JUDGMENT : CHEEKATI MANAVENDRANATH ROY, J. 1. The respondent is the sole accused in Sessions Case No.66 of 2012 on the file of the learned 5th Additional Sessions Judge (Ad-hoc), Kheda-Nadiad. He was prosecuted for the offences punishable under Sections 363 , 366 and 376 of the INDIAN PENAL CODE . Eventually, after trial, he was not found guilty for any of the said offences and he was acquitted of all the said charges by the impugned judgment. 2. Aggrieved by the impugned judgment of acquittal, the State has preferred the instant appeal challenging the legality and validity of the impugned judgment of acquittal. 3. Facts of the prosecution case germane to dispose of this appeal may briefly be stated as follows:- 4. The victim girl is a minor aged about 15 years, 11 months and 13 days on the date of offence, which took place on 14.2.2012, (she will be herein after referred to as “the prosecutrix”). She was studying 10 th class at the time of the offence. It is stated that she has been preparing for final examination of her 10 th class and when she was studying during the night time on 14.2.2012, that she went out of her house to answer the calls of nature at about 12 O’ clock in the mid night. At that time, when she was alone, at that place, and while she was answering the calls of nature, the accused came and caught hold of her and forcibly took her to the nearby field and committed rape on her. It is stated that he has stripped off her clothes and had sexual intercourse with her by force. Thereafter, he has taken her along with him, threatening her with dire consequences. Initially, he has taken her towards Rajkot and again he has brought her back to Ahmedabad. They were sitting at the bus stop of Geeta Mandir between 5 to 6 p.m. on 15.2.2012. At that time, police traced both of them and questioned them and brought them to Geeta Mandir Police Station. They, in turn, informed Mahemadavad Police Station that the accused and the prosecutrix were found at the bus stop and handed them over to Mahemadavad Police. Mahemadavad Police informed the family members of the prosecutrix, that they were traced at the bus stop. Grand- father of the prosecutrix immediately reached the police station. They, in turn, informed Mahemadavad Police Station that the accused and the prosecutrix were found at the bus stop and handed them over to Mahemadavad Police. Mahemadavad Police informed the family members of the prosecutrix, that they were traced at the bus stop. Grand- father of the prosecutrix immediately reached the police station. Thereafter, he has taken the prosecutrix along with him to their house. Initially, PW-1, father of the prosecutrix did not file any report with police as he does not want to complicate the issue, as it is relating to the future of his minor daughter. He wants to settle the matter and did not initiate any legal action. However, it is stated that the accused continued to make efforts to take away the prosecutrix with him and that he also threatened to take her away with him. Therefore, PW-1 lodged a report with police on 8.4.2012 regarding the incident that took place on 14.2.2012. Police registered the said report of PW-1, as a case for the offences punishable under Sections 363 , 366, 376 and 506 (2) of IPC against the accused. The case was investigated. The accused was arrested on 11.4.2012. Thereafter, both the prosecutrix and the accused were referred for medical examination. Before the doctor, who examined the accused, he stated that he and the prosecutrix were in love with each other and that they used to have sexual intercourse with each other. The doctor, who examined the accused opined that the accused is capable of performing sexual intercourse. Accordingly, he has issued certificate to that effect. Even before the doctor, who examined the prosecutrix, PW-6, she also stated that she and the accused are in love with each other and that they used to have sexual intercourse with each other. The doctor, who examined the prosecutrix, opined that she is habituated to sexual intercourse and medical certificate to that effect was also issued by him. After examining other witnesses and after completion of investigation, police filed charge-sheet against the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 363 , 366, 376 and 506 (2) of IPC. 5. In the trial Court, charges under Section 363 , 366 and 376 of IPC were framed against the accused. Same were read over and explained to the accused. He denied the said charges and claimed to be tried. 6. The trial has taken place. 5. In the trial Court, charges under Section 363 , 366 and 376 of IPC were framed against the accused. Same were read over and explained to the accused. He denied the said charges and claimed to be tried. 6. The trial has taken place. During the course of trial, the prosecution got examined PW-1 to PW-10 witnesses and got marked 18 exhibits to substantiate its case against the accused. 7. At the culmination of the trial, after considering the oral and documentary evidence on record, learned trial Court found the accused not guilty for any of the aforesaid charges framed against him and acquitted him of all the said charges by the impugned judgment. 