JUDGMENT : HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK, J. 1. Present appeal is filed by the appellant-insurance company challenging the judgment and award dated 5.10.2011 passed by the Ex-officio Commissioner, Surat (hereinafter referred to as the "learned Commissioner") in W.C. (F) Case No.56 of 2008, whereby the learned Commissioner has awarded compensation of Rs. 3,51,080/- with 6% simple interest favour of original claimants. 2. The short facts giving rise to present appeal are that the deceased was working with original respondent No.1 i.e. M/s. Nishiko as an Wireman. On 14.05.2007 when the deceased removing the fitting of Pole No.S.B. 29 on Sardar Bridge, at that time, suddenly pole was broken and fallen down on ladder. Due to the said incident, the deceased lost his balance and fell down with the ladder. Thereafter, he was taken to the hospital, where he was declared as 'dead' after initial treatment. 2.1 Thereafter, original claimant Nos. 1 to 3 had preferred Workmen's Compensation (Fatal) Application No.56 of 2008 before the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner for compensation. 2.3 After hearing both the parties and after evaluating the evidence placed on record, the learned Commissioner has awarded compensation of Rs. 3,51,080/- with 6% simple interest in favour of original claimants. 2.4 Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and award of the learned Commissioner, the insurance company-original respondent No.2 has filed present appeal. 3. Heard Mr. Palak H. Thakkar, learned advocate for the appellant, Mr. Hiren Modi, learned advocate for respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 and Mr. Kapadia, learned advocate for respondent No.4 (hereinafter referred to as "opponent No.1"). 4. Mr. Palak Thakkar, learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the the appellant insurance company is not held liable for the alleged accident to indemnify opponent No.1 since, the accident occurred because of the negligence on the part of the opponent No.1. He has also submitted that it was clear breach of the condition stipulated in the policy document, more particularly condition No.3. 4.1 Mr. He has also submitted that it was clear breach of the condition stipulated in the policy document, more particularly condition No.3. 4.1 Mr. Palak Thakkar, learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the panchnama was drawn at the place of accident and it appears that the deceased has not weared helmet and no safety belt was provided and this is clear breach of the condition, as opponent No.1 has not provided proper safety measures to the workmen and the deceased died because of negligence of opponent No.1 and therefore, under such circumstances, the appellant insurance company is not held liable for the alleged accident to indemnify opponent No.1. It is also further contended that learned Commissioner has also committed an error while interpreting the condition of the insurance policy, by treating the same as 'simple policy' and not under the 'workmen compensation', in fact, from the perusal of the impugned policy, on the cover note, it is mentioned that it is policy under 'Employers Liability (WC), Workmen Compensation (General)' and thus, the impugned judgment and award passed by the learned Commissioner deserves to be quashed and set aside. It is also contended that even as per the policy document, legal provision was mentioned with regard to the liability to pay the interest and penalty and thus, the Court has exceeded its jurisdiction which is not vested with it and therefore, impugned judgment and award passed by the learned Commissioner deserves to be quashed and set aside. 4.2 Mr. Thakkar, learned counsel for the appellant has referred and relied upon the panchnama of the place of occurrence and contended that due to the negligence on part of the opponent No.1, the accident had occurred, since opponent No. 1 has not provided proper safety measures to its workmen. He has submitted that though the pole was in rusted condition however, there was no proper precautionary measures or equipment provided and thus, the appellant insurance company is not held liable for the alleged accident and therefore, the impugned judgment and award passed by the learned Commissioner requires to be quashed and set aside. 4.3 In view of the above submissions, Mr. Thakkar, learned counsel for the appellant urges before the Court that present appeal may be allowed and the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Commissioner may be quashed and set aside. 5. As against that Mr. 4.3 In view of the above submissions, Mr. Thakkar, learned counsel for the appellant urges before the Court that present appeal may be allowed and the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Commissioner may be quashed and set aside. 5. As against that Mr. Kapadia, learned counsel for opponent No.1 has contended that so far as negligence on the part of the opponent no.1 is concerned, prosecution was lodged against him wherein, this Court after considering all the relevant documents and after hearing all the concerned parties, quashed the criminal complaint vide order dated 30.10.2015 passed in Special Criminal Application (Quashing) No. 6171 of 2015. Learned counsel Mr. Kapadia, has produced a photocopy of the said order, wherein this Court has considered the aspect with regard to negligence on the part of the opponent No. 1 and therefore, he urges before the Court that present appeal may be dismissed and no interference may be made in present appeal. 5.1 However, Mr. Kapadia, learned counsel for opponent No.1 is unable to deny the settled principle enunciated by the Hon'ble Apex Court with regard to the liability of the penalty and interest, as it was held in the case of New India Assurance Company vs. Harshadbhai Amrutbhai Modhiya and another reported 2006 (5) SCC 192, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that so far as liability to pay interest is concerned, the same is on the original employer and not on the insurance company. 6. As against that Mr. Modi, learned counsel appearing for the respondents Nos. 1 to 3 original claimants has submitted that in view of the order dated 30.10.2015 passed in Special Criminal Application (Quashing) No. 6171 of 2015 by this court in quashing petition, it was found that there was no negligence on the part of the opponent No.1 and therefore, the insurance company is liable to indemnify the policy, as it was mentioned in the policy condition, thus present appeal deserves to be dismissed. 