ORDER : K.V. JAYAKUMAR, J. The short question involved in this case is whether this Court can act upon a statement filed by the complainant that the matter has been settled amicably by the parties, without filing a compounding petition under Section 147 of the Negotiable Instruments Act or under Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973?. 2. The 1 st respondent/complainant, Sree Gokulam Chits and Finance Company Pvt. Ltd., initiated criminal prosecution against the petitioner/accused under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act [hereinafter referred to as ‘the NI Act’] for an amount due to the company. 3. The trial court vide judgment dated 27.03.2008 in C.C.No.121/2006 convicted and sentenced the revision petitioner/accused to undergo simple imprisonment for six months and directed to pay compensation of Rs.2,72,000/-. Impugning the judgment of the learned Magistrate, the accused preferred Crl.Appeal No.256/2008. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track No.II, Palakkad allowed the appeal in part, modified and reduced the sentence to simple imprisonment for ten days and maintained the compensation. Aggrieved by the appellate court judgment, accused preferred this criminal revision petition. 4. When the matter was taken up for consideration on 14.03.2025, Adv.N. Sudha, instructed by Adv.K S Babu, learned counsel for the 1 st respondent/complainant submitted that the matter has been amicably settled between the parties and the aforementioned company had received the amount from the revision petitioner. The learned counsel filed a statement dated 18.03.2025 as directed by this Court on 14.03.2025, the contents of which are extracted hereunder: “The above Criminal revision Petition is filed against the judgment in Crl.Appeal No.256/2008 of the Sessions Court, Palakkad arising from the judgment in CC No.121/2006 of Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-II, Palakkad. Both the courts below held that the accused is guilty of the offence. The Trial Court convicted the accused and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for six months and to pay compensation of Rs.2,72,000/-( Rupees Two Lakhs Seventy Two Thousand only) under section 357(3) Cr.P.C. The appellate court reduced the sentence to 10 days imprisonment. The direction to pay compensation has been maintained by the appellate court. It is intimated by the 1st respondent that the parties had amicably settled the above case and the settled amount had been paid by the revision petitioner to the 1st respondent. The direction to pay compensation has been maintained by the appellate court. It is intimated by the 1st respondent that the parties had amicably settled the above case and the settled amount had been paid by the revision petitioner to the 1st respondent. Therefore this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to record the same and appropriate order may be passed in the above case.” 5. Adv.P.K.Mohanan, learned counsel for the revision petitioner/accused submitted that the revision petitioner was completely bedridden and he had paid the amount in 2013 itself. 6. It is trite law that, once the criminal revision petition is preferred and admitted, it shall be disposed of on merits, unless the parties arrived at a settlement and filed a compounding petition. 7. If the parties had arrived at an amicable settlement, the usual mode of bringing quietus to the lis is by way of filing a compounding petition signed by both the parties under Sections 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure [hereinafter referred to as ‘the Code’] or under Section 147 of the NI Act. In the instant case, it could be seen that the matter has been settled between the parties and the counsel for the complainant has filed a statement to that effect as aforesaid. 8. The crucial question before me is whether this Court can act upon the statement of the counsel for the complainant and pass appropriate orders setting aside the conviction and sentence? 9. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/accused invited the attention of this Court to the dictum laid down in Mathew v. State of Kerala [1986 KHC 38], wherein the Single Bench of this Court observed that the insistence on the appearance of the parties before Court need be, only if it becomes absolutely necessary for some purpose. Further, it was observed that, as soon as the offence was compounded by the complainant, it operates as an acquittal even if no acquittal order was recorded. The relevant paragraphs of Mathew ’s case (supra) are extracted hereunder: “5. As earlier stated the offence involved in the case is one punishable under S.420 of the Indian Penal Code. It is an offence which is compoundable by the person cheated, of course, with the permission of court. The relevant paragraphs of Mathew ’s case (supra) are extracted hereunder: “5. As earlier stated the offence involved in the case is one punishable under S.420 of the Indian Penal Code. It is an offence which is compoundable by the person cheated, of course, with the permission of court. Ordinarily when the affected parties have decided to compound the matter between themselves permission required from the court will be refused only in appropriate cases when public interest or ends of justice demand the same. In this case there is absolutely nothing indicating that it may not be desirable in the interest of justice to accord permission to compound the offence. What was involved between the parties was only a money transaction. The affected person received the amount and decided to settle the matter. There is nothing to indicate that the compromise was to defeat the purpose of law. Normally in such a case courts will only be inclined to accord permission. 