JUDGMENT : (Michael Zothankhuma, J.) Heard Mr. Lalramdinthara, learned Amicus Curiae for the appellant. Also heard Mrs. Mary L. Khiangte, learned Addl. Public Prosecutor for the State. 2. This appeal had been filed against the impugned Judgment and Order dated 03.10.2023 passed by the Fast Track Court-cum-Addl. District & Sessions Judge, Kolasib District, in connection with Sessions Registration Case No. 24/2020 in Criminal Trial No. 102/2020, by which the appellant has been convicted under Section 302 and Section 436 IPC. The appellant has been sentenced under Section 302 IPC to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 20,000/-, in default, Rigorous Imprisonment for twelve months, vide Sentence Order dated 05.10.2023. The appellant has also been sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for 5 years with a fine of Rs. 10,000/-, in default, Rigorous Imprisonment for 10 months under Section 436 IPC. 3. The prosecution case in brief is that an FIR was lodged by PW-1 on 19.03.2020 stating that on 18.03.2020 at around 9:14 p.m, the Accountant of PW-1, i.e. one Dinbandhu Prasad Singh’s throat was slit and his quarter was set ablaze, which was located near the Petrol Pump named VEES Petrol Filling Station, Bualpui. 4. The FIR dated 19.03.2020 was registered by the Kawnpui Police Station as Kawnpui PS Case No. 6/2020 dated 19.03.2020 under Section 302/436 IPC. 5. During investigation, the appellant who had been arrested, confessed to having committed the crime of killing the deceased and the same was recorded by the Magistrate under Section 164 CrPC. After the investigation was completed, the case I.O. i.e. PW-31, submitted the chargesheet, on finding a prima facie case under Section 302 IPC and Section 436 IPC against the appellant. 6. Charge was framed against the appellant under Section 302 IPC and Section 436 IPC on 11.11.2020, to which the appellant pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 7. During the trial, 22 prosecution witnesses and 1 defence witness were examined by the learned Trial Court. After the evidence of witnesses were recorded, the appellant was examined under Section 313 CrPC, in which he denied having anything to do with the death of the deceased. 8. 7. During the trial, 22 prosecution witnesses and 1 defence witness were examined by the learned Trial Court. After the evidence of witnesses were recorded, the appellant was examined under Section 313 CrPC, in which he denied having anything to do with the death of the deceased. 8. The learned Trial Court on perusing the evidence and after hearing the counsels for the parties, came to a finding that the appellant was guilty of having killed the deceased and setting the body and the house of the deceased on fire. Accordingly, the appellant was convicted and sentenced under Section 302 IPC and Section 436 IPC. 9. The learned Amicus Curiae submits that there being no eye witness to the crime, the entire case of the prosecution is based on circumstantial evidence, which does not form a complete chain. He however submits that in the appeal petition filed by the appellant, the appellant has taken the responsibility of killing the deceased. However, the appellant had caused the death of the deceased due to a grave and sudden provocation on the part of the deceased. He submits that due to the above, the appellant could not have been convicted under Section 302 IPC and he should have instead been convicted under Section 304 Part-II of IPC. He also submits that there was no pre-meditation on the part of the appellant to kill the deceased, as his confessional statement shows that the appellant had gone into the house of the deceased to drink water. However, as the appellant had unknowingly used the cup used by the deceased to drink water, the deceased was angry with the appellant and had told him that Mizo’s were very dirty. Thus, in the heat of argument, the appellant had stabbed the victim’s forehead twice. However, as the deceased started shouting, the appellant had thereafter slit the throat of the deceased. 10. The appellant’s counsel submits that there was no pre-meditation to kill the deceased when he entered the house of the deceased, as such, in the absence of the pre-meditation on the part of the appellant to kill the deceased; Section 302 IPC could not be attracted. In this regard, he has relied upon the Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Dauvaram Nirmalkar Vs. State of Chhattisgarh reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 955. 11. In this regard, he has relied upon the Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Dauvaram Nirmalkar Vs. State of Chhattisgarh reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 955. 