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2025 DIGILAW 706 (GAU)

Lalhlimpuii Venghlui/College Veng v. Laltanpuia, Venghlui, Aizawl

2025-05-02

MARLI VANKUNG

body2025
JUDGMENT : (MARLI VANKUNG, J.) Heard Mr. C. Zoramchhana, learned counsel for the appellant along with Mr. Lalfakawma, learned counsel for the respondents. 2. This is an appeal filed under Section 17 of the Mizoram Civil Courts Act, 2005 read with Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Court, 1908 against the Judgment & Order dated 15.12.2021, passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge-II, Aizawl in Probate Case No. 8 of 2015. 3. The case of the appellant is that the learned Trial Court has erred in not probating the ‘Will’ executed on 28.10.2018, left by her late mother Smt. Lallawmi and for dismissing the same on the grounds that the said ‘Will’ was not maintainable for want of compliance with Sections 9 & 17(e) of The Mizo District (Inheritance of Property) Act, 1956, whereas the relevant Act applicable is The Mizo Marriage, Divorce and Inheritance of Property Act, 2014. 4. The fact of the case in a nutshell is that the appellant is one of the legatee of the ‘Will’ executed on 28.10.2012 said to be left behind by her mother Smt. Lallawmi (L), who died on 03.05.2013, in respect of LSC No. 312/1973 located at Venghlui, Aizawl, Mizoram. In the said ‘Will’, the deceased Smt. Lallawmi(L) had bequeathed her immovable properties to her sons and daughter, being the legal heir of the property covered by the said LSC No. 312 of 1973 by virtue of an Heirship Certificate dated 28.02.2003 issued in her favour. Earlier, the appellant had filed an application for the probate of the ‘Will’ which was registered as Probate case No. 54 of 2014 and on the strength of the said probated ‘Will’, an Heirship Certificate in respect of the said LSC No. 312 of 1973 was issued in favour of the children of Smt. Lallawmi (L) namely, Shri. Laltanpuia (R1), Shri. Lalnuntluanga (R2), Shri. Lalropuia (R3), Shri. Chawngliankima and the appellant, Smt. Lalhlimpuii. However, a review application was filed before the Court of District & Sessions Judge, Aizawl by the respondents in RFA No. 22 of 2014 wherein, the order probating the ‘Will’ executed on 28.10.2012 was cancelled and set aside with liberty to file a fresh application for the Probate of the ‘Will’. Subsequently, the appellant filed another application registered as Probate Case No. 54 of 2014, which was withdrawn by the appellant due to some formal defect. Subsequently, the appellant filed another application registered as Probate Case No. 54 of 2014, which was withdrawn by the appellant due to some formal defect. Thereafter, the appellant filed another application, praying for the Probate of the ‘Will’ executed on 28.10.2012 which was registered as Probate Case No. 8 of 2015 on 31.07.2015. The present respondents contested the application by filing their written statements, stating that the deceased Smt. Lallawmi (L) did not have any right to execute the ‘Will’ over the property of the deceased C. Thangliana covered under LSC No. 312 of 1973 since the said Heirship Certificate issued in her favour in respect of the LSC No. 312 of 1973 was not executed and was still in the name of C. Thangliana (L). They also denied the authenticity of the signature of Smt. Lallawmi (L) in the said ‘Will’ and also questioned the soundness of the mind of Smt. Lallawmi (L) and her capacity of exercising her free will to execute the said ‘Will’. 5. From the pleadings of the parties, the learned Trial Court framed the following issues: i) Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form and style? ii) Whether the petitioner has locus standi to file the present application for probate? iii) Whether the deceased had any authority over the property covered by the LSC No.312 of 1973 which belonged to C.Thangliana (L)? iv) Whether the signature found in the alleged ‘Will’ belongs to Lallawmi? v) Whether the deceased Lallawmi was fully possessed of her clear conscience and capable of exercising her free will on 28.10.2012? vi) Whether the ‘Will’ was executed in conformity with the provisions of Mizo District Inheritance of Property Act, 1956? vii) Whether the petitioner is entitled to the reliefs claimed? If so, to what extent? 6. During trial, the appellant/petitioner produced three witnesses including herself, and the respondent also examined three witnesses. Thereafter, the learned Trial Court vide its Judgment and Order dated 15.12.2021 held that the Probate application was not maintainable and dismissed the same for want of compliance with Sections 9 and 17(e) of the defunct The Mizo District (Inheritance of Property) Act, 1956. Aggrieved, the appellant has filed the Instant Application. 7. The learned Trial Court decided issue Nos. Thereafter, the learned Trial Court vide its Judgment and Order dated 15.12.2021 held that the Probate application was not maintainable and dismissed the same for want of compliance with Sections 9 and 17(e) of the defunct The Mizo District (Inheritance of Property) Act, 1956. Aggrieved, the appellant has filed the Instant Application. 