6. The very existence of the courts is for dispensation of justice. The process of courts should not be used for harassment of litigants. The insistence on the appearance of parties before court need be only if it becomes absolutely necessary for some purpose, Courts are entitled to compel the appearance of the accused. But such insistence should not be for the mere pleasure of the accused being seen in the dock. Sometimes his presence may be absolutely essential, say for instance, for questioning him or for himself being identified by witnesses. Insistence on his appearance in such cases may be alright. To insist on his appearance on a day when his appearance has nothing to do with the progress of the case will only result in unnecessary harassment, especially when he has some inconvenience and his counsel is prepared to represent him. In this case that is what actually happened. The petitioner who is the accused before the Magistrate is already in Switzerland. Even if he wanted he was not in a position to come over to India and appear before the Magistrate because on the requisition of the Magistrate himself his passport was impounded by the concerned authorities. The Magistrate ought to have realised the fact that under such circumstances appearance of the accused before him was rather an impossibility. Even if he wanted he was not in a position to come over to India and appear before the Magistrate because on the requisition of the Magistrate himself his passport was impounded by the concerned authorities. The Magistrate ought to have realised the fact that under such circumstances appearance of the accused before him was rather an impossibility. One could only enjoy sadistic pleasure by insisting on an unnecessary impossibility and penalising a person for not complying with such a condition. xxxxxx 9. Suravi Mukherjee v. State (AIR 1965 Calcutta 469) dealt with a case where a compromise petition was filed by the complainant before court on 15-4-1964 duly signed by her and her pleader. That was a case relating to offences punishable under S.354, 379 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code. The compromise petition was put up for consideration before court on 22-4-1964 and was rejected by the Magistrate on the ground that the offences under S.379 and 354 of the Indian Penal Code were not compoundable. One of the accused against whom only a case under S.323 of the Indian Penal Code was made out was absent on that date. The Magistrate issued a warrant of arrest against him. Submission was made on behalf of that accused that under the impression that the matter has been compromised she did not think it fit to appear before court. That contention was negatived by the Magistrate. The High Court held: "The compromise against the accused was effective from the date of its filing i.e. 15-4-1964 and the reopening of the case against her on 22-4-1964 was unwarranted by law. Hence the order of the Magistrate issuing warrant of arrest against her could not be allowed to stand but the compromise being not operative against the accused charged with non compoundable offences the case should proceed against them." In that case it was further held that as soon as the offence was compounded by the complainant it operated as an acquittal even if no acquittal order was recorded. Even though it is not necessary in this case to go to that extent, it is clear that the presence of the accused ought not have been insisted for the purpose of passing favourable orders on the petitions filed before the Magistrate. Even though it is not necessary in this case to go to that extent, it is clear that the presence of the accused ought not have been insisted for the purpose of passing favourable orders on the petitions filed before the Magistrate. I could have understood if the Magistrate rejected the petitions on the ground that the case before him was one in which permission of court for compounding could not be granted in public interest. The Magistrate has no such case and there cannot be such a case also.” (emphasis supplied) 10. In Mathew ’s case (supra), the Magistrate has insisted the presence of the accused for compounding of an offence punishable under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code. The petitioner/accused therein, was in Switzerland, who issued a cheque to the complainant for discharge of a liability to the tune of Rs.20,000/-. When the Magistrate insisted the presence of the accused, Crl.M.C was preferred under Section 482 of the erstwhile Code. 11. Now the crucial question before me is whether a statement filed by the counsel for the complainant can be accepted and acted upon and to allow the parties to compound the matter?. 12. Before further discussion, it will be useful to extract Section 320 of the CrPC and Section 147 of the NI Act. “ Section 320: Compounding of Offences 1. xxxx 2. xxxx 3. When an offence is compoundable under this section, the abetment of such offence or an attempt to commit such offence (when such attempt is itself an offence) or where the accused is liable under section 34 or 149 of the Indian Penal Code, may be compounded in like manner. 