JUDGMENT : (Michael Zothankhuma, J.) Heard Mr. Lalremsanga Nghaka, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mrs. Linda L. Fambawl, learned Public Prosecutor and Ms. Lalngaihsaki Fanai, learned Amicus Curiae for the respondent No. 2 2. This appeal has put to challenge the Judgment & Order dated 12.12.2022 passed by the Special Court, POCSO Act, Champhai in S.R. No. 25/2020 arising out of Champhai P.S. Case No. 113/2020 dated 26.09.2020, by which the appellant has been convicted under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 and Section 341 IPC. Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 is the provision for punishment for committing the offence of aggravated penetrative sexual assault, in terms of Section 5(4) of the POCSO Act. Section 341 of the IPC is the provision for punishment for wrongful restraint. 3. The prosecution case in brief is that an FIR dated 26.09.2020 was submitted by the Prosecution Witness-1(PW-1), to the effect that he believed that the appellant had raped the 5 year old victim girl in a jhum hut located at Vengthar on 26.09.2020 during 5:00 p.m to 6:00 p.m. Further, the victim girl’s parents had given authority to the informant (PW-1) to lodge the FIR on their behalf. On the basis of the FIR, Champhai P.S. Case No. 113/2020 dated 26.09.2020 under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 was registered. 4. The victim was thereafter sent for medical examination on 26.09.2020 itself. The appellant was also arrested on the same date. After visiting the place of occurrence and making a sketch map, the I.O. started the investigation, during which time he seized the Birth Certificate of the victim girl. The statement of the victim (PW-2) was recorded by the Judicial Magistrate First Class-II (JMFC-II), Champhai on 28.09.2020. The statements of PW-5 and PW-6 were also recorded under Section 164 Cr.PC on 05.10.2020 and 06.10.2020 respectively by the JMFC-II, Champhai. The statements of PW-9 and PW-10 under Section 164 Cr.PC were also recorded by the JMFC-II, Champhai on 14.10.2020. 5. The case I.O. thereafter having found a prima facie case under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 and Section 341 of IPC against the appellant, submitted the charge-sheet. 6. The learned Trial Court framed two charges under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 and Section 341 of IPC, to which the appellant pleaded not guilty. 5. The case I.O. thereafter having found a prima facie case under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 and Section 341 of IPC against the appellant, submitted the charge-sheet. 6. The learned Trial Court framed two charges under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 and Section 341 of IPC, to which the appellant pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, the learned Trial Court examined 11 Prosecution Witnesses and 4 Defence Witnesses. The appellant was examined under Section 313 Cr.PC, wherein he did not deny the fact that he had been inside the hut with the victim girl and that since he was intoxicated, he could not recall why he had taken the victim to the jhum hut, instead of taking her to her grandmother. 7. The learned Trial Court on weighing the evidence, came to a finding that the appellant was guilty of having committed the offence of aggravated penetrative sexual assault on the 5 year old victim girl and wrongfully restraining her. Accordingly, the appellant was convicted by the learned Trial Court under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 and Section 341 of IPC and sentenced accordingly. 8. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that there is no evidence adduced to connect the appellant with the alleged offence. He submits that the conviction of the appellant had only been made on the basis of conjectures and surmises. He submits that the learned Trial Court had only considered the materials favouring the prosecution and had completely ignored the evidence that had been recorded in favour of the appellant. He also submits that the evidence of the victim (PW-2), not being consistent with her statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.PC, the discrepancy in the testimony of the victim vis-à-vis her statement under Section 164 could not have been the basis for convicting the appellant. He also submits that the evidence of the Doctor (PW-11) shows that the hymen was intact. As such, there was no ground for the learned Trial Court to have convicted the appellant under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012. 9. The appellant’s counsel submits that the appellant has to be presumed to be innocent until proven guilty beyond all reasonable doubt. In this case, as the evidence adduced did not prove the guilt of the appellant beyond all reasonable doubt, the impugned Judgment and Order should be set aside. 9. The appellant’s counsel submits that the appellant has to be presumed to be innocent until proven guilty beyond all reasonable doubt. In this case, as the evidence adduced did not prove the guilt of the appellant beyond all reasonable doubt, the impugned Judgment and Order should be set aside. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Jarnail Singh Vs. State of Haryana reported in AIR (2013) SC 3467 (para 93), Babu Vs. State of Kerala reported in (2010) 9 SCC 189 and in the case of State of Punjab Vs. Gurmit Singh & Others reported in (1996) 2 SCC 384 . 10. Mrs. Linda L. Fambawl, learned Public Prosecutor submits that on 26.09.2020, the appellant had come to the house of the victim where he had consumed some liquor. Thereafter, as the victim wanted to pay a visit to her grandmother who was at New Champhai Cemetery, her mother asked the appellant to drop the victim to her grandmother. The appellant then took the victim, but instead of dropping her at her grandmother’s house, the appellant took the victim to a small hut beside Vengthar Playground, wherein the appellant removed her clothes and inserted his private parts into the victim’s private parts. Due to the pain, the victim started crying, which was heard by PW-6 and PW-7. PW-6 and PW-7 then went into the hut where they found the victim and the appellant. The victim was sitting in the corner on the floor with her pants removed till her lower legs. The appellant thereafter pulled up the victim’s pants and cleaned the dirt from the victim’s buttock. PW-6 and PW-7 thereafter were informed by the victim that the appellant had put his private parts into her private parts and it was very painful. However, the appellant said, ”Nothing happened, Nothing happened”. 11. The learned Public Prosecutor submits that PW-8 had witnessed blood coming out from the private parts of the victim. Further, PW-9 and PW-10, who had also heard the victim crying and who later met the victim, were informed by the victim that the appellant had raped her. Pw-9 and PW-10 had also stated in their evidence that the appellant had asked for forgiveness and had said that, may be the problem could be solved by giving money. 12. Further, PW-9 and PW-10, who had also heard the victim crying and who later met the victim, were informed by the victim that the appellant had raped her. Pw-9 and PW-10 had also stated in their evidence that the appellant had asked for forgiveness and had said that, may be the problem could be solved by giving money. 12. The learned Public Prosecutor further submits that the Defence Witness-I (DW-1) had also stated in his evidence that the appellant’s wife and himself had gone to the victim’s house asking for forgiveness due to the illegal act of the appellant. Further, the parents of the victim had also written a letter of forgiveness, which DW-1 had also signed. The learned Public Prosecutor further submits that the evidence of DW-4 in her cross examination, is to the effect that when someone from the Young Mizo Association (YMA) told her that there was havoc created because of the rape, DW-4 told the person from the YMA to give Rupees One Lakh (Rs. 1 Lakh) to the victim’s family. 13. The learned Public Prosecutor further submits that in the examination of the appellant under Section 313 Cr.PC, the appellant has not denied his presence in the jhum hut with the victim when PW-6 and PW-7 had entered the jhum hut. The appellant also did not deny the fact that there was no enmity between the victim’s family and himself. When asked as to why he did not take the victim straight to her grandmother, the appellant had stated that as he was already intoxicated, he could not recall why he did not take the victim to her grandmother, but instead to the jhum hut. 14. The learned Public Prosecutor submits that the above facts clearly go to show that the appellant was the perpetrator of the crime, of having committed penetrative sexual assault, on the victim. She also submits that just because the victim’s hymen remained intact, the same does not mean that there was no penetrative sexual assault. He submits that even if there is no medical confirmation of a crime of rape, the same cannot lead to an inference that the appellant had not committed forcible sexual intercourse. In this respect, she has relied upon the Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of B.C. Deva Alias Dyava Vs. He submits that even if there is no medical confirmation of a crime of rape, the same cannot lead to an inference that the appellant had not committed forcible sexual intercourse. In this respect, she has relied upon the Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of B.C. Deva Alias Dyava Vs. State of Karnataka reported in ( 2007) 12 SCC 122 (para18) The learned Public Prosecutor submits that the facts of the case however clearly shows that the medical report and evidence of the witnesses proved that rape had been committed upon the victim. 