JUDGMENT : V.R.K. KRUPA SAGAR, J. Original plaintiff in O.S.No.355 of 1995 was Dr. Mikkilineni Venkateswara Rao. During pendency of the suit before learned I Additional Senior Civil Judge, Vijayawada he died. His wife and children were brought on record as plaintiff Nos.2 to 5. The present appeal under Section 96 of C.P.C. is filed by the plaintiffs impugning the judgment dated 26.10.2009 of learned I Additional Senior Civil Judge, Vijayawada in O.S.No.355 of 1995. The sole defendant in the suit is the sole respondent herein. 2. Meticulous and elaborate arguments were advanced on behalf of the appellants by Sri Kanakamedala Ravindra Kumar, the learned Senior Counsel. For respondent, Sri Venkateswara Rao Gudapati, the learned counsel submitted effective reply arguments. 3. A brief note of respective contentions is filed by both sides. Precedent is cited by both sides. 4. The original plaintiff Dr. Mikkilineni Venkateswara Rao is brother-in-law of Sri Thummala Chittaranjandas. The defendant in the suit Sri Thummala Rambabu is the son of Sri Thummala Chittaranjandas. Thus, both parties are closely related to each other. As a matter of fact, it has never been disputed by both sides that under a registered sale deed dated 02.07.1963 the original plaintiff purchased 800 square yards of vacant site in RS.No.914 of Patamata Village. The original plaintiff lived in India till December 1981. It was during December 1981 he left India for Algeria and lived there till March 1987. On his return he was staying at Hyderabad till his death. On 01.12.1993 the original plaintiff had executed a registered sale deed in favour of the defendant whereunder he sold 400 square yards out of his 800 square yards of site and delivered possession of the same to the defendant. The certified copy of the said sale deed was exhibited before the trial Court as per Ex.B.132. The dispute between the parties has arisen by virtue of another registered sale deed dated 31.08.1994 for the remaining extent of 400 square yards. The registration extract of the said sale deed was exhibited by original plaintiff as per Ex.A.4. The certified copy of the said sale deed was exhibited before the trial Court as per Ex.B.132. The dispute between the parties has arisen by virtue of another registered sale deed dated 31.08.1994 for the remaining extent of 400 square yards. The registration extract of the said sale deed was exhibited by original plaintiff as per Ex.A.4. The prayer in the suit reads as below: “Hence, the plaintiff prays that the Hon'ble court may be pleased to pass a decree and judgment in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant: “(a) for the declaration that the plaintiff is the absolute owner of the plaint schedule property and that the sale deed dated 31-8-1994 under document No.4740/1994 of the office of the sub-Registrar, Vijayawada said to be executed in favour of the defendant by the so called power of Attorney holder of the plaintiff in respect of the plaint schedule property is null and void, unenforceable and not binding on the plaintiff; (b) for consequential relief of recovery of possession of the plaint schedule property from the defendant to the plaintiff; (c) for future damages at the rate of Rs.3,000/- per month for his unauthorised occupation of the plaint schedule property from the date of the suit till the date of delivery of the said property; (d) for the costs of the suit; and (e) pass such other reliefs as the Hon’ble Court deems fit and proper in the circumstances of the case.” 5. In the plaint it is stated that the defendant was pursuing his studies in Vijayawada and at the request of his father the original plaintiff permitted the defendant to stay in the house that was there in a part of 800 square yards of site that was owned by the plaintiff. There were tenants on the said property. The original plaintiff instructed the defendant to collect rent periodically and account for the same to the original plaintiff. He did not do so between 1981 and 1987. After return from Algeria the original plaintiff questioned the defendant about his failure to account for the rents, but he dodged the issue. In May 1995 the original plaintiff had come to know that two months prior to that the defendant got all the tenants vacated and had trespassed into the entire property. After return from Algeria the original plaintiff questioned the defendant about his failure to account for the rents, but he dodged the issue. In May 1995 the original plaintiff had come to know that two months prior to that the defendant got all the tenants vacated and had trespassed into the entire property. The original plaintiff questioned this and got issued a notice dated 04.06.1995/Ex.A.1 to the defendant demanding him to vacate the house and deliver vacant possession of the house in good condition and pay the entire amounts overdue along with interest within ten days. A further warning was mentioned that the original plaintiff would take the matter to criminal and civil courts and would demand for further damages and costs. According to plaint averments the defendant managed to return the notice unserved. The defendant was found constructing a wall in the property. The plaintiff went and questioned him, and it was then the defendant showed him a photostat copy of the sale deed dated 12.09.1994/Ex.B.133 and claimed right for himself in the entire property. The said sale deed discloses that it was executed by one Yelamanchili Madhava Rao purportedly holding the registered power of attorney executed by the original plaintiff. In the plaint it is stated that the said registered power of attorney is a forged document. Using the said forged document the defendant and his father and others procured the original of Ex.A.4-sale deed. In these circumstances the suit was filed with the prayer referred earlier. 