4. — 1. When the person who would otherwise be competent to compound an offence under this section is under the age of eighteen years or is an idiot or a lunatic, any person competent to contract on his behalf, may, with the permission of the Court compound such offence. 2. When the person who would otherwise be competent to compound an offence under this section is dead, the legal representative, as defined in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) of such person may, with the consent of the Court compound such offence. 5. 2. When the person who would otherwise be competent to compound an offence under this section is dead, the legal representative, as defined in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) of such person may, with the consent of the Court compound such offence. 5. When the accused has been committed for trial or when he has been convicted and an appeal is pending no composition for the offence shall be allowed without the leave of the Court to which he is committed, or, as the case may be, before which the appeal is to be heard. 6. A High Court or Court of Session acting in the exercise of its powers of revision under section 401 may allow any person to compound any offence which such person is competent to compound under this section. 7. No offence shall be compounded if the accused is, by reason of a previous conviction, liable either to enhanced punishment or to a punishment of a different kind for such offence. 8. The composition of an offence under this section shall have the effect of an acquittal of the accused with whom the offence has been compounded. 9. No offence shall be compounded except as provided by this section.” Section 147 of the NI Act is extracted hereunder: “ Section 147. Offences to be compoundable .— Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), every offence punishable under this Act shall be compoundable.” 13. In Gimpex Pvt. Ltd. v. Manoj Goel [2022(11) SCC 705] , the Honourable Apex Court observed that the purpose of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is to provide security to creditors and instil confidence in the banking system of the country. Paragraphs 27, 37 and 45 of the aforementioned judgment are extracted hereunder: “27. The nature of the offence under S.138 of the NI Act is quasi - criminal in that, while it arises out of a civil wrong, the law, however, imposes a criminal penalty in the form of imprisonment or fine. The purpose of the enactment is to provide security to creditors and instil confidence in the banking system of the country. The nature of the offence under S.138 of the NI Act is quasi - criminal in that, while it arises out of a civil wrong, the law, however, imposes a criminal penalty in the form of imprisonment or fine. The purpose of the enactment is to provide security to creditors and instil confidence in the banking system of the country. The nature of the proceedings under S.138 of the NI Act was considered by a three judge Bench decision of this Court in P. Mohanraj and Others v. Shah Brothers Ispat Private Limited (2021 KHC 6120 : (2021) 6 SCC 258 : 2021 KHC OnLine 6120 : 2021 (2) KLT SN 35 : AIR 2021 SC 1308 ), where Justice RF Nariman, after adverting to the precedents of this Court, observed that: "53. A perusal of the judgment in Ishwarlal Bhagwandas [S.A.L. Narayan Row v. Ishwarlal Bhagwandas, 1966 (1) SCR 190 : AIR 1965 SC 1818 ] would show that a civil proceeding is not necessarily a proceeding which begins with the filing of a suit and culminates in execution of a decree. It would include a revenue proceeding as well as a writ petition filed under Art.226 of the Constitution, if the reliefs therein are to enforce rights of a civil nature. Interestingly, criminal proceedings are stated to be proceedings in which the larger interest of the State is concerned. Given these tests, it is clear that a S.138 proceeding can be said to be a "civil sheep" in a "criminal wolf's" clothing, as it is the interest of the victim that is sought to be protected, the larger interest of the State being subsumed in the victim alone moving a Court in cheque bouncing cases, as has been seen by us in the analysis made hereinabove of Chapter XVII of the Negotiable Instruments Act." 31. Thus, under the shadow of S.138 of the NI Act, parties are encouraged to settle the dispute resulting in ultimate closure of the case rather than continuing with a protracted litigation before the Court. This is beneficial for the complainant as it results in early recovery of money; alteration of the terms of the contract for higher compensation and avoidance of litigation. Equally, the accused is benefitted as it leads to avoidance of a conviction and sentence or payment of a fine. This is beneficial for the complainant as it results in early recovery of money; alteration of the terms of the contract for higher compensation and avoidance of litigation. Equally, the accused is benefitted as it leads to avoidance of a conviction and sentence or payment of a fine. It also leads to unburdening of the judicial system, which has a huge pendency of complaints filed under S.138 of the NI Act. In Damodar S. Prabhu (supra) this Court had emphasised that the compensatory aspect of the remedy under S.138 of the NI Act must be preferred and has encouraged litigants to resolve disputes amicably. The Court observed: "18. It is quite obvious that with respect to the offence of dishonour of cheques, it is the compensatory aspect of the remedy which should be given priority over the punitive aspect. There is also some support for the apprehensions raised by the learned Attorney General that a majority of cheque bounce cases are indeed being compromised or settled by way of compounding, albeit during the later stages of litigation thereby contributing to undue delay in justice delivery. The problem herein is with the tendency of litigants to belatedly choose compounding as a means to resolve their dispute. Furthermore, the written submissions filed on behalf of the learned Attorney General have stressed on the fact that unlike S.320 CrPC, S.147 of the Negotiable Instruments Act provides no explicit guidance as to what stage compounding can or cannot be done and whether compounding can be done at the instance of the complainant or with the leave of the Court. 