ORDER : 1. The petitioners - accused Nos.1 to 6 are at the doors of this Court calling in question registration of a crime in Crime No.115/2023 for offences punishable under Sections 448 , 506 read with 34 of the IPC . 2. Heard Sri Anant Mandgi, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners, Smt. Sowmya R., learned High Court Government Pleader for respondent No.1 – State, Sri A. Madhusudhana Rao, learned counsel representing respondent No.2 – complainant and Sri H. Shanthi Bhushan, learned Deputy Solicitor General of India for respondent No.3. 3. Sans details, facts in brief, are as follows: Respondent No.2 is the complainant - wife of one Dr.Renuka Prasad. It transpires that the said Dr.Renuka Prasad claims to be the Secretary of the Institutions - Academy of Liberal Education, which runs 17 Institutions of various discipline in Dakshina Kannada district. The issue in the lis relates to an incident that takes place on 06.10.2023. The wife of Dr.Renuka Prasad, the second respondent registers the complaint before the jurisdictional police alleging that the petitioners herein - accused Nos.1 to 6 have entered into the premises unauthorisedly and have criminally intimidated the complainant. This becomes a crime in crime No.115/2023, registered for offences punishable under Sections 448 , 506 read with 34 of the IPC . The registration of the crime is what has driven these petitioners to this Court in the subject petition. 4. This Court by its order dated 07.12.2023, interdicted the proceedings and stayed the further investigation in the matter. 5. Learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners would take this Court through the documents appended to the petition to demonstrate that as on the date, the petitioners were the office bearers of the Institution and had a right to enter into the Institution to which they were the office bearers elected pursuant to certain resolution. Therefore, the complaint alleging entering into the Institution cannot mean that they cannot enter into their own office or premises as the case would be. He would submit that the offences so alleged against these petitioners spring out of certain civil proceedings, which are pending before the concerned Court between the parties. He would therefore seek quashment of the crime. 6. He would submit that the offences so alleged against these petitioners spring out of certain civil proceedings, which are pending before the concerned Court between the parties. He would therefore seek quashment of the crime. 6. Sri A. Madhusudhan Rao, learned counsel representing respondent No.2 - complainant would dispute the claim of the petitioners contending that the petitioners are the office bearers; several civil proceedings are pending between the parties; on the said cause of action, he would submit that the husband of the complainant gets convicted or was convicted as on the date of registration of the complaint, but the conviction is set aside by the Apex Court and is now acquitted of the offences. He would submit that the matter is still at the stage of investigation and further proceedings must be permitted to be continued as there are various disputed questions of fact in the case at hand. He would seek dismissal of the petition. 7. Learned High Court Government Pleader representing the State would also toe the lines of the learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2 - complainant and would seek dismissal of the petition. 8. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the respective parties and have perused the material on record. 9. The afore-narrated facts are not in dispute. The link in the chain of events is what is narrated hereinabove. The entire issue gets triggered from registration of the complaint. Therefore, I deem it appropriate to notice the complaint. It reads as follows: The complaint is that, the petitioners - accused have trespassed into the office of the Institution on 06.10.2023 and criminally intimidated the complainant. Therefore, the offences would spring. 10. Learned senior counsel for the petitioners submits that the matter between the two with regard to who is the Secretary of the Institution or the office bearers had reached the Apex Court. The Apex Court in its order dated 09.01.2023 has observed as follows: “…under the provisions of Mysore Societies Registration Act, 1960 (Now, Karnataka Societies Registration Act, 1960). Petitioner and the first respondent are real brothers whereas respondent Nos.2 to 6 are family members of respondent No.2/close relatives of the parties. The above- stated Society runs 17 educational/technical/training institutes. The Apex Court in its order dated 09.01.2023 has observed as follows: “…under the provisions of Mysore Societies Registration Act, 1960 (Now, Karnataka Societies Registration Act, 1960). Petitioner and the first respondent are real brothers whereas respondent Nos.2 to 6 are family members of respondent No.2/close relatives of the parties. The above- stated Society runs 17 educational/technical/training institutes. The first respondent is the President of the society whereas the petitioner used to perform duties of General Secretary, the other family members/relatives are also office bearers/members of the Society. Unfortunately, some dispute has arisen between the petitioner and respondent No.1, due to which, Court proceedings have also been initiated. 3. Since respondent No.1 is on caveat, we have the advantage of hearing learned Senior Counsel for both sides. They have, very fairly and on instructions, agreed to the suggestion of this Court that the dispute amongst the family members can be resolved through mediation. 4. As suggested by learned Senior Counsel for the parties, Hon'ble Mr.Justice R.V. Raveendran, a former Judge of this Court, is requested to mediate between the parties for amicable resolution of the dispute. 5. The petitioner, respondent No.1 and/or any other member of the Society shall appear before. Hon'ble Mr.Justice R.V. Raveendran, along with a copy of this Order, on 16.01.2023 at 11.00 A.M. and/or at a time that may be convenient to the Hon'ble former Judge. 6. We leave it to Hon'ble Mr.Justice R.V. Raveendran to determine the amount of his honorarium, which shall be borne by both the parties equally. 