6. The defendant filed a written statement whereunder he admitted the original ownership of original plaintiff over the entire 800 square yards of site. He specifically denied the rest of the contentions alleged in the plaint and stated that he as a student pursued his studies in Vijayawada at different places and never lived on the property of the original plaintiff and he was never entrusted with the task of collecting rents from the alleged tenants and accounting for the same to the original plaintiff. The further contentions raised in the written statement are that the original plaintiff originally executed an unregistered agreement for sale with possession in favour of one Bobba Venkata Rao on 09.12.1981/Ex.B.4. Thereafter the said Bobba Venkata Rao executed an agreement for sale with possession in favour of this defendant on 19.10.1987/Ex.B.21. The further contentions raised in the written statement are that the original plaintiff originally executed an unregistered agreement for sale with possession in favour of one Bobba Venkata Rao on 09.12.1981/Ex.B.4. Thereafter the said Bobba Venkata Rao executed an agreement for sale with possession in favour of this defendant on 19.10.1987/Ex.B.21. That the original plaintiff executed a registered General Power of Attorney in favour of Sri Yelamanchili Madhava Rao on 18.11.1988/Ex.B.20. Initially the defendant purchased 400 square yards of site from the original plaintiff for valuable consideration on 01.12.1993/Ex.B.132. Coming to the remaining 400 square yards of site, the original plaintiff got it sold through his registered general power of attorney holder on 12.09.1994/Ex.B.133. The registered General Power of Attorney executed by original plaintiff in favour of Sri Yelamanchali Madhava Rao is true and valid. It was executed on 18.11.1988/Ex.B.20 and that was in force when the disputed sale was affected by the power of attorney holder in favour of the defendant. 7. In the written statement it is further stated that the defendant lost all his original documents and accordingly gave a report to the Station House Officer in Gudivada Town Police Station and after due enquiry they certified that the documents could not be traced. Thereafter the defendant published this aspect in various newspapers on 04.05.1995. The original plaintiff got inspiration from that and with a view to grab the property filed this false suit. Various other averments made in the plaint were specifically denied in the written statement. The defendant prayed for dismissal of the suit. 8. The learned trial Court settled the following issues for trial: 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to declaration as prayed for? 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recovery of possession of plaint schedule property? 3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for future damages at Rs.3,000/- p.m. as prayed for? 4. To what relief? Additional Issue: 1. Whether there is a valid power of attorney in the name of 2 nd plaintiff? 9. There was oral evidence of PWs.1 to 3 and Exs.A.1 to A.6 for plaintiffs. There was oral evidence of DWs.1 to 8 and Exs.B.1 to B.140 for the defendant. 10. 4. To what relief? Additional Issue: 1. Whether there is a valid power of attorney in the name of 2 nd plaintiff? 9. There was oral evidence of PWs.1 to 3 and Exs.A.1 to A.6 for plaintiffs. There was oral evidence of DWs.1 to 8 and Exs.B.1 to B.140 for the defendant. 10. The learned trial Court after considering the entire evidence on record and after considering the arguments advanced on both sides recorded that it was not convinced with the case of the plaintiffs and further recorded that there was truth in the defence set up by the defendant. It answered all the issues against the plaintiffs and dismissed the suit. 11. Aggrieved by that, the plaintiffs preferred the present appeal. 12. The following points fall for consideration in this appeal: 1. Whether the trial Court committed an error in admitting and acting upon secondary evidence? 2. Whether the evidence on record has not proved that plaintiff No.1/appellant No.1 executed registered General Power of Attorney dated 18.11.1988 in favour of Sri Yelamanchili Madhava Rao? 3. Whether registered sale deed dated 31.08.1994 executed by Sri Yelamanchili Madhava Rao as power of attorney holder of plaintiff No.1/appellant No.1 in favour of defendant/respondent is invalid? 4. Whether the various facts and circumstances brought on record entitled the plaintiffs for suit prayed reliefs, but the trial Court erroneously dismissed the suit? 13. A registered document carries with it the presumption that it was validly executed. It is for the party challenging the genuineness of the transaction to show that the transaction is not valid in law. Invalidity of a registered sale deed when assailed in a suit for declaration and cancellation of such sale deed, the onus lies on the plaintiff to establish the case asserted.,[ Jamila Begum v. Shami Mohd. (2019) 2 SCC 727 ]. 14. A power of attorney is not an instrument of transfer in regard to any right, title or interest in an immovable property. The power of attorney is the creation of an agency whereby the grantor authorizes the grantee to do the acts specified therein, on behalf of grantor, which when executed will be binding on the grantor as if done by him. [Suraj Lamp & Industries (P) Ltd. (2) v. State of Haryana (2012) 1 SCC 656 ]. 15. The power of attorney is the creation of an agency whereby the grantor authorizes the grantee to do the acts specified therein, on behalf of grantor, which when executed will be binding on the grantor as if done by him. [Suraj Lamp & Industries (P) Ltd. (2) v. State of Haryana (2012) 1 SCC 656 ]. 