said application was not accepted and as such the petitioner sought for directions from the learned District Judge and having failed to obtain any favourable response have also sought for directions from this Court that the said application filed under Order XXI Rule 15 (2) of the Code be adjudicated by the learned Executing Court. 23. In the backdrop of the above, let this Court take note of the submissions made by the learned counsels appearing on behalf of the petitioner as well as the respondents. Mr. B. D. Deka, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that the petitioner herein being one of the joint decree holders had leased out the decreetal premises by an unregistered agreement dated 13.11.2023, and as such, till a partition is not affected, the question of allowing the other decree holders to further pursue the execution proceedings do not arise. He referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Jagdish Dutt and Another vs. Dharam Pal and Others , reported in (1999) 3 SCC 644 as well as the judgment of the Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Bipul Bihari Nag vs. Md. Mehmood Hussain , reported in 1993 1 GLR 336. He further submitted that the application filed under Order XXI Rule 15 (2) of the Code had not been accepted for which appropriate directions be issued. 24. Per contra, Mr. A. Sancheti, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents submitted that this is the case where the judgment debtors have indulged in various forms of litigations in order to deny the fruits of the decree.
24. Per contra, Mr. A. Sancheti, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents submitted that this is the case where the judgment debtors have indulged in various forms of litigations in order to deny the fruits of the decree. He submitted that the instant proceedings as well as the proceedings filed by the petitioner is nothing but a sponsored litigation at the behest of the judgment debtors. He submitted that the judgment and decree passed by this Court on 05.06.2023 was passed holding inter-alia that landlord had bonafide requirement of the suit premises and in order to nullify the said judgment and decree by operation of Section 5 (3) of the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972, the purported agreement dated 13.11.2023 was entered into. The learned counsel further submitted that the timing of the execution of the purported agreement dated 13.11.2023 is also relevant. Referring to the contents of the purported agreement dated 13.11.2023, he submitted that it was mentioned that by the last Will of the petitioner’s father, the suit premises was bequeathed to the petitioner whereas the petitioner was aware of the Will dated 13.08.2013 executed by the petitioner’s father which was put to probate in Misc.(Probate) Case No.25/2023 and in fact as would be apparent from the records of the present application objection was filed by the petitioner before the learned District Judge on 14.11.2023 just one day after entering into the purported agreement. The learned counsel further submitted that though vide Annexure Nos.17 & 18, the petitioner has made an attempt to show that the agreement dated 13.11.2023 was terminated but in effect, the suit premises is still under the possession of the judgment debtors. He submitted that the judgment debtors in collusion and in concert with the petitioner is trying to play fraud upon the learned Executing Court as well as this Court by bringing on record Annexure Nos. 17 & 18 to the instant application. The learned counsel further submitted that a perusal of the judgment in the case of Jagdish Dutt (supra) would also show that the application filed by the petitioner cannot be maintained before the learned Executing Court. He therefore submitted that any interference in the present proceedings would seriously impact the rights of the respondents. 25.
The learned counsel further submitted that a perusal of the judgment in the case of Jagdish Dutt (supra) would also show that the application filed by the petitioner cannot be maintained before the learned Executing Court. He therefore submitted that any interference in the present proceedings would seriously impact the rights of the respondents. 25. This Court has duly heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties and perused the materials on record of the present petition. This Court has also taken note of the proceedings being CRP (IO) No.92/2024 which was disposed of by this Court by an order dated 27.03.2024. In the instant petition though the petitioner had brought on record, the application filed under Section 47 read with Section 151 of the Code which was registered as Misc.(J) Case No.56/2024, but did not enclose the enclosures to the said application. However, in the records of CRP(IO) No.92/2024, the purported agreement dated 13.11.2023 was enclosed as Annexure-3 to the said proceedings. 26. This Court has duly taken note of the contents of the said purported agreement. A perusal of the said agreement shows that on the basis of the last Will and wish of the father of the petitioner, she had entered into the said purported agreement. A perusal of the application being Misc.(J) Case No.56/2024 further shows that it is an admitted case of the petitioner that the last Will of Late Mool Chand Kucheria as mentioned in paragraph No.3 was only made verbally. 27. Part IX of the Indian Succession, Act, 1925 (for short, ‘the Act of 1925’) stipulates that all grants of Probate and Letters of Administration with the Will annexed and the administration of the assets of a deceased in the case of intestate succession shall be carried out as the case may be, in accordance with the provisions of the said Part IX of the Act of 1925. For the grant to probate, in terms with Section 276 of the Act of 1925 stipulates that the requirement of enclosing the Will with the application is essential and the case coming within the purview of Sections 237, 238 & 239 of the Act of 1925, a copy of the draft or statement of the contents of the Will is required to be enclosed to the application.