8. Aggrieved thereby, as noticed supra, the State has preferred the instant appeal questioning the legality and validity of the impugned judgment of acquittal. Notice of rule was issued to the respondent-sole accused. Despite service of notice of rule, respondent did not turn up for hearing in this appeal. The matter was listed before us on 13.6.2025 for final hearing under the caption “critically old matters for final hearing”. As the accused did not appear before the Court and did not turn up for hearing in this appeal, despite service of notice of rule on him, to give a fair opportunity of hearing to him, we have ordered to list the matter on 4.7.2023 for hearing. But on that day also, he did not appear before the Court. As it an old matter of the year 2013, which is listed before us for final hearing, though we were not inclined to adjourn the matter on that day, but in order to give one more fair opportunity to the accused, we have ordered to list the mater finally for hearing today, i.e. on 8.7.2025, in the supplementary Board. But today also, he did not turn up for hearing. We have made it clear in our order dated 4.7.2025 that if the accused fails to appear today that we will proceed to hear learned APP and to decide the appeal and to dispose of the same on merits, as per the material available on record. 9. But today also, he did not turn up for hearing. We have made it clear in our order dated 4.7.2025 that if the accused fails to appear today that we will proceed to hear learned APP and to decide the appeal and to dispose of the same on merits, as per the material available on record. 9. Therefore, as the accused did not turn up for hearing inspite of affording several opportunities to him, and as we have no other option, we have heard learned APP, Ms.Krina Calla, and we have meticulously perused the record and considered the evidence available on record and subjected the same to judicial scrutiny, and we are disposing of this matter on merits, as per the record. 10. At the very outset, it is relevant to note that the prosecutrix, who is examined as PW-6, is a minor aged 15 years, 11 months and 13 days, on the date of offence i.e. on 14.2.2012. She was studying 10 th class at that time. Therefore, she is a minor on the date of offence. In order to prove that the prosecutrix was a minor as on the date of offence, the prosecution got marked Exh.16, which is her birth certificate. As per Exh.16, her date of birth was 1.3.1996. The said birth certificate was issued on 4.3.1996. PW-1, who is the father of the prosecutrix, has produced the said Exh.16 birth certificate of the prosecutrix before PW-9, who is the investigation officer. PW-9 has collected Exh.16, birth certificate of the prosecutrix from PW-1. PW-1 testified to the said fact in his evidence that he has produced the said Exh.16 birth certificate of his daughter before PW-9. PW-9, who is investigation officer also testified to the fact in his evidence that he has collected Exh.16 birth certificate of the prosecutrix from PW-1. As noticed supra, it is evidence from Exh.16 birth certificate that date of birth of the prosecutrix was 1.3.1996. So, as on 14.2.2012, when the offence took place, she was aged about 15 years, 11 months and 13 days. So she is below the age of 16 years. Therefore, she is evidently and undoubtedly a minor as on the date of the offence. 11. It is pertinent to note that the accused did not deny the fact that date of birth of the prosecutrix was 1.3.1996. So she is below the age of 16 years. Therefore, she is evidently and undoubtedly a minor as on the date of the offence. 11. It is pertinent to note that the accused did not deny the fact that date of birth of the prosecutrix was 1.3.1996. We have carefully gone through the cross-examination of PW-1, who is the father of the prosecutrix, and also the cross- examination of PW-9, who is the investigation officer, who collected the said birth certificate, Exh.16, from PW-1. The accused did not deny in their evidence or in their cross- examination that the prosecutrix was born on 1.3.1996, as per Exh.16. There is not even a denial suggestion given to that effect. Thus, the accused did not dispute or controvert the material fact that the date of birth of the prosecutrix was 1.3.1996 and the accused also did not question the genuineness of Exh.16, birth certificate of the prosecutrix. In fact, there is no cross-examination at all in the evidence of PW- 1 and PW-9, regarding Exh.16, birth certificate, and regarding evidence given by them that the prosecutrix was born on 1.3.1996. Therefore, the evidence given by both PW-1 and PW- 9 regarding date of birth of the prosecutrix as 1.3.1996 absolutely remained unchallenged. It is well settled law that while appreciating oral evidence of a witness that when a witness testifies to a particular material fact on oath, for instance, in this case, regarding date of birth of the prosecutrix, and when the said material evidence given in the examination-in-chief is not controverted or challenged in the cross-examination and not even denied in the cross- examination, that part of the unchallenged testimony of the witnesses given in their chief-examination shall be accepted in toto. Therefore, the unchallenged testimony of PW-1 and PW-9, coupled with Exh.16, birth certificate of the prosecutrix, clinchingly proves that the prosecutrix was a minor as on the date of offence that took place on 14.2.2012. 