15. Mere mention in the title or the body of a power of attorney that it is irrevocable, does not make it irrevocable. However, if the agent has an interest in the property which forms the subject matter of the agency, the agency cannot in the absence of the express contract be terminated to the prejudice of such interest., [Barses J.A. D’Douza v. Municipal Corporation of GR. Brihan Mumbai 2003 SCC OnLine Bom 244]. 16. In the case at hand, the cause of concern for the plaintiffs/appellants is the registered sale deed dated 31.08.1994. A registration extract of it is filed by the plaintiffs as per Ex.A.4. The purchaser of the property under this document is respondent/defendant. The original of this registered sale deed must have been with the defendant/respondent. He did not file the original of it. He filed certified copy of it as per Ex.B.133 and also a photostat copy of it as per Ex.B.134. The date of this document is 31.08.1994. The date of its registration is 12.09.1994. The recitals in it disclosed that it was not signed by plaintiff No.1 himself, but it was signed by his power of attorney agent Sri Yelamanchili Madhava Rao. It is under this document 400 square yards of site was shown to have been sold by plaintiff No.1/appellant No.1. It is that property which is shown in the plaint schedule and it is that document which the plaintiffs seek annulment. Original plaintiff denied to have executed any such general power of attorney. Defendant produced a copy of this registered General Power of Attorney and the same was exhibited as Ex.B.20. It discloses that on 18.11.1988 it was executed by plaintiff No.1 whereunder he appointed Sri Yelamanchili Madhava Rao as his power of attorney agent empowering him to execute registered sale deeds with reference to his 800 square yards of site. In this there is a mention that plaintiff No.1 had already sold this property under an agreement to Sri Bobba Venkata Rao and he also received full consideration from him. In this there is a mention that plaintiff No.1 had already sold this property under an agreement to Sri Bobba Venkata Rao and he also received full consideration from him. Registered documents cannot be executed because of certain Government Orders. Stating that his children are living in other countries and that he needs going abroad and as he was not sure as to when the Government Orders would be relaxed, he found the need to appoint a power of attorney holder and accordingly he appointed him. As stated earlier, this GPA refers to an agreement for sale dated 09.12.1981 said to have been executed by plaintiff No.1 in favour of Sri Bobba Venkata Rao. The plaintiffs denied to have executed any such agreement for sale. The defendant produced a photostat copy of the said agreement for sale as per Ex.B.4. In addition to the above documents the defendant has also produced a photostat copy of an agreement for sale dated 19.10.1987 as per Ex.B.21. This document discloses that it was executed by Sri Bobba Venkata Rao in favour of the defendant. 17. Since original documents are not produced and only photostat copies of documents were produced, the question had arisen before the Court below as well as here about admissibility of secondary evidence. It is that aspect of the matter that has to be considered now. POINT No.1: 18. Defendant as DW.1 stated that on 29.04.1995 while he was travelling in A.P.S.R.T.C. bus from Vijayawada to Gudivada the original documents of his property and some of the link documents which were kept in a polythene bag along with clothes were lost and he accordingly gave a complaint to police and after due search police certified as per Ex.B.23 that the documents could not be traced. A perusal of Ex.B.23 confirms the truth of the above evidence of DW.1. The witness further deposed that he also published a news item in daily newspapers about the loss of his documents which is evidenced by Exs.B.24 and 25. Thus, we have got a case where the witness on oath stated that he lost the original documents. One thing that he could do was to complain to the police and also request the general public about loss of his documents. He did both things. Since the original documents were no more in possession of the defendant he could not produce the originals. One thing that he could do was to complain to the police and also request the general public about loss of his documents. He did both things. Since the original documents were no more in possession of the defendant he could not produce the originals. In the normal course, unless some motive is suggested to the party proposing to adduce secondary evidence to the effect that he made an application to adduce secondary evidence on false grounds, normally he can be permitted to lead secondary evidence. A bear statement made on evidence affidavit by a party would be sufficient proof of fact that the document has been lost or not traced out. There can never be absolute proof of fact that the document had been lost. A statement from the person that the document was lost and in spite of his best efforts he could not trace out the document could be sufficient evidence of the fact that the document had been lost.[Kodali Jhansi Rani v. Valasala Venkta Ramana Ramana LAWS(TLNG)-2019-2-112/ 2019 (6) ALT 58 ]. 