JUDGMENT : P. SAM KOSHY,  J. 1. Since the issue involved in the instant appeals is one and the same and the appellant and respondents therein are also same, we proceed to decide the instant appeals by way of this common judgment. 2. Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No.640 of 2005 is filed by the appellant herein, viz., M/s. Coromandal Fertilisers Limited, (formerly known as M/s. Godavari Fertilizers & Chemicals Limited) under Section 39 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1940 assailing the common Judgment and Decree dated 28.01.2005 in O.P.No.4 of 2001 passed by the III Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Secunderabad, rejecting the said O.P., and confirming the impugned Award that had been passed by the learned Arbitrator against the said appellant and Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No.524 of 2006 is filed by the appellant, viz., M/s. East Godavari Coast Shipping Agency, under Section 39 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1940 assailing the common Judgment and Decree dated 28.01.2005 in O.P.No.7 of 2001 passed by the III Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Secunderabad, in whose favour the Award had been passed by the learned Arbitrator, and challenging that portion of the order insofar as it relates to limiting the interest to 6% and rejecting to grant 18% interest (for short, the ‘impugned common order’). 3. The appellant in C.M.A.No.640 of 2005, i.e., M/s. Coromandal Fertilisers Limited, had also filed Civil Revision Petition No.3630 of 2005 challenging the Award dated 12.03.2001 passed by the 2nd respondent / sole arbitrator on merits, and which is also being taken up along with the appeals to be decided by this Court. 4. Heard Mr.Shiv Rohan Singh, learned counsel representing Mr. S. Ravi, learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the appellant in C.M.A.No.640 of 2005; for the respondent No.1 in C.M.A.No.524 of 2006; and for the revision petitioner in C.R.P.No.3630 of 2005. Mr.R.N. Hemendranath Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of Ms.M.Siva Jyothi, learned counsel for the appellant in C.M.A.No.524 of 2006; learned counsel for respondent No.1 in C.M.A.No.640 of 2005 and for the respondent in C.R.P.No.3630 of 2005. 5. The challenge in the instant appeals is to the order passed by Trial Court in O.P.No.4 of 2001 and O.P.No.7 of 2001, filed by the appellant under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, both of which stood decided by the Trial Court vide the common order dated 28.01.2005. 5. The challenge in the instant appeals is to the order passed by Trial Court in O.P.No.4 of 2001 and O.P.No.7 of 2001, filed by the appellant under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, both of which stood decided by the Trial Court vide the common order dated 28.01.2005. O.P.No.4 of 2001 was filed by the appellant herein seeking for setting aside the Award dated 12.03.2001 passed by the 2nd respondent / sole arbitrator wherein the rate of interest awarded by the learned Arbitrator stood modified from 18% to 6%. O.P.No.7 of 2001 was one which was preferred by the respondent No.1-Shipping Company, praying the Trial Court to confirm the Award dated 12.03.2001 passed by the learned Arbitrator and to be made Rule of the Court, and also for a direction to the appellant to pay the amount along with interest as awarded by the learned Arbitrator. 6. Vide the common impugned order, the Trial Court rejected the petition, viz., O.P.No.4 of 2001 which was filed under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, and simultaneously O.P.No.7 of 2001 was allowed making the Award dated 12.03.2001 passed by the learned Arbitrator Rule of the Court. 7. Aggrieved, the instant appeals were filed by the appellant herein. 8. The appellant in C.M.A.No.640 of 2005, i.e., M/s. Coromandal Fertilizers Limited, has assailed the impugned common order, amongst others, on the following grounds: (a) that the learned Arbitrator failed to appreciate the scope of enquiry and the manner in which the Trial Court had proceeded to decide the case; (b) that the learned Arbitrator had mis-conducted himself in rejecting the preliminary objection on the ground that it was not raised in the Written Statement. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant primarily contended that the learned Arbitrator had not properly considered the Document Ex.B.2, dated 22.06.1993, insofar as the same being a full and final settlement and the claim raised by the claimant could not had been processed by the learned Arbitrator beyond the said Ex.B.2 which was in the nature of a full and final settlement. He further contended that the learned Arbitrator has misconducted himself in allowing the claim of Rs.10,06,006.17 ps. pertaining to shortage of cargo unload from M.V. Aditya Prakash as the learned Arbitrator had in fact not properly considered the fact that there was an actual receipt of Rs.6,83,279/- from the Insurance Company. He further contended that the learned Arbitrator has misconducted himself in allowing the claim of Rs.10,06,006.17 ps. pertaining to shortage of cargo unload from M.V. Aditya Prakash as the learned Arbitrator had in fact not properly considered the fact that there was an actual receipt of Rs.6,83,279/- from the Insurance Company. He further submitted that the challenge to the Award was for an amount of Rs.4,32,526.44 ps. awarded by the learned Arbitrator towards the cost of damage caused to HDPE sacks. 10. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, the burden was upon the respondent No.1-Shipping Agency to establish that they had paid Insurance Premium in respect of the HDPE sacks and the said amount was not recovered from the account of the claimants. He further contended that the learned Arbitrator has failed to consider the documents produced before it, particularly Exs.B.2, B.5, B.6, B.9, B.10, and B.11. 