ORDER : 1. The petitioner has challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated 13.06.2020 passed by the ACP-cum-Executive Magistrate, Jodhpur, as well as the order dated 03.12.2020 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Jodhpur Metro in Criminal Appeal No. 203/2020. 2. The brief facts of the present case is that the petitioner, a law student, is a relative of one Dinesh Kumar, who was embroiled in a matrimonial dispute with his wife, Smt. Meenaxi. The said dispute led to a police complaint by Smt. Meenaxi against her husband. Following standard protocol, both parties were summoned for counseling before the Mahila Suraksha Salah Kendra on 12.06.2020. 3. During the counseling session, the petitioner, while accompanying his relative, allegedly raised his voice. Merely for this reason, he was apprehended by the police and detained under Sections 107 and 151 of the Cr.P.C. He was thereafter produced before the Executive Magistrate on 13.06.2020. However, the arrest and detention of the petitioner were wholly unjustified, arbitrary, and in blatant disregard of legal principles. 4. The petitioner contends that his illegal detention and arrest by the police were in clear violation of his fundamental rights under Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution. The petitioner was falsely implicated and detained in a revengeful manner for lodging a complaint against a Women's Counselling Centre employee on the Rajasthan Sampark Portal. The entire sequence of events, demonstrates abuse of power by the police. The petitioner argues that his arrest was made without reasonable justification, as emphasized in Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P. (1994 AIR 1349), where the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that arrest cannot be made in a routine manner without due investigation and necessity. The petitioner further relies on State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992 AIR 604), which outlines instances where criminal proceedings should be quashed due to malafide intent. He also cites Kishor v. State of Maharashtra (Criminal Writ Petition No. 183/2014, Bombay HC), Pankaj Kumar Sharma v. Govt of NCT of Delhi (W.P. (C) No. 3851/2023, Delhi HC), Shiv Kumar Verma v. State of U.P. (Criminal Misc W.P. No. 16386/2020, Allahabad HC) and Anand Mahadevan v. State of Kerala (Crl. MC No. 1940/2023, Kerala HC), all of which emphasize the need for fair investigation, protection against abuse of police power, and the importance of upholding constitutional rights. MC No. 1940/2023, Kerala HC), all of which emphasize the need for fair investigation, protection against abuse of police power, and the importance of upholding constitutional rights. The petitioner, therefore, prays for the quashing of proceedings under Sections 107 and 151 CrPC, a declaration of his arrest as illegal, and compensation for the violation of his rights. 5. I have heard the petitioner, who appeared in person, as well as the learned Public Prosecutor for the State, and have carefully examined the facts and circumstances of the case. 6. The order dated 13.06.2020 passed by the Executive Magistrate is a half-printed, half-written proforma, which, on its face, exhibits non-application of mind. The fundamental requirement under Sections 107 and 151 Cr.P.C. is the existence of a reasonable apprehension that a person is likely to commit a breach of peace or disturb public tranquility. However, in the present case, there is no material on record to suggest that the petitioner was about to commit any cognizable offence. 7. Sections 107 and 151 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, are preventive provisions designed to maintain public order and tranquility. Section 107 Cr.P.C. empowers the Executive Magistrate to take preventive action when there is a likelihood of a breach of peace, whereas Section 151 Cr.P.C. permits the police to arrest a person without a warrant when it is necessary to prevent the commission of a cognizable offence. However, these provisions cannot be invoked arbitrarily or as a tool of harassment, as they operate within a legal framework that demands strict compliance with constitutional safeguards and procedural fairness. 8. In Istkar vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (Criminal Appeal No. 2034 of 2022 and Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 8586 of 2022) , the Hon’ble Supreme Court emphasized that the scope and nature of Section 107 CrPC is preventive, not punitive. It is aimed at averting potential threats to public peace rather than penalizing past conduct.For ready reference the same is reproduced hereinbelow:- “11. As noticed, the scope and nature of Section 107 CrPC is preventive and not punitive. It aims at ensuring that there be no breach of peace and that the public tranquillity be not disturbed by any wrongful or illegal act. As noticed, the scope and nature of Section 107 CrPC is preventive and not punitive. It aims at ensuring that there be no breach