11. The appellant’s counsel thus prays that the impugned conviction of the appellant under Section 302 IPC should be set aside and the charge be altered to Section 304 Part-II IPC. 12. Mrs. Mary L. Khiangte, learned Addl. Public Prosecutor, on the other hand, submits that the dao used for giving body blows to the head and slitting the neck of the deceased, was recovered on the basis of the disclosure statement made by the appellant before the Police and in the presence of civilian witnesses. She also submits that the blood stains found on the long sleeve T- shirt of the appellant matched the blood sample taken from the deceased. Further, the confessional statement made by the appellant under Section 164 CrPC corroborated the circumstantial evidence, which proved that the appellant had killed the deceased. 13. The learned Addl. Public Prosecutor further submits that the appellant was seen outside his sister Indra-i’s shop/residence on the night of the killing between 8:00 p.m to 8:20 p.m by PW-6. Indra-i is the sister of the appellant. In his cross examination, PW-6 stated that the place from where he saw the appellant i.e. the residence of Indra-i is about 5 to 10 minutes walk to the Petrol Pump. As such, the appellant had ample time to commit the crime as he was in the vicinity of the place of occurrence. 14. The learned Addl. Public Prosecutor also submits that the confessional statement of the appellant had clearly recorded the fact that the appellant had worked under the deceased for around a year in VEES Filling Station at Bualpui. However, the deceased had allegedly not given the entire salary of the appellant on many occasions, due to which the appellant had quit his job in October, 2019. He submits that the above statement made by the appellant, during recording of his confessional statement, clearly provides the motive for the appellant to kill the deceased. 15. The learned Addl. Public Prosecutor submits that in terms of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sudam Prabhakar Achat Vs. He submits that the above statement made by the appellant, during recording of his confessional statement, clearly provides the motive for the appellant to kill the deceased. 15. The learned Addl. Public Prosecutor submits that in terms of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sudam Prabhakar Achat Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in 2025 SCC Online SC 602, the appellant can be said to have the intention to kill the deceased, inasmuch, as the appellant had stabbed the deceased on the neck and head with the dao and had also slit his throat, which shows that the appellant had acted in a cruel manner, by taking undue advantage. 16. The learned Addl. Public Prosecutor also relied upon the Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Trimukh Maroti Kirkan Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (2006) 10 SCC 681 , where it has been held in paragraph 15 as follows:- “15. Where an offence like murder is committed in secrecy inside a house, the initial burden to establish the case would undoubtedly be upon the prosecution, but the nature and amount of evidence to be led by it to establish the charge cannot be of the same degree as is required in other cases of circumstantial evidence. The burden would be of a comparatively lighter character. In view of Section 106 of the Evidence Act there will be a corresponding burden on the inmates of the house to give a cogent explanation as to how the crime was committed. The inmates of the house cannot get away by simply keeping quiet and offering no explanation on the supposed premise that the burden to establish its case lies entirely upon the prosecution and there is no duty at all on an accused to offer any explanation.” Thus, the murder having been committed within the confines of a house, a burden was cast upon the appellant to give a cogent explanation as to how the crime was committed. However, the explanation given by the appellant does not attract Section 304 Part-II. It only attracts Section 302 IPC. 17. We have heard the learned counsels for the parties. 18. However, the explanation given by the appellant does not attract Section 304 Part-II. It only attracts Section 302 IPC. 17. We have heard the learned counsels for the parties. 18. At the outset, we would like to refer to the appeal petition filed by the appellant through the Superintendent, District Jail, Kolasib which is to the effect that he had gone to look for a fighting cock in the residence of his friend, Vara. As his friend Vara was not at home, he decided to go back. While passing his old work place i.e, VEES Filing Station, he felt thirsty. He accordingly went inside the house of his old supervisor, the deceased. As the door was open, he entered the house to drink some water. As the deceased did not respond to the appellant requests for water, the appellant reached for a cup and drank water from it. 19. In his appeal petition, the appellant further states that the deceased started cursing him in Hindi language and said that the Mizo’s were filthy. The deceased then grabbed the cup from the hand of the appellant and threw it at the back of the appellant’s head. A fight started and the deceased fell down as the appellant punched him. The deceased then tried to cut the appellant with a knife. Though the appellant took the knife from the deceased, the deceased kept on attacking. The appellant states that he did not know when the knife hit the body of the deceased, as they were both fighting. The appellant then put diesel that was in the room and tried to kill himself. The appellant further states that he did not try to stab the deceased with the knife and he did not see the knife that hit the body of the deceased, as he was blind in one eye. 20. In the appeal petition, the appellant further states that though he was responsible for the incident, the killing of the deceased was an accident and was a result of his defensive reaction to the assault by the deceased. 