7. we are sanguine that the dispute in question will stand resolved with the intervention of Hon'ble Mr.Justice R.V. Raveendan. However, in case the mediation does not succeed, the petitioner shall be at liberty to pursue the Civil Suit and the Writ Petition, pending before different forums, and such matters shall then be decided as per their own merits, uninfluenced by the observations made by the High Court in the impugned order. 8. The Special Leave Petition is disposed of accordingly. 9. 8. The Special Leave Petition is disposed of accordingly. 9. As a result, pending interlocutory applications also stand disposed of.” Sd/- Sd/- (SATISH KUMAR YADAV) (KAMLESH RAWAT) DEPUTY REGISTRAR COURT MASTER.” (Emphasis supplied) The Apex Court observes that the first petitioner is the President of the Institution, husband of the complainant is the General Secretary and other family members and relatives are to perform the duties of the office bearers and members of the Institution and unfortunately, dispute has arisen between them. The Apex Court has also observed as quoted hereinabove, in Special Leave to Appeal in SLA No. 23907/2022, an appeal preferred against the order passed by the coordinate bench of this Court in W.P.No.11177/2022 disposed on 04.11.2022. The coordinate bench has observed as follows: “…. …. …. 6. Plaintiff No.3 pursuant to the order passed by this Court in MFA.Nos. 4283/21 and 4288/2021 filed two applications under Section 94 read with Section 151 of CPC. seeking stay of entire resolutions passed in the meetings held on 22.1.2022, 27.1.2022 and 12.2.2022 And to prohibit the conduct of AGM to be held on 4.03.2022. When the matter stood thus, third plaintiff has filed seven applications on 10.3.2022 which are numbered as I.A.No.19 to 25. The seven applications are filed seeking stay of resolutions passed in the meetings held on 27.1.2022, 22.1.2022, 7.12.2021, 23.12.2021, 12.2.2022 and 4.3.2022 respectively. 7. The said applications were seriously resisted by the defendants by filing objections. The learned Judge by a common order dated 21.4.2022 has allowed all the seven applications and has stayed the operation of the resolutions passed in the meetings held on 7.12.2021, 23.12.2021 at 10.00 a.m., 23.12.2021 at 12.15 p.m., 22.1.2022, 27.01.2022, 12.02.2022 and 4.3.2022.” I have felt it appropriate to quote the judgement of the Apex Court only to observe that there are several disputes that are civil in nature, between the protagonists of the crime. 11. The issue now would be, whether the petitioners are guilty of offence under Section 448 of the IPC , even prima facie Section 448 of the IPC is wrongly alleged, which ought to have been alleged under Section 447 of the IPC . Section 447 of the IPC reads as follows: “ 447. 11. The issue now would be, whether the petitioners are guilty of offence under Section 448 of the IPC , even prima facie Section 448 of the IPC is wrongly alleged, which ought to have been alleged under Section 447 of the IPC . Section 447 of the IPC reads as follows: “ 447. Punishment for criminal trespass .— Whoever commits criminal trespass shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both.” Section 447 of the IPC deals with criminal trespass. The ingredients of Section 447 of the IPC are found in Section 441 of the IPC . Section 441 of the IPC reads as follows: “441. Criminal trespass. - Whoever enters into or upon property in the possession of another with intent to commit an offence or to intimidate, insult or annoy any person in possession of such property, or having lawfully entered into or upon such property, unlawfully remains there with intent thereby to intimidate, insult or annoy any such person, or with intent to commit an offence, is said to commit “criminal trespass”. If the ingredients found in Section 441 of the IPC is pitted, to the contents of the complaint, what would unmistakably emerge is that, the petitioners are now being alleged is for criminal trespassing into their own office, or which they claim to be their own office, as the case would be, but trespass will be by the accused over the victim’s property and not the accused against their own property. Therefore, the ingredients of Section 441 of the IPC for it to become an offence Section 447 of the IPC for criminal trespass is not even found any semblance in the case at hand. 12. What is the other offence is the one punishable under Section 506 of the IPC , which deals with criminal intimidation. Criminal intimidation has obtaining in Section 506 of the IPC has its ingredients in Section 503 of the IPC . If Section 503 of the IPC is noticed, there is not even an iota of ingredient present in the complaint or the allegations made in the complaint for it to become punishable under Section 506 of the IPC . The Apex Court in the case Mohammad Wajid and Another v. State of U.P . If Section 503 of the IPC is noticed, there is not even an iota of ingredient present in the complaint or the allegations made in the complaint for it to become punishable under Section 506 of the IPC . The Apex Court in the case Mohammad Wajid and Another v. State of U.P . 2023 SCC OnLine SC 951, has delineated as to what could become the offences under Sections 504 and 506 of the IPC . The Apex Court has held as follows: “ SECTIONS 503, 504 AND 506 OF THE IPC 24. Chapter XXII of the IPC relates to Criminal Intimidation, Insult and Annoyance. Section 503 reads thus:— “Section 503. Criminal intimidation. — Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation. Explanation.—A threat to injure the reputation of any deceased person in whom the person threatened is interested, is within this section. Illustration A, for the purpose of inducing B to resist from prosecuting a civil suit, threatens to burn B's house. A is guilty of criminal intimidation.” 25. Section 504 reads thus:— “ Section 504. Intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of the peace .—Whoever intentionally insults, and thereby gives provocation to any person, intending or knowing it to be likely that such provocation will cause him to break the public peace, or to commit any other offence, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.” 