12. Regarding legal position that when the material evidence given by a witness in his examination-in-chief is not controverted, denied and disputed in his cross-examination that the said unchallenged testimony of the witness is to be accepted in toto, there are catena of judicial pronouncements on the point. The said principle is based on rule of essential justice. 12. Regarding legal position that when the material evidence given by a witness in his examination-in-chief is not controverted, denied and disputed in his cross-examination that the said unchallenged testimony of the witness is to be accepted in toto, there are catena of judicial pronouncements on the point. The said principle is based on rule of essential justice. It is held by the Apex Court in the case of Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab reported in (2003) 1 SCC 240 , in paragraph 9 of the judgment as follows:- “…………….. It is rule of essential justice that whenever the opponent has declined to avail himself of the opportunity to put his case in cross-examination it must follow that the evidence tendered on that issue ought to be accepted.” 13. Further held that decision of the Kolkata High Court rendered in the case A.E.G. Carapiet v. A.Y.Derderian reported in AIR 1961 Cal 359 , lends support to the observations made above. 14. The Kolkata High Court in the said judgment in A.E.G. Carapiet held at paragraph no.9 as follows:- “The law is clear on the subject. Wherever the opponent has declined to avail himself of the opportunity to put his essential and material case in cross-examination, it must follow that he believed that the testimony given could not be disputed at all. It is wrong to think that this is merely a technical rule of evidence. It is a rule of essential justice. It serves to prevent surprise at trial and miscarriage of justice, because it gives notice to the other side of the actual case that is going to be made when the turn of the party on whose behalf the cross-examination is being made comes to give and lead evidence by producing witnesses.” 15. Then the Apex Court in another case rendered in the case of Shri Sonu Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh reported in 2012 Cri L.J. 3210 , held at paragraph no.42 as follows:- “It is settled position of law that failure to cross examine a witness on some material part of his evidence may be treated as an acceptance of truth of that part of the evidence. If a witness is not cross examined on a particular material fact, the court, unless there are inherent improbabilities affecting the credibility of the witness, would presume and accept the account given by the witness to be true. If the accused fails to cross- examine the prosecutrix on the material aspect, for which he stands charged, consequence would follow that he believed that her testimony is not disputed. It is not a mere technical rule of evidence but a rule of essential justice.” 16. In laying the said proposition of law relating to appreciation of evidence of a witness, the Apex court relied on the earlier judgments rendered on the point in the cases of Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab reported in (2003) 1 SCC 240; A.N.Venkatesh v. State of Karnataka , (2005) 7 SCC 714; Mishrilal v. State of Madhya Pradesh , (2005) 10 SCC 701; and Utpal Das v. State of West Bengal , (2010) 6 SCC 493 17. Thus, there are plethora of judicial precedents on this aspect of law, as enunciated in the above-cited judgments. 18. The fact that the officer, who issued Exh.16 certificate was not examined in this case is of no consequence and it will not have any adverse impact on the case of the prosecution, as the accused, as noticed supra, did not question or challenged the genuineness or validity of the Exh.16, birth certificate, either in the cross-examination of PW-1 or PW-9. It is only when he disputes its genuineness or when he disputes the date of birth of the prosecutrix, then the non-examination of the person, who issued Exh.16, would have some impact or relevance. As its genuineness is not denied and questioned and as date of birth of the prosecutrix is not denied, Exh.16 can safely be accepted and relied on in proof of date of birth of the prosecutrix. Therefore, we have absolutely no hesitation to hold that PW-6 was a minor as on date of offence. 