JUDGMENT : (S.K. Medhi, J.) 1. The instant appeal has been preferred from jail against a judgment and order dated 06.12.2019 passed by the Addl. Sessions Judge, Udalguri in Sessions Case No. 13/2019 (GR Case No. 943/2018), whereby the appellant was convicted under Section 302 of the IPC and was sentenced to undergo R.I. for life and fine of Rs.10,000/-. 2. The said case involves the killing of the father by the appellant for which he has been convicted and sentenced vide the impugned judgment and order. 3. The criminal law was set into motion by lodging of an Ejahar on 16.09.2018 by PW-1. In the said Ejahar, it was alleged that on the previous day i.e., 15.09.2018 at around 5.30 a.m., an altercation took place between his brother-in-law (appellant) and father-in-law (deceased) over the issue of a bicycle in which the appellant, in a fit of rage hit on the head of the deceased with a piece of firewood which was lying nearby causing grievous injury causing the death of the deceased. 4. After registration of the Ejahar, the investigation had begun in which the appellant was arrested, statements of the witnesses were examined, the body was taken for post-mortem, Sketch Map was prepared and after completion of the formalities, the Charge Sheet was laid. Based on the above, charge was framed under Section 302 IPC [corresponding to Section 103 of the BNS] by the learned trial court and on its denial the trial had begun in which the prosecution had adduced evidence through 11 nos. of prosecution witnesses. 5. PW-1 is the informant, who is the son-in-law of the deceased and the brother-in-law of the appellant. He had deposed that he heard from the neighbour regarding the incident and accordingly had gone to the Gaonburah, who had called the police. He had also deposed of a confession made by the appellant before the police. The FIR was proved as Ext. 1. In his cross- examination he had clarified that he had not seen how the deceased had received the injuries and that his house was about half kilometer away from the place of occurrence. He had also deposed about the presence of the wife and mother-in-law in the house of the deceased at the time of the occurrence. 6. 1. In his cross- examination he had clarified that he had not seen how the deceased had received the injuries and that his house was about half kilometer away from the place of occurrence. He had also deposed about the presence of the wife and mother-in-law in the house of the deceased at the time of the occurrence. 6. PW-2 is a resident of the locality who had also similarly deposed of getting the information about the incident from his wife. He had accordingly gone to the place of occurrence where police was already there and the appellant had made a confession before the police. He is a witness to the seizure by which the firewood used in the assault was seized as Material Ext. 1 and the seizure list was proved as Ext. 2. In the cross-examination, he had clarified of not witnessing as to how the deceased had received the injuries. 7. PW-3 is another person of the locality who had similarly deposed of hearing about the incident while returning from the market and had accordingly gone to the place of occurrence. He had also deposed of the appellant making a confession before the police and is also a witness to the seizure list. 8. PW-4 had deposed about hearing the incident from the villagers and going to the place of occurrence. His further deposition is similar to that of PW-2 and PW-3. 9. PW-5 who is a resident of the locality had deposed of coming to know of the incident from PW-2 and PW-9 and on coming to the place of occurrence found the appellant sitting on a bench in the house. He had also deposed of the appellant making a confession before the police. In the cross-examination he clarified of not witnessing the incident. He is also a witness to the seizure list. 10. PW-6 who is also a person of the locality had stated that he came to learn about the incident and accordingly had gone to the place of occurrence and saw the appellant sitting on the verandah of the house and police was already there. He had however stated regarding the reason for the assault which was selling of a bicycle by the deceased and keeping the sale proceeds. He had however stated regarding the reason for the assault which was selling of a bicycle by the deceased and keeping the sale proceeds. In the cross- examination he had however admitted that at the relevant time, he was in his house which was at a distance of half a kilometre. 11. PW-7 is the Doctor who had conducted the post-mortem on the deceased. He had deposed of noticing multiple injuries and had given the opinion that the death was as a result of Neurogenic shock. For ready reference the opinion is extracted herein below: “In my opinion death is due to Neurogenic shock following multiple injuries sustained which are ante-mortem in nature. Time since death:16-20 hrs.” The post-mortem report was proved as Ext.3. 