26. Section 506 reads thus:— “ Section 506 . Punishment for criminal intimidation. —Whoever commits, the offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both; If threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc. Section 506 reads thus:— “ Section 506 . Punishment for criminal intimidation. —Whoever commits, the offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both; If threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc. —And if the threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, or to cause the destruction of any property by fire, or to cause an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or to impute unchastity to a woman, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both.” 27. An offence under Section 503 has following essentials:— 1) Threatening a person with any injury; (i) to his person, reputation or property; (ii) to the person, or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested. 2) The threat must be with intent; (i) to cause alarm to that person; or (ii) to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat; (iii) to cause that person to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat. 28. Section 504 of the IPC contemplates intentionally insulting a person and thereby provoking such person insulted to breach the peace or intentionally insulting a person knowing it to be likely that the person insulted may be provoked so as to cause a breach of the public peace or to commit any other offence. Mere abuse may not come within the purview of the section. But, the words of abuse in a particular case might amount to an intentional insult provoking the person insulted to commit a breach of the public peace or to commit any other offence. Mere abuse may not come within the purview of the section. But, the words of abuse in a particular case might amount to an intentional insult provoking the person insulted to commit a breach of the public peace or to commit any other offence. If abusive language is used intentionally and is of such a nature as would in the ordinary course of events lead the person insulted to break the peace or to commit an offence under the law, the case is not taken away from the purview of the Section merely because the insulted person did not actually break the peace or commit any offence having exercised self control or having been subjected to abject terror by the offender. In judging whether particular abusive language is attracted by Section 504, IPC , the court has to find out what, in the ordinary circumstances, would be the effect of the abusive language used and not what the complainant actually did as a result of his peculiar idiosyncrasy or cool temperament or sense of discipline. It is the ordinary general nature of the abusive language that is the test for considering whether the abusive language is an intentional insult likely to provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace and not the particular conduct or temperament of the complainant. 29. Mere abuse, discourtesy, rudeness or insolence, may not amount to an intentional insult within the meaning of Section 504, IPC if it does not have the necessary element of being likely to incite the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace of an offence and the other element of the accused intending to provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace or knowing that the person insulted is likely to commit a breach of the peace. Each case of abusive language shall have to be decided in the light of the facts and circumstances of that case and there cannot be a general proposition that no one commits an offence under Section 504, IPC if he merely uses abusive language against the complainant. Each case of abusive language shall have to be decided in the light of the facts and circumstances of that case and there cannot be a general proposition that no one commits an offence under Section 504, IPC if he merely uses abusive language against the complainant. In King Emperor v. Chunnibhai Dayabhai , (1902) 4 Bom LR 78, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court pointed out that:— “To constitute an offence under Section 504, I.P.C. it is sufficient if the insult is of a kind calculated to cause the other party to lose his temper and say or do something violent. Public peace can be broken by angry words as well as deeds.” (Emphasis supplied) 30. A bare perusal of Section 506 of the IPC makes it clear that a part of it relates to criminal intimidation. Before an offence of criminal intimidation is made out, it must be established that the accused had an intention to cause alarm to the complainant. 31. In the facts and circumstances of the case and more particularly, considering the nature of the allegations levelled in the FIR, a prima facie case to constitute the offence punishable under Section 506 of the IPC may probably could be said to have been disclosed but not under Section 504 of the IPC . The allegations with respect to the offence punishable under Section 504 of the IPC can also be looked at from a different perspective. In the FIR, all that the first informant has stated is that abusive language was used by the accused persons. What exactly was uttered in the form of abuses is not stated in the FIR. One of the essential elements, as discussed above, constituting an offence under Section 504 of the IPC is that there should have been an act or conduct amounting to intentional insult. Where that act is the use of the abusive words, it is necessary to know what those words were in order to decide whether the use of those words amounted to intentional insult. Where that act is the use of the abusive words, it is necessary to know what those words were in order to decide whether the use of those words amounted to intentional insult. In the absence of these words, it is not possible to decide whether the ingredient of intentional insult is present.” (Emphasis supplied) If the facts obtaining in the case at hand is considered on the bedrock of the elucidation of the law by the Apex Court, permitting further proceedings against these petitioners would become an abuse of the process of the law and result in miscarriage of justice, as a seemingly civil dispute between two wings of the management or office bearers of the management, is rendered a colour of crime. 13. For the aforesaid reasons, the following: ORDER : a. The criminal petition is allowed. b. The impugned Crime in Crime No.115/2023, pending before the Senior Civil Judge and JMFC, Sullia, D.K. District, stands quashed.