JUDGMENT : Ajit Kumar, J. 1. Heard Sri Vinod Kumar Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel appearing for the State respondents. 2. By means of present petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution, petitioner has prayed for a writ of certiorari to quash the order of punishment dated 1st March, 2015 in the nature of dismissal from service as well as appellate order dated 29th April, 2019 and the order dated 24th July, 2019 passed in revision. 3. The only short legal point argued before this Court is that enquiry officer could not have proposed punishment in the ultimate finding part of the enquiry report whereas in the present case enquiry officer/circle officer, Baghpat while submitting enquiry report on 12 th January, 2015 also made a recommendation for dismissal from service to be given effect to with the final approval by the authority and also “No Pay for No Work” for the 458 days. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance of Rule 14(1) with appendix of the U.P. Police Officer of Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991. The relevant rules and are reproduced hereunder: “14(1) Procedure for conducting departmental proceedings: (1) subject to the provisions contained in these rules, the departmental proceedings in the case referred to in sub-rule (1) of rule 5 against to the police officers may or conducted in accordance with the procedure laid down in appendix-I "APPENDIX-1 PROCEDURE RELATING TO THE CONDUCT OF DEPARTMENTAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST POLICE OFFICER Upon institution of a formal enquiry such police officer against whom the enquiry has been instituted shall be informed in writing of the grounds on which it is proposed to take action and shall be afforded an adequate opportunity of defending himself. The grounds on which it is proposed to take action shall be used in the form of a definite charge or charges as in Form I appended to these Rules which shall be communicated to the charged police officer and which shall be so clear and precise as to give sufficient indication to the charged police officer of the facts and circumstances against him, he shall be required, within a reasonable time, to put in, in a written statement of his defence and to state whether he desires to be heard in person.
If he so desires, or if the Inquiry Officer so directs an oral enquiry shall be held in respect of such of the allegation as are not admitted. At that enquiry such oral evidence will be recorded as the Inquiry Officer considers necessary. The charged police officer shall be entitled to cross-examine the witnesses, to give evidence in person and to have such witnesses called as he may wish: Provided that the Inquiry Officer may for sufficient reasons to be recorded in writing, refuse to call a witness. The proceedings shall contain a sufficient record of the evidence and statement of the findings and the ground thereof. The Inquiry Officer may also separately from these proceedings make his own recommendation regarding the punishment to be imposed on the charged police officer." 5. It is contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that despite stand taken in reply to show cause notice by the petitioner that enquiry officer exceeded his authority in making recommendation of punishment alongwith finding part of enquiry report and thus he contends enquiry report stood vitiated in law. According to learned counsel, the disciplinary authority absolutely ignoring this stand of the petitioner as replied and proceeded to impose major penalty from dismissal of service. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the authority of this Court in the case of Mohd. Haneef Khan v. State of U.P. (Service Bench No. 314 of 2010) decided on 03.04.2017. 6. Learned Standing Counsel on the contrary tried to defend the order on the ground that threat conduct of the petitioner in police force has been indicative of gross indiscipline, and accordingly this Court may not interfere in the matter exercising equitable jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 7. Having heard learned counsel for the respective parties and having perused the records, I proceed to examine only short legal point involved as to whether departmental enquiry report would get vitiated in law for having proposed punishment of dismissal from service and ‘no work, no pay’. From the perusal of the enquiry report, it is clearly reflected that enquiry officer not only found the petitioner guilty of the charges but also proposed punishment for dismissal from his service. The language is so set in the report that it amounts almost awarding punishment but for the approval granted by the authority.