19. Further, Exh.16, birth certificate of the prosecutrix is a public document. The entry relating to date of birth of PW-6 was entered in it by a public servant in discharge of his official duty. Therefore, when it is a public document maintained by a public servant by making relevant entries in it, in discharge of his official duty, presumption of genuineness is attached to the said documents, Exh.16. The entry relating to date of birth of PW-6 was entered in it by a public servant in discharge of his official duty. Therefore, when it is a public document maintained by a public servant by making relevant entries in it, in discharge of his official duty, presumption of genuineness is attached to the said documents, Exh.16. Exh.16, therefore, is admissible in evidence without requiring any further proof thereof or even examining its author. On this proposition of law, there is a long line of judicial precedents. 20. The Apex Court in the case of Harpal Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh reported in (1981) 1 SCC 560 held that since the entry in a birth and death register is made by concerned official in discharge of his official duties, it is admissible in evidence “ and it is not necessary to examine the author thereof” 21. The High Court of Karnataka in the case of Vanajakshamma v. P. Gopala Krishna , AIR 1970 Mysore 305 held that the extract of birth register maintained under the Act is a public document to be read in evidence. A division Bench of the High Court of Bombay in Shri Joaquim Constantinho Carvalho v. State reported in 1995 SCC Online Bombay 2 held that for determination of the age of the prosecutrix in a case of rape, a birth certificate issued by the Municipal Commissioner being a public record is to be presumed to be authentic and correct and it has to prevail upon the birth certificate issued by the church. The Supreme Court in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi v. State of UP , (2006) 5 SCC 584 held that entries in birth and death register made by a public servant in discharge of official duty are relevant and admissible in evidence. The High Court of Orissa in the case of Shiba Prasad Jena v. Pushpanjali Jena , 2007 SCC On-line Orissa 163 held that birth certificate issued under the Act is a public document admissible in evidence without requiring any further proof thereof. 22. The High Court of Orissa in the case of Shiba Prasad Jena v. Pushpanjali Jena , 2007 SCC On-line Orissa 163 held that birth certificate issued under the Act is a public document admissible in evidence without requiring any further proof thereof. 22. The High Court of Bombay in Jayant Gopal Rao v. Pachade v. Motilal Kuber Kanoje , 2008 SCC On-line Bom 638 , while relying on a decision in Gopi Chand Arya v. Sm.Bedmo Kuer , AIR 1966 SC 231 held that a birth/death certificate being an entry made by a public servant in the ordinary course of his public duty and which entry is a public document, must have a presumption of correctness attached to it. It was further held that an entry in a birth or death register is conclusive evidence, unless disproved. The Supreme Court in the case of CIDCO v. Vasudha Gorakhnath Mandevlekar , (2009) 7 SCC 283 held that entries in birth and death register raise a presumption of correctness. 23. Finally, in a decision of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana rendered in Ambika Kaul v. Central Board of Secondary Education , 2015 SCC On-line P&H 1669 held that the Registration of Births and Deaths Act was enacted with an object to have adequate and accurate country wide data for registration of births and deaths in the country and the said Act gives statutory recognition to the birth certificates and carries a presumption of correctness. 24. It is also significant to note that even the trial Court also held that PW-6, who is the prosecutrix, is a minor, at paragraph 65 of the judgment of the trial Court. 25. Now, coming to the offence portion, PW-6, who is the prosecutrix clearly deposed in her evidence that on 14.2.2012, when she was preparing for her examination and studying during night time on that day, that she went out of her house to answer the calls of nature and, at that time, the accused came and caught hold of her and forcibly took her to the nearby field and committed rape on her, and he stripped off her clothes and had sexual intercourse with her. She further deposed that thereafter the accused took her by threatening her with dire consequences towards Rajkot and again when they were on way, he brought her back to Ahmedabad and, they were sitting at the bus stop of Geeta Mandir, and at that time, that the police traced them and took them to police station and handed them over to Mahemadavad Police. Thereafter, grand-father of the prosecutrix, reached the police station on information given by police and took her to their house. 26. This evidence of PW-6 proves that the accused took her to the nearby field on that night and had sexual intercourse with her. The medical evidence on record also proves the said fact. PW-2, the doctor, who has examined the prosecutrix, stated in his evidence that PW-6 informed him that she is in love with the accused and both of them used to have sexual intercourse with each other. So after examining PW-6, doctor has opined that PW-6 is habituated to sexual intercourse. The same doctor has examined the accused, and he has stated in his evidence that the accused also informed him that he and the prosecutrix are in love with each other and that they used to have sexual intercourse with each other. He opined that the accused is capable of performing sexual intercourse. Exh.20 is the certificate issued by PW-2 of the prosecutrix and Exh.22 is the certificate issued by the doctor of the accused. Thus, the medical evidence on record, as discussed supra, proves that both the accused and PW-6, who is the prosecutrix, are in love with each other and they used to have frequent sexual intercourse with each other. 