19. So far as registered documents are concerned, it was well within the competence of the defendant to obtain registration extracts of such documents. It is obvious that the defendant did not do that. It was for the defendant to offer his explanation for his omission to do that. The defendant as DW.1 stated that in the year 1988 in Vijayawada a Member of Legislative Assembly was assassinated and that resulted in huge problems and unknown people set the Sub-Registrar’s Office to fire and consequently all the documents and registers of the Government Office were gutted. This assertion of DW.1 is never in dispute during trial as well as here. Thus, the defendant offered valid explanation for his inability to procure registration extracts of the sale deed and the general power of attorney. The learned trial Court was satisfied with these explanations and observed that sufficient foundation was laid by the defendant for non-production of primary evidence and for production of secondary evidence. 20. In this appeal those observations of the trial Court are challenged. 21. Learned counsel for appellants contends that after the destruction of registers and documents in the Sub-Registrar’s Office, the Government notified that persons who were in possession of documents could approach the Sub-Registrar’s Office for reconstruction of records and the defendant failed to do that. 20. In this appeal those observations of the trial Court are challenged. 21. Learned counsel for appellants contends that after the destruction of registers and documents in the Sub-Registrar’s Office, the Government notified that persons who were in possession of documents could approach the Sub-Registrar’s Office for reconstruction of records and the defendant failed to do that. This was suggested to DW.1 during his cross-examination and the witness expressed his ignorance of that aspect of the matter. Be that as it may. His registered sale deed dated 31.08.1994 is subsequent to the burning of Sub-Registrar’s Office. Ex.B.20 which is a photostat copy of General Power of Attorney dated 18.11.1988 was just earlier than the fire incident in the Sub-Registrar’s Office. By the time he obtained his registered sale deed under the original of Ex.A.4 the fire incident was over long time ago. Therefore, there was no need for him to do anything further. He lost the original of Ex.A.4 and thereafter he obtained its registration extract as per Ex.B.133. Coming to Ex.B.20 which is the photostat copy of general power of attorney he himself did not have the original or duplicate and the records in the Sub-Registrar’s Office were burnt and he produced a photo copy which was available with him. Therefore, it can be said that the defendant did what all he could do and there is no merit in the contention raised on behalf of the appellants. 22. Learned counsel for appellants argued the principles concerning primary evidence and secondary evidence and photostat copies of documents and cited U.Sree v. U.Srinivas, (2013) 2 SCC 114 . That was a case where their Lordships held that secondary evidence must be authenticated by foundational evidence that the alleged copy is in fact a true copy of the original. Mere admission of a document in evidence does not amount to its proof. Therefore, it is the obligation of the Court to decide the question of admissibility of a document in secondary evidence before making endorsement thereon. 23. Mere admission of a document in evidence does not amount to its proof. Therefore, it is the obligation of the Court to decide the question of admissibility of a document in secondary evidence before making endorsement thereon. 23. In J.Yashoda v. K.Shobha Rani , [ (2007) 5 SCC 730 ] , their Lordships referred to Sections 63 and 65 of Indian Evidence Act and on facts made an observation that the appellant therein failed to explain as to what were the circumstances under which the photostat copy was prepared and who was in possession of the original document at the time its photograph was taken. 24. In H.Siddiqui v. A.Ramalingam , [ (2011) 4 SCC 240 ] , referring to secondary evidence, their Lordships stated that it is the duty of the Court to examine whether documents produced in the Court or contents thereof have any probative value. 25. Joseph John Peter Sandy v. Veronica Thomas Rajkumar , [ (2013) 3 SCC 801 ] - That was a case where parties associated with the document were not examined and therefore based on the principles disputed document therein was not considered. 26. Nurukurthi Solman Raju v. Nurukurthi Veera Lakshmi , [LAWS(APH)-2017-7-51/ 2017 (5) ALT 178 ] - In this it was held that a photostat copy was inadmissible in evidence. 27. Badrunnisa Begum v. Mohamooda Begum , [LAWS(APH)-2001-2-59/ALT 2001 (3) 243 (DB) (AP)] - That is a case where a copy of the copy was found inadmissible. It was further held that if secondary evidence is allowed to be marked for one party without objection at the trial, no objection can be permitted to be raised by the opposite party at any later stage in the same Court or in appeal that conditions for adducing secondary evidence have not been made out initially. 28. In terms of Section 65(c) of Indian Evidence Act, when the original has been destroyed or lost, the party is entitled to produce secondary evidence.,[ Kodali Jhansi Rani v. Valasala Venkta Ramana Ramana LAWS(TLNG)- 2019-2-112/ 2019 (6) ALT 58 ]. 29. Chandabolu Bhaskara Rao v. Betha Saidi Reddy , [LAWS (APH)-2006-4-25/ALT 2006 (4) 245] - That is a case where a photostat copy was explained stating that it is quite possible to conceal the signatures on the original and take a photocopy. 30. 29. Chandabolu Bhaskara Rao v. Betha Saidi Reddy , [LAWS (APH)-2006-4-25/ALT 2006 (4) 245] - That is a case where a photostat copy was explained stating that it is quite possible to conceal the signatures on the original and take a photocopy. 