15. Ms. Lalngaihsaki Fanai, the learned Amicus Curiae submits that the evidence of the prosecution witnesses proves the fact that the appellant had committed aggravated penetrative sexual assault upon the victim. She also submits that the same is corroborated by the explanation given by the appellant in his examination under Section 313 Cr.PC. Further, the medical examination report of the victim states that there was dirt and stain on the genital area of the victim, though active bleeding was not seen at the time of medical examination, as the victim had already been washed at home. However, there was redness and laceration seen on the victim’s private parts. She also submits that the victim’s statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.PC was consistent with the testimony of the victim. As such, there was no infirmity with the learned Trial Court convicting the appellant. 16. The learned Public Prosecutor and the learned Amicus Curiae also submit that discrepancies in the statement of a child witness can be disregarded; if the same does not touch upon the core issue of the case. In this regard, they have relied upon the Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra Vs. Bharat Fakira Dhiwar reported in (2002) 1 SCC 622 . They also submit that when foundational facts are proved by the prosecution, the reverse burden of proof requires the appellant/accused to prove that he was not the perpetrator of the crime. In this regard, she has relied upon the Judgment of this Court in Bhupen Kalita Vs. State of Assam reported in ( 2020) SSC GAU Online 2230. They also submit that the evidence of the prosecutrix alone was sufficient for conviction in a rape case and the absence of injury on the prosecutrix is not sufficient to discredit her evidence. In this regard, she has relied upon the Judgment of this Court in Bhupen Kalita Vs. State of Assam reported in ( 2020) SSC GAU Online 2230. They also submit that the evidence of the prosecutrix alone was sufficient for conviction in a rape case and the absence of injury on the prosecutrix is not sufficient to discredit her evidence. In this respect, they have relied upon the Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of UP Vs. Chhotey Lall reported in (2011) 2 SCC 550 . They also submit that the statement of an accused can be used to test the accuracy of the exculpatory nature of admission, as held by the Supreme Court in the case of Balaji Gunthu Dhule Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (2012) 11 SCC 685. They also submit that just because the hymen was intact, the same does not prove that rape was not committed. 17. We have heard the learned counsels for the parties. 18. As stated earlier, the learned Trial Court examined 11 Prosecution Witnesses and 4 Defence Witnesses. PW-1, who is a resident of Vengthar locality in Champhai, is to the effect that he was informed over phone that the victim had been raped. Thereafter, they went to the place of occurrence wherein he saw the appellant. The victim had by then gone to sleep. Upon inquiring from the victim, he was informed that the victim had been raped by the appellant and as such an FIR was filed by him. 19. The evidence of PW-2, who is the victim, shows that the learned Trial Court had asked preliminary questions to the victim, which were not related to the allegation of rape, prior to asking questions on the incident itself. The learned Trial Court also found that the answers given by the victim to the preliminary questions were rational. The learned Trial Court thus held that though the appellant was 7 years old at the time of giving her testimony, the victim was in a fit state of mind to give her statement. The evidence of PW-2 (victim) is to the effect that she used to call the appellant as “APU”. APU can mean grandfather, Sir or Uncle in the Mizo language. The evidence of PW-2 (victim) is to the effect that she used to call the appellant as “APU”. APU can mean grandfather, Sir or Uncle in the Mizo language. PW-2 stated that she had told her mother that she wanted to go with the appellant and as such, the victim’s mother told the victim to ask the appellant to take her in his vehicle. Thereafter, the appellant took the victim and he raped her near the green grass and later on in the jhum hut. The appellant took off his own and her underwear. He then took out his private parts and he inserted his finger into her private parts. Thereafter, one lady and another person came as they heard her shouting and took her home. The victim also stated in her evidence that the appellant had raped her. In her cross examination, the victim stated that by saying that the appellant raped her, she meant that he did not insert his private parts inside her private part. However, two lines later, the victim in her cross examination clarified that the appellant had raped her on the grass and also in the jhum hut. PW-2 also said that she sometimes told lies, but she did not lie regarding the incident of rape. 20. The evidence of 5PW-3 and PW-4 is that they were seizure witnesses to the seizing of the Birth Certificate of the victim by the Police. 