27. Though PW-6 stated in her evidence that the accused took her by force and committed rape on her and had sexual intercourse with her, by force against her will, a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case and the evidence on record show that the accused did not have any forcible sexual intercourse with PW-6, but they had consensual sexual intercourse with each other. Therefore, it is a case of consent. Therefore, it is a case of consent. Facts of the case, when carefully examined and considered, clearly proves that on the night of 14.2.2012, when PW-6, went out of her house that the accused has taken her with her consent to the nearby field and had sexual intercourse with her, by consent, and thereafter, they went towards Rajkot and returned to Ahmedabad. But this consent of PW-6 will not absolve or exonerate the accused of his liability to be punished under Section 376 of IPC. 28. After considering the evidence on record, the trial Court has held that the prosecutrix was minor at the time of offence. We are also of the same view, as noticed supra. “Rape” is defined under Section 375 of IPC. As per the definition of “rape” under Section 375 of IPC, when a male person had sexual intercourse with a girl, with or without her consent, when she is under the age of 16 years, it constitutes an offence of rape. At present, when male person had sexual intercourse with or without the consent of a girl, who is under the age of 18 years, it constitutes an offence of rape. The Section was amended in the year 2018. As the present offence took place in the year 2012, at the relevant time, the age was 16 years. So, as on the date of the offence i.e. on 14.2.2012, when a male person had sexual intercourse with or without consent of a girl, who is under 16 years age, it clearly constitutes an offence of rape. Therefore, the fact that the accused herein had sexual intercourse with PW-6 with her consent will not come to his rescue and it will not absolve him from his liability under Section 376 of IPC. Therefore, a clear offence of rape under Section 375 of IPC is made out and proved against the accused in this case. 29. It is significant to note here that when the doctor, who is examined as PW-2, categorically stated in his evidence that the accused admitted and stated before him that he and the prosecutrix are in love with each other and that they had frequent sexual intercourse with each other, the accused even did not deny that part of the evidence given by PW-2 in his examination-in-chief, in his cross-examination. Not even a denial suggestion was given to that effect. Not even a denial suggestion was given to that effect. So, he did not at all deny that part of the material evidence given by PW-2 in his evidence. So that part of the evidence of PW-2 absolutely remained unchallenged. So, the said unchallenged testimony given by PW-2 is to be accepted in toto. Further, this PW-2 is a doctor, who is an official witness and he has no necessity or reason to give any false evidence against the accused. Therefore, there is no valid reason as to why the said evidence given by PW-2 is to be dis-believed or discarded and, more particularly, when the said evidence is not controverted and challenged by the accused. Therefore, the oral, documentary and medical evidence on record clinchingly proves that the accused had sexual intercourse with PW-6, who is a minor on the night of 14.2.2012 and before that also, and thereby he has committed an offence punishable under Section 376 of IPC. So, he is liable for punishment under Section 376 of IPC. 30. The trial Court, though held that PW-6 was a minor, as on date of offence, did not believe her evidence to hold that an offence of rape was committed by the accused on the ground that except her evidence that there is no other evidence supporting her testimony. The said appreciation of evidence on record by the trial Court is per se erroneous and also perverse in the nature of it. When the accused has taken the prosecutrix, PW-6 to an isolated place and had sexual intercourse with her on the mid night of 14.2.2012, there cannot be any other evidence in proof of the fact that he had sexual intercourse with PW-6, except her own testimony. It is well settled law that, in a case of rape, and that too, when it took place in an isolated place and in the mid night, the sole testimony of prosecutrix will only be available. It is also settled law that when the sole testimony of the prosecutrix is trustworthy and reliable and inspires confidence in the mind of the Court regarding veracity of the testimony given by her, the Court can place complete reliance on her testimony for the purpose of arriving at a conclusion relating to the guilt of the accused. No corroboration is required to the sole testimony of prosecutrix in such circumstances. No corroboration is required to the sole testimony of prosecutrix in such circumstances. Further corroboration is not a rule of law and it is only a rule of prudence and abundant caution. The trial Court did not appreciate the evidence of PW- 6 in the light of this well settled principles of law, relating to appreciation of evidence of a prosecutrix. So, the fact that the trial Court discarded the evidence of PW-1 and dis-believed her testimony for want of corroboration is erroneous and same cannot be countenanced. 