JUDGMENT : Satyen Vaidya, J. All these Regular Second Appeals are being decided by a common judgment as common questions of facts and law are involved. 2. The respondent in all these appeals were the plaintiffs before the first Court in their respective suits. The parties hereinafter, for convenience, will be referred to by the same status as they held before the first Court. 3. Facts common in all the appeals are that plaintiffs owned their respective land in Village Dhrarshani, Post Office Rishikesh, Tehsil Jhandutta, District Bilaspur, Himachal Pradesh. Defendants constructed “Auhar-Kohina” road and during such process utilized the lands of plaintiffs without acquisition and payment of compensation. Plaintiffs filed the suits seeking decree of permanent prohibitory and mandatory injunctions. 4. Defendants contested the suit by raising questions of maintainability, estoppel, non joinder of necessary parties, valuation, limitation etc.. 5. It was submitted that the road had been constructed in the year 1986-87. Plaintiffs were to file suits within three years and due to long delay the suits were alleged to be not maintainable. 6. Learned trial Court held the plaintiffs entitled to the relief and defendants were directed to take steps for acquisition of lands of plaintiffs utilized for construction of “Auhar-Kohina” road and to disburse the assessed compensation to them expeditiously and not later than six months from the date of passing of decree(s). 7. The defendants filed appeals under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure which came to be decided by the learned Additional District Judge, Ghumarwin vide impugned judgment(s) and decree(s). In the cases, from which RSA Nos. 255 of 2020, 239 of 2020 and 204 of 2020 have arisen, the plaintiffs had also filed cross-objections. Learned First Appellate Court, dismiss the appeals of the State and allowed the cross-objections of the plaintiffs wherever such objections were filed. 8. Learned First Appellate Court passed the decrees in following terms:- “35. The decree passed by the learned Court is up-held. It is further directed that in event the defendants neither acquire the suit land under the road in accordance with law, nor opt to hand over the possession, the plaintiffs will be entitled to vacant possession by restoring the suit land to its original position. 36. The decree passed by the learned Court is up-held. It is further directed that in event the defendants neither acquire the suit land under the road in accordance with law, nor opt to hand over the possession, the plaintiffs will be entitled to vacant possession by restoring the suit land to its original position. 36. This alternative relief of possession shall not be executable for six months and also in event a notification for acquisition is issued and matter processed for payment of compensation in accordance with law.” 9. Out of these appeals, RSA No.255 of 2020 has been admitted on the following substantial questions of law:- “1. Whether the Court has jurisdiction to try & determine the suit which was filed after the expiry of limitation period i.e. 31 years? 2. Whether the plaintiffs are estopped to file the suit by their own acts, conducts and deeds etc.? 3. Whether the suit filed for prohibitory injunction and mandatory injunction after a period of 31 years suffers from delay and laches?” 10. The remaining appeals are still at the stage of admission. Since, similar questions have been raised by the defendants in all the appeals, as such they are being decided taking into consideration the aforesaid substantial questions of law. 11. The Court of the first instance as also the First Appellate Court have concurrently held that the land of the plaintiffs were utilized for construction of “Auhar-Kohina” road without payment of compensation to them. No dispute has been raised as to such findings of fact. It has only been contended on behalf of the defendants that the suits filed by the plaintiffs after almost 27 years were hopelessly time barred. In alternative, plaintiffs having remained silent for such a long period were estopped from raising the claim . Principle of acquiescence has also sought been applied against them on the premise that the plaintiffs were aware about the construction of road and the road was constructed with their implied consent and now they cannot, turn around to raise objections against the construction of road. 12. Defendants are constituents of welfare State. It is settled that the welfare State cannot claim adverse possession against its citizens. 12. Defendants are constituents of welfare State. It is settled that the welfare State cannot claim adverse possession against its citizens. Thus, the suits on the basis of title cannot be said to be time barred, which right could only be defeated by proof of perfection of title by way of adverse possession by the other. 13. Admittedly, the defendants were not in possession of any documents to show that the plaintiffs had consented for construction of road through their lands. The issue is no more res integra. In Sukh Dutt Ratra vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and others, (2022) 7 SCC 508 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court in almost identical fact situation, after placing reliance on Vidya Devi vs. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors., (2020) 2 SCC 569 has held as under:- “23. This court, in Vidya Devi (supra) facing an almost identical set of facts and circumstances – rejected the contention of ‘oral’ consent to be baseless and outlined the responsibility of the State: “12.9. In a democratic polity governed by the rule of law, the State could not have deprived a citizen of their property without the sanction of law. Reliance is placed on the judgment of this Court in Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC [Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC, (2013) 1 SCC 353 : (2013) 1 SCC (Civ) 491] wherein it was held that the State must comply with the procedure for acquisition, requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode. The State being a welfare State governed by the rule of law cannot arrogate to itself a status beyond what is provided by the Constitution. 12.10. This Court in State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar [State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar, (2011) 10 SCC 404 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 769] held that the right to property is now considered to be not only a constitutional or statutory right, but also a human right. Human rights have been considered in the realm of individual rights such as right to shelter, livelihood, health, employment, etc. Human rights have gained a multi-faceted dimension.” 24. And with regards to the contention of delay and laches, this court went on to hold: “12.12. The contention advanced by the State of delay and laches of the appellant in moving the Court is also liable to be rejected. Human rights have gained a multi-faceted dimension.” 24. And with regards to the contention of delay and laches, this court went on to hold: “12.12. The contention advanced by the State of delay and laches of the appellant in moving the Court is also liable to be rejected. Delay and laches cannot be raised in a case of a continuing cause of action, or if the circumstances shock the judicial conscience of the Court. Condonation of delay is a matter of judicial discretion, which must be exercised judiciously and reasonably in the facts and circumstances of a case. It will depend upon the breach of fundamental rights, and the remedy claimed, and when and how the delay arose. There is no period of limitation prescribed for the courts to exercise their constitutional jurisdiction to do substantial justice. 12.13. In a case where the demand for justice is so compelling, a constitutional court would exercise its jurisdiction with a view to promote justice, and not defeat it. [P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N., (1975) 1 SCC 152 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 22]” 25. Concluding that the forcible dispossession of a person of their private property without following due process of law, was violative of both their human right, and constitutional right under Article 300-A, this court allowed the appeal. We find that the approach taken by this court in Vidya Devi (supra) is squarely applicable to the nearly identical facts before us in the present case.” 14. In light of above analysis, the suits of plaintiffs were neither barred by limitation or the principle of estoppel of acquiescence would apply against them. The substantial questions of law as framed in RSA No.255 of 2020 are answered accordingly. 15. In result, there is no merit in these appeals and the same are accordingly dismissed. Accordingly, the impugned judgments and decrees are affirmed. No order as to the costs. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. Records be sent back forth with. 16. Decree sheets be prepared accordingly.