JUDGMENT : N. TUKARAMJI, J. 1. We have heard Mr.V.Ravinder Rao, learned Senior Counsel, argued on behalf of Mr.Arvind Geedipelly, learned counsel for the appellants/defendant Nos.2 and 3; Mr.A.Venkatesh, learned Senior Counsel, argued on behalf of Mr.Aruva Raghuram Mahadev, learned counsel for the respondent No.1/plaintiff and Mr.K.Durga Prasad, learned counsel for the respondent No.2/defendant No.1. 2. Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 221 of 2024 has been filed by appellants/defendants Nos.2 and 3, challenging the order dated 19.03.2024 in I.A. No. 125 of 2023. Similarly, Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No.230 of 2024 has been preferred by the same appellants, contesting the order dated 19.03.2024 in I.A. No.126 of 2023. 3. As both appeals arise from orders passed in related interlocutory applications within O.S. No.150 of 2023, before the IV Additional District Judge, Ranga Reddy District at L.B. Nagar, and since the reliefs sought are similar, they are being heard and adjudicated together in this common judgment. 4. These appeals are brought by appellants/respondents Nos. 2 and 3/defendants Nos.2 and 3, challenging the decrees and orders dated 19.03.2024 in I.A. Nos.125 and 126 of 2023 in O.S. No.150 of 2023. The learned IV Additional District and Sessions Judge, Ranga Reddy District at L.B. Nagar, had allowed the applications of respondent No.1/petitioner/plaintiff, granting a temporary injunction restraining respondent No.3/defendant No.3 from altering and alienating the petition schedule property. Brief Facts: 5. The respondent No.1/plaintiff filed the suit seeking a declaration as the absolute owner and possessor of the schedule property i.e., Ac.1.09 guntas in Sy.No.299, Puppalaguda, Rajendranagar Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, and to declare the sale deeds dated 29.12.2022 (executed by the respondent No.2/defendant No.1 in favour of appellant No.1/defendant No.2) and 16.01.2023 (executed by appellant No.1/defendant No.2 in favour of appellant No.2/defendant No.3) as null and void and not binding on the petitioner. The petitioner also seeks recovery of possession. 6. For facility of reference, hereinafter the respondent No.1/petitioner/plaintiff is arrayed as ‘the petitioner’ and the appellant Nos.1 and 2/respondent Nos.2 and 3/defendant Nos.2 and 3 as ‘the respondent Nos.2 and 3’ respectively, in accordance with the I.A.Nos.125 and 126 of 2023. 7. The petitioner claims title to the schedule property through a registered sale deed dated 07.07.2012 and an exchange deed dated 30.03.2013, executed by the vendors Nagula Sattemma and others. 7. The petitioner claims title to the schedule property through a registered sale deed dated 07.07.2012 and an exchange deed dated 30.03.2013, executed by the vendors Nagula Sattemma and others. Originally, the land in Sy.No.299 (Ac.13.01 gts.) was classified as evacuee property, with Nagula Sathaiah, Nagula Srinivas and Nagula Swamy as tenants over Ac.10.01 gts. Upon application, the Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District, allotted this land to them on 16.12.1994, by issuing a sale certificate, whereby conferred title. Subsequently, Nagula Sathaiah and Nagula Swamy executed a registered General Power of Attorney in favour of M.Subba Rao in 1994. Acting on their behalf, the attorney executed a registered sale deed in favour of respondent No.1 for Ac.7.20 gts. on 08.02.1995. Additionally, the remaining Ac.2.20 gts. was sold to Smt. Sandeepa on 03.07.1997. Due to an error in the northern boundary description in respondent No.1’s sale deed, a registered rectification deed was executed on 23.05.2007. After the demise of Nagula Sathaiah and Nagula Swamy, their legal heirs, along with Nagula Srinivas, filed O.S. No. 60 of 2000 before the IV Additional Senior Civil Judge, Ranga Reddy District, seeking cancellation of the sale deed dated 08.02.1995, alleging it was executed without their consent. During the proceedings, the parties reached a compromise: respondent No.1 relinquished his title over Ac.3.19 gts. (including Ac.1.00 gts. acquired by HUDA) and agreed to execute a relinquishment deed in favour of the plaintiffs. In return, the plaintiffs relinquished their rights over Ac.4.03 gts. (including Ac.1.00 gts. acquired by HUDA) in favour of respondent No.1. This compromise was recorded in a Lok Adalat Award on 16.12.2008. Pursuant to execution proceedings, the plaintiffs executed the agreed relinquishment deeds on 09.05.2011, making respondent No.1 the title holder of Ac.3.03 gts. in Sy. No.299. Respondent No.1 subsequently sold Ac.0.18 gts. to B.Madhusudhan Reddy, and on 09.05.2011, sold Ac.2.19 gts. to Nagula Sattamma and others. Nagula Sattamma and others then executed a registered sale deed dated 07.07.2012 in favour of the petitioner for Ac.1.00 gts., and conveyed Ac.1.02 gts. to third parties, retaining Ac.0.17 gts., of which Ac.0.13.5 gts. was acquired for the Outer Ring Road. M.Renuka and two others executed a registered ratification deed on 09.08.2012. Additionally, B.Madhusudhan Reddy conveyed Ac.0.09 gts. to the petitioner vide