31. Further, the fact that there is a delay of two months in lodging the FIR, by itself, is also not fatal to the case of the prosecution. It is well settled law that, in cases of rape, the victim or her parents would be hesitating or would be slow in initiating legal action keeping in view the future of the victim girl. In the instant case, the delay is properly explained by the prosecution. It has come in evidence that as PW-1, who is the father of the prosecutrix do not want to complicate the issue, as it is relating to the future of his daughter that, initially, he did not take any legal action against the accused. But after the accused persisted on his conduct in threatening to take away PW-6 with him. PW-1 was constrained to initiate legal action against him by way of lodging a report with police. Therefore, he lodged a report against the accused on 8.4.2012. So, when the delay is properly explained, the case of the prosecution cannot be dis-believed or thrown out, which is otherwise proved, on the said sole ground of delay. Delay in lodging the FIR is not always fatal to the case of the prosecution and a case is to be made out by the accused as to why a false report was lodged with delay to falsely implicate him in a false case. In the instant case, the accused did not have any rivalry with PW-1, who is the father of the prosecutrix. So, PW-1 has no necessity or motive to falsely implicate the accused in a false case. Therefore, delay has no adverse impact on the case of the prosecution. 32. In the instant case, the accused did not have any rivalry with PW-1, who is the father of the prosecutrix. So, PW-1 has no necessity or motive to falsely implicate the accused in a false case. Therefore, delay has no adverse impact on the case of the prosecution. 32. Apropos the offence of kidnap under Section 363 of IPC is concerned, Section 363 deals with the punishment for the offence of kidnap and Section 361 deals with the definition of kidnap of a minor from the lawful guardianship. For better appreciation, Section 361 is extracted hereunder and it reads thus:- “361. Kidnapping from lawful guardianship.— Whoever takes or entices any minor under sixteen years of age if a male, or under eighteen years of age if a female, or any person of unsound mind, out of the keeping of the lawful guardian of such minor or person of unsound mind, without the consent of such guardian, is said to kidnap such minor or person from lawful guardianship. Explanation.— The words “lawful guardian” in this section include any person lawfully entrusted with the care or custody of such minor or other person. (Exception)— This section does not extend to the act of any person who in good faith believes himself to be the father of an illegitimate child, or who in good faith believes himself to be entitled to lawful custody of such child, unless such act is committed for an immoral or unlawful purpose.” 33. A careful perusal of Section 361 makes it manifest that in order to constitute an offence of kidnap of a minor from lawful guardianship, necessary prerequisites or ingredients that are to be proved as per the law are, (i) the victim, if a female, must be a minor under the age of 18 years and (ii) she shall be taken or be enticed by the accused from her lawful guardianship with the consent of the guardian. 34. It is not stated in the Section that minor girl shall be forcibly taken from her lawful guardianship. Mere taking of minor girl under the age of 18 years from the custody of her lawful guardianship is sufficient to constitute an offence of kidnap under Section 361 of IPC. Further, the disjunctive word “or” is used. Minor shall be either taken or be enticed, from her legal guardianship. 35. Mere taking of minor girl under the age of 18 years from the custody of her lawful guardianship is sufficient to constitute an offence of kidnap under Section 361 of IPC. Further, the disjunctive word “or” is used. Minor shall be either taken or be enticed, from her legal guardianship. 