12. PW-8 who is the mother of the appellant and wife of the deceased is a crucial witness. She is an eyewitness to the incident and had deposed that the incident had occurred on the courtyard of their house in which the appellant had assaulted the deceased by a firewood and the deceased had fell down. She had however stated that the appellant had taken the deceased to the verandah and had also informed the villagers whereafter the police had also come. 13. PW-9 is a person of the locality who had deposed that while returning home from the market, he had heard about the incident. He had also similarly stated regarding confession made by the appellant before the police. In the cross-examination he had clarified that he had not seen the incident. 14. PW-10 is an IO who had played a role at a later point of time of submission of the Charge Sheet. He had deposed that the investigation was done by another IO who however was examined as PW-11. 15. PW-11 is the IO who had made the principal investigation. He had deposed that on 15.09.2018 at about 8.15 pm, a telephonic information was received leading to registration of GD Entry 330. On such information, he had gone to the place of occurrence and found the appellant sitting on the courtyard and he had showed the piece of firewood which was used for the assault. The FIR was accordingly lodged on the next day i.e., 16.09.2018. On such information, he had gone to the place of occurrence and found the appellant sitting on the courtyard and he had showed the piece of firewood which was used for the assault. The FIR was accordingly lodged on the next day i.e., 16.09.2018. He had also deposed of the steps taken in the investigation which included preparation of the sketch map, recording of the statements of the witnesses, sending the body for post-mortem, collecting the PM report and other formalities whereafter the Charge Sheet was laid. 16. After completion of the prosecution evidence, the incriminating materials were put to the appellant in his examination under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. [corresponding to Section 351 of the BNSS], where he had denied the truthfulness and veracity of the materials against him. 17. Based on the aforesaid materials and the response given by the appellant in the aforesaid examination, the impugned judgment has been passed which is the subject matter of challenge in the present appeal. 18. We have heard Shri A. Ahmed, learned Amicus Curiae for the appellant. We have also heard Ms. B. Bhuyan, learned Senior Advocate and Addl. Public Prosecutor, Assam. 19. Shri Ahmed, the learned Amicus Curiae has submitted that in the instant case, neither the intention nor the knowledge of the appellant to cause the death can be readily inferred. He had submitted that in view of the unshaken testimony of PW-8 who is the mother of the appellant, his scope of arguing that the appellant was not involved is very limited. He has however submitted that even if the involvement of the appellant is established, the aspect of the conviction and the sentence imposed upon the appellant has a scope to be re- examined and altered. He has submitted that as per the eyewitness herself, the appellant did not take undue advantage or fled away from the place of occurrence. It also appears from the evidence of PW-8 and other witnesses that when the police had arrived at the place of occurrence on being informed about the incident, the appellant was present. He has submitted that the conduct of the appellant, post the incident would show that he did not have any intention to cause the death of his father. It also appears from the evidence of PW-8 and other witnesses that when the police had arrived at the place of occurrence on being informed about the incident, the appellant was present. He has submitted that the conduct of the appellant, post the incident would show that he did not have any intention to cause the death of his father. He had also submitted that both the ocular evidence as well as the medical evidence would suggest that a single blow was given which would also lend credence to the aspect that there was no intention to cause the death. 20. In support of his submission, the learned Amicus Curiae has relied upon a judgment of this Court passed in Crl. A. (J)/24/2022 dated 29.11.2024 [ Dipak Urang vs. State of Assam ]. In the said judgment, the aspect of the difference between an offence under Section 299 [corresponding to Section 100 of the BNS] and 300 of the IPC [corresponding to Section 101 of the BNS] has been dealt with in which, reference has been made to the various decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 21. The learned Amicus Curiae accordingly submits that the present is a fit case wherein the conviction and sentence is liable to be altered. 