a registered sale deed dated 30.03.2013. After further Government acquisition, B.Madhusudhan Reddy retained Ac.0.08 gts. in Sy.No.299. to third parties, retaining Ac.0.17 gts., of which Ac.0.13.5 gts. was acquired for the Outer Ring Road. M.Renuka and two others executed a registered ratification deed on 09.08.2012. Additionally, B.Madhusudhan Reddy conveyed Ac.0.09 gts. to the petitioner vide a registered sale deed dated 30.03.2013. After further Government acquisition, B.Madhusudhan Reddy retained Ac.0.08 gts. in Sy.No.299. At the petitioner’s request, Mr.Madhusudhan Reddy executed a registered exchange deed dated 30.03.2013 for Ac.0.08 gts., making the petitioner the owner and possessor of Ac.1.09 gts. Conversely, after these transactions and acquisitions, respondent No.1 was left with less than Ac.2.15 gts. The petitioner constructed a compound wall and a watchman’s room on the property, maintaining peaceful possession. However, on 06.01.2023 and 10.01.2023, agents of respondent No.2 allegedly demolished the watchman’s room and attempted to take possession. When the petitioner approached the Police, they declined to act, citing the civil nature of the dispute. Meanwhile, the respondent No.2 filed W.P. No. 920 of 2023, alleging Police interference, and the petitioner filed W.P. No. 961 of 2023, challenging the respondents’ actions. Despite knowing he did not possess Ac.3.03 gts., respondent No.1 allegedly executed a fraudulent sale deed on 29.12.2022 in favour of respondent No.2, followed by another sale deed from respondent No.2 to respondent No.3 on 16.01.2023. On 19.01.2023, respondents allegedly encroached upon and dispossessed the petitioner, prompting the present suit to challenge these actions and protect the petitioner’s rights. Arguments: 8. Counsel for appellants/respondents Nos.2 and 3 contends that the schedule-B property belongs to them, and the petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case. They argue that the petitioner’s own pleadings and the Lok Adalat settlement show the disputed property is different from what the petitioner claims, and that after acquisition, respondent No.1 retained only Ac.2.15 gts. The appellants further assert that the petitioner has not clearly identified the exact location of Ac.1.09 gts. claimed. They also pointed to revenue records and the issuance of a pattadar passbook in favour of respondent No.2, and question the trial Court’s reliance on the Lok Adalat Award and other documents. The appellants claim that preventing them from developing the property would cause irreparable loss. 9. Conversely, counsel for the petitioner argues that the trial Court properly considered the pleadings and evidence, and that the impugned orders were necessary to preserve the status quo and prevent multiplicity of litigation. The appellants claim that preventing them from developing the property would cause irreparable loss. 9. Conversely, counsel for the petitioner argues that the trial Court properly considered the pleadings and evidence, and that the impugned orders were necessary to preserve the status quo and prevent multiplicity of litigation. The petitioner maintains that the property’s location is clear and that the efforts of respondent Nos.1 and 2 to complicate the matter are unfounded. Therefore, the appeals lack merit. In support, the petitioner cited following judicial authorities: (i) Mahawarlal Khewaji Trust, Faridkot v. Baldev Dass , Manu/SC/0912/2004 (ii) Wander Limited & Another v. Antox India Private Limited, 1990 (Supp) SCC 727 (iii) Behari Kunj Sahkari Avas Samiti v. State of U.P. (2008) 12 SCC 306 (iv) Tirumala Venkata Reddaiah Chowdary and another v. Potla Krishna Prasad , Manu/AP/0852/2008 (v) Gurbax Singh v. Kartar Singh , Manu/SC/0144/2004 (vi) K. Ravi Prasad Reddy v. G. Giridhar , Manu/AP/0075/2022 (vii) Corporation of the City of Bangalore v. M. Papaiah & others, AIR 1989 SC 1809 (viii) Dalip Singh Sachar v. Prabodh Chander Puri , Manu/DE/8037/2007 (ix) Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar v. Mahomed Haji Latif and others , Manu/SC/0168/1969 : AIR 1968 SC 1413 (x) Mohan Overseas Private Limited v. Goyal Tin and General Industries , Manu/DE/3071/2009 Point for determination: 10. Whether the impugned orders of interim injunctions are sustainable under the facts and law? 11. The petitioner asserts ownership and possession of the schedule property based on a series of sale and exchange deeds. Conversely, respondent Nos.2 and 3 (the appellants) claim title to the same property through subsequent sale deeds and supporting revenue records. A central issue in this dispute is the validity of the sale deeds dated 29.12.2022 (executed by respondent No.1 in favour of respondent No.2) and 16.01.2023 (executed by respondent No.2 in favour of respondent No.3). Whether these sale deeds are genuine and binding, or fraudulent and unenforceable against the petitioner, will be pivotal in determining the outcome of the suit. 12. Significantly, both the petitioner and respondent No.3 assert possession over the schedule property. Therefore, it is crucial to ascertain whether the petitioner was in peaceful possession and subsequently dispossessed by the appellants, or whether the appellants were lawfully in possession. This factual determination is a key issue for adjudication. 