7. The learned Trial Court decided issue Nos. 1 and 3 in favour of the appellant by observing that, by virtue of the Heirship Certificate dated 28.02.2003 issued to Smt. Lallawmi (L), she was declared the rightful owner of the property covered by LSC No. 312 of 1973. The learned Trial Court also decided issue No. 4 in favour of the appellant by finding that the evidence of the attesting witnesses PW Nos. 2 and 3 clearly established that the signature on the ‘Will’ dated 11.09.2012 belonged the Smt. Lallawmi (L), since PW Nos. 2 and 3 are the only people who were present by the side of Smt. Lallawmi (L) during the execution the ‘Will’. The learned Trial Court held that the contentions of the two witnesses were not shaken during cross examination, rather the cross examination of PW No. 3 affirmed that it was Smt. Lallawmi(L) who put her signature on Exhibit P-2. 8. Though the Trial Court observed that a few aspects of the ‘Will’ were vague and does not inspire the confidence of the Court, and though the learned Trial Court also observed that there is no information as to who typed or prepared ‘Will’ (Exhibit P-2) when the testator studied only up to Class II/III, however, the Trial Court found that there was nothing in evidence to discredit the attesting witnesses or question their character or the veracity of their evidence before the court. Thus, the learned Trial Court while considering issue No. 5, had held that even though the deceased Smt. Lallawmi (L) is said to have suffered a stroke on 03.08.2012, however, the respondents had not annexed any medical certificates/documents to prove the same. The learned Trial Court found that the evidence of petitioner’s witness, regarding the execution of the ‘Will’ is well corroborated by the attesting witnesses and held issue No. (V) in favour of the appellant based solely on the testimony of the attesting witness PW Nos. 2 & 3. 9. The learned Trial Court then discussed issue Nos. The learned Trial Court found that the evidence of petitioner’s witness, regarding the execution of the ‘Will’ is well corroborated by the attesting witnesses and held issue No. (V) in favour of the appellant based solely on the testimony of the attesting witness PW Nos. 2 & 3. 9. The learned Trial Court then discussed issue Nos. 2 & 6 together by held that the two issued formed the crux of the case. The Trial Court observed that while filing the application for probate of the ‘Will’ on 31.07.2015 by the petitioner/appellant did not specify under which law it was moved. The Court further observed that a study of the history of the application reveals that the petitioner/appellant had previously filed two applications for probate of the ‘Will’ and thus the third probate application must be continued as a continuity of the first two applications and not as a separate entity. The first application for probate of the ‘Will’ executed on 28.10.2012, was filed under the The Mizo District (Inheritance of Property) Act, 1956. Meanwhile, The Mizo Marriage, Divorce and Inheritance of Property Act, 2014, came into force on 13.02.2015 and therefore, since there is no retrospective effect in The Mizo Marriage, Divorce and Inheritance of Property Act, 2014, the prevalent or governing law at the time of the testator’s death would be The Mizo District (Inheritance of Property) Act, 1956. The learned Trial Court observed that if the petitioner had filed just one application after the implementation of The Mizo Marriage, Divorce and Inheritance of Property Act, 2014, the matter would have been different. However, at the time of the first probate application filed by the petitioner/appellant, The Mizo District (Inheritance of Property) Act, 1956 was still in place. The learned Trial Court relied on the judgment of the Gauhati High Court in M/S Universal Pipes (P) Ltd. Versus The State Of Assam & 3 Others in Writ Appeal No. 393 of 2010 by stating that a subordinate legislation with retrospective effect cannot be made unless so authorized by the legislature, and in the absence of any power given to the subordinate authority to make subordinate legislation with retrospective effect, a subordinate legislation has to be treated, and must be allowed to operate prospectively and not retrospectively; more so, when the parent legislation is prospective in nature. The learned Trial Court had also relied on the case of ITO vs. M.C. Ponnosse reported in (1969) 2SCC 351 10. Having decided that The Mizo District (Inheritance of Property) Act, 1956 would be applicable in this instant case, the learned Trial Court considered whether the ‘Will’ executed on 28.10.2012 was executed in conformity with the mandatory provision of the said law. It was observed that under Section 9 of The Mizo District (Inheritance of Property) Act, 1956, the appointment of an executor to the ‘Will’ was mandatory. Section 17(e) also required that the petitioner is the executor named in the ‘Will’ and that in the instant case the ‘Will’ executed on 28.10.2012, executed by Smt. Lallawmi, no executor was appointed by the testator, and none of the legatees were appointed as the executor. The learned Trial Court, in view of the above held that the ‘Will’ executed by Smt. Lallawmi (L) executed on 28.10.2012 was not executed in conformity with the provisions of The Mizo District (Inheritance of Property) Act, 1956. The learned Trial Court had relied on the judgment of a Co- ordinate bench of this Court in Lalchhuana Vs. Romawii in RFA No.25 of 2012 , and accordingly had dismissed the probate application. 