19. As mentioned earlier, the learned Attorney General's submission is that in the absence of statutory guidance, parties are choosing compounding as a method of last resort instead of opting for it as soon as the Magistrates take cognizance of the complaints. One explanation for such behaviour could be that the accused persons are willing to take the chance of progressing through the various stages of litigation and then choose the route of settlement only when no other route remains. While such behaviour may be viewed as rational from the viewpoint of litigants, the hard facts are that the undue delay in opting for compounding contributes to the arrears pending before the Courts at various levels. While such behaviour may be viewed as rational from the viewpoint of litigants, the hard facts are that the undue delay in opting for compounding contributes to the arrears pending before the Courts at various levels. If the accused is willing to settle or compromise by way of compounding of the offence at a later stage of litigation, it is generally indicative of some merit in the complainant's case. In such cases it would be desirable if parties choose compounding during the earlier stages of litigation. If however, the accused has a valid defence such as a mistake, forgery or coercion among other grounds, then the matter can be litigated through the specified forums. [xxxx xxxx xxxx] 23. We are also in agreement with the learned Attorney General's suggestions for controlling the filing of multiple complaints that are relatable to the same transaction. It was submitted that complaints are being increasingly filed in multiple jurisdictions in a vexatious manner which causes tremendous harassment and prejudice to the drawers of the cheque. For instance, in the same transaction pertaining to a loan taken on an instalment basis to be repaid in equated monthly instalments, several cheques are taken which are dated for each monthly instalment and upon the dishonour of each of such cheques, different complaints are being filed in different Courts which may also have jurisdiction in relation to the complaint. In light of this submission, we direct that it should be mandatory for the complainant to disclose that no other complaint has been filed in any other Court in respect of the same transaction. Such a disclosure should be made on a sworn affidavit which should accompany the complaint filed under S.200 CrPC. If it is found that such multiple complaints have been filed, orders for transfer of the complaint to the first Court should be given, generally speaking, by the High Court after imposing heavy costs on the complainant for resorting to such a practice. These directions should be given effect prospectively." 40. Thus, in our view, a complainant cannot pursue two parallel prosecutions for the same underlying transaction. Once a settlement agreement has been entered into by the parties, the proceedings in the original complaint cannot be sustained and a fresh cause of action accrues to the complainant under the terms of the settlement deed. It has been urged by Mr. Thus, in our view, a complainant cannot pursue two parallel prosecutions for the same underlying transaction. Once a settlement agreement has been entered into by the parties, the proceedings in the original complaint cannot be sustained and a fresh cause of action accrues to the complainant under the terms of the settlement deed. It has been urged by Mr. V. Giri, learned Senior Counsel, and Ms. Liz Mathew, learned counsel, that parallel prosecutions would not lead to a multiplicity of proceedings, as in the present case, both complaints are being tried by the same Court. This may be true for the case before us, however, this Court in Damodar S. Prabhu (supra) and Re: Expeditious Trial of Cases (supra) has recognized multiplicity of complaints as one of the major reasons for delay in trial of cases under S.138 of the NI Act and the consequent choking of the criminal justice system by a disproportionate number of S.138 cases. While it is true that the trial in this case is before one Court, that is not necessarily the ground reality in all cases.” 