21. The evidence of PW-6 is to the effect that she could hear a child crying, saying it is very painful, while she along with three of her friends, were going towards her home. PW-6 stated that due to the sound of a girl crying coming from a jhum hut, PW-6 and PW-7 went towards the said jhum hut and called out the victim’s name, as they could identify the voice of the victim. When they entered the jhum hut, they saw the victim sitting in a corner on the floor with her pants removed till her lower legs. The appellant who was also inside the jhum hut pulled up the victim’s pants, while cleaning the dirt from the victim’s buttock with his hands. The victim then told PW-6 that the appellant had inserted his private parts into her private parts and it was very painful. Then, the appellant said, ”Nothing has happened, Nothing has happened”. The appellant who was also inside the jhum hut pulled up the victim’s pants, while cleaning the dirt from the victim’s buttock with his hands. The victim then told PW-6 that the appellant had inserted his private parts into her private parts and it was very painful. Then, the appellant said, ”Nothing has happened, Nothing has happened”. PW-6 then stated that she took the victim to her house and her son and wife looked at the private parts of the victim, from where some blood was coming out. They wiped the blood clean thereafter. The incident was informed by the son and wife of the PW-6 to the Vengthar Branch YMA, which resulted in PW-1 submitting an FIR at the Champhai Police Station. In her cross examination, PW-6 stated that she did not see the act of the appellant raping the victim and she did not witness the blood coming out from the private parts of the victim. 22. The evidence of PW-7 is to the effect that when she was returning home with her grandmother (PW-6) from New Champhai Thlanmual, they could hear a girl crying saying it’s very painful. They assumed it was the victim’s voice as they were familiar with her voice. While going towards the jhum hut, PW-6 called out the victim’s name and on entering the jhum hut, she saw the victim sitting on the corner of the floor, with her pants down till her lower legs. An old man was also there who pulled up the victim’s pants and started cleaning her buttock with his hands. The victim stated that the old man had put his private parts into her private parts and it was very painful. The old man then told them that nothing had happened. Thereafter, PW-6 and PW-7 took the victim to her grandmother’s house. PW-7 stated that she ran in front, to tell the victim’s mother that the old man had raped the victim. 23. The evidence of PW-8 is to the effect that when he was in the house of one Khampianthanga @ Pathanga on 26.09.2020 between 4:00 pm to 5:00 pm, the victim and her grandmother came inside the house with the victim crying in pain. PW-8, Pathanga and his wife saw blood coming out of the private parts of the victim. The victim’s mother started wiping the blood clean. PW-8, Pathanga and his wife saw blood coming out of the private parts of the victim. The victim’s mother started wiping the blood clean. As PW-8 saw that the victim had been raped, he called PW-1. After a while, the appellant came inside the house and sat near him. While asking for forgiveness from Pathanga and his wife, the appellant also offered to give Rupees One Lakh (Rs. 1 Lakh). During this time, the YMA leaders had arrived and they took the victim to the Champhai Police Station. PW-8 also went along with them. In his cross examination, PW-8 stated that he believed that the blood coming out of the victim’s private parts was because of the rape and not due to any accident. 24. The evidence of PW-9 is that on 26.09.2020 at around 4:00 pm to 5:00 pm, while he was outside his house with his wife, they could hear a child crying and saying at the same time, “mother, grandmother, it is very painful”. They heard the girl crying for almost 10 minutes, where upon the wife of PW-9 told PW-9 that it was an unusually long time for a girl to cry. They also felt that the crying voice belonged to the victim as they were familiar with her voice. The crying came from the jhum hut of one Pu Vanbawia which was adjacent to their house. However, since it was about to get dark and there was a big tree in front of the jhum hut, they could not see what was happening inside the jhum hut. Though, PW-9 did not feel comfortable hearing the cry of a girl, he assumed that her grandmother had beaten her, as she was a naughty child. Thus, PW-9 and his wife did not go and see why the girl was crying. After the crying had stopped, PW-7 came to the house of PW-9 and told him that PW-6 had asked him to come to their house, as the victim had been raped. There upon PW-9 and his wife hurriedly went towards the house of PW-6, where they saw the victim sleeping on top of a trunk. The victim’s mother then told them that blood came out from the private parts of the victim and they had wiped it off. There upon PW-9 and his wife hurriedly went towards the house of PW-6, where they saw the victim sleeping on top of a trunk. The victim’s mother then told them that blood came out from the private parts of the victim and they had wiped it off. When