State Of Orissa v. Bhagaban Mohanty (Dead) Through Lrs
2025-03-03
DIPANKAR DATTA, MANMOHAN
body2025
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : 1. Leave granted. 2. The High Court of Orissa at Cuttack has dismissed the appellant's writ petition [W.P.(C) No. 8886 of 2003] by the impugned judgment and order dated November 29, 2018 and thereby upheld the judgment and order dated September 17, 1998 of the Orissa Administrative Tribunal [Tribunal] allowing the original application of the respondent[Original Application No. 423 of 1997]. 3. The respondent, who succeeded before the Tribunal as well as before the High Court, was appointed on contractual basis for a period of three years. His service was terminated by an order dated December 30, 1974. He approached the Tribunal in the year 1992 for the first time, eighteen years after such termination, with an original application [Original Application No. 1474 of 1992] under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985[the Act]. The Tribunal by an order dated November 23, 1995 disposed of the said application granting liberty to the respondent to make a representation and the appellant was directed to consider the respondent's grievance. The representation of the respondent dated December 19, 1995 having been declined by the appellant by an order dated October 1, 1996, once again the respondent approached the Tribunal with the original application out of which this appeal has arisen. The original application was considered along with three other original applications by the Tribunal. By the judgment and order under challenge in the writ petition, the Tribunal allowed all the original applications by directing the appellant to appoint the original applicants as Homeopathic Medical Officers with retrospective effect and together with all service benefits, if they are otherwise not found unfit. 4. The appellants applied for a review [R.P No. 67 of 1998] before the Tribunal. The review petition was disposed of with certain modification. 5. We have not been shown that the Tribunal had assigned any reason as to why it felt satisfied in entertaining a grossly delayed original application under Section 19 of the Act (the first of the two original applications). Eighteen years to move the Tribunal with the first original application was too long a time and being beyond the prescribed period of limitation, no order should have been passed on it in the first place.
Eighteen years to move the Tribunal with the first original application was too long a time and being beyond the prescribed period of limitation, no order should have been passed on it in the first place. We are, at this stage, reminded of the decision of this Court in Union of India vs. M.K. Sarkar [ (2010) 2 SCC 59 ] where law was declared in the following terms: 15. When a belated representation in regard to a "stale" or "dead" issue/dispute is considered and decided, in compliance with a direction by the court/tribunal to do so, the date be of such decision cannot considered as furnishing a fresh cause of action for reviving the "dead" issue or time-barred dispute. The issue of limitation or delay and laches should be considered with reference to the original cause of action and not with reference to the date on which an order is passed in compliance with a court's direction. Neither a court's direction to consider a representation issued without examining the merits, nor a decision given in compliance with such direction, will extend the limitation, or erase the delay and laches. 16. A court or tribunal, before directing "consideration" of a claim or representation should examine whether the claim or representation is with reference to a "live" issue or whether it is with reference to a "dead" or "stale" issue. If it is with reference to a "dead" or "stale" issue or dispute, the court/tribunal should put an end to the matter and should not direct consideration or reconsideration. If the court or tribunal deciding to direct "consideration" without itself examining the merits, it should make it clear that such consideration will be without prejudice to any contention relating to limitation or delay and laches. Even if the court does not expressly say so, that would be the legal position and effect." 6. In terms of the law as declared, the date on which the respondent's prayer was declined by the appellant (read: October 1, 1996) could not have been reckoned as the date on which there was accrual of cause of action. Accrual of cause action, if any, had to be reckoned from December 30, 1974, when the respondent's service stood terminated. Viewed thus, the relevant original application of the respondent being hopelessly barred by limitation, the same should not have been entertained by the Tribunal.
Accrual of cause action, if any, had to be reckoned from December 30, 1974, when the respondent's service stood terminated. Viewed thus, the relevant original application of the respondent being hopelessly barred by limitation, the same should not have been entertained by the Tribunal. The High Court clearly fell in error in not interdicting the judgment and order under challenge before it. 7. That apart, having regard to the decision of this Court dated November 06, 2000 in a civil appeal [Civil Appeal No. 6221 of 2000 (State of Orissa vs. Chandra Sekhar Mishra)] between the appellant and one other original applicant, the High Court ought not to have dismissed the writ petition of the appellant. 8. Hence, for the foregoing reasons, the impugned judgment and order is set aside with the result that the original application filed by the respondent before the Tribunal shall stand dismissed. 9. The appeal stands allowed. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.