14. In Raj Reddy Kallem v. State of Haryana [2024(3) KHC 485], the Apex Court held that, even in the absence of ‘consent’, the Court can close criminal proceedings against the accused in cases of Section 138 of the Negotiable instruments Act, if the accused is compensated the complainant. The Apex Court further observed that, Section 147 of the NI Act does not elaborate upon the meaning in which offences should be compounded, unlike under Section 320 of the Code. Offence under Section 138 of the Act can be best described as a regulatory offence that has been created to serve the public interest in ensuring the reliability of these instruments. It is the compensatory aspect of remedy which should be given priority over the punitive aspect with regard to the offence of dishonour of cheques. Paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Raj Reddy Kallem’ s case (supra) are extracted hereunder: “11. As per S.147 of the NI Act, all offences punishable under the Negotiable Instruments Act are compoundable. However, unlike S.320 of CrPC, the NI Act does not elaborate upon the manner in which offences should be compounded. Paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Raj Reddy Kallem’ s case (supra) are extracted hereunder: “11. As per S.147 of the NI Act, all offences punishable under the Negotiable Instruments Act are compoundable. However, unlike S.320 of CrPC, the NI Act does not elaborate upon the manner in which offences should be compounded. To fill up this legislative gap, three Judges Bench of this Court in Damodar S. Prabhu v. Sayed Babalal H. 2010 (5) SCC 66 3, passed some guidelines under Art.142 of the Constitution of India regarding compounding of offence under S.138 of NI Act. But most importantly, in that case, this Court discussed the importance of compounding offence under S.138 of the NI Act and also the legislative intent behind making the dishonour of cheque a crime by enacting a special law. This Court had observed that: "4 ....What must be remembered is that the dishonour of a cheque can be best described as a regulatory offence that has been created to serve the public interest in ensuring the reliability of these instruments. The impact of this offence is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. 5. Invariably, the provision of a strong criminal remedy has encouraged the institution of a large number of cases that are relatable to the offence contemplated by S.138 of the Act. So much so, that at present a disproportionately large number of cases involving the dishonour of cheques is choking our criminal justice system, especially at the level of Magistrates' Courts... " Further, after citing authors pointing towards compensatory jurisprudence within the NI Act, this Court observed that: "18. It is quite obvious that with respect to the offence of dishonour of cheques, it is the compensatory aspect of the remedy which should be given priority over the punitive aspect." 12. This Court has time and again reiterated that in cases of S.138 of NI Act, the accused must try for compounding at the initial stages instead of the later stage, however, there is no bar to seek the compounding of the offence at later stages of criminal proceedings including after conviction, like the present case (See: K. M. Ibrahim v. K.P Mohammed & Anr. 2010 (1) SCC 798 and O. P. Dholakia v. State of Haryana & Anr. 2000 (1) SCC 762 ). 2010 (1) SCC 798 and O. P. Dholakia v. State of Haryana & Anr. 2000 (1) SCC 762 ). In the case at hand, initially, both sides agreed to compound the offence at the appellate stage but the appellant could not pay the amount within the time stipulated in the agreement and the complainant now has shown her unwillingness towards compounding of the offence, despite receiving the entire amount. The appellant has paid the entire Rs.1.55 crore and further Rs.10 lacs as interest. As far the requirement of 'consent' in compounding of offence under S.138 of NI Act is concerned, this Court in JIK Industries Limited & Ors. v. Amarlal V. Jamuni & Anr. 2012 (3) SCC 255 denied the suggestion of the appellant therein that 'consent' is not mandatory in compounding of offences under S.138 of NI Act. This Court observed that: "57. S.147 of the Negotiable Instruments Act reads as follows: "147. Offences to be compoundable. - Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), every offence punishable under this Act shall be compoundable." 58. Relying on the aforesaid non obstante clause in S.147 of the NI Act, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that a three - Judge Bench decision of this Court in Damodar [ 2010 (5) SCC 663 : 2010 (2) SCC (Civ) 520 : 2010 (2) SCC (Cri) 1328] , held that in view of non obstante clause in S.147 of the NI Act, which is a special statute, the requirement of consent of the person compounding in S.320 of the Code is not required in the case of compounding of an offence under the NI Act. 59. This Court is unable to accept the aforesaid contention for various reasons " Further this Court observed in para 89 of the said judgement that: "S.147 of the NI Act must be reasonably construed to mean that as a result of the said section the offences under the NI Act are made compoundable, but the main principle of such compounding, namely, the consent of the person aggrieved or the person injured or the complainant cannot be wished away nor can the same be substituted by virtue of S.147 of the NI Act." This Court in Meters and Instruments private Ltd. And Another. v. Kanchan Mehta 2018 (1) SCC 560 after discussing the series of judgments including the JIK Industries Ltd. (supra) observed that even in the absence of 'consent' court can close criminal proceedings against an accused in cases of S.138 of NI Act if accused has compensated the complainant. The exact words of this Court were as follows: "18.3. Though compounding requires consent of both parties, even in absence of such consent, the court, in the interests of justice, on being satisfied that the complainant has been duly compensated, can in its discretion close the proceedings and discharge the accused." In our opinion, Kanchan Mehta (supra) nowhere contemplates that 'compounding' can