PW-9 asked the victim what happened, the victim said that the appellant had taken her inside the jhum hut and taken out his big penis, which he had put into her private parts. The victim also told PW-9 that she was still feeling the pain. After a short while, the appellant came inside the house and PW-9 asked the victim, whether the appellant was the one who had raped her. The victim then answered in the positive. The appellant then tried to leave the house, saying that he had not done any harm to the victim. However, PW-9 told him to remain in the house. PW-9 thereafter called PW-1 and as the Vengthar Branch YMA office bearers arrived, he told them what had happened. PW-9 in his evidence also stated that when the YMA Office bearers arrived, the appellant asked for forgiveness and said that nothing had happened and that the problem may/could be solved by giving some money. PW-6 and other family members did not agree to the proposal, as they wanted action to be taken as per law. Thereafter, PW-1 took PW-6 and the victim to the Champhai Police Station to file a report. In his cross examination, PW-9 stated that he did not see the act of rape. However, though he did not have proof that the child crying was the victim, it was his assumption that it was the victim’s voice, as it sounded like the victim’s voice. 25. The evidence of PW-10, who is the wife of PW-9, is similar to the evidence adduced by PW-9. 26. The evidence of PW-11, who is the Doctor who examined the victim, is to the effect that the mental and physical health of the victim was normal. There was no seminal stain on her clothes, as her clothes had already been changed. During genital examination of the victim, it was found that pubic hair was absent and there was dirt and stain near her private parts. There was no seminal stain on her clothes, as her clothes had already been changed. During genital examination of the victim, it was found that pubic hair was absent and there was dirt and stain near her private parts. There was no bleeding at the time of examination and as it had been stated by the others that the same had been wiped clean and washed at home.There was redness in the vagina, besides there being discharge. The redness in the vagina was still fresh and the main reason was believed to be because of the attempt to rape or sexual assault. There was also a small laceration in the vagina. However, the hymen was still intact. In the opinion of the doctor, there was an attempt to rape. PW-11 also said that he did not think that the appellant had inserted his finger into the private parts of the victim. It was also the opinion of PW-11 that the victim had been sexually assaulted, though there was no sperm detected at the time of examination. 27 . The evidence of PW-12, who is the case I.O. is to the effect that he had done the investigation and had found a prima facie case under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012, against the appellant. 28 . The evidence of PW-6 and PW-7 clearly shows that the appellant was present in the jhum hut along with the half-naked victim whose pants had been pulled down to her lower legs. Further, the old man also started cleaning the victim’s buttock, while the victim stated that the appellant had put his private parts into her private parts. 29. The statement of the victim recorded under Section 164 Cr.PC on 28.09.2020 is to the effect that the appellant had come into their house on Saturday afternoon and said, “let’s buy something”. He gave the victim Rs.20 and carried her out. He took her to the jhum hut near the field and laid her on the floor. He thereafter, took down her underwear and also took down his own underwear. The victim even saw the appellant’s private parts. The appellant then said, “Let us pretend to have sexual intercourse”. Then, the appellant put his private parts into her private parts, which gave her a lot of pain. She cried out, “It is very painful, it is very painful”. The victim even saw the appellant’s private parts. The appellant then said, “Let us pretend to have sexual intercourse”. Then, the appellant put his private parts into her private parts, which gave her a lot of pain. She cried out, “It is very painful, it is very painful”. The victim started crying due to which the appellant covered the victim’s mouth and was squeezing her neck. After she was raped, the old lady arrived. The old lady helped her to wear her underwear and carried her home. 30. The statements of PW-6 and PW-7 recorded under Section 164 Cr.PC on 06.10.2020 and 05.10.2020 respectively, are also similar to their testimony given before the learned Trial Court. 31. The statements of PW-9 and PW-10 recorded under Section 164 Cr.PC on 14.10.2020, are also similar to the testimony given by them before the learned Trial Court. 