30. A.Sudershan v. M/S Gowra Leasing And Finance Ltd. , [LAWS(TLNG)-2020-6-16/ALT 2020 (4)273] - That is a case where a contention was raised before the Court that the photocopy of a document cannot be received as secondary evidence. In specific terms such contention was negatived and held such contention was unsustainable. 31. Facts are to be spoken to by witnesses. Witnesses are to answer questions. In a trial process witnesses do not stand and continue making statements. DW.1 was in the witness box. During his evidence he produced photostat copies of the above referred documents. Objections were raised about their admissibility. Subject to those objections the trial Court marked the documents. 32. Section 63(2) of Indian Evidence Act states that secondary evidence means and includes copies made from the original by mechanical processes which in themselves ensure the accuracy of the copy. While DW.1 was in witness box he ought to have been questioned as to when and how he procured the photostat copies. That was not done. Plaintiff No.1 as PW.1 by his very plaint questioned the validity of the documents. It has to be observed here that while the entire document was questioned it has never been the case of the plaintiffs that the photostat copies produced contains something that was not there in the original or it does not contain what was there in the original. A registered general power of attorney is a matter of fact and that could be seen from the endorsements of the Registrar on the photocopy of Ex.B.20. It is nobody’s case that its contents were altered, or some signatures were concealed or some signatures which were not there were produced by manipulation. Therefore, in the given facts and circumstances while the validity of those documents is still a question what is produced in the form of secondary evidence there can be no dispute. Therefore, in the opinion of this Court the principles laid down in various rulings referred above stand satisfied in the present case and the trial Court rightly considered secondary evidence. This Court finds no reason to disagree with the findings of the trial Court. Therefore, in the opinion of this Court the principles laid down in various rulings referred above stand satisfied in the present case and the trial Court rightly considered secondary evidence. This Court finds no reason to disagree with the findings of the trial Court. Therefore, this point is answered against the appellants/plaintiffs. POINT Nos.2, 3 and 4: 33. Section 31 of Specific Relief Act reads as below: “ 31. When cancellation may be ordered .— (1) Any person against whom a written instrument is void or voidable, and who has reasonable apprehension that such instrument, if left outstanding may cause him serious injury, may sue to have it adjudged void or voidable; and the court may, in its discretion, so adjudge it and order it to be delivered up and cancelled. (2) If the instrument has been registered under the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), the court shall also send a copy of its decree to the officer in whose office the instrument has been so registered; and such officer shall note on the copy of the instrument contained in his books the fact of its cancellation.” 34. Section 34 of Specific Relief Act reads as below: “ 34. Discretion of court as to declaration of status or right .—Any person entitled to any legal character, or to any right as to any property, may institute a suit against any person denying, or interested to deny, his title to such character or right, and the court may in its discretion make therein a declaration that he is so entitled, and the plaintiff need not in such suit ask for any further relief: Provided that no court shall make any such declaration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so.” 35. Explaining the difference between Sections 31 and 34 of Specific Relief Act, the following observations are made at paragraph No.7 by the Apex Court in Suhrid Singh @ Sardool Singh v. Randhir Singh, (2010) 12 SCC 112 : “Where the executant of a deed wants it to be annulled, he has to seek cancellation of the deed. But if a non-executant seeks annulment of a deed, he has to seek a declaration that the deed is invalid, or non-est, or illegal or that it is not binding on him. But if a non-executant seeks annulment of a deed, he has to seek a declaration that the deed is invalid, or non-est, or illegal or that it is not binding on him. The difference between a prayer for cancellation and declaration in regard to a deed of transfer/conveyance, can be brought out by the following illustration relating to `A' and `B' -- two brothers. `A' executes a sale deed in favour of `C'. Subsequently `A' wants to avoid the sale. `A' has to sue for cancellation of the deed. On the other hand, if `B', who is not the executant of the deed, wants to avoid it, he has to sue for a declaration that the deed executed by `A' is invalid/void and non- est/ illegal and he is not bound by it. In essence both may be suing to have the deed set aside or declared as non-binding. But the form is different and court fee is also different. If `A', the executant of the deed, seeks cancellation of the deed, he has to pay ad- valorem court fee on the consideration stated in the sale deed. If `B', who is a non-executant, is in possession and sues for a declaration that the deed is null or void and does not bind him or his share, he has to merely pay a fixed court fee of Rs. 19.50 under Article 17(iii) of Second Schedule of the Act. But if `B', a non- executant, is not in possession, and he seeks not only a declaration that the sale deed is invalid, but also the consequential relief of possession, he has to pay an ad-valorem court fee……”. The principle was reiterated by their Lordships in Hussain Ahmed Choudhury v. Habibur Rahman, 2025 INSC 553 /2025 LiveLaw (SC) 466. 