ORDER : Y. LAKSHMANA RAO, J. The Revision has been preferred under Section 397 and 401 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for brevity ‘the Cr.P.C’) against the concurrent judgment of conviction, dated 25.05.2011 in Crl.A.No.140 of 2009 passed by the learned XI Additional District & Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Kakinada, whereby and whereunder the judgment dated 10.07.2009 in C.C.No.48 of 2004 passed by the learned Judicial First Class Magistrate, Prathipadu, finding the Petitioners guilty of the offences punishable under Section 353 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short ‘the I.P.C’) and imposing rigorous imprisonment for a period of six months and finding the Petitioners guilty for the offence punishable under Section 29 (2) (B) of A.P. Forest Act, 1967 (for brevity ‘the Act.,’) read with Rules 3 and 4 of A.P.Transit Rules, 1970 (for brevity ‘the Rules.,’) and Section 29 (1) (a) (ii) of ‘the Act.,’ and convicting them under Section 248 (2) of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ and sentencing them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three months and to pay a fine of Rs.100/- each and, in default, to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of seven days. 2. I have heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the revisionists and the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor. 3. Sri V.V.N. Narayana Rao, learned Counsel for the Petitioners, while reiterating the grounds of revision, submitted that there was no evidence for seizure of the property; no independent witnesses were examined; no eye-witness were examined; no mediators were secured while seizing the property and urged to allow the revision case as the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the Petitioners beyond reasonable doubt. 4. 4. Alternatively, it is submitted that the Petitioners at the time of the alleged offence were aged about 23, 36 and 23 years respectively; nearly 21 years have passed by; they had suffered a lot of mental agony, they are doing coolie works; now they are aged about 44, 57 and 44 years respectively; there were no adverse antecedents against the Petitioners; Petitioner No.2 has been suffering from severe aliments due to post Covid-19 complications and requested to consider the case of the revisionists sympathetically and requested to impose sentence which they had already undergone, while volunteering that the sentence of payment of fine of Rs.10,000/- may be imposed on the Petitioner No.1 and Rs.5,000/- may be imposed on the Petitioner No.2 & 3 as a measure of penance and urged to dispose of the revision. 5. Per contra, Ms. P. Akila Naidu, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor, vehemently argued that the learned Appellate Court having gone through the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and the judgment of the learned Trial Court rightly passed the judgment confirming the conviction for the offence charged and urged to dismiss the revision case as there are no material irregularities, miscarriage of justice and misreading of the evidence. 6. Thoughtful consideration is bestowed on the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for both sides. I have perused the entire record. 7. Now the point for consideration is: “Whether the judgment in Crl.A.No.140 of 2009 dated 25.05.2011, passed by the learned XI Additional District & Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Kakinada, is correct, legal, and proper with respect to its finding, sentence, or judgment, and there are any material irregularities? And to what relief?” 8. It is apposite to refer the Hon’ble Apex Court in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v State of Bihar , [ (2002) 6 SCC 650 ] wherein at Paragraph No.13 it is held as under: “13. ... In the absence of any legal infirmity either in the procedure or in the conduct of the trial, there was no justification for the High Court to interfere in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. It has repeatedly been held that the High Court should not re-appreciate the evidence to reach a finding different from the trial Court. In the absence of manifest illegality resulting in grave miscarriage of justice, exercise of revisional jurisdiction in such cases is not warranted.” 9. It has repeatedly been held that the High Court should not re-appreciate the evidence to reach a finding different from the trial Court. In the absence of manifest illegality resulting in grave miscarriage of justice, exercise of revisional jurisdiction in such cases is not warranted.” 