32 . In the case of Ganesan Vs. State reported in ( 2020) 10 SCC 573, the Supreme Court referred to various of its other decisions, where it has been held that there is no rule of law that the testimony of a prosecutrix cannot be acted upon without corroboration in material particulars. She stands at a higher pedestal than an injured witness. It has also been stated that in cases involving sexual harassment, molestation, etc., the Court is duty-bound to deal with such cases with utmost sensitivity. Minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of a prosecutrix should not be a ground for throwing out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. Evidence of the victim of sexual assault is enough for conviction and it does not require corroboration, unless there are compelling reasons for seeking corroboration. It was also held that to test the quality of a sterling witness, what would be relevant would be the consistency of the statement right from the starting point till the end, besides the truthfulness of the statement made by such a witness. The witness should be in a position to withstand cross examination of any length and howsoever strenuous it may be and under no circumstance should give room for any doubt as to the factum of the occurrence. It held that the version of the sterling witness should remain intact in relation to the core spectrum of the crime. 33 . The witness should be in a position to withstand cross examination of any length and howsoever strenuous it may be and under no circumstance should give room for any doubt as to the factum of the occurrence. It held that the version of the sterling witness should remain intact in relation to the core spectrum of the crime. 33 . In the case of Bharat Farika Dhiwar (Supra), the Supreme Court referred to another of its Judgment i.e., Suryanaryana Vs. State of Karnataka reported in (2001) 9 SCC 129 , where it was held that the evidence of a child witness cannot be discarded only on the ground of her being of tender age. It held that the evidence of a child witness would require the Court to scrutinize the evidence with care and caution and that corroboration of the testimony of a child witness was not a rule, but a measure of caution and prudence. It also held that some discrepancies in the statement of a child witness cannot be made the basis for discarding her/his testimony. It held that discrepancies in the deposition, if not in material particulars, would lend credence to the testimony of a child witness. It held that while appreciating the evidence of a child witness, the Courts are required to rule out the possibility of the child being tutored. 34 . In the case of State of Himachal Pradesh Vs Sanjay Kumar @ Sunny reported in (2017) 2 SCC 51 , the Supreme Court has held that minor discrepancies are not to be given undue emphasis and the evidence is to be considered from the point of view of trustworthiness. Further, conviction can be based on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, provided the same is trustworthy and inspires the confidence of the Court. 35. The examination of the appellant under Section 313 Cr.PC clearly shows that the appellant has not denied that he was present in the jhum hut along with the victim when PW-6 and PW-7 had entered the jhum hut. There is also no denial by the appellant in his examination under Section 313 Cr.PC, that when PW-6 and PW-7 had entered the jhum hut , the pants of the victim was half down. There is also no denial by the appellant in his examination under Section 313 Cr.PC, that when PW-6 and PW-7 had entered the jhum hut , the pants of the victim was half down. It is also not denied by the appellant that there was no enmity between the appellant and the victim’s family, as the appellant’s answer to question No. 7, in the appellant’s examination under Section 313 Cr.PC reveals the same. The appellant had also stated that as he was intoxicated, he could not recall the reason why he had taken the victim to the jhum hut, instead of taking her to her grandmother. The question and answer relating to question No. 10 in the appellant’s examination under Section 313 Cr.PC is reproduced herein below as follows: “Q (10) You were asked by the mother of the victim to drop the victim to her grandmother at a place near New Champhai Cemetary where she was selling liquor but instead you took her to the Jhum hut. Why did not you take her straight to her grandmother? Ans:- Since I was already intoxicated I cannot recall why I did not take the victim to her grandmother but instead to the jhum hut.” 36. In the case of B.C. Deva (supra) , the Supreme Court has held that absence of marks of injury either on the accused or on the person of the prosecutrix, does not lead to any inference that the accused has not committed forcible sexual intercourse on the prosecutrix. It further held that though the report of the Gynaecologist pertaining to the medical examination of the prosecutrix does not disclose any evidence of sexual intercourse, yet even in the absence of any corroboration of medical evidence, the oral testimony of the prosecutrix, which is found to be cogent, reliable, convincing and trustworthy, has to be accepted. 