21. The contents of the appeal petition filed by the appellant clearly shows that the appellant was with the deceased at the time the deceased was stabbed. 21. The contents of the appeal petition filed by the appellant clearly shows that the appellant was with the deceased at the time the deceased was stabbed. This gives a lie to the appellant’s explanation given during his examination under Section 313 CrPC, where he has denied having any involvement in the death of the deceased. 22. The above being said, the confession of the appellant under Section 164 CrPC, which has not been retracted at any time by the appellant, is to the effect that he worked in the VEES Filing Station, Bualpui from mid 2018 for about a year. The deceased who was an Accountant had refused to give him his whole salary on numerous occasions. The appellant then resigned on October, 2019. On the night of 18th March, 2020, the appellant went back to check the poultry of his friend, Vara. However, as Vara was not at home, the appellant went to the house of the deceased to drink water. Unfortunately, the appellant drank water from the personal mug of the deceased, due to which the deceased got angry and threw the mug at the appellant saying, “You Mizo’s are a filthy lot”. In his anger, he used the knife that he had with him to chop the left forehead of the deceased twice. As the deceased started shouting, the appellant slit the throat of the deceased with the knife. He then poured kerosene on the wall of the house and also on his own body to burn himself. Though he lit a paper from the flame of a cooking gas, he left the house of the deceased after throwing the flame towards the wall, as he got scared. 23. In the present case, the nature of injuries inflicted upon the deceased are serious, as the Post Mortem Report of the Doctor shows that there were multiple incised wounds in the neck, face and scalp of the deceased. Besides the above, the appellant had burnt the body of the deceased, by burning the deceased person’s residential quarter. The nature of injuries on the deceased, as given in the Post Mortem Report, is reproduced herein below as follows:- 7. Injuries: “(a) Superficial to deep burns present all over the body with back of trunk spared. Besides the above, the appellant had burnt the body of the deceased, by burning the deceased person’s residential quarter. The nature of injuries on the deceased, as given in the Post Mortem Report, is reproduced herein below as follows:- 7. Injuries: “(a) Superficial to deep burns present all over the body with back of trunk spared. (b) Cut-throat injury in the form of deep gaping incised wound is present over front aspect of the neck, cutting through the skin, superficial fascia, platysma, with left jugular vein, left common carotid artery with anterior wall of trachea. Length of wound is 13 cms and maximum width is 4 cms in the centre. Depth of wound is 3 cms near the right angle and 1 cm near the left angle. Charred black blood clot seen at and around the wound. (c) Incised wound of (13x3) cms at the scalp extending from 4 cms behind the right ear towards occiput. (d) Incised wound of (3x1) cms at the right side of forehead lateral to the right eye-brow. (e) Incised wound (5x1) cm at the dorsum of right hand distal to the wrist. (f) All the open wounds are blackened and charred.” 24. The nature of injuries on the deceased shows that the appellant had taken undue advantage and acted in a cruel manner against the deceased. 25. In the case of Sudam Prabhakar Achat (supra), the Supreme Court hld that if there was an intention to kill the deceased, there was no reason as to why the accused therein would not have used the sharp side of the axe instead of the blunt side of the axe. It also held that the nature of injury and the evidence of the Prosecution Witnesses did not show that the appellant had taken undue advantage, or acted in a cruel manner. 26. In the case of Singapagu Anjaiah Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh reported in (2010) 9 SCC 799 , the Supreme Court has held that nobody can enter into the mind of the accused. His intention has to be gathered from the weapon used, the part of the body chosen for assault and the nature of injuries caused. In the above case, the accused therein had chosen a crowbar as the weapon of offence and had chosen a vital part of the body i.e. the head for causing injuries. His intention has to be gathered from the weapon used, the part of the body chosen for assault and the nature of injuries caused. In the above case, the accused therein had chosen a crowbar as the weapon of offence and had chosen a vital part of the body i.e. the head for causing injuries. The Supreme Court in the above case held that the cumulative effect of all those factors, irresistibly led to one and only conclusion that the appellant therein had intended to cause the death of the deceased. 