Order : AVNEESH JHINGAN, J. 1. This is an appeal filed under Section 35-G of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (for brevity ‘the Act’) against the order dated 16.04.2018 of the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate, Tribunal (for short ‘the tribunal’). 2. The proposed questions of law are reproduced below:- “I. Whether the ld. CESTAT is correct in law in upholding that excise duty is payable on clearances of obsolete Moulds and Dies from the factory of the manufacturer appellant to the customer. II. Whether the ld. CESTAT is correct in law in disallowing the benefit of exemption under Notification No.67/1995-CE Dated 01/03/1995 when the Moulds and Dies were used in the factory of appellant and exemption is available under Notification on the basis of place of use i.e. “within the factory of production” which is not disputed – exemption should not be disallow on the ground that appellant issued invoices to their customers for getting payment of obsolete and worn out Moulds and Dies. III. Whether the ld. CESTAT is correct in law in upholding that excise duty is payable on clearances of obsolete Moulds and Dies from the factory of the manufacturer appellant to the customer without distinguishing the decision of the Tribunal in the identical matter of Elcon Clipsal India Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of C. Ex. Ahmedabad-I reported in 2002 (146) E.L.T. 360 (Tri. - Del.) which was being relied upon by the appellant.” 3. The brief facts are that the appellant is engaged in manufacturing of Bathroom Fittings. During the course of manufacturing, Dies and Moulds were manufactured for M/s. Parryware Roca Private Ltd., Chennai (for short ‘the company’) in the period 2007-08. After use, Dies and Moulds were returned to company without payment of excise duty. A show cause notice issued on 24.03.2011, culminated in adjudicating order dated 23.03.2012 creating a demand for excise duty, interest and penalty. The appellant was unsuccessful before the First Appellate Authority and the tribunal. Hence, the present appeal. 4. Learned counsel for respondent raises a preliminary objection that the appeal is not maintainable before this Court as the issue of exigibility to excise duty and claiming exemption under the Notification is involved. 5. Learned counsel for appellant submits that in case the proper interpretation is given to the Notification No.67/1997 CEE dated 01.03.2015, the issue of Dies and Moulds being exigible to excise duty shall not arise. 6. 5. Learned counsel for appellant submits that in case the proper interpretation is given to the Notification No.67/1997 CEE dated 01.03.2015, the issue of Dies and Moulds being exigible to excise duty shall not arise. 6. Before proceeding further it would be appropriate to reproduce Section 35G(1) and 35-L of the Central Excise Act, 1944 :- “Appeal to High Court- (1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court from every order passed in appeal by the Appellate Tribunal on or after the 1 st day of July, 2003 (not being an order relating, among other things, to the determination of any question having a relation to the rate of duty of excise or to the value of goods for purposes of assessment), if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law.” “35L. Appeal to Supreme Court.- {1} An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from - (a) An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from- (i) in an appeal made under section 35G; or (ii) on a reference made under section 35G by the Appellate Tribunal before the 1 st day of July, 2003; (iii) on a reference made under section 35H, in any case which, on its own motion or on an oral application made by or on behalf of the party aggrieved, immediately after passing of the judgment, the High Court certifies to be a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court; or (b) any order passed {before the establishment of the National Tax Tribunal} by the Appellate Tribunal relating, among other things, to the determination of any question having a relation to the rate of duty of excise or to the value of goods for purposes of assessment.” 7. Section 35(G) of the Act provides for appeal to the High Court against the order passed by the Tribunal, if this Court is satisfied that substantial questions of law is involved. The exception being the questions relating to rate of duty of excise or value of goods for the purpose of assessment. Section 35-L provides for the cases where the appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. As per Section 35-L(i)(b) on issue of determination of question relating to rate of duty, value of the goods for purpose of assessment, the appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. 8. Section 35-L provides for the cases where the appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. As per Section 35-L(i)(b) on issue of determination of question relating to rate of duty, value of the goods for purpose of assessment, the appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. 8. The Supreme Court in the case of Navin Chemicals Mfg. And Trading Co. Ltd. Vs. Collector of Customs reported in (1993) 4 SCC 320 has held as under:- “11. It will be seen that Sub-section 5 uses the said expression 'determination of any question having a relation to the rate of duty or to the value of goods for the purposes of assessment' and the Explanation thereto provides a definition of it 'for the purposes of this sub-section'. The Explanation says that the expression includes the determination of a question relating to the rate of duty; to the valuation of goods for purposes of assessment; to the classification of goods under the Tariff and whether or not they are covered by an exemption notification; and whether the value of goods for purposes/of assessment should be enhanced or reduced having regard to certain matters that the said Act provides for. Although this Explanation expressly confines the definition of the said expression to Sub-section 5 of Section 129-D, it is proper that the said expression used in the other parts of the said Act should be interpreted similarly. The statutory definition accords with the meaning we have, given to the said expression above. Questions relating to the rate of duty and to the value of goods for purposes of assessment are questions that squarely fall within the meaning of the said expression.” (emphasis supplied) 9. The Supreme Court in another case of Commissioner of Customs, Bangalore-1 Vs. Motorola India Ltd. reported in (2019) 9 SCC 563 has held as under:- “16. We are of the considered view that the Legislature has carved out only following categories of cases to which it has intended to give a special treatment of providing an appeal directly to the Court. Motorola India Ltd. reported in (2019) 9 SCC 563 has held as under:- “16. We are of the considered view that the Legislature has carved out only following categories of cases to which it has intended to give a special treatment of providing an appeal directly to the Court. (i) determination of a question relating to a rate of duty; (ii) determination of a question relating to the valuation of goods for the purpose of assessment; (iii) determination of a question relating to the classification of goods under the Tariff and whether or not they are covered by an exemption notification; (iv) whether the value of goods for purposes of assessment should be enhanced or reduced having regard to certain matters that the said Act provides for.” 10. The considered view is that the issue of Dies and Moulds being exigible to excise duty is involved and this is fortified from the substantial question of law formulated by the appellant i.e. “I. Whether the ld. CESTAT is correct in law in upholding that excise duty is payable on clearances of obsolete Moulds and Dies from the factory of the manufacturer appellant to the customer.” 11. The contention that if notification is give proper interpretation, the issue of exigibility to excise duty will not be involved has a fallacy. The contention of learned counsel for appellant in other words is that in case appellant succeeds in getting exemption under the notification, no excise duty would be leviable. This in facts tantamount to arguments as to whether the used Dies and Moulds are exigible to excise duty or not? 12. In view of the above, we are not inclined to entertain the present appeal on the ground of jurisdiction and the same is accordingly, dismissed as not maintainable.