11. Mr. C. Zoramchhana, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the learned Trial Court had failed to invoke the relevant provision of law which was enforced at the time when the matter came before the Court for adjudication and instead had wrongly applied the defunct and already repealed the Mizo District (Inheritance of Property) Act, 1956. He submitted that the issue whether the Mizo District (Inheritance of Property) Act, 1956 or The Mizo Marriage, Divorce and Inheritance of Property Act, 2014 was to be applied in the instant case was not even included in the issues framed by the Trial Court. The application of the Mizo Marriage, Divorce and Inheritance of Property Act, 2014 was also not contested by the respondents in their written statement. He submitted that the learned Trial Court had invented its own issue which was not raised by neither of the parties before the Trial Court and that the learned Trial Court should not have gone beyond the pleadings of the parties. The learned Trial Court relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in N. Mani Vs. He submitted that the learned Trial Court had invented its own issue which was not raised by neither of the parties before the Trial Court and that the learned Trial Court should not have gone beyond the pleadings of the parties. The learned Trial Court relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in N. Mani Vs. Sangeetha Theatre reported in 2004 12SCC 278 (Para 9) and State of Orissa Vs. Mamata Mohanty reported in 2011 3SCC 436 (Para 13) by pointing out that nothing was mentioned regarding the applicable law in the written objection and that the learned Trial Court had invented its own issues. 12. The learned counsel submitted that at the time of filing the probate application by the appellant, which was in the year 2015, the Mizo Marriage, Divorce and Inheritance of Property Act, 2014 was already applicable and is the law enforced at the time when the matter in issue is adjudicated in the Court and that the already repealed the Mizo District (Inheritance of Property) Act, 1956 has nothing to do with the present application. 13. The learned counsel also submitted that the learned Trial Court had not applied its judicious mind in holding that the probate application is not maintainable for want of compliance or Sections 9 and 17(e) of the defunct the Mizo District (Inheritance of Property) Act, 1956 and that in the applicable the Mizo Marriage, Divorce and Inheritance of Property Act, 2014 there is no requirement for appointment of an executor. 14. The learned counsel further submitted that the learned Trial Court had decided all the other issues in favour of the appellant and had actually probated the ‘Will’ by finding that the witnesses to the ‘Will’ had witnessed the deceased Smt. Lallawmi (L) put her signature and therefore, the learned Trial Court had wrongly decided the last issue only on procedural lapses or procedural provision of law by not touching upon the merit and circumstances of the case, wherein, it was found that the ‘Will’ was executed by the deceased Smt. Lallawmi (L). The learned counsel further submitted that even if it was found that the mandatory requirement of appointing an executor in a valid ‘Will’ as per The Mizo District (Inheritance of Property) Act, 1956 was not fully complied with while executing the ‘Will’ executed on 28.10.2012, the same being actually procedural law, should not be allowed to come in the way of administering a substantial justice as it was held by the learned Trial Court that the ‘Will’ executed on 28.10.2012 was genuine and found to be actually executed by Smt. Lallawmi (L) during her lifetime He submitted that the learned Trial Court had erred in dismissing the application for probate of the ‘Will’ only on grounds of a hyper-technical point. In support of his submission, he had cited the State of Maharashtra Vs M/S. Hindustan Construction Company Ltd. reported in (2010) 4SCC 518 (Para 16) and Union Of India Vs.Pramod Gupta (D) By Lrs. &Ors reported in 2003 3SCC 272 (Para 26) 15. The learned counsel further submitted that under section 40 of the Mizo Marriage, Divorce and Inheritance of Property Act, 2014, it is stated that the Mizo District (Inheritance of Property) Act, 1956 stands repealed however all acts done under the Mizo District (Inheritance of Property) Act, 1956 would be deemed to be done under the Mizo Marriage, Divorce and Inheritance of Property Act, 2014, and therefore, the execution of the ‘Will’ by the deceased Smt. Lallawmi (L) is also to be deemed to be done under the Mizo Marriage, Divorce and Inheritance of Property Act, 2014, wherein, there is no requirement to appoint an ‘Executor’. 16. Mr. Lalfakawma, learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand submitted that the learned Trial Court need not be confined to the submissions made by the parties as provided under Order 8 and Order 14 Rule 5 of the CPC. He further submitted that at the time of framing of issues by the learned Trial Court, both the parties were duly represented by their own counsels and no objection was raised regarding the issues framed by the learned Trial Court. It would not be appropriate at this appellate stage to raise objections to the issues framed by the learned Trial Court. 