Therefore, the provisions of law do not provide grant of a probate on the basis of a verbal Will. 28. It is also relevant to take note of that in Misc.(Probate) Case No.25/2023, the Will of Late Mool Chand Kucheria dated 13.08.2013 is sought to be probated. Therefore, there arises no question of Late Mool Chand Kucheria having died intestate for filing an application of Letter of Administration as on date. 29. This Court further takes note of Section 213 of the Act of 1925 wherein Sub-section (1) stipulates that no right as executor or legatee can be established in any Court of Justice unless a Court of competent jurisdiction in India has granted probate of the Will under which the right is claimed or has granted Letter of Administration with the Will or with an authenticated copy of the Will is annexed. Therefore, by virtue of Section 213 of the Act of 1925, the petitioner could not have entered into the purported agreement dated 13.11.2023 with the judgment debtors on the ground that she had been bequeathed the suit premises. 30. This Court further finds it relevant to take note of that vide the Will dated 13.08.2013 executed by Late Mool Chand Kucheria, the suit premises have been bequeathed in favour of the respondent No.1. This Court further finds it relevant that this Probate Application being Misc.(Probate) Case No.25/2023 was filed on 04.07.2023. By operation of Section 211 of the Act of 1925, the respondent No.1 being the executor of the Will would be deemed to be the legal representative of Late Mool Chand Kucheria for all purposes and all the property of the deceased person. In this regard, this Court finds it relevant to take note of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of FGP Limited vs. Saleh Hooseini Doctor & Another , reported in (2009) 10 SCC 223. Paragraph Nos.46 & 47 of the said judgment being relevant is reproduced herein under:- “46. In this connection, we must see the distinction between Sections 211 and 213 of the Succession Act. Under Section 211 of the said Act, the executor or administrator, as the case may be, of a deceased person is his legal representative for all purposes, and all the property of the deceased person vests in him as such.
In this connection, we must see the distinction between Sections 211 and 213 of the Succession Act. Under Section 211 of the said Act, the executor or administrator, as the case may be, of a deceased person is his legal representative for all purposes, and all the property of the deceased person vests in him as such. Here the legal representatives will have the same meaning as has been given in Section 2(11) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 2(11) of the Code of Civil Procedure provides as under: “2. (11) ‘legal representative’ means a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person, and includes any person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased and where a party sues or is sued in a representative character the person on whom the estate devolves on the death of the party so suing or sued;” 47. Therefore, it is Section 211 and not Section 213 that deals with the vesting of property. This vesting does not take place as a result of probate. On the executor’s accepting his office, the property vests on him and the executor derives his title from the will and becomes the representative of the deceased even without obtaining probate. The grant of probate does not give title to the executor. It just makes his title certain.” 31. In view of the above exposition of law, the respondent No.1 herein being the executor of Late Mool Chand Kucheria and he having accepted his office, as would be apparent from the very filing of the application seeking probate on 04.07.2023, the suit premises had vested on him and the respondent No.1 had derived his title from the Will and became the representative of the deceased of Late Mool Chand Kucheria even without obtaining the probate. 32. Considering the above, the possession being handed over by the judgment debtors to the petitioner on the basis of a verbal Will on 13.11.2023 and on the very same day, entering into the purported agreement of tenancy on 13.11.2023 was nonest and cannot be recognized in law, more so, when the petitioner herein claims title over the suit property on the basis of a verbal Will and not any other independent right. 33.
33. This Court further finds it relevant to take note of that from a perusal of Annexure Nos.17 and 18, the petitioner claims that the purported agreement dated 13.11.2013 stood terminated and the partner of the judgment debtor, namely, Ram Kishan Mantri @ Maheswari had handed over the possession of the suit premises on 01.04.2023. Therefore, from the very admission on the part of the petitioner, the judgment debtors claim on the basis of the purported agreement dated 13.11.2023 no longer exists. It is also relevant to take note of that in view of the said statements made by the petitioner and the documents enclosed as Annexure Nos.17 and 18, the petitioner and the judgment debtors have given up their claim in respect to the suit premises on the basis of the purported agreement dated 13.11.2023. 34. In the backdrop of the above, let this Court now take note of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Jagdish Dutt (supra). The said judgment in the opinion of this Court cannot now apply to the facts of the instant case taking into account that it is the petitioner's own case that the judgment debtors have given up their claim made on the basis of the purported agreement dated 13.11.2023. Furthermore, the dispute which is sought to be raised by the petitioner cannot also be decided in a proceedings under Section 47 of the Code as would also appear from a very reading of the said judgment. 35. This Court further finds it relevant to take note of that the petitioner had also in the meantime filed the suit before the Court of the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Bongaigaon which was registered and numbered as Title Suit No.117/2024 whereby the petitioner had inter-alia sought for a decree for partition as well as for cancellation of the Will dated 13.08.2013. Without commenting on the merit of the said suit, it perhaps appears that the petitioner is aware that the proceedings under Section 47 of the Code was not the right course. 36. Now let this Court take note of the order passed by the learned Executing Court dated 06.02.2025 which is impugned in the present proceedings.