35. In the instant case, PW-6, who is a minor below the age of 16 years, is in the lawful guardianship of her father, who is examined as PW-1. Needless to say or emphasis on the legal position that father is a natural guardian of a minor girl. Therefore, when PW-6 is in the custody of lawful guardian of her father, who is PW-1, the accused has taken PW-6 from her lawful guardianship with him on the night of 14.2.2012 and kept her with him till the evening of 15.2.2012 i.e. upto 5 p.m. when they were traced at the bus station by the police. These facts are amply proved from the testimony of PW-6. Therefore, a clear offence under Section 361 of kidnap is made out from the facts of the case and the prosecution proved the case of offence of kidnap against the accused to the hilt with acceptable legal evidence on record. So, the accused is liable for punishment under Section 363 of IPC. 36. The trial Court also did not consider the case from the correct perspective, as per the ingredients set out in Section 361 of IPC relating to offence of kidnap and, thereby arrived at an erroneous conclusion in acquitting the accused from the said charge also. 37. As regards the offence under Section 366 of IPC is concerned, it relates to kidnapping, abducting or inducing a woman to compel her marriage etc. In order to appreciate the correct legal position relating to said offence, it is apposite to extract Section 366 of IPC. It reads as under:- “366. Kidnapping, abducting or inducing the woman to compel her marriage etc. In order to appreciate the correct legal position relating to said offence, it is apposite to extract Section 366 of IPC. It reads as under:- “366. Kidnapping, abducting or inducing the woman to compel her marriage etc. Whoever kidnaps or abducts any woman with intent that she may be compelled, or knowing it to be likely that she will be compelled, to marry any person against her will, or in order that she may be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse, or knowing it to be likely that she will be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; And whoever, by means of criminal intimidation as defined in this Code or of abuse of authority or any other method of compulsion, induces any woman to go from any place with intent that she may be, or knowing that it is likely that she will be, forced or seduced to illicit intercourse with another person shall also be punishable as aforesaid.” 38. A careful reading of aforesaid Section makes it clear that mere abduction of woman is not sufficient by itself to attract the offence under Section 366 of IPC. It is sine qua non to prove that the accused abducted a woman with an intent to compel her to marry against her will or to force or seduce her to illicit intercourse. In the instant case, the accused did not abduct PW-6 with an intention to compel her for marriage against her will or to force her or to seduce her for illicit intercourse. Therefore, no offence under Section 366 of IPC is made out or constituted from the facts and circumstances of the case. 39. The Apex Court in the case of Kavita Chandakant Lakhani v. State of Maharashtra & Another reported in (2018) 6 SCC 664 held that mere abduction does not bring accused under the ambit of Section 366 . It must be proved that an accused abducted woman with an intention that she may be compelled, or knowing it to be likely that she will be compelled to marry any person or in order that she may be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse or knowing it to be likely that she will be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse. It is held that unless the prosecution proves that abduction is for the purposes mentioned in Section 366 of IPC, it cannot be held that the accused is guilty under Section 366 to punish him. 40. Therefore, we hold that no case under Section 366 of IPC is made out and the trial Court has rightly acquitted him of the said charge. 41. Upon considering the evidence on record and on erroneous appreciation of the same, the trial Court committed grave and manifest error of law and patent illegality on account of erroneous appreciation of evidence on record, which is perverse, in acquitting the accused of the charges under Sections 363 and 376 of IPC. 42. Upon considering the said evidence on record and on reappraisal of the same, we found the accused guilty for the offences punishable under Sections 363 and 376 of IPC. However, we do not find the accused guilty for the offence punishable under Section 366 of IPC. Therefore, the impugned judgment of acquittal warrants interference in this appeal relating to the offences punishable under Sections 363 and 376 of IPC. So the prosecution has succeeded in proving the guilt of the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 363 and 376 with acceptable legal evidence beyond any reasonable doubt. So, the accused is liable for punishment under Sections 363 and 376 of IPC. Therefore, the appeal succeeds in part so far as offences under Sections 363 and 376 of IPC are concerned. 43. Resultantly, appeal is partly allowed, setting aside the impugned judgment of acquittal of the trial Court for the offences punishable under Sections 363 and 376 of IPC. The accused is found guilty of the offences under Section 363 and 376 of IPC and he is convicted for the aforesaid two offences. The appeal as regards offence under Section 366 of IPC is concerned, it fails. 44. As the respondent-accused did not turn up for hearing and he is absent today also, issue non-bailable warrant against him, to secure his presence to hear him on the quantum of sentence to be passed, returnable on 23.07.2025.