JUDGMENT : P. Krishna Kumar, J. The petitioner was advised by the Kerala Public Service Commission (PSC) for the post of Police Constable/Civil Police Officer in the Kerala Armed Police, 5th Battalion. However, during verification, he disclosed that he had been implicated in three criminal cases, which initially led to his non-appointment. He challenged this decision before the Kerala Administrative Tribunal, which directed the respondents to send him for training, stipulating that he would be permanently appointed only if he was acquitted of all charges. During the training period, he informed the authorities that he had been again implicated in two additional cases, following which he was retrenched from service. 2. Subsequently, the petitioner was acquitted in all the cases. However, through Ext. A13 proceedings, the Government debarred him from appointment in the Civil Police Officer cadre, citing the interdiction in Rule 10(b)(iii) of Part II of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules (KS&SSR). The petitioner again approached the Tribunal, contending that none of the alleged offences involved proclivity of violence or moral turpitude and that all the cases were fabricated at the behest of his neighbours. Relying on Section 86(2) of the Kerala Police Act, 2011, he claimed that he was entitled to permanent appointment and challenged Annexure A13, seeking a direction to appoint him as a Police Constable/Civil Police Officer. 3. The Tribunal rejected his claim, noting that the allegations involved physical assaults using deadly weapons. Although the cases resulted in acquittal, the Tribunal observed that it occurred when the witnesses turned hostile or when the petitioner settled the matters. 4. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Government Pleader. 5. The argument of the petitioner rests on two grounds. First, under Section 86(2) of the Kerala Police Act, he is entitled to appointment upon acquittal. Second, relying on the decision in Binnesh Babu v. State of Kerala ( 2024 (3) KHC 364 ), he contends that the appointment should not be declined if the alleged criminal acts do not amount to violence or moral turpitude. 6. We are unable to agree with the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner. From Annexure A13, it is obvious that the cases registered against the petitioner are very serious in nature, and two of them were registered even subsequent to the advice of the Public Service Commission.
6. We are unable to agree with the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner. From Annexure A13, it is obvious that the cases registered against the petitioner are very serious in nature, and two of them were registered even subsequent to the advice of the Public Service Commission. All the cases occurred during 2015-2019, whereas the petitioner was advised by the PSC on 20.09.2017. 7. Upon reviewing the judgments in the criminal cases, the reply statement of the State and Annexure A13, we note the following: a) One case was quashed based on a settlement between the petitioner and the victim (Crime No. 361/2015 of Nooranad Police Station), where the court recorded that the victim had suffered a lacerated scalp injury. As per the case of the police, the injury was caused by the petitioner. b) Another case was compounded out of court, leading to acquittal under Section 320(8) Cr.P.C (Crime No. 183/2019). According to the police, the petitioner attacked the victim with a wooden stick. c) In the third case (Crime No. 189/2019), the occurrence witnesses turned hostile, and thus the petitioner was acquitted. d) In Crime Nos. 1311/2012 and 1317/2012 also, the victims turned hostile, which led to the acquittal of the petitioner. In one of these cases, the prosecution alleged that the petitioner, along with several other accused persons, formed an unlawful assembly, armed with deadly weapons such as swords and iron rods, attacked the victim, and caused cut injuries and other serious injuries. In the other case, it was alleged that the petitioner stopped the victim's car by placing a motorbike across its path and then attacked the victim with a cricket bat. 8. All the above allegations are very serious in nature. Thus, we are not in a position to apply the law laid down by this Court in Binnesh Babu v. State of Kerala (supra) in this case. The Tribunal rightly distinguished the law stated in Binnesh Babu ’s case by describing the factual differences. 9. In Union of India and Others v. Methu Mada [ (2022) 1 SCC 1 ], it was held that even if the candidate is acquitted, if the reason for such a verdict is because the witness turned hostile, that would not automatically entitle a candidate for employment, especially in a disciplined force.
9. In Union of India and Others v. Methu Mada [ (2022) 1 SCC 1 ], it was held that even if the candidate is acquitted, if the reason for such a verdict is because the witness turned hostile, that would not automatically entitle a candidate for employment, especially in a disciplined force. It is also observed that, if the offence involves moral turpitude, then also the candidate cannot claim the right to appointment, based on the acquittal order. The Court further held that in such cases, the employer has a right to reject his candidature in terms of the statutory or other instructions. 10. Given the nature of the allegations and the records before us, the petitioner cannot claim that the said offences do not involve moral turpitude or proclivity of violence. Most charges involved the use of dangerous weapons, with two cases including an offence under Section 308 IPC and another involving the formation of an unlawful assembly armed with deadly weapons. Significantly, the petitioner allegedly engaged in criminal activities even after receiving the PSC’s advice. 11. We are also unable to accept the contentions based on Section 86(2) of the Police Act. Section 86(2) does not inhibit the employer from going into the merit of the allegations in the criminal cases against a candidate offering employment, even if he is acquitted of those criminal charges. It depends on the nature of the acquittal order. 12. Further, Annexure A13 order was issued by the Government by referring to Rule 10(b)(iii) of the KS&SSR. It is an independent provision empowering the Government to decide the eligibility of a candidate for appointment on the basis of his character and antecedents. By exercising the said authority, the Government found that the petitioner was not suitable for public employment. In this case, the Government reached a conclusion that the petitioner was not suitable for the post of Civil Police Officer based on the report of the Additional Director General of Police (Intelligence) as to the character and antecedents of the petitioner. The finding is not merely because the petitioner had been involved in criminal cases. The Government rightly assessed his character and antecedents in the background of the allegations made in the criminal cases. 13. In these circumstances, we find no reason to interfere with the impugned order. The original petition is dismissed. 14.
The finding is not merely because the petitioner had been involved in criminal cases. The Government rightly assessed his character and antecedents in the background of the allegations made in the criminal cases. 13. In these circumstances, we find no reason to interfere with the impugned order. The original petition is dismissed. 14. Before parting with the matter, we find it appropriate to bring one aspect to the attention of the Government. While passing orders like Annexure A13, the focus of the Government should be on the factual allegations against the candidate in the criminal cases, as well as the matters revealed through the judgment of the trial court and the materials uncovered in the enquiry conducted by the Intelligence Wing. The Government must analyse the character, antecedents and attending circumstances of the candidate, related to the criminal case. Though we uphold the decision taken by the Government (as per Annexure A13), we find that it could have furnished more details about the materials it considered while arriving at its conclusion, rather than reproducing the text of the judgments of the Constitutional Courts.