7. I have perused the relevant material and documents placed on record. I have also examined the record and proceedings and gone through the impugned judgment and award passed by the learned Commissioner. 8. The issue involved in present appeal is more or less considered to be a substantial question of law, as it relates to the interpretation of the policy document. 9. I have also examined the record and proceedings and gone through the impugned judgment and award passed by the learned Commissioner. 8. The issue involved in present appeal is more or less considered to be a substantial question of law, as it relates to the interpretation of the policy document. 9. Hence, issue arises for consideration before this Court is, as to whether the opponent No.1 was liable to be held responsible or not? 10. On perusal of the documentary evidence and on perusal of the record and proceedings, it appears that so far as liability of the insurance company is concerned, it is rightly held liable, as this Court after considering all the documentary evidence and after considering the submissions of all the concerned has quashed the criminal complaint registered against opponent No.1 vide order dated 30.10.2015 passed in Special Criminal Application (Quashing) No. 6171 of 2015 and thus, in view of that the appellant insurance company cannot take shelter and wash its hand that it is not liable and in my view the said version of the insurance company is completely erroneous and so far as the findings recorded by the learned Commissioner with regard to the liability is concerned, the same is in consonance with the settled legal principle of law. 11. At this stage, it is relevant to refer the provision of Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, which reads as under:- "30. 11. At this stage, it is relevant to refer the provision of Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, which reads as under:- "30. Appeals.— (1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court from the following orders of a Commissioner, namely: (a)an order awarding as compensation a lump sum whether by way of redemption of a half-monthly payment or otherwise or disallowing a claim in full or in part for a lump sum;(aa)an order awarding interest or penalty under section 4A; (b)an order refusing to allow redemption of a half-monthly payment; (c)an order providing for the distribution of compensation among the dependants of a deceased employee, or disallowing any claim of a person alleging himself to be such dependant; (d)an order allowing or disallowing any claim for the amount of an indemnity under the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 12; or (e)an order refusing to register a memorandum of agreement or registering the same or providing for the registration of the same subject to conditions: Provided that no appeal shall lie against any order unless a substantial question of law is involved in the appeal, and in the case of an order other than an order such as is referred to in clause (b), unless the amount in dispute in the appeal is not less than thousand rupees or such higher amount as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify: Provided further that no appeal shall lie in any case in which the parties have agreed to abide by the decision of the Commissioner, or in which the order of the Commissioner gives effect to an agreement come to by the parties: Provided further that no appeal by an employer under clause (a) shall lie unless the memorandum of appeal is accompanied by a certificate by the Commissioner to the effect that the appellant has deposited with him the amount payable under the order appealed against. (2)The period of limitation for an appeal under this section shall be sixty days. (3)The provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), shall be applicable to appeals under this section." 12. The provision of Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act obligatory that the High Court cannot interfere in the award passed by the Commissioner unless and until it is satisfied that the substantial question of law is involved in the appeal. The provision of Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act obligatory that the High Court cannot interfere in the award passed by the Commissioner unless and until it is satisfied that the substantial question of law is involved in the appeal. The statutory provision restricts the interference of the High Court. However, considering the fact and the limitation to entertain present appeal, more particularly Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, only the circumstance which is provided under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, High Court can interfere with the award passed by the Commissioner. 13. At this stage, learned Counsel for the appellant urges that this is a jurisdictional error committed by the learned Commissioner and it involves substantial question of law. 14. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, I am agreed to the effect that the interpretation of the policy condition stipulated in documents requires to be considered as "substantial question of law". In this regard, reliance placed by learned counsel for the appellant upon clause No.3 of the policy documents, reads as under:- "3. The insured shall take reasonable precaution to prevent accidents and diseases and shall comply with all statutory obligations. 15. It appears that this Court, while exercising power under Section 482 of the Code and quashed the complaint against opponent No.1 had an occasion to examine the panchnama of the place of occurrence and other relevant documents and the investigation papers and after verifying all these documents, the Court observed and passed order and allowed the quashing petition and quashed the criminal prosecution against opponent No.1. 16. Thus, in view of that, the contention raised by the appellant is required to be turned down in negative and the learned Commissioner has rightly fasten the liability upon the insurance company. More particularly, the cover note suggests that it is Workmen Compensation Policy though, it is a general policy but it covers the employer's liability and thus, the appellant cannot take shelter of it. 17. So far as the interest part is concerned the Hon'ble Apex Court in case Harshadbhai Amrutbhai Modhiya (supra) has held paragraph Nos. 21 and 24 as under:- ""23. The law relating to contracts of insurance is part of the general law of contract. So said Roskill Lord Justice in Cehave vs. Bremer ([1976] Q.B. 44). 