be done without the 'consent' of the parties and even the above observation of Kanchan Mehta (supra) giving discretion to the trial court to 'close the proceedings and discharge the accused', by reading S.258 (Footnote.1) of CrPC, has been held to be 'not a good law' by this Court in the subsequent 5 judges bench judgement in Expeditious Trial of Cases Under S.138 of NI Act, 1881, In re, 2021 (16) SCC 116 (Footnote.2). Footnote No:1 (258. Power to stop proceedings in certain cases. - In any summons - case instituted otherwise than upon complaint, a Magistrate of the first class or, with the previous sanction of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, any other Judicial Magistrate, may, for reasons to be recorded by him, stop the proceedings at any stage without pronouncing any judgment and where such stoppage of proceedings is made after the evidence of the principal witnesses has been recorded, pronounce a judgment of acquittal, and in any other case, release the accused, and such release shall have the effect of discharge.) Footnote:2 (Para 20.) All the same, in this particular given case even though the complainant has been duly compensated by the accused yet the complainant does not agree for the compounding of the offence, the courts cannot compel the complainant to give 'consent' for compounding of the matter. It is also true that mere repayment of the amount cannot mean that the appellant is absolved from the criminal liabilities under S.138 of the NI Act. But this case has some peculiar facts as well. In the present case, the appellant has already been in jail for more than 1 year before being released on bail and has also compensated the complainant. But this case has some peculiar facts as well. In the present case, the appellant has already been in jail for more than 1 year before being released on bail and has also compensated the complainant. Further, in compliance of the order dated 08.08.2023, the appellant has deposited an additional amount of Rs.10 lacs. There is no purpose now to keep the proceedings pending in appeal before the lower appellate court. Here, we would like to point out that quashing of a case is different from compounding. This Court in JIK Industries Ltd.(Footnote No.3)(Supra) distinguished the quashing of case from compounding in the following words: FootnoteNo:3 (Para 43.) "Quashing of a case is different from compounding. In quashing the court applies it but in compounding it is primarily based on consent of the injured party. Therefore, the two cannot be equated." In our opinion, if we allow the continuance of criminal appeals pending before Additional Sessions Judge against the appellant's conviction then it would defeat all the efforts of this Court in the last year where this Court had monitored this matter and ensured that the complainant gets her money back.” 15. When the parties to the lis in a prosecution under Section 138 of the NI Act had arrived at a compromise, the usual and normal method is to file a compounding petition, either under Section 320 of the Code or under Section 147 of the NI Act, or both. In the instant case, the accused/revision petitioner is completely bedridden and unable to sign the compounding petition. This is a criminal revision petition of the year 2012. In other words, revision petition is pending here for the past 13 years. The insistence of the presence of the accused/compounding petition signed by the parties would, no doubt, prolong and protract the litigation for an indefinite period. 16. Therefore, I am of the view that, the aforesaid statement filed by the counsel for the 1 st respondent/complainant would be accepted, without insisting on a compounding petition or the presence of the petitioner/accused and the conviction and sentence in this matter can be set aside. 16. Therefore, I am of the view that, the aforesaid statement filed by the counsel for the 1 st respondent/complainant would be accepted, without insisting on a compounding petition or the presence of the petitioner/accused and the conviction and sentence in this matter can be set aside. On the basis of the ratio decidendi culled out from the various judgments referred above, I am of the considered opinion that, once the counsel for the complainant files a statement stating that the complainant has received the amount, nothing further remains to be adjudicated in this matter. Therefore, I am of the considered opinion that the parties can be allowed to compound the matter. 17. This Court has got ample powers to pass necessary orders so as to secure the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of process of Court. Therefore, I am of the considered opinion that the criminal courts need not insist the presence of the accused or filing of the compounding petition, if the matter is amicably settled between the parties and in cases wherein, the presence of accused could not be secured or could be secured only with considerable delay and expenses. In such circumstances, the criminal courts can act upon the statement of the complainant or his counsel showing that the matter has been settled amicably by the parties and the cause of action does not survives. In the light of the above discussion, the conviction and sentence imposed in this matter are hereby set aside, in the interest of justice. In the result, (i) Criminal Revision Petition is allowed, setting aside the conviction and sentence imposed in this matter. (ii) The revision petitioner/accused is set at liberty forthwith.