22. Per contra, Ms. Bhuyan, the learned Addl. Public Prosecutor, has submitted that the offence involved is heinous which involves killing of his father by the appellant. She has also highlighted the aspect that it is the appellant who had shown the weapon (firewood) by which the assault was caused. She had also submitted that the evidence of PW-8 who is an eyewitness is unshaken and therefore the complicity of the appellant stood established beyond all reasonable doubt. She has also led us to the post-mortem report (Ext.-3) as per which there were multiple bruises seen over (R) Eyebrow, (L) Ear, (R) side of Head, (L) leg, (L) shoulder and two fractures were found on his scalp. She has submitted that the assault was made with such an impact that death was almost instantaneous and therefore it cannot be inferred that the appellant did not have the intention or the knowledge to cause the death of the deceased. 23. In support of her submission, the learned Addl. She has submitted that the assault was made with such an impact that death was almost instantaneous and therefore it cannot be inferred that the appellant did not have the intention or the knowledge to cause the death of the deceased. 23. In support of her submission, the learned Addl. Public Prosecutor has relied upon the case of Virsa Singh vs. State of Punjab reported in AIR 1958 SC 465 in which the following paragraphs have been pressed into service. “11. In considering whether the intention was to inflict the injury found to have been inflicted, the enquiry necessarily proceeds on broad lines as, for example, whether there was an intention to strike at a vital or a dangerous spot, and whether with sufficient force to cause the kind of injury found to have been inflicted. It is, of course, not necessary to enquire into every last detail as, for instance, whether the prisoner intended to have the bowels fall out, or whether he intended to penetrate the liver or the kidneys or the heart. Otherwise, a man who has no knowledge of anatomy could never be convicted, for, if he does not know that there is a heart or a kidney or bowels, he cannot be said to have intended to injure them. Of course, that is not the kind of enquiry. It is broad-based and simple and based on commonsense: the kind of enquiry that "twelve good men and true" could readily appreciate and understand. 12. To put it shortly, the prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring a case under S. 300 "thirdly"; First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present; Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved; These are purely objective investigations. Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional or that some other kind of injury was intended. Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds further and, Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender. 13. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender. 13. Once these four elements are established by the prosecution (and, of course, the burden is on the prosecution throughout) the offence is murder under S. 300 "thirdly". It does not matter that there was no intention to cause death. It does not matter that there was no intention to cause death. It does not matter that there was no intention even to cause an injury of a kind that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature (not that there is any real distinction between the two). It does not even matter that there is no knowledge that an act of that kind will be likely to cause death. Once the intention to cause the bodily injury actually found to be present is proved, the rest of the enquiry is purely objective and the only question is whether, as a matter of purely objective inference, the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. No one has a licence to run around inflicting injuries that are sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and claim that they are not guilty of murder. If they inflict injuries of that kind, they must face the consequences; and they can only escape if it can be shown, or reasonably deduced, that the injury was accidental or otherwise unintentional.” 24. The learned Addl. Public Prosecutor has also referred the case of Vadivelu Thevar vs. The State of Madras reported in AIR 1957 SC 614 on the aspect of credibility of a single witness. The relevant observation is extracted herein below: “In view of these considerations, we have no hesitation in holding that the contention that in a murder case, the court should insist upon plurality of witnesses, is much too broadly stated. Section 134 of the Indian Evidence Act, has categorically laid it down that "no particular number of witnesses shall, in any case, be required for the proof of any fact." The legislature determined, as long ago as 1872, presumably after the consideration of the pros and cons, that it shall not be necessary for proof or disproof of a fact, to call any particular number of witnesses. In England both before and after the passing of the Indian Evidence Act 1872, there have been a number of statutes as set out in Sarkar's 'Law of Evidence' - 9th Edition, at pages 1100 and 1101, forbidding convictions on the testimony of a