of peace and that the public tranquillity be not disturbed by any wrongful or illegal act. The action being preventive in nature is not based on any overt act but is intended to forestall the potential danger to serve the interests of public at large. In other words, this provision is in aid of orderly society and seeks to avert any conduct subversive of the peace and public tranquillity. The provision authorises the Magistrate to initiate proceedings against a person if upon information, he is satisfied that such person is either likely to commit breach of peace or disturb public tranquillity or is likely to commit any wrongful act that might probably produce the same result. Simply stated, the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Code are merely preventive in nature and are not to be used as a vehicle for punishment.” 9. The foundational principle behind these provisions is the existence of a reasonable apprehension that a person’s conduct is likely to disturb public peace. A mechanical or routine invocation of these sections without any substantial material demonstrating an imminent threat defeats their very purpose. The law does not empower either the police or the Executive Magistrate to exercise preventive jurisdiction in a casual or discretionary manner. The Supreme Court has time and again emphasized that the preventive powers under Cr.P.C. should not be used to curtail personal liberty unless there is a clear, immediate, and substantial risk to public order. The absence of any such material in the present case indicates an excessive and arbitrary use of power. 10. In the instant matter, the Executive Magistrate’s approach to the case is deeply concerning. The order dated 13.06.2020, being a mere half-printed, half-written proforma, is an outright display of non-application of mind. Such an order, devoid of any reasoned discussion or independent analysis, reflects an institutional failure to uphold the rule of law. It suggests that the Executive Magistrate acted as a rubber stamp for the police rather than as an independent judicial authority tasked with ensuring fairness and justice. The expectation from an Executive Magistrate is not mere clerical endorsement of police actions but the application of independent judicial reasoning to assess whether a preventive action is warranted under the law. 11. It suggests that the Executive Magistrate acted as a rubber stamp for the police rather than as an independent judicial authority tasked with ensuring fairness and justice. The expectation from an Executive Magistrate is not mere clerical endorsement of police actions but the application of independent judicial reasoning to assess whether a preventive action is warranted under the law. 11. Moreover, the casual and callous approach of the Executive Magistrate in mechanically approving the police’s request without scrutinizing the necessity of detention is a direct violation of constitutional and legal principles. Such an attitude not only undermines the individual’s right to liberty but also erodes public trust in the judicial process. An Executive Magistrate, while exercising powers under Section 107 Cr.P.C., must ensure that the subjective satisfaction regarding the likelihood of a breach of peace is based on cogent material and not vague apprehensions. Similarly, under Section 151 Cr.P.C., an arrest cannot be made as a matter of routine; it must be justified by compelling reasons, indicating an immediate need for preventive action. 12. The instant case exemplifies a broader trend of misuse of preventive provisions by the police and the executive branch, where individuals are detained without proper justification, often in an arbitrary and high-handed manner. Such misuse of power, if left unchecked, can lead to a dangerous precedent where preventive detention becomes a tool of harassment rather than a lawful means of maintaining order. Judicial authorities, including Executive Magistrates, must be conscious of their duty to act as protectors of constitutional rights rather than facilitators of executive overreach. 13. It is in this context that the Executive Magistrate’s lack of judicial discretion and mechanical approval of the petitioner’s detention must be viewed as a grave dereliction of duty. The law mandates a judicious balance between preventive measures and individual liberty, and any failure to uphold this balance results in a direct affront to the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. The present case stands as a testament to the need for greater accountability and vigilance in the exercise of preventive jurisdiction by both the police and the Executive Magistracy. 14. The police, before effecting an arrest under Section 151 Cr.P.C., must demonstrate an imminent threat or compelling circumstances justifying the detention. In the instant case, there was neither an immediate threat nor any lawful reason for depriving the petitioner of his liberty. 