11. Per contra, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent No.1- Shipping Agency, opposing the appeal preferred by the appellant, contended that the Award passed by the learned Arbitrator in fact was a well reasoned and duly considered Award, and that there was hardly any scope of interference left. According to him, while passing the Award, the learned Arbitrator has taken into consideration the terms and conditions agreed upon between the parties and also the contentions put forth by both parties, and all them have been dealt with by the learned Arbitrator in the course of passing of the impugned Award, and which leaves no room for interference by this Court under Section 39 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1940. He further contended that since it is a well reasoned and well considered Award, the case of the appellant also would not fall within the permissible limits under which an Award, much less even an order of the Court confirming the said order under Section 17 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1940, can be interfered with; and therefore, prayed for dismissal of the appeals. 12. 12. In addition, learned counsel for respondent No.1 contended that in the appeal that was filed by him, viz., C.M.A.No.524 of 2006, challenging the order of the Trial Court insofar as modifying the rate of interest awarded by the learned Arbitrator from 18% to 6%, since the parties had agreed upon the same and the transaction being commercial in nature, the Trial Court ought to have maintained the rate of interest of 18% as awarded by the learned Arbitrator. He therefore contended that the said modification by the Trial Court so far as rate of interest is grossly erroneous and contrary to the legal position as it stood then. He therefore prayed for modifying the impugned order to the extent of restoring the rate of interest as awarded by the learned Arbitrator. 13. Having considered the contentions put forth on either side and particularly taking into consideration the reasons assigned by the Trial Court in the impugned common order, while deciding the above two O.P.s under Section 17 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1940 filed by either side, the Trial Court had in fact threadbare taken note of all the contentions that have been advanced by both the parties. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the grounds raised in the instant two appeals also are the very same grounds which were agitated before the Trial Court. Given the fact that the very same grounds which are raised in the instant two appeals have been duly considered by the Trial Court while deciding the appeals under Section 17 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1940, the Trial Court further took note of the fact that under Section 39 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1940, in the course of hearing an appeal the only scope for interference is on the ground of a misconduct being committed by the learned Arbitrator in the course of passing of the Award or in the event of an error apparent on the face of record. The learned Trial Court found that in fact there was a contract executed on 02.05.1991 by the parties with an arbitration clause in it, and the nature of contract was in respect of work of unloading and clearing the cargo from the ships at Kakinada Port. The learned Trial Court found that in fact there was a contract executed on 02.05.1991 by the parties with an arbitration clause in it, and the nature of contract was in respect of work of unloading and clearing the cargo from the ships at Kakinada Port. In the course of execution of the said contract, there was certain dispute which arose between the parties, and therefore, the respondent No.1-Shipping Agency had withheld certain amounts payable to the appellant, which led to filing of the O.S.No.368 of 1993, wherein a sole Arbitrator was appointed to adjudicate the dispute. The learned Arbitrator, after giving extensive hearing to both sides, had finally vide Awarded dated 12.03.2001 directed the respondent No.1-Shipping Agency to pay an amount of Rs.46,00,161.69 ps. to the appellant with simple interest @ 18% p.a. from the date of Award till realization. The Trial Court, after thoroughly going through the entire pleadings and evidence, found that the entire arbitration proceeding was proceeded in a fair and reasonable manner and that the learned Arbitrator has not committed any misconduct by exercising powers that he has exercised as an ‘Arbitrator’ and there was hardly any material to show that the learned Arbitrator acted beyond the scope. The Trial Court also did not found any material to show that the act on the part of the learned Arbitrator in the course of passing the Award amounted to any misconduct. What is also pertinent to take note of the fact is that in the course of scrutinizing the materials, the Trial Court did find that the rate of interest awarded by the learned Arbitrator was in fact on the higher side, and taking into consideration a couple of judicial precedents the Trial Court had modified the Award to the extent of making it applicable from the date of Award, i.e., from 12.03.2001 till the payment is made, by reducing the rate of interest from 18% to 6%. 14. 14. From a perusal of the instant appeals filed by both parties, we find that the instant appeals are filed under the same facts and grounds which were agitated by both sides before the Trial Court with the same ground and with the same material, without there being prima facie material to show that these grounds were not considered by the learned Arbitrator or that the grounds have been considered with perversity so as to bring the Award under the purview of a misconduct committed by the learned Arbitrator in passing the Award. In the absence of any such material, the scope of interference for this Bench at this stage gets further reduced to the minimal. 15. Upon due consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, we do not find any strong case made out by the learned counsel for the appellants in both the two appeals calling for interference to the impugned common order. The appeals, being devoid of merit, deserve to be and are accordingly dismissed. Since the two appeals stand decided finally, there is hardly any scope left to adjudicate the Civil Revision Petition No.3630 of 2005 and no orders therefore need be passed in the said Civil Revision Petition No.3630 of 2005. Therefore, the Civil Revision Petition No.3630 of 2005 stands closed. No costs. 16. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions pending if any, shall stand closed.