Without commenting on the merit of the said suit, it perhaps appears that the petitioner is aware that the proceedings under Section 47 of the Code was not the right course. 36. Now let this Court take note of the order passed by the learned Executing Court dated 06.02.2025 which is impugned in the present proceedings. It appears that the learned Executing Court after taking into account the respective contentions had arrived at its findings and had rightly dismissed the application under Section 47 of the Code being Misc.(J) Case No.56/2024. 37. In the opinion of this Court, the very edifice of the petitioner’s challenge to the order dated 06.02.2025 in Misc.(J) Case No.56/2024 had eroded taking into account that it is the petitioner’s own case now that she was handed over the possession by the partner of the judgment debtors and the purported agreement dated 13.11.2023 was terminated. Therefore, when the basis of the application filed by the petitioner no longer remains, the order dated 06.02.2025 cannot be interfered with on that count also. 38. This Court further takes note of that upon the dismissal of the application filed by the petitioner under Section 47 of the Code, the petitioner through her engaged counsel had filed a petition under Order XXI Rule 15 of the Code which was not taken on record as alleged. The petitioner seeks for a direction that the said application should be considered by the learned Executing Court. 39. This Court had perused the said application enclosed as Annexure 19 to the instant application. The manner in which the said application is filed shocks and surprises this Court in as much as the said application is not filed by the petitioner but her engaged counsel that too seeking judicial determination. Further, it also surprises this Court that the engaged counsel on affidavit seeks to bring on record certain documents and new factual materials that too without any authorization and further placing himself to the status of a litigant. Such act on the part of the counsel is not in consonance with the Advocates Act, 1961 and the Rules framed thereunder.
Further, it also surprises this Court that the engaged counsel on affidavit seeks to bring on record certain documents and new factual materials that too without any authorization and further placing himself to the status of a litigant. Such act on the part of the counsel is not in consonance with the Advocates Act, 1961 and the Rules framed thereunder. It further appears from the contents of the said application filed under Order XXI Rule 15 of the Code by the engaged counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner before the learned Executing Court that the said application is a continuation of Misc.(J) Case No.56/2024 which was dismissed and the same is nothing but a bogey to delay the execution of a lawful decree. 40. This Court, taking into account the above facts, is of the opinion that this is not a fit case even for exercising the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court, that too at the instance of the petitioner who in collusion with the judgment debtors had resorted to means to nullify a judgment and decree validly passed by this Court. It is the further opinion of this Court that if any interference is made by this Court, it would result in encouraging the diabolical plans of the judgment debtors to deny the decree holders of the fruits of the decree obtained by them. It is well settled that such attempts on the part of the judgment debtors if not thwarted, would encourage frivolous and cantankerous litigations causing law’s delay and bring bad name to the judicial system. 41. Under such circumstances, the instant petition stands dismissed. 42. Before concluding, this Court further finds it apt to refer to the opening words of His Lordship V. R. Krishna Iyer J. in the case of T. Arvindanam (supra) which is quoted herein below:- “The pathology of litigative addiction ruins the poor of this country and the Bar has a role to cure this deleterious tendency of parties to launch frivolous and vexatious cases.” 43. Taking into account that the instant proceedings is a frivolous and a vexatious attempt to derail and delay the execution of a lawfully obtained judgment and decree after 25 years, at the behest of the petitioner in collusion and in concert with the judgment debtors, this Court imposes an exemplary cost of Rs.50,000/- upon the petitioner.
Taking into account that the instant proceedings is a frivolous and a vexatious attempt to derail and delay the execution of a lawfully obtained judgment and decree after 25 years, at the behest of the petitioner in collusion and in concert with the judgment debtors, this Court imposes an exemplary cost of Rs.50,000/- upon the petitioner. Non-imposition of such cost would send a wrong signal to litigants like the present petitioner as well as the judgment debtors at whose behest, the present proceedings appears to have been instituted.