14. The police, before effecting an arrest under Section 151 Cr.P.C., must demonstrate an imminent threat or compelling circumstances justifying the detention. In the instant case, there was neither an immediate threat nor any lawful reason for depriving the petitioner of his liberty. The arrest was an exercise of arbitrary power, made without due consideration of the principles governing preventive detention. 15. The petitioner’s detention for 24 hours before being produced before the Executive Magistrate raises serious concerns regarding unlawful confinement. The law mandates that a person arrested without a warrant should be produced before the Magistrate at the earliest opportunity. The failure to do so in this case renders the petitioner’s detention unlawful and violative of his fundamental rights enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution. 16. Furthermore, the Executive Magistrate failed to exercise judicial discretion. It is expected that an Executive Magistrate should assess the necessity of detention independently, without blindly accepting the police report. The position of an Executive Magistrate is not a mere extension of police power but entails independent judicial application of mind. However, in the present case, the Executive Magistrate, who was formerly a Circle Inspector (CI) before his promotion, appears to have viewed the matter from a police officer’s perspective rather than as a judicial authority. The role of an Executive Magistrate demands impartiality, legal acumen, and an ability to assess matters from a constitutional and legal standpoint, rather than being influenced by a police-centric approach. 17. The learned Sessions Judge, while deciding the petitioner’s appeal, failed to examine the legality, correctness, and propriety of the Executive Magistrate’s order. The appellate court did not scrutinize the apparent non-application of mind in the Executive Magistrate’s order, which was issued on a pre-printed proforma with only minimal additions. The learned Sessions Judge merely dismissed the appeal without addressing the core legal issue, thereby failing in his duty as an appellate authority. 18. The petitioner was neither an accused nor a party to any ongoing criminal proceedings at the time of his arrest. He had merely accompanied his relative for counseling, which, by its very nature, requires patience and an environment conducive to dialogue. It is natural that during such sessions, emotions may run high, and parties may raise their voices. 18. The petitioner was neither an accused nor a party to any ongoing criminal proceedings at the time of his arrest. He had merely accompanied his relative for counseling, which, by its very nature, requires patience and an environment conducive to dialogue. It is natural that during such sessions, emotions may run high, and parties may raise their voices. However, this does not justify an arrest, particularly when there was no legal basis for assuming that the petitioner’s actions would lead to any cognizable offense. 19. It is pertinent to note that the FIR in the matter was lodged much later, on 15.07.2020, i.e., a month after the petitioner’s arrest. The fact that there was no pending case against the petitioner at the time of his arrest further strengthens the argument that his detention was unwarranted and illegal. 20. Arbitrary arrests under Section 151 Cr.P.C. have become rampant, and such misuse of power must be checked. An arrest is a serious curtailment of personal liberty and should never be exercised mechanically or capriciously. The principles of fairness, reasonableness, and due process must guide any action that seeks to restrict an individual’s fundamental rights. The Executive Magistrate in this case failed to exercise due diligence and acted in a manner that undermines the spirit of the Constitution and the established principles of law. 21. The manner in which the Assistant Commissioner of Police (ACP), while acting in the capacity of an Executive Magistrate, has dealt with the liberty of an individual in the present case is deeply concerning. Instances of such arbitrary exercise of power have become alarmingly frequent, with numerous cases of a similar nature coming before this Court. This highlights a systemic issue that requires urgent attention at the highest levels of administration. 22. In light of the recurring instances of misuse of magisterial powers by Assistant Commissioners of Police (ACPs), this Court deems it necessary that the Additional Chief Secretary (Home) and the Director General of Police (DGP) forthwith take cognizance of the matter and undertake a comprehensive review of the existing mechanism governing the deployment of ACPs as Executive Magistrates within Police Commissionerates. It is further observed that officers of the Rajasthan Police Service (RPS) who have been promoted through the ranks—from Sub-Inspector to Inspector—ought not to be entrusted with magisterial functions unless they have successfully undergone structured and formal training in magisterial duties at a recognized judicial or administrative training academy. Until such training is imparted and duly completed, such officers should not be assigned magisterial responsibilities. In the alternative, it is recommended that only directly recruited officers of the Indian Police Service (IPS) or Rajasthan Police Service (RPS), who are more likely to possess the requisite legal orientation and administrative competence, be considered eligible for such quasi-judicial roles so as to safeguard the integrity, impartiality, and fairness expected of an Executive Magistrate. 