17. It would not be appropriate at this appellate stage to raise objections to the issues framed by the learned Trial Court. 17. The learned counsel further submitted that the cause of action arose on the death of the testator Smt. Lallawmi (L), which is in the year 2013 before The Mizo Marriage, Divorce and Inheritance of Property Act, 2014 came into force for which the first application for probate of the ‘Will’ was filed and there is continuity till the filing of the third application for probate of the ‘Will’. The learned counsel submitted that Section 5 of The Mizo District (Inheritance of Property) Act, 1956 has clearly stated that the course of action arises on the death of the testator, thus, when the cause of action arose in 2013, which is on the death of the Smt.Lalawmi, the law applicable would be The Mizo District (Inheritance of Property) Act, 1956, therefore the application for probate of the ‘Will’ can be said to be made under Section 9, 10 & 17 of The Mizo District (Inheritance of Property) Act, 1956. The learned counsel submitted that it was mandated under the Mizo District (Inheritance of Property) Act, 1956 that an ‘Executor has to be appointed by the testator of the will which was not done so in the instant case. The learned counsel relied upon the judgment of a Coordinate Bench of this Court in LalchhuanaVs. Romawii in RFA No.25 of 2012 , wherein, the probate for ‘Will’ was dismissed due to non appointment of an executor. 18. The learned counsel for the respondent also submitted that the facts of the case, which is not disputed was that the present appellant is living at College Veng after her divorce and was not living with the deceased Smt. Lallawmi (L) during her lifetime. He submitted that it was the younger son/Respondent No. 3 of the deceased Smt. Lallawmi (L), who was looking after the deceased Smt. Lallawmi (L) and that he lived in the main house covered by the LSC No. 312/1973. 19. The learned counsel further submitted that since the cause of action arose in 2013 on the death of Smt. Lalawmi and the act applicable was The Mizo District (Inheritance of Property) Act, 1956, even if the second application for the probate of the ‘Will’ was filed in 2015, it cannot be applied retrospectively unless specifically mentioned in the act. 19. The learned counsel further submitted that since the cause of action arose in 2013 on the death of Smt. Lalawmi and the act applicable was The Mizo District (Inheritance of Property) Act, 1956, even if the second application for the probate of the ‘Will’ was filed in 2015, it cannot be applied retrospectively unless specifically mentioned in the act. He has relied on the Judgment of the Apex Court in the case of The State of Rajasthan Vs. Ashok Kumar Kashyap reported in (2021) 10SCC 210 (Para 16 & 17) wherein the Apex court held that there is profusion of judicial authority on the proposition that a rule or law cannot be construed as retrospective unless it expresses a clear or manifest intention, to the contrary. 20. The learned counsel further submitted that if the plea taken by the learned counsel for the appellant that ‘any action before the Mizo Marriage, Divorce and Inheritance of Property Act, 2014 should be considered to be taken under the said Act’, is taken in its literal form, then all previous judgments wherein the probate of the ‘Will’ which was dismissed due to non-appointment of an executor would be nullified. He submitted that the Mizo Marriage, Divorce and Inheritance of Property Act, 2014 cannot have any retrospective effect. 21. I have considered the submissions made by the counsels for both the parties. From the submissions of the rival parties it transpires that the only issues that needs to be decided in the appeal are: i) whether the learned Trial Court had erred in deciding an issue which was not framed by the learned court at the time of framing of issues and ii) whether the learned Trial Court was correct in deciding that The Mizo District (Inheritance of Property) Act, 1956, would be applicable in the instant case instead of the Mizo Marriage, Divorce and Inheritance of Property Act, 2014. It is thus seen that since the appeal is only on the question of law and not on the question of fact, the evidence adduced by the parties before the learned trial court need not be delved into. 22. It is thus seen that since the appeal is only on the question of law and not on the question of fact, the evidence adduced by the parties before the learned trial court need not be delved into. 22. This Court finds that the learned Trial Court’s decision to include and decide the additional issue after framing of the other issues does not warrant interference by this Court, as this falls squarely within the powers conferred upon the learned Trial Court under Order XIV Rule of the Code. The power to frame additional issues by a Court to entertain civil disputes is conferred by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, under Order XIV Rule 5. This provision grants the Court the authority to amend, strike out, or frame additional issues at any stage of the proceedings as deemed necessary. The said rule empowers the Court to ensure that the real matters in dispute are clearly identified, allowing for the effective adjudication of the case. Order XIV Rule 5 of the Code is reproduced below for reference: "Order XIV - Settlement of Issues and Determination of Suit on Issues of Law or on Issues agreed upon *** 5. Power to amend and strike out, issues.