27. In the present case, the reason for the appellant stabbing the deceased with a dao was on the ground that the deceased had rebuked the appellant by saying that you Mizos are filthy and by throwing the mug/cup at the appellant. 28. In the case of Dauvaram Nirmalkar Vs. State of Chhattisgarh reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 955 , the Supreme Court has held that for interpreting Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC, as held in the case of K.M. Nanavati Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in 1961 SCC OnLine SC 69, the following conditions which have to be satisfied for the exception to be invoked are (a) the deceased must have given provocation to the accused; (b) the provocation must be grave; (c) the provocation must be sudden; (d) the offender, by the reason of the said provocation, should have been deprived of his power of self-control; (e) the offender should have killed the deceased during the continuance of the deprivation of power of self-control; and (f) the offender must have caused the death of the person who gave the provocation or the death of any other person by mistake or accident. For determining whether or not the provocation had temporarily deprived the offender from the power of self-control, the test to be applied is that of a reasonable man and not that of an unusually excitable and pugnacious individual. 29. The Supreme Court in the above case of Dauvaram Nirmalkar (supra) further held in paragraph 12 that the retaliation should be proportionate to the provocation. Para 12 states as follows:- “12. The question of loss of self-control by grave and sudden provocation is a question of fact. Act of provocation and loss of self-control, must be actual and reasonable. 29. The Supreme Court in the above case of Dauvaram Nirmalkar (supra) further held in paragraph 12 that the retaliation should be proportionate to the provocation. Para 12 states as follows:- “12. The question of loss of self-control by grave and sudden provocation is a question of fact. Act of provocation and loss of self-control, must be actual and reasonable. The law attaches great importance to two things when defence of provocation is taken under Exception 1 to Section 300 of the IPC. First, whether there was an intervening period for the passion to cool and for the accused to regain dominance and control over his mind. Secondly, the mode of resentment should bear some relationship to the sort of provocation that has been given. The retaliation should be proportionate to the provocation.” 30. In the case of Trimukh Maroti Kirkan Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (2006) 10 SCC 681 , the Supreme Court has held that where an offence like murder is committed in secrecy inside a house, the initial burden to establish the case would undoubtedly be on the prosecution. However, the burden would be comparatively lighter. In view of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, there would be a corresponding burden on the inmates of the house to give a cogent explanation as to how the crime was committed. 31. In the case of Ki Pavunny Vs. Assistant Collector reported in (1997) 3 SCC 721, the Supreme Court has held that it is settled law that confession can be the sole basis for conviction. In the case of Aloke Nath Dutta & Ors Vs. State of West Bengal, reported in 2007 12 SCC 230 , the Supreme Court has held in Para 87 as follows:- “87. Confession ordinarily is admissible in evidence. It is a relevant fact. It can be acted upon. Confession may under certain circumstances and subject to law laid down by the superior judiciary from time to time form the basis for conviction. It is, however, trite that for the said purpose the court has to satisfy itself in regard to: (i) voluntariness of the confession; (ii) truthfulness of the confession; (iii) corroboration.” 32. As can be seen from the evidence of the witnesses, the appellant was arrested on 29.03.2020. Thereafter, the appellant give a disclosure statement on 30.03.2020 before the Police and two (2) witnesses. As can be seen from the evidence of the witnesses, the appellant was arrested on 29.03.2020. Thereafter, the appellant give a disclosure statement on 30.03.2020 before the Police and two (2) witnesses. On the basis of the disclosure statement made by the appellant, the dao which had been used for cutting the deceased was recovered on 30.03.2020 from a jungle, which was about 100 meters away from the place of occurrence. In the case of Manoj Kumar Soni Vs. State of M.P., reported in 2023 11 SCR 246 , the Supreme Court held that a disclosure statement alone, without supporting evidence, is insufficient to secure a conviction, as it cannot establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In the case of Vinobhai