single witness. The Indian Legislature has not insisted on laying down any such exceptions to the general rule recognized on S. 134 quoted above. The section enshrines the well recognized maxim that "Evidence has to be weighed and not counted." Our Legislature has given statutory recognition to the fact that administration of justice may be hampered if a particular number of witnesses were to be insisted upon. It is not seldom that a crime has been committed in the presence of only one witness, leaving aside those cases which are not of uncommon occurrence where determination of guilt depends entirely on circumstantial evidence. If the Legislature were to insist upon plurality of witnesses, cases where the testimony of a single witness only could be available in proof of the crime, would go unpunished. It is here that the discretion of the presiding judge comes into play. The matter thus must depend upon the circumstances of each case and the quality of the evidence of the single witness whose testimony has to be either accepted or rejected. If such a testimony is found by the court to be entirely reliable, there is no legal impediment to the conviction of the accused person on such proof. Even as the guilt of an accused person may be proved by the testimony of a single witness, the innocence of an accused person may be established on the testimony of a single witness, even though a considerable number of witnesses may be forthcoming to testify to the truth of the case for the prosecution. Hence, in our opinion, it is a sound and well- established rule of law that the court is concerned with the quality and not with the quantity of the evidence necessary for proving or disproving a fact. Generally speaking, oral testimony in this context may be classified into three categories, namely: (1) Wholly reliable. (2) Wholly unreliable. (3) Neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable.” 25. The aforesaid case has been referred in as much as in the present case there was only eyewitness namely, PW-8. 26. Generally speaking, oral testimony in this context may be classified into three categories, namely: (1) Wholly reliable. (2) Wholly unreliable. (3) Neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable.” 25. The aforesaid case has been referred in as much as in the present case there was only eyewitness namely, PW-8. 26. By reiterating that it is the quality of the witness and not the quantity, the learned Addl. Public Prosecutor has referred and relied upon the case of Veer Singh and Ors. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2014) 2 SCC 455 wherein the following observations have been made. 21. Legal system has laid emphasis on value, weight and quality of evidence rather than on quantity multiplicity or plurality of witnesses. It is not the number of witnesses but -quality of their evidence which is important as there is no requirement under the Law of Evidence that any particular number of witnesses is to be examined to prove/disprove a fact. Evidence must be weighed and not counted. It is quality and not quantity which determines the adequacy of evidence as has been provided under Section 134 of the Evidence Act. As a general rule the Court can and may act on the testimony of a single witness provided he is wholly reliable. 27. The learned Addl. Public Prosecutor has submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the conclusion arrived at by the learned trial court is justified and therefore the appeal is liable to be dismissed. 28. In his rejoinder, the learned Amicus Curiae for the appellant has submitted that the age of the appellant is also a relevant factor as at the time of the incident, he was only about 30 years. He has also reiterated that his conduct post the commission of the offence would lend support to the submission of absence of any intention or knowledge to cause the death of his father. 29. The rival submissions have been duly considered and the materials, including the TCRs placed before this Court have been carefully examined. 30. In the instant case, apart from the other evidence, there is an eyewitness (PW-8) who is none else but the mother of the appellant and the wife of the deceased. 29. The rival submissions have been duly considered and the materials, including the TCRs placed before this Court have been carefully examined. 30. In the instant case, apart from the other evidence, there is an eyewitness (PW-8) who is none else but the mother of the appellant and the wife of the deceased. The incident, as has been discussed is the killing of his father by the appellant by use of a firewood by which, a blow was given on the head of the deceased. 