9. The prosecution had examined P.Ws.1 to 4, got marked Ex.P1 to P3 and M.Os.1 and 2. P.Ws.1 to 3, who are Officers of Forest Department, and they are victims and eyewitnesses of the incident. They had deposed in unison that on 13.01.2004 at about 03.30 p.m., while they were discharging their duties at the outskirts of Kathipudi towards Sankhavaram by searching the vehicles going on the route, as they got credible information that the forest goods were illegally transported without any permission. They observed that an auto bearing No.AP 5 Y 2262 was going from Sankhavaram towards Kathipudi. On seeing P.Ws.1 to 3, the driver of the auto tried to turn back the vehicle. However, P.Ws.1 to 3 had stopped the auto and found seven Teakwood logs in the auto. Two persons seated on the back side of the auto. Petitioner No.1/Accused No.1 was the driver and owner of the said auto. Accused No.1 caught hold the neck of the P.W.1 and pushed him aside. As a result, P.W.1 fell. The other Accused pushed Teakwood logs from the auto and left them at the scene of offence and escaped from the scene of offence in the said auto. 10. They further deposed that P.W.3, who was the then guard, consulted Forest Range Officer, Yeleswaram and after informing the incident to their higher officials on the next day, P.W.3 gave report in Annavaram Police Station vide Ex.P1. The learned Magistrate had convicted the petitioners under Section 353 read with 34 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ and the learned Appellate Court confirmed the same. In this case, the evidence is not forthcoming that the Petitioners Nos.2 and 3 by entertaining common intention used criminal force against P.W.1. It is evident that Petitioner No.1/Accused No.1 only had used criminal force against the P.W.1 while he was discharging official duties. The Petitioner Nos.2 and 3 had indulged in transportation of the Teakwood logs without valid permission along with the Petitioner No.1. They had removed Teakwood logs from the auto and went away from the scene of offence in the auto. The Petitioner Nos.2 and 3 had indulged in transportation of the Teakwood logs without valid permission along with the Petitioner No.1. They had removed Teakwood logs from the auto and went away from the scene of offence in the auto. Therefore, the conviction for the offence under Section 353 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ against the Petitioner Nos.2 and 3 is unsustainable. 11. It is contended by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that no independent eyewitnesses were examined. It must be pointed out that in cases of this nature, it is practically not possible to examine any eyewitness, when nobody was there seeing the occurrence. Examination of the eyewitnesses would arise only when they had happened to see the offence. When nobody witnessed the offence except the forest officials, it is not proper to expect from the prosecution to secure and examine the eyewitnesses. 12. Securing the mediators for seizure of Teakwood logs in all cases is not sine qua non. As far as possible, the mediators would be secured by the police officials while seizing any contraband. In the instant case, P.Ws.1 to 3 are not the police officials, their evidence is not hit by Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. They had prepared special proceedings while seizing the Teakwood logs. Therefore, the contention that the mediators were not secured has no legal force to stand. 13. For the above reasons, the conviction for the offence under Section 353 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ shall be maintained against the Petitioner No.1. The conviction for the offence under Section 353 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ against the Petitioner Nos.2 and 3 shall liable to be interfered and set aside. Furthermore, the conviction under Section 29 (2) (B) of ‘the Act.,’ read with Rule 3 and 4 of ‘the Rules.,’ and Section 29 (1) (a) (ii) of ‘the Act.,’ shall be maintained since the Petitioners were involved in transportation of Teakwood logs illegally without valid permission. 14. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Hussainara Khatoon (IV) v. Home Secretary State of Bihar , [ AIR 1979 SC 1360 ] held that right to speedy trial which includes hearing of the Appeal and Revision is part of a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution. 14. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Hussainara Khatoon (IV) v. Home Secretary State of Bihar , [ AIR 1979 SC 1360 ] held that right to speedy trial which includes hearing of the Appeal and Revision is part of a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution. In addition to the appeals the right to a speedy trial also includes criminal revisions as per the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Rajdeo Sharma v. State of Bihar , [ (1999) 7 SCC 604 ] . The right of speedy trial of the revisionist is being violated because of delay in disposal of the revision within a reasonable time. 15. As stated supra, the occurrence took place about 21 years ago. The revisionists have been facing mental agony and trauma of the protracted prosecution and suffered mental harassment for a long period of 21 years. The age of the Petitioner No.1 was 23 years, Petitioner No.2 was 36 years, Petitioner No.3 was 23 years at the time of the offence. Now they are 44, 57 and 44 years respectively. The Petitioners were in jail for about five days. Therefore, the delay is also one of the grounds to modify the impugned judgment. There were no prior or subsequent adverse antecedents against the petitioners, as fairly conceded by the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor. Therefore, it is appropriate and proportionate that the sentence is required to be reduced to the period of sentence of imprisonment already undergone by the revisionist. 16. The learned Trial Court sentenced the Petitioners to rigorous imprisonment for six months for the offence punishable under Section 353 of ‘the I.P.C.’ As observed supra, Petitioner Nos.2 and 3 are not liable for punishment under Section 353 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ as no case was not made out under that charge. Hence, the conviction and sentence for the offence under Section 353 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ against the Petitioner Nos.2 and 3 is hereby set aside. Section 353 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ gives discretion to this Court either to impose sentence of imprisonment up to two years or fine or both. As observed supra, they were no prior or subsequent adverse antecedents against the Petitioner No.1/Accused No.1. The Petitioner No.1 was in jail for about five days. Section 353 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ gives discretion to this Court either to impose sentence of imprisonment up to two years or fine or both. As observed supra, they were no prior or subsequent adverse antecedents against the Petitioner No.1/Accused No.1. The Petitioner No.1 was in jail for about five days. Therefore, it would be appropriate and proper if the Petitioner No.1 is sentenced to imprisonment to which he had already undergone for the offence punishable under section 353 of ‘the I.P.C.’ 17. The learned Counsel for the Petitioners volunteered that the Petitioner No.1 would pay an amount of Rs.5,000/- as a measure of penance for the offence punishable under Section 353 of ‘the I.P.C.’ The said voluntary statement is recorded and approved. 18. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the Petitioner Nos.1 to 3 are liable to be sentenced to the imprisonment to which they had already undergone for the offence punishable under Section 29 (1) (a) (ii) of ‘the Act.’ The learned Counsel for the Petitioners volunteered that an amount of Rs.5,000/- each may be imposed on Petitioner Nos.1 to 3 as a measure of penance for the offence punishable under Section 29 (1) (a) (ii) of ‘the Act.’ The said voluntary statement is recorded and approved. 19. For the above reasons, this Criminal Revision Case is disposed of confirming the conviction for the offence punishable under Section 353 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ against the Petitioner No.1 while setting aside the conviction for the offence under Section 353 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ against the Petitioner Nos.2 and 3. The Petitioner No.1 is sentenced to suffer imprisonment to which he had already undergone for the offence punishable under Section 353 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ while sentencing him to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/- for the offence under Section 353 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ in default of payment of fine, the Petitioner No.1 shall suffer two months rigorous imprisonment. 20. The conviction for the offence punishable under Section 29 (1) (a) (ii) of ‘the Act.,’ against the Petitioner Nos.1 to 3 shall be maintained. 20. The conviction for the offence punishable under Section 29 (1) (a) (ii) of ‘the Act.,’ against the Petitioner Nos.1 to 3 shall be maintained. The Petitioners are sentenced to suffer imprisonment to which they had already undergone while sentencing the Petitioner No.1 to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- and Petitioner Nos.2 and 3 shall pay the fine of Rs.5,000/- each, for the offence punishable under Section 29 (1) (a) (ii) of ‘the Act.,’ in default of payment of fine, they shall suffer two months rigorous imprisonment. 21. The learned Judicial First Class Magistrate, Prathipadu is directed to take required follow-up steps for complying with the directions of this Court. The Petitioners shall pay the fine amounts imposed by this court in this order within a period of two months from the date of receipt of copy of this order before the learned Trial Court. As a sequel, interlocutory applications, if any pending, shall stand closed. No order as to costs.