Vs. State of Kerala, reported in 2025 SCC Online SC 178 , the Supreme Court held in Para 8 as follows:- “ 8. In this case, there are material omissions which amount to contradiction. Coupled with the material omissions, if we consider the conduct of both the witnesses, their version does not inspire confidence. Once evidence of these two witnesses is disbelieved, the only remaining evidence against the appellant is of the recovery of the knife at his instance. The law relating to the evidentiary value of recovery made under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is settled by this Court in the case of Manoj Kumar Soni v. State of M.P..2 Paragraph 22 of the said decision reads thus:— “ 22. A doubt looms : can disclosure statements per se, unaccompanied by any supporting evidence, be deemed adequate to secure a conviction? We find it implausible. Although disclosure statements hold significance as a contributing factor in unriddling a case, in our opinion, they are not so strong a piece of evidence sufficient on its own and without anything more to bring home the charges beyond reasonable doubt.” (emphasis added) Therefore, in our view, the appellant's guilt was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 33. Although disclosure statements hold significance as a contributing factor in unriddling a case, in our opinion, they are not so strong a piece of evidence sufficient on its own and without anything more to bring home the charges beyond reasonable doubt.” (emphasis added) Therefore, in our view, the appellant's guilt was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 33. In the present case, the disclosure statement of the appellant having resulted in the recovery of the weapon used to kill the deceased and the fact that the appellant has not denied the fact that the deceased had been cut with the knife due to a fight that had taken place between the deceased and the appellant, besides the appellant having burnt the living quarter of the deceased, shows that the disclosure statement was a contributing factor to the other evidence pointing towards the guilt of the appellant. Further, the appellant had also confessed the fact that he had used the knife against the deceased in the confessional statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C, which has not been retracted. 34. The confessional statement of the appellant recorded under Section 164 Cr.PC states as follows:- “I started working at VEES filling Station Bualpui from mid 2018 and I have worked there for about a year. While working here the accountant Mr. Singh (Dindandhu Prashad Singh) refused to give me my whole salary on numerous occasions. As I was supporting my younger siblings, I resigned on October 2019. On the night of 18th March, 2020 I went to check out the poultry of my friend Vara and as Vara was not there I went to the home of Mr. Singh to drink water. I unfortunately drank water using Mr. Singh's personal mug and he got angry and threw his mug at me saying "You Mizos are filthy lot." In my anger I used the knife that I have with me to chop his left forehead twice. As he was shouting, I slit his throat using the knife. I poured kerosene on his house wall and I also poured kerosene on my body to burn myself. I lit a paper from the flame of the cooking gas and as I was immensely scared, I threw the flame towards the wall and left.” 35. As he was shouting, I slit his throat using the knife. I poured kerosene on his house wall and I also poured kerosene on my body to burn myself. I lit a paper from the flame of the cooking gas and as I was immensely scared, I threw the flame towards the wall and left.” 35. The evidence of PW-17 i.e, Nanui, who is the sister of the appellant, is to the effect that three (3) Police personnel had come to her residence in the afternoon of 30.03.2020 and taken one black T-shirt which belonged to the appellant. In her cross examination, PW-17 states that she had washed the appellant’s clothes and she did not see any kind of blood stain on the long sleeve T-shirt, as it had already been washed by the appellant. On the other hand, the prosecution case is that the blood sample of the appellant had been collected in a vial and sent to the FSL. The long sleeve T-shirt of the appellant which was black in colour, which was suspected to stain with the blood of the appellant, was also sent to the FSL for examination. 36. The evidence of PW-29 who is the Assistant Director, FSL, Aizawl is to the effect that the blood stain on the long sleeve T-shirt (Black Colour) of the appellant was that of the deceased. 