36. In the case at hand, the appellants/plaintiffs made a prayer for declaration of title and cancellation of original of Ex.A.4- registered sale deed dated 31.08.1994. In the absence of the disputed alienation under the original of Ex.A.4, the title of plaintiff No.1 is an undisputed fact. The defendant claiming under the original of Ex.A.4 seeks title through plaintiff No.1 only. According to plaintiffs, plaintiff No.1 did not execute Ex.A.4. If that be the case, it would have been sufficient for him to seek for declaration of title since the existence of Ex.A.4 casts a cloud on his title. The defendant claiming under the original of Ex.A.4 seeks title through plaintiff No.1 only. According to plaintiffs, plaintiff No.1 did not execute Ex.A.4. If that be the case, it would have been sufficient for him to seek for declaration of title since the existence of Ex.A.4 casts a cloud on his title. A person who executed a document could alone seek for its cancellation. Though plaintiff No.1 alleges that he did not execute either by himself or through power of attorney, he still seeks cancellation of Ex.A.4 which is a little confounding. Be that as it may. His Ex.A.4 discloses that it was executed through the alleged power of attorney holder. Is it not incumbent upon plaintiff No.1 who has come to know about existence of such GPA dated 18.11.1988 as per Ex.B.20 to pray a relief against that document. He did not do so. Learned counsel for respondent contended that acts of GPA bind the principle and if prayer against GPA is not made the suit is not maintainable and cited Vuppu Veera Venkata Subba Rao v. Borra Padmaja Rao , [2024 APHC 186] . That was also a case where the prayer was to declare the plaintiff as the absolute owner of the plaint schedule property and for an injunction. At paragraph No.25 a learned Judge of this Court recorded that Ex.B.1-registered sale deed was executed by a power of attorney holder under Ex.B.2 and the plaintiff failed to seek a declaration that Ex.B.2-General Power of Attorney is null and void or vitiated by fraud or undue influence. In the absence of such a prayer the prayer for declaration of title could not be granted. Learned counsel for respondent further cited Qamar Mehdi v. Mirza Asraf Hussain Baig , [Judgment dated 22.09.2022 in C.C.C.A.No.108 of 2014] . In the absence of such a prayer the prayer for declaration of title could not be granted. Learned counsel for respondent further cited Qamar Mehdi v. Mirza Asraf Hussain Baig , [Judgment dated 22.09.2022 in C.C.C.A.No.108 of 2014] . A Division Bench of Telangana High Court held “it is well settled principle of law, as long as the registered GPA executed by the principal is not cancelled or revoked, if the GPA holder acted upon for any transaction in pursuant to the said GPA, the same is binding upon the principal unless and until the principal produces evidence to the effect that the said transaction is contrary to the recitals specified in the GPA or if the GPA holder/agent acted contrary to law.” After laying down the said principle it was held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to seek for relief of declaration of Ex.A.1-sale deed therein as null and void since Ex.A2-registered GPA was not cancelled or revoked. 37. Learned counsel for respondent argued that in the instant case the original of Ex.A.4-sale deed was executed by the general power of attorney holder who acted in pursuance of the original of Ex.B.20 and the GPA holder was entitled to execute and present the sale deed for registration and at that time there was no legal obligation on part of the registering authority also to demand for production of registered GPA and cited to that effect the ruling of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Amar Nath v. Gian Chand, (2022) 11 SCC 460 . 38. Learned counsel for respondent cited Rattan Singh v. Nirmal gill. , [ (2021) 15 SCC 300 ]. That was a case where their Lordships had stated that where a plaintiff questions the documents and their validity and contents that they were forged the burden lies upon the plaintiff to prove his case. Their Lordships concluded saying that the standard of proof required in a civil dispute is preponderance of probabilities and not beyond reasonable doubt. Though the discrepancies in the 1990 GPA are bound to create some doubt, however, in absence of any tangible evidence produced by the plaintiff to support the plea of fraud, it does not take the matter further. Rather, in this case the testimony of the attesting witnesses, scribe and other independent witnesses plainly support the case of the defendants. Though the discrepancies in the 1990 GPA are bound to create some doubt, however, in absence of any tangible evidence produced by the plaintiff to support the plea of fraud, it does not take the matter further. Rather, in this case the testimony of the attesting witnesses, scribe and other independent witnesses plainly support the case of the defendants. That evidence dispels the doubt if any and tilts the balance in favour of the defendants. Since the 1990 GPA had been proved, there is no reason to doubt their bona fides. It is in the light of these principles now the facts on record are to be scrutinized. 