31. From the materials on record including the evidence of PW-6, the reason for the offence appears to be a trivial one involving the sale / use of a bicycle. It however appears that the assault which was made by the appellant was most likely one blow by a firewood. Though the material Ext. 1 relates to the seizure of the firewood and in this connection Ext. 2 is the seizure list, a perusal of the same exhibit does not give the dimension of the firewood and only the length has been stated to be 2 feet 2 inches. As such it is difficult on the part of this Court to ascertain the impact, if such firewood is used in the assault. Nonetheless, the medical evidence including the post-mortem report would show that two fractures were caused on the scalp of the deceased along with certain bruises on the head and face of the deceased. As such, it cannot be said that there was no forceful impact in the assault made. 32. It is also required to keep in mind the part of the body in which the assault was made. The same was made on the head of the deceased which is a vital part. Having said that it is also necessary to keep in mind the reasons for commission of the offence as well as the conduct of the appellant post commission of the offence. 33. In this connection, there are materials on record that the appellant had made a confession of his involvement in the offence and such deposition is made by PW-1, PW-2, PW-3, PW-4 and PW-5. It however appears that such confession has been made before the police and therefore would be hit by Section 25 [corresponding to Section 23 of the BSA] r/w Section 24 of the Indian Evidence Act [corresponding to Section 22 of the BSA]. It however appears that such confession has been made before the police and therefore would be hit by Section 25 [corresponding to Section 23 of the BSA] r/w Section 24 of the Indian Evidence Act [corresponding to Section 22 of the BSA]. It is the provision of law that confession which is made on inducement, promise or threat or in the custody of the police are not admissible in evidence and are irrelevant. 34. Though the confessions alleged to have been made would not be relevant, the aspect of the deposition made by the PW-8 as eyewitness which is unshaken cannot be ignored. The said evidence would, in fact establish the complicity of the appellant in commission of the offence and therefore, the aspect which needs our consideration is only to under what provision of law the conviction and sentence should be made. 35. It is on record, namely, the evidence of PW-5, PW-6 as well as the IO that after the commission of the offence, the appellant was found sitting in the courtyard and had not fled from the place of occurrence. The PW-8 who is the mother had also deposed that when the deceased had fell down on the ground after the assault, it is the appellant who had brought him to the verandah and thereafter informed the villagers whereafter the police had also come. 36. As discussed in the case of Dipak Urang (supra) (judgment dated 29.11.2024 passed in Crl.A.(J)/24/2022), the fine distinction between Section 299 [corresponding to Section 100 of the BNS]and Section 300[corresponding to Section 101 of the BNS], as explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases relied has been laid down. 37. Section 300 of the IPC lays down 5 exceptions where culpable homicide would not amount to murder. However, it is a settled law that an offence under Section 299 of the IPC not to fall under the offence of murder under Section 300 would not be restricted only to the five exceptions. For a culpable homicide to be murder, it must come within the four provisions of Section 300. Murder is the gravest form of culpable homicide. At this stage it will be beneficial to refer to the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of AP vs Rayavarapu Punnayya and Anr. reported in AIR 1977 SC 45 . “21. Murder is the gravest form of culpable homicide. At this stage it will be beneficial to refer to the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of AP vs Rayavarapu Punnayya and Anr. reported in AIR 1977 SC 45 . “21. From the above conspectus, it emerges that whenever a court is confronted with the question whether the offence is murder or culpable homicide not amounting to murder on the facts of a case, it will be convenient for it to approach the problem in three stages. The question to be considered at the first stage would be, whether the accused has done an act by doing which he has caused the death of another. Proof of such causal connection between the act of the accused and the death, leads to the second stage for considering whether that act of the accused amounts to “culpable homicide” as defined in Section 299. If the answer to this question is prima facie found in the affirmative, the stage for considering the operation of Section 300, Penal Code, is reached. This is the stage at which the Court should determine whether the facts proved by the prosecution bring the case within the ambit of any of the four Clauses of the definition of ‘murder’ contained in Section300. If the answer to this question is in the negative the offence would be ‘culpable homicide not amounting to murder’, punishable under the first or the second part of Section 304, depending, respectively, on whether the second or the third