37. The evidence of the only defence witness, i.e. DW-1, is to the effect that he only came to know about the incident and he did not think that the appellant had committed the crime as he was not in Bualpui at the relevant time. 38. On considering the fact that the appellant had been seen near his sister’s shop/residence between 8:00 pm and 8:20 pm on 18.03.2020 and as the appellant sister’s residence was only 5 to 10 minutes walk away from the house of the deceased, the time of the killing of the deceased by the appellant appears to be plausible. This is due to the fact that the incident of stabbing and burning the house of the deceased occurred between 9:00 to 9:40 p.m. The fact that the assault weapon was recovered on the basis of the disclosure statement by the appellant shows that the circumstantial evidence pointing to the guilt of the appellant forms a complete chain. This is due to the fact that the incident of stabbing and burning the house of the deceased occurred between 9:00 to 9:40 p.m. The fact that the assault weapon was recovered on the basis of the disclosure statement by the appellant shows that the circumstantial evidence pointing to the guilt of the appellant forms a complete chain. PW12 and PW13 were witnesses to the appellant making the disclosure statement, which led to the recovery of the weapon. The confessional statement made by the appellant under Section 164 Cr.PC, which was exhibited as Exh. P-IV and which has not been retracted, corroborates the circumstantial evidence that the appellant had killed the deceased. This is also further fortified by the appellant’s averments made in his appeal petition. 39. The fact that the appellant had been the cause of the death of the deceased having been proved beyond all reasonable doubt, the appellant’s prayer is to now alter the charge under Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part-II IPC. To come to a finding as to whether the appellant had the intention to kill the deceased, can be gathered from the weapon used, the part of the body chosen for assault and nature of injuries caused by the appellant’s action. In this regard, it would be profitable to refer to the Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Singapagu Anjaiah Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh reported in (2010) 9 SCC 799 , where it had been held at paragraphs 16 and 20 as follows: “16. In our opinion, as nobody can enter into the mind of the accused, his intention has to be gathered from the weapon used, the part of the body chosen for the assault and the nature of the injuries caused. Here, the appellant had chosen a crowbar as the weapon of offence. He has further chosen a vital part of the body i.e. the head for causing the injury which had caused multiple fractures of skull. This clearly shows the force with which the appellant had used the weapon. The cumulative effect of all this factors irresistibly leads to one and the only conclusion that the appellant intended to cause death of the deceased. “20. This clearly shows the force with which the appellant had used the weapon. The cumulative effect of all this factors irresistibly leads to one and the only conclusion that the appellant intended to cause death of the deceased. “20. In the present case, as pointed out above, the weapon used, the part of the body chosen for the assault and the intensity with which the appellant assaulted the deceased clearly go to show that he intended to cause the death of the deceased.” 40. In view of the fact that the injuries on the body of the deceased showed that his throat had been cut and there were incised wounds on the scalp, forehead and right wrist of the deceased by the dao used by the appellant, besides the body of the deceased being blackened and charred due to the burning of the quarter of the deceased by the appellant, we are of the view that the appellant had intended to cause the death of the deceased. 41. The above has been corroborated not only by the confessional statement made by the appellant under Section 164 Cr.PC which has not been retracted till date and also in terms of his admission made in his appeal petition that he had taken the knife from the deceased and they continued fighting. However, there is no evidence to show that the deceased had produced the knife. On the other hand, it appears that the appellant had instead produced the knife, inasmuch as, the appellant has stated in his confessional statement that he had used the knife that he had with him to chop the left forehead of the deceased twice. 42. The only provocation that has been made by the deceased was with regard to the deceased telling the appellant that “the Mizos were a filthy lot” and due to the deceased throwing his mug at the appellant. This abuse and throwing of the mug by the deceased, in our view, should not have resulted in the appellant causing such grievous injuries on the deceased, as it has been held in the case of Dauvaram Nirmalkar (supra) that retaliation should be proportionate to the provocation. In the present case, the retaliation was greatly disproportionate to the alleged provocation. 43 . In the present case, the retaliation was greatly disproportionate to the alleged provocation. 43 . In view of all the above reasons, we do not find any ground to interfere with the decision of the learned Trial Court in convicting and sentencing the appellant. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. 44. Send back the LCR. 45. In appreciation of the assistance provided by the learned Amicus Curiae, his fee is to be paid by the Mizoram State Legal Services Authority.