23. Furthermore, this Court is acutely cognizant of the fact that the functional transition from a predominantly policing- oriented role to that of a quasi-judicial authority is not merely a matter of administrative reassignment but requires a deep- seated psychological and institutional transformation. The mental and procedural shift from exercising coercive law enforcement powers to discharging adjudicatory responsibilities rooted in fairness, neutrality, and adherence to legal principles is inherently complex and cannot be achieved through the mere conferral of magisterial designation. When officers engaged in active policing are suddenly vested with magisterial authority without adequate preparatory training, the ability to recalibrate their mindset from enforcement to adjudication becomes significantly compromised. This transformation is not a superficial or mechanical process—it is neither immediate nor instinctive.Rather, it resembles the intricate and often strenuous natural process observed in certain species, such as the shedding of skin, which symbolizes a fundamental change in function, structure, and identity. Just as such biological renewal demands time, readiness, and conducive conditions, the professional evolution from a police officer to a magistrate necessitates deliberate reorientation, educational immersion, and cognitive recalibration. Absent this, the officer remains tethered to the enforcement-centric reflexes and hierarchical command models of policing, which are antithetical to the independent and unbiased temperament demanded of a magistrate. 24. Accordingly, unless such transformation is facilitated through structured instruction and institutional mentoring, the conferral of quasi-judicial powers upon officers who have historically operated within the contours of a police framework not only poses a grave risk to the sanctity of magisterial proceedings but may also undermine public trust in the fairness and impartiality of executive decision-making under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 25. 25. Additionally, it has been observed that in several cases, orders passed by such Executive Magistrates are of a stereotypical nature, often partially printed and partially handwritten, demonstrating a mechanical approach that is an abuse of the legal process. This Court unequivocally condemns such practice and directs the Secretariat (Home) and the DGP to ensure that such defective and perfunctory orders are not issued in the future. 26. To prevent the recurrence of such arbitrary exercises of power, the Court mandates that within three months, a robust mechanism be devised or appropriate orders be issued to ensure that only officers possessing the necessary skills, legal knowledge, and capacity to act as an Executive Magistrate are assigned such responsibilities. The competency of such officers must be thoroughly examined before entrusting them with these quasi-judicial powers. 27. It is also pertinent to elaborate upon the powers vested in an Executive Magistrate. The role of an Executive Magistrate encompasses critical functions, including but not limited to, maintaining public order, preventing potential breaches of peace, and exercising preventive jurisdiction under various provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.). These powers, however, are not meant to be exercised arbitrarily or as an extension of routine policing. The principle of separation of powers dictates that executive and judicial functions must be distinct, and therefore, a police officer cannot be permitted to routinely don the mantle of an Executive Magistrate without sufficient judicial oversight. The exercise of magisterial powers necessitates a judicious mind, an independent approach, and a commitment to upholding constitutional values, qualities that may not always align with the training and orientation of a career police officer. 28. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Miscellaneous Petition succeeds and is hereby allowed. The proceedings initiated against the petitioner pursuant to the order dated 13.06.2020 and the subsequent order dated 03.12.2020 are quashed and set aside. 29. The arrest and detention of the petitioner are declared illegal. The petitioner is at liberty to seek legal recourse against the wrongful confinement suffered by him. 30. Copies of this order be directly sent to the ACS (Home) and Director General of Police, for information and further course of action.