-- (1) The Court may at any time before passing a decree amend the issues or frame additional issues on such terms as it thinks fit, and all such amendments or additional issues as may be necessary for determining the matters in controversy between the parties shall be so made or framed. (2) The Court may also, at any time before passing a decree, strike out any issues that appear to it to be wrongly framed or introduced." 23. Thus it is seen that this power to frame additional issues is not limited to the initial framing of issues and can be exercised as the case progresses and the court can make such amendments or frame additional issues to ensure the matters in controversy between the parties are properly determined. It is also seen that both the rival parties in their written arguments before the learned trial court have made their respective submissions on the issue of whether the Mizo District (Inheritance of Property) Act, 1956, or the Mizo Marriage, Divorce and Inheritance of Property Act, 2014 would be applicable in the probate of the will of the deceased testator Smt. Lallawmi (L). In view of the above, this court finds that the learned trial court had not erred in considering which the law would be applicable in the probate of the ‘Will’ executed on 28.10.2012, though not included as an issue at the time of framing of issues at the initial stage of the trial. 24. This court finds that in Apex Court in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India, (2004) 6 SCC 254 : had held that “Cause of action 6. Cause of action implies a right to sue. The material facts which are imperative for the suitor to allege and prove constitute the cause of action. Cause of action is not defined in any statute. It has, however, been judicially interpreted inter alia to mean that every fact which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court. Negatively put, it would mean that everything which, if not proved, gives the defendant an immediate right to judgment, would be part of cause of action. Its importance is beyond any doubt. For every action, there has to be a cause of action, if not, the plaint or the writ petition, as the case may be, shall be rejected summarily.” Thus this court finds that the cause of action in case of probate cannot be held to have occurred from the time of death of the testator but the cause of action will arise when an application for grant of probate is made. 25. Thus in view of the above, this Court finds that in the instant case , the cause of action can be said to arise when the appellant had file an application st on 31 July 2015 praying for the Probate of the ‘Will’ executed on 28.10.2012 which was duly registered as Probate Case No. 8 of 2015. This court is of the considered view that the previous applications were already disposed of when the fresh application was filed and cannot be considered to continue since the instant application was subsequently registered afresh. 26. This court is of the considered view that the previous applications were already disposed of when the fresh application was filed and cannot be considered to continue since the instant application was subsequently registered afresh. 26. This court herein finds that the submissions made in pertaining to the section 40 of the Mizo Marriage, Divorce and Inheritance of Property Act, 2014 under the heading ‘Repeal and Savings’ was never raised or discussed before the Trial Court and therefore need not be considered at this appellant stage. 27. For the above reasons since the law prevailing at the relevant time was the Mizo Marriage, Divorce and Inheritance of Property Act, 2014 and not the repealed the Mizo District (Inheritance of Property) Act, 1956, this court is constrained to set aside the impugned the Judgment & Order dated 15.12.2021, passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge-II, Aizawl in Probate Case No. 8 of 2015. Accordingly, in light of the findings and observations made by the learned Trial Court wherein the issues no.(i), (iii), (iv), and v) were decided in favour of the appellant by finding that there was nothing in evidence to discredit the attesting witnesses or question their character or the veracity of their evidence before the Court, and by finding that the evidence of the attesting witnesses PW Nos. 2 and 3 clearly established that the signature on the ‘Will’ dated 11.09.2012 belonged the Smt. Lallawmi (L), and wherein these findings has not been challenged, this Court finds that the ‘Will’ dated 11.09.2012 executed by the testator on 28.10.2012, has been probated. 28. Accordingly RFA No. 17 of 2022 stands allowed and disposed of. 29. LCR to be returned.