13. 12. Significantly, both the petitioner and respondent No.3 assert possession over the schedule property. Therefore, it is crucial to ascertain whether the petitioner was in peaceful possession and subsequently dispossessed by the appellants, or whether the appellants were lawfully in possession. This factual determination is a key issue for adjudication. 13. Another important consideration is whether the properties claimed by the petitioner and the respondents are clearly identified and whether they are, in fact, distinct parcels of land. Thus, the identification and precise localization of the property will have a material bearing on the case. 14. Additionally, the effect of prior legal proceedings-including the compromise recorded in O.S. No. 60 of 2000 and the Lok Adalat award-on the present rights and titles of the parties, as well as any alleged discrepancies in the boundaries and extent of the property, require careful scrutiny. 15. These complex factual and legal issues can only be thoroughly examined and resolved through a detailed trial. Accordingly, there exists a prima facie case warranting further adjudication. 16. During the pendency of a suit, it is a well-established principle that the status quo regarding the suit property should ordinarily be maintained, unless the defendant demonstrates exceptional circumstances warranting permission to raise construction or alienate the property. 17. Considering a similar situation, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Maharwal Khewaji Trust (Regd.) Faridkot v. Baldev Dass, (2004) 8 SCC 488 , wherein held that: “10. Be that as it may, Mr. Sachhar is right in contending that unless and until a case of irreparable loss or damage is made out by a party to the suit, the court should not permit the nature of the property being changed which also includes alienation or transfer of the property which may lead to loss or damage being caused to the party who may ultimately succeed and may further lead to multiplicity of proceedings. In the instant case no such case of irreparable loss is made out except contending that the legal proceedings are likely to take a long time, therefore, the respondent should be permitted to put the scheduled property to better use. In the instant case no such case of irreparable loss is made out except contending that the legal proceedings are likely to take a long time, therefore, the respondent should be permitted to put the scheduled property to better use. We do not think in the facts and circumstances of this case, the lower appellate court and the High Court were justified in permitting the respondent to change the nature of property by putting up construction as also by permitting the alienation of the property, whatever may be the conditions on which the same is done. In the event of the appellant's claim being found baseless ultimately, it is always open to the respondent to claim damages or, in an appropriate case, the court may itself award damages for the loss suffered, if any, in this regard. Since the facts of this case do not make out any extraordinary ground for permitting the respondent to put up construction and alienate the same, we think both the courts below, namely, the lower appellate court and the High Court erred in making the impugned orders. The said orders are set aside and the order of the trial court is restored.” 18. In the light of above observation, when the facts and circumstances of the present case are considered, pending adjudication of aforementioned factual issues, we are of the considered view that the petitioner would suffer irreparable harm, if injunction is not granted, and does the balance of convenience favour maintaining status quo. In this view, if the property was to be alienated, it would likely result in a multiplicity of legal proceedings. The trial Court recognized this risk when it granted interim relief. Furthermore, any alteration to the nature of the property during the suit could similarly give rise to additional litigation. Given these considerations, the trial Court’s decision to grant a temporary injunction-restraining the defendants from alienating or altering the property was both justified and appropriate. 19. Upon review, and in light of the aforementioned principles, this Court finds that the trial Court’s exercise of discretion in granting the temporary injunction in favour of the petitioner/plaintiff is neither illegal nor perverse. The order is found to be just, proper, and does not warrant any interference. 20. For the afore-stated reasons and in the absence of merit, the appeals i.e., C.M.A. Nos. The order is found to be just, proper, and does not warrant any interference. 20. For the afore-stated reasons and in the absence of merit, the appeals i.e., C.M.A. Nos. 221 and 230 of 2024 are liable to be and are accordingly dismissed. No costs. As a sequel, pending miscellaneous applications, if any, stands closed.