39. Sri Yelamanchili Madhava Rao is stated to be the General Power of Attorney holder under Ex.B.20. He testified as DW.5. Further one of the attestors to this document is Sri K.Venugopala Rao. He testified as DW.3. Another attestor is Sri K.Bhanuprasad. He testified as DW.4. An identifying witness before the Sub-Registrar for the original of Ex.B.20 was Sri J.Krishna Murthy. He testified as DW.7. All these witnesses stated that in their presence plaintiff No.1 executed the original of Ex.B.20. Thus, as a matter of fact the facts given by them on oath proved execution of original of Ex.B.20 by plaintiff No.1 in favour of DW.5- Sri Yelamanchili Madhava Rao. It is to be noted that the document is of the year 1988. The suit was filed in the year 1995. The witnesses were examined during the year 2005 and 2006. Their cross-examination led on behalf of the plaintiffs would only try to test their accuracy about such facts as to who purchased stamps, where they were purchased, how many signatures were obtained etc. In the opinion of the trial Court there were some discrepancies among these witnesses, yet it can act upon their evidence. That is questioned in this appeal by the learned counsel for appellants. One can never lose sight of the fact that it has never been the case of the appellants/plaintiffs that Ex.B.20 for its original was not a registered document. All the witnesses were examined in cross and they were all known to plaintiffs and the defendant. No facts are suggested to them probabilising any animosity for them to speak falsehood against the plaintiffs. All the witnesses were examined in cross and they were all known to plaintiffs and the defendant. No facts are suggested to them probabilising any animosity for them to speak falsehood against the plaintiffs. The only suggestion given to them was that it was a fraudulent document and they are trying to help the defendant and such suggestions were denied by the witnesses. The original plaintiff was a doctor by profession. These witnesses belonged to nearby villages. No facts are shown as to why their evidence should not be believed. The contention of the learned counsel for the plaintiffs/appellants is that according to the respondent/ defendant/DW.1 he was very much present at the time of Ex.B.20. According to DW.5-Sri Yelamanchili Madhava Rao, DW.1 was not present at the time of Ex.B.20. Therefore, there is such variation in their evidence. However, recollecting facts nearly 1½ decades after the event under Ex.B.20 such discrepancies do occur. Whether the defendant was present when Ex.B.20 was made or not has no bearing on the validity of Ex.B.20. Therefore, it must be recorded that the original of Ex.B.20 is a document that was executed by plaintiff No.1 in favour of Sri Yelamanchili Madhava Rao. 40. Under the disputed sale deed/original of Ex.A.4 the defendant is the beneficiary. He testified as DW.1. An attestor of this document is Sri Ch.Varaprasad. He testified as DW.2. Their evidence is that DW.5 acting in terms of Ex.B.20 executed the original of Ex.A.4. Thus, with that evidence the defendant established his contentions. 41. From the cross-examination of the witnesses of the defendant one could not find anything to state that either Ex.A.4 or Ex.B.20 are not proved. Once Ex.B.20 is proved and Ex.A.4 is proved the case rests there. However, certain valiant submissions are made on behalf of the plaintiffs in the following manner. 42. Learned counsel submits that, Ex.B.4 relied on by the defendant is an agreement for sale with possession said to have been executed by plaintiff No.1 in favour of Sri Bobba Venkata Rao. According to the learned counsel he never executed any such agreement for sale. The further contention is that the contents of Ex.B.4 would indicate that it was really a sale deed and not a mere agreement for sale and in such an event the said document which was not registered could not have been acted upon. According to the learned counsel he never executed any such agreement for sale. The further contention is that the contents of Ex.B.4 would indicate that it was really a sale deed and not a mere agreement for sale and in such an event the said document which was not registered could not have been acted upon. Learned counsel cited Banguru Ramatthula Samma v. Yedem Masthan Reddy, LAWS(APH)-1998-8-98/ALT 1998 (4) 796. Their Lordships recorded the ruling stating that when the document embodies a complete sale and not merely an executory contract and when the transfer of ownership is affected under the document itself, it cannot be considered as an agreement for sale and it has to be considered as sale deed itself. In such a case such a document having not been registered under Section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act could not be admitted in evidence. 43. A perusal of Ex.B.4 shows that agreed sale consideration was Rs.1,00,000/- and Sri Bobba Venkata Rao paid only Rs.90,000/- and was yet to pay Rs.10,000/- to the vendor/plaintiff No.1. The document further reveals that there are tenants in the premises. The lease amounts shall belong to the vendor/plaintiff No.1 till the tenants vacate the property. It further mentions that plaintiff No.1 needed money as he was going to Algeria and therefore, he was selling the property. It is mentioned that even one year from the date of document plaintiff No.1 would return to India and would receive Rs.10,000/- towards balance sale consideration and then execute a registered sale deed. Thus, the recitals do indicate that there was no transfer of title. In such circumstances, the document is only an agreement for sale and not a sale deed. Be that as it may. On the one hand plaintiffs/appellants denied to have executed Ex.B.4. If that be the case in terms of Ex.B.4 he received money and he gave possession of the property to Sri B.Venkata Rao and he never prayed for cancellation of it or declaration that it is invalid. On the other hand, it is the evidence of plaintiff No.1 as PW.1 that he approached Sri Bobba Venkata Rao and obtained from him Ex.A.5-affidavit dated 21.07.1995. Be it noted that the plaint was presented on 24.07.1995 and three days earlier to that he allegedly obtained such affidavit