37. In the case of Bhupen Kalita (supra) , the Division Bench of this Court has held that once the foundational facts are proved by the prosecution, the reverse burden of proof requires the accused to prove that he was not the perpetrator of the crime. However, in the present case, the appellant has not been able to prove that he was not the perpetrator of the crime, even though the foundational facts and the circumstantial evidence have clearly proved the fact that the accused was the perpetrator of the crime. However, in the present case, the appellant has not been able to prove that he was not the perpetrator of the crime, even though the foundational facts and the circumstantial evidence have clearly proved the fact that the accused was the perpetrator of the crime. 38. In the case of State of UP vs. Chhotey Lall (supra) , the Supreme Court has held that if the statement of the prosecutrix is found to be worthy of credence and reliable, requiring no corroboration, the Court may convict the accused on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix. 39. In the case of Balaji Cunthu Dhule (supra) , the Supreme Court referred to another of it’s judgment in Manu Sao vs. State of Bihar, reported in (2010) 12 SCC 310, where it was held that the statement of the accused can be used to test the veracity of the exculpatory nature of admission, if any, made by the accused. It can be taken into consideration in any inquiry or trial but still it is not strictly evidence in the case. It further held that the Court may rely on a portion of the statement of the accused and find him guilty in consideration of the other evidence against him led by the prosecution. However, such statements made under Section 313 Cr.P.C should not be considered in isolation, but in conjunction with the evidence adduced by the prosecution. 40. In the case of State of Mizoram vs. Lalramliana , reported in 2024 SCC OnLine GAU 403 , this Court had held that Courts have to be mindful that children sometimes do not disclose incidents of sexual abuse at one go, which could be in piecemeal. 41. On considering all the above, it is quite clear that the appellant had committed aggravated penetrative sexual assault on the victim, keeping in view the testimony of the victim, the evidence of PW-6 to 10 and the fact that blood had come out from the victim’s private parts, not to speak of the redness and laceration on the victim’s genitalia. The statement of the prosecutrix in our view is not only trustworthy, but also inspires the confidence of the Court. There are small discrepancies, which need not be given undue importance, as the same does not touch upon the core issue of the case. The statement of the prosecutrix in our view is not only trustworthy, but also inspires the confidence of the Court. There are small discrepancies, which need not be given undue importance, as the same does not touch upon the core issue of the case. Section 3 of the POCSO Act, 2012 defines penetrative sexual assault to include not only the penetration of a penis, but also the penetration of a finger, into the vagina or anus of a child, to any extent. As the said act of penetration into the vagina had apparently been done by not only the penis of the appellant, but also by his finger, the appellant has committed penetrative sexual assault. As the child was 5 years old at the relevant point of time, Section 5(m) of the POCSO Act is attracted. The witnesses have seen both the victim and appellant together in the jhum hut, with the victim being half-naked, inasmuch as, the pants of the victim were half down. The victim was crying and had told many people that she was raped. Blood was seen coming out from her private parts by some of the witnesses. There was redness and laceration in her vagina. Just because her hymen was intact does not mean that she was not subjected to penetrative sexual assault. This is clear from the Judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Manga Singh, reported in (2019) 16 SCC 759 where it has been held that merely because the hymen was not ruptured, it cannot be said that there was no penetration. 42. The evidence of the PW-8, PW-9 and PW-10 which is to the effect that the appellant had asked for forgiveness and had sought to settle/compromise the issue by giving money, also points towards the guilt of the appellant, inasmuch as, there was no reason for asking for forgiveness by the appellant, if he was innocent of any wrongdoing vis-a-vis the victim. 43. Considering all the above facts, we are of the considered view that there is no infirmity with the decision of the learned Trial Court, in coming to a finding that the appellant was guilty of having committed the offence of aggravated penetrative sexual assault, which is punishable under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012. The appeal accordingly stands dismissed. 44. Send back the LCR. 45. The appeal accordingly stands dismissed. 44. Send back the LCR. 45. In appreciation of the assistance provided by the learned Amicus Curiae, her fee is to be provided by the State Legal Services Authority.