Clause of Sec. 299 is applicable. If this question is found in the positive, but the case comes within any of the Exceptions enumerated is Section 300, the offence would still be ‘culpable homicide not amounting to murder’, punishable under the First Part of Section 304, Penal Code.” 38. Further in the case of Kishore Singh and anr. vs. The State of M.P. reported in AIR 1977 SC 2267 it has been laid down as follows: “11. The distinction between culpable homicide (Section 299, I.P.C.) and murder (Section 300, I.P.C.) has always to be carefully borne in mind while dealing with a charge under Section 302, I.P.C. Under the category of unlawful homicides fall both cases of culpable homicide amounting to murder and those not amounting to murder. The distinction between culpable homicide (Section 299, I.P.C.) and murder (Section 300, I.P.C.) has always to be carefully borne in mind while dealing with a charge under Section 302, I.P.C. Under the category of unlawful homicides fall both cases of culpable homicide amounting to murder and those not amounting to murder. Culpable homicide is not murder when the case is brought within the five exceptions to Section 300, I.P.C. But even though none of the said five exceptions are pleaded or prima facie established on the evidence on record, the prosecution must still be required under the law to bring the case under any of the four clauses of Section 300. I. P. C. to sustain the charge of murder. If the prosecution fails to discharge this onus in establishing any one of the four clauses of Section 300, I. P. C., namely, 1stly to 4thly, the charge of murder would not be made out and the case may be one of culpable homicide not amounting to murder as described under S. 299, I. P. C.” 39. There is another aspect of the matter regarding the nature of the assault. In the instant case though death was caused by one blow, without knowing the dimension of the firewood involved in commission of the offence, it would be difficult on our part to readily come to an inference that there was an intention to cause the death. Therefore, it cannot be said that the impact was such that in all likelihood, death was to be caused. In this connection it would be beneficial to refer to the case of Abani K. Debnath and anr. Vs State of Tripura reported in 2005 13 SCC 422 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court on noticing that the death was caused by one blow of a dao in the spur of the moment which was preceded by a quarrel had converted the punishment from Section 302 of the IPC to 304 Part II. 40. In the case of Pularu vs. State of M.P. reported in AIR 1993 SC 1487 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court was dealing with a case where death was caused by a single blow with an agricultural equipment. It was held as follows: “7. That takes us to the nature of the offence. All the three eye- witnesses have spoken that the appellant dealt only one blow with the agricultural implement. It was held as follows: “7. That takes us to the nature of the offence. All the three eye- witnesses have spoken that the appellant dealt only one blow with the agricultural implement. Having regard to the time and the surrounding circumstances it is difficult to hold that he intended to cause the death of the deceased particularly, when he was not armed with any deadly weapon as such. As an agriculturist he must have been having a tabbal in his hands and if in those circumstances he dealt a single blow it is difficult to convict him by invoking clause (1) or (3) of Section 300, I.P.C. It cannot be said that he intended to cause that particular injury which unfortunately resulted in the fracture of bones. Therefore, the offence committed by him would be one amounting to culpable homicide punishable under Section 304, Part-II I.P.C. We accordingly set aside the conviction of the appellant under Section 302, I.P.C. and sentence of imprisonment for life awarded thereunder. Instead we convict him under Sec. 304, Part-II, I.P.C. and sentence him to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for seven years. The appeal is partly allowed to the extent indicated hereinabove.” 41. In view of the aforesaid discussions, we are of the considered opinion that the conviction be made not under Section 300[corresponding to Section 101 of the BNS] but would come under Section 299 [corresponding to Section 100 of the BNS] pertaining to culpable homicide not amounting to murder. As such, we are of the view that the sentence is required to be altered to be under Section 304 Part II of the IPC [corresponding to Section 105 of the BNS]. We accordingly alter the sentence to one of rigorous imprisonment of 7 (seven) years and with a fine of Rs.5,000/-(Rupees Five Thousand only) in default of which simple imprisonment for 2 (two) months. 42. Send back the TCRs. 43. For the valuable assistance rendered by Shri A. Ahmed, the learned Amicus Curiae, we record our appreciation and he would be entitled to the prescribed fee.