From the perusal of the enquiry report, it is clearly reflected that enquiry officer not only found the petitioner guilty of the charges but also proposed punishment for dismissal from his service. The language is so set in the report that it amounts almost awarding punishment but for the approval granted by the authority. The relevant portion (conclusion) of the enquiry report is reproduced hereunder: 8. From the perusal of the reply to the show cause notice submitted by the petitioner, it clearly transpires that petitioner had taken this stand that enquiry officer could not have proposed punishment. Paragraph 19 of the reply is reproduced hereunder: “That, the enquiry officer/Presiding Officer, came into the conclusion that the petitioner was found guilty and he has committed misconduct on his part of his duties. After holding the guilty the enquiry officer recommended the punishment upon the petitioner, dismissal from services under Rule 14(1)(a) (I) of the U.P. Police Officers of Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rule, 1991” 9. From the perusal of the order of punishment, I find that disciplinary authority has not found any error in the enquiry report as far as proposed punishment is concerned. I find that disciplinary authority has held recommendation of the proposed punishment to be lawful in order to test this finding part of the disciplinary authority, I proceed to examine the relevant Rule 14 and appendix already reproduced above. 10. From a bare reading of the provision, it is apparent that disciplinary authority is vested with the power to exercise its discretion to select punishment that is to be imposed and enquiry officer is only required to submit report bringing home the charge. The enquiry officer may make recommendation for a punishment but within a specific separate note whereas in the present case, punishment has been proposed alongwith finding part. 11.
The enquiry officer may make recommendation for a punishment but within a specific separate note whereas in the present case, punishment has been proposed alongwith finding part. 11. Thus in the instant case not only enquiry officer brought home the charge but also made recommendation which was certainly beyond the scope and authority of the enquiry officer as contemplated to be appointed under Rule 14(I), the manner and method in which enquiry report is to be submitted is reflected from the appendix- I. It is clear that enquiry officer is only to bring home charge and submit final report bringing the charge was exonerated the charge officer and it is left to the discretion of the final authority to take action upon report. The decision that have been cited clearly speak of law to the effect that an enquiry officer’s domain is only to submit report and not to propose punishment. 12. The relevant paragraph of the judgment is reproduced hereunder: “This aspect has already considered in State of Uttranchal and others v. Kharak Singh , MANU/SC/7951/2008 : 2008 (8) SCC 236 and Court has held, if in inquiry report, punishment is also recommended by Inquiry Officer, it is a grave illegality for the reason that appropriate punishment is the exclusive jurisdiction of punishing or disciplinary authority and Inquiry Officer’s only job is to enquire, whether charge levelled against delinquent employee is proved or not.” 13. In view of above, the argument advanced by learned Standing Counsel that petitioner’s conduct was such that he did not deserve any equity before this Court cannot be accepted. Authority is to pass order well within the boundaries of the rules prescribed for and if any authority exceeds his authority so vested in law in passing an order, such an order becomes void ab initio. 14. In such above view of the matter, the enquiry officer’s recommendation of the preposed punishment from dismissal of service as well as ‘No Work No Pay’ cannot be approved of. The report also deserves to be set aside and so also consequential order of dismissal of the petitioner and also the orders passed by the appellate authority and order of authority sitting in revision also deserve to be set aside. 15. Thus writ petition succeeds and is allowed.
The report also deserves to be set aside and so also consequential order of dismissal of the petitioner and also the orders passed by the appellate authority and order of authority sitting in revision also deserve to be set aside. 15. Thus writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The order of punishment dated 1st March, 2015 in the nature of dismissal from service as well as order dated 29th April, 2019 passed by appellate authority and the order dated 24th July, 2019 passed in revision are hereby quashed . The matter is remitted to the disciplinary authority to get the enquiry report in the matter afresh by appointing enquiry officer other than officer who had previously held, the enquiry . The petitioner shall be participated in the enquiry and enquiry report shall be submitted within a maximum period of two months from the date of appointment of enquiry officer. The disciplinary authority, thereafter shall proceed to take appropriate decision in the matter within a further period of one month in compliance of principles of natural justice. The status of the petitioner in the meanwhile shall continue to remain the same as was at the time of passing of order impugned by the disciplinary authority.