17. So far as the interest part is concerned the Hon'ble Apex Court in case Harshadbhai Amrutbhai Modhiya (supra) has held paragraph Nos. 21 and 24 as under:- ""23. The law relating to contracts of insurance is part of the general law of contract. So said Roskill Lord Justice in Cehave vs. Bremer ([1976] Q.B. 44). This view was approved by Lord Wilberforce in Reardon Smith vs. Hanson-Tangen (1976 [1 WLR] 989, wherein he said "it is desirable that the same legal principles should apply to the law of contract as a whole and that different principles should not apply to the different branches of that law". A contract of insurance is to be construed in the first place from the terms used in it, which terms are themselves to be understood in their primary, natural, ordinary and popular sense. (See Colinvaux's Law of Insurance 7th Edition paragraph 2-01). A policy of insurance has therefore to be construed like any other contract. On a construction of the contract in question it is clear that the insurer had not undertaken the liability for interest and penalty, but had undertaken to indemnify the employer only to reimburse the compensation the employer was liable to pay among other things under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Unless one is in a position to void the exclusion clause concerning liability for interest and penalty imposed on the insured on account of his failure to comply with the requirements of the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1923, the insurer cannot be made liable to the insured for those amounts. 24. Section 17 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act voids only a contract or agreement whereby a workman relinquishes any right of compensation from the employer for personal injury arising out of or in the course of the employment and insofar as it purports to remove or reduce the liability of any person to pay compensation under the Act. As my learned brother has noticed, in the Workmen’s Compensation Act, there are no provisions corresponding to those in the Motor Vehicles Act, insisting on the insurer covering the entire liability arising out of an award towards compensation to a third party arising out of a motor accident. As my learned brother has noticed, in the Workmen’s Compensation Act, there are no provisions corresponding to those in the Motor Vehicles Act, insisting on the insurer covering the entire liability arising out of an award towards compensation to a third party arising out of a motor accident. It is not brought to our notice that there is any other law enacted which stands in the way of an insurance company and the insured entering into a contract confining the obligation of the insurance company to indemnify to a particular head or to a particular amount when it relates to a claim for compensation to a third party arising under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. In this situation, the obligation of the insurance company clearly stands limited and the relevant proviso providing for exclusion of liability for interest or penalty has to be given effect to. Unlike the scheme of the Motor Vehicles Act the Workmen’s Compensation Act, does not confer a right on the claimant for compensation under that Act to claim the payment of compensation in its entirety from the insurer himself. The entitlement of the claimant under the Workmen’s Compensation Act is to claim the compensation from the employer. As between the employer and the insurer,the rights and obligations would depend upon the terms of the insurance contract. Construing the contract involved here it is clear that the insurer has specifically excluded any liability for interest or penalty under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and confined its liability to indemnify the employer only against the amount of compensation ordered to be paid under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The High Court was, therefore, not correct in holding that the appellant insurance company, is also liable to pay the interest on the amount of compensation awarded by the Commissioner. The workman has to recover it from the employer." 18. In view of the above observation of Hon'ble Apex Court, so far as second contention raised by the insurance company with regard to the liability to pay the interest is concerned, that finding is illegal, as learned Commissioner, has awarded 6% interest to be borne by appellant insurance company. The workman has to recover it from the employer." 18. In view of the above observation of Hon'ble Apex Court, so far as second contention raised by the insurance company with regard to the liability to pay the interest is concerned, that finding is illegal, as learned Commissioner, has awarded 6% interest to be borne by appellant insurance company. The said finding is required to be modified in view of the above referred decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court, as the same is liable to pay by the opponent No.1 because the compensation has not been paid within 30 days from the date of accident and therefore, liability towards penalty and interest is upon the opponent No.1. 19. Hence, in view of the above, I am of the opinion that so far as liability is concerned, learned Commissioner has rightly fasten the same upon the insurance company. However, so far as interest part is concerned, the same is modified to the extent that the insurance company is not held liable to pay interest and the same is to be borne by opponent No.1 and the impugned award is modified to that extent. 20. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed to the aforesaid extent. The amount deposited by the insurance company towards interest, shall be refunded along with interest accrued on it to the appellant insurance company after following due procedure through R.T.G.S./N.E.F.T. within period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of copy of present order. If the amount of compensation is not disbursed in favour of original complainants, the same shall be disbursed in favour of the original complainants after due verification and after following due procedure within period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of copy of present order. 21. The record and proceedings, if received, be sent back to the learned Commissioner forthwith.