from Sri Bobba Venkata Rao. On the other hand, it is the evidence of plaintiff No.1 as PW.1 that he approached Sri Bobba Venkata Rao and obtained from him Ex.A.5-affidavit dated 21.07.1995. Be it noted that the plaint was presented on 24.07.1995 and three days earlier to that he allegedly obtained such affidavit from Sri Bobba Venkata Rao. A perusal of Ex.A.5 does not disclose any whisper about Ex.B.4- agreement for sale. Thus, even according to the own showing of plaintiff No.1/appellant No.1 Sri Bobba Venkata Rao has not denied execution of original of Ex.B.4 by plaintiff No. 1 in his favour. What all Ex.A.5 intended to show was only to question the correctness of passing of sale consideration as mentioned in the disputed sale deed which is original of Ex.A.4. It may be mentioned here that in Ex.A.4 obtained by defendant it is recited that consideration was paid by Sri Bobba Venkata Rao to plaintiff No.1. At present what is relevant is that Ex.A.5-affidavit only says denial of Sri Bobba Venkata Rao about such consideration. In the evidence of PW.1 it is noticed that Ex.A.5 was obtained with the assistance of counsel of him. If that be the case, it was on advice such an affidavit was obtained. If really there is no truth in Ex.B.4-agreement for sale, the affidavit would have mentioned the same. In such circumstances, one has to necessarily accept the correctness of Ex.B.4-agreement for sale. 44. According to the defendant, subsequent to Ex.B.4 Sri Bobba Venkata Rao executed an agreement for sale in his favour under the original of Ex.B.21 dated 19.10.1987. A reading of this document shows that agreement holder who is Bobba Venkata Rao delivered possession of the property to the defendant and that was all for 800 square yards. 45. The purport of Ex.B.4 is an agreement to sell 800 square yards. The purport of Ex.B.21 is also an agreement for sale of 800 square yards. Correctness of Ex.B.21 is challenged on the ground that stamps were purchased on 08.10.1986 but the document was executed on 19.10.1987 and the document writer’s renewal licence was of the year 1988 as is mentioned on such a document of the year 1987. All those suspicious circumstances are shown with reference to correctness of Ex.B.21. Be that as it may. Correctness of Ex.B.21 is challenged on the ground that stamps were purchased on 08.10.1986 but the document was executed on 19.10.1987 and the document writer’s renewal licence was of the year 1988 as is mentioned on such a document of the year 1987. All those suspicious circumstances are shown with reference to correctness of Ex.B.21. Be that as it may. If this Court excludes Exs.B.4 and B.21 from consideration still no legal consequence follows with reference to Ex.B.20 GPA and Ex.A.4-registered sale deed. The only argument for plaintiffs/appellants is that if sale consideration was paid by defendant to Sri Bobba Venkata Rao under Ex.B.21 would it suit to common sense that he once again paid sale consideration and obtained one sale deed in the year 1993 for 400 square yards and another sale deed under Ex.A.4. According to the learned counsel, no prudent person would have paid sale consideration twice and therefore Ex.A.4 should be declared as null and void. While the argument cannot be stated to be meritless, yet its acceptance by itself does not invalidate either Ex.A.4-sale deed or Ex.B.20 GPA. In this regard a few more aspects concerning possession of the property are required to be noticed here. 46. According to the pleaded case of plaintiffs since 1981 when the original plaintiff left India for Algeria and till the suit is filed in the year 1995 he or his family has never been in physical occupation of any part of 800 square yards which he owns. It is the pleaded case of plaintiffs that since 1987 the defendant has been in possession of this property. One would see Exs.B.5 to B.11, B.13 to B.19 and B.28 to B.131 house tax receipts and electricity bills were produced by the defendant. Thus, plaintiff No.1 has not been exercising any control over this property. Whether the defendant came into possession of the property in terms of Ex.B.21-agreement for sale said to have been executed by Sri Bobba Venkata Rao or whether he has been put in possession by plaintiff No.1 as alleged by plaintiff No.1, the fact remains that it was the defendant who has been in occupation and exercising actual control over this property. Plaintiff No.1 as PW.1 and his wife as PW.2 and his wife’s brother as PW.3 while stated that there were tenants in the premises and they were got vacated by the defendant two months earlier to the filing of the suit in the year 1995, they admitted that there are no rent receipts, rent agreements and they do not even know the names of any of the tenants. Why is that? Huge information lapses on their part. It is so precisely because plaintiff No.1 executed Ex.B.4 dated 09.12.1981 in favour of Sri Bobba Venkata Rao and obtained his money and therefore he did not have any interest over this property. The question whether the defendant obtained Ex.B.21 from Sri Bobba Venkata Rao or not makes no difference so far as the validity of his possession and the title he obtained under the original of Ex.A.4. The trial Court rightly considered the entire evidence and reached to the right conclusions. The various aspects brought on record through evidence on peripheral facts have not really touched the core of the issue and the appellants failed to show invalidity of original of Ex.A.4 and Ex.B.20. The impugned judgment does not call for any interference. For all these reasons all the points are answered against the appellants/plaintiffs. 47. In the result, this Appeal is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.