JUDGMENT : M.A.ABDUL HAKHIM, J. 1. These appeals arise from O.S No.345/2004 of the Principal Sub Court Palakkad, which was filed for partition of A & B schedule properties. The plaintiff is the appellant in both the appeals. Even though partition is sought with respect to plaint A and B Schedule properties, B schedule property was later deleted with leave to institute a fresh suit for the same. The properties included in Plaint A Schedule are the properties included in the C schedule of Ext.A11 Partition Deed dt. 10.02.1973. 2. Admitted facts are that the parties belonged to Hindu Ezhava community. Raman, grandfather of the plaintiff, had three sons- Rakkandi, Kittu, and Theethan (1 st defendant). His wife was Nagunni. Raman died around 1952. The plaintiff is the son of 1 st defendant. The plaintiff and his sisters, who are the defendants 6 to 8, are the children of the 1 st defendant in his first marriage with Janaki. On the death of Janaki, the 1st defendant married the 2nd defendant, and the defendants 3 to 5 are the sons born in that wedlock. The aforesaid children and wife of Raman executed Ext.A11 Partition Deed in the year 1973, partitioning the properties among them in which C schedule properties were allotted to the 1 st defendant. The 1 st defendant executed Ext.B1 to B5 Settlement Deeds of the years 2003 and 2004 with respect to the Plaint schedule properties in favour of the defendants 2 to 5. The 1 st defendant had executed Exts.B6 and B7 registered Wills bequeathing his estate in favour of defendants 2 to 5. The 1 st defendant died on 08.05.2005 during the pendency of the suit after filing Written Statement. The defendants 6 to 8 were impleaded as the remaining legal heirs of the 1 st defendant as other legal heirs are already in the party array. There ends the admitted facts. 3. The suit is filed by the plaintiff on the claim that the Plaint A Schedule properties are the ancestral properties of the Joint Family headed by Raman. Plaint B schedule property is acquired by the 1 st defendant and his brothers out of the profits from Plaint A schedule properties. There ends the admitted facts. 3. The suit is filed by the plaintiff on the claim that the Plaint A Schedule properties are the ancestral properties of the Joint Family headed by Raman. Plaint B schedule property is acquired by the 1 st defendant and his brothers out of the profits from Plaint A schedule properties. Since the Plaint Schedule properties are allotted to the branch of the 1 st defendant as per Ext.A11 of the year 1973, it has the character of joint family property consisting of the plaintiffs and the defendants 2 to 5. The plaintiff is having birth right in the plaint schedule properties. On the abolition of joint family as on 1.12.1976, the plaintiff became a co-owner having 1/5 share in the plaint schedule properties. The 1 st defendant had only 1/5 share in the plaint schedule properties. The 1 st defendant did not have a sound disposing mind to execute Ext.B1 to B5 settlement deeds. Those documents are executed exerting undue influence, coercion, misrepresentation, and fraud on the 1 st defendant, and hence, those documents are null and void. On the death of the 1 st defendant, his 1/5 share is liable to be divided among the plaintiff and the defendants 2 to 8. Thus, as per the amended Plaint, the plaintiff claims 1/5 share as a coparcener and 1/8 share out of the 1/5 share of the 1 st defendant as the legal heir of the 1 st defendant calculating the total share as 9/40. 4. The defendants 1 to 3 opposed the suit prayers, contending that plaint A schedule properties are not ancestral properties. Raman had only a homestead held on Kudiyiruppa. Raman was a toddy tapper. Raman had no other property or source of income. Three sons of Raman had set up separate hearths and homes with separate living. They had taken lease of cultivable lands. The first defendant, in addition, pursued other avocations such as Paddy Procuring Agency, Abkari, fertilizer business, Etc. There was no jointness in food, worship, and estate. The three brothers purchased properties in their joint names, pooling their earnings, and they never intended to treat it as belonging to the group consisting of them as their progeny. The division as per Ext.A11 was not on per stripes. The properties allotted to each of the sharers are his individual and exclusive property. The three brothers purchased properties in their joint names, pooling their earnings, and they never intended to treat it as belonging to the group consisting of them as their progeny. The division as per Ext.A11 was not on per stripes. The properties allotted to each of the sharers are his individual and exclusive property. Hence, C schedule properties in Ext.A11 allotted to the 1st defendant, which is included in the plaint schedule properties, are the exclusive properties of the 1st defendant, and hence, the plaintiff did not derive any birthright. The 1 st defendant voluntarily executed Ext.B1 to B4 settlement deeds transferring the properties in favour of the defendants 2 to 5. The 1 st defendant had executed Ext.B7 registered Will of the year 1999 bequeathing his estate in favour of defendants 2 to 5. The 1 st defendant had sound disposing capacity at the time of executing those documents. The said documents are not vitiated in any manner. On the basis of the aforesaid documents, the plaint schedule properties exclusively belonged to the defendants 2 to 5, and the same are not available for partition. 5. The Trial Court found that the plaint A schedule properties are ancestral properties, and hence the plaintiff and the defendants 3 to 5 acquired right by birth over the same. The Trial Court found that after the enforcement of the Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act, 1975, the 1 st defendant and his sons became tenants in common by virtue of the notional partition having 1/5 share each. It is also found that as per Ext.B1 to B5 Settlements Deeds and Ext.B7 Will, the 1/5 right of the 1 st defendant is derived by the defendants 2 to 5, and hence, the said 1/5 share of the 1 st defendant is not liable to be partitioned among the legal heirs of the 1 st defendant and that the plaintiff and defendants 6 to 8 did not acquire any right over plaint A schedule properties. The 1/5 share of the 1 st defendant was allotted equally to the defendants 2 to 5. The suit was decreed, passing a preliminary decree for partition dividing the plaint A schedule properties into 20 equal shares and allotting 4 shares to the plaintiff, one share to the 2nd defendant, and 5 shares each to the defendants 3 to 5. The 1/5 share of the 1 st defendant was allotted equally to the defendants 2 to 5. The suit was decreed, passing a preliminary decree for partition dividing the plaint A schedule properties into 20 equal shares and allotting 4 shares to the plaintiff, one share to the 2nd defendant, and 5 shares each to the defendants 3 to 5. The plaintiff is allowed to get a share of profits from defendants 2 to 5, the quantum of which is directed to be decided in the final decree proceedings. 6. The defendants 2 to 5, 7, and 8 filed A.S No.357/2010 before the First Appellate Court challenging the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court. The plaintiff filed Cross objection in A.S No. 357/2010. AS No.357/2010 is filed challenging the judgment and decree of the Trial Court so far as it finds that the plaint A schedule properties were ancestral properties in which the plaintiff and the defendants 1 to 5 are having birth right and ordering partition in accordance with that. The Cross objection filed by the plaintiff was challenging the judgment and decree of the Trial Court so far as it upheld Ext.B1 to B5 and B7 and allotting the share of the 1 st defendant to the defendants 2 to 5 on the basis of the same. The First Appellate Court allowed A.S No.357/2010 setting aside the judgment and decree of the Trial Court and dismissing the suit, holding that plaint A schedule property is the exclusive property derived by the 1 st defendant as per C schedule of Ext.A11 Partition deed and he transferred the entire property in favour of the defendants 2 to 5 as per Ext.B1 to B5 and B7 documents. The Cross objection filed by the plaintiff was disallowed. 7. The plaintiff filed R.S.A No.852/2015 challenging the judgment and decree in Cross Objection in A.S No.357/2010 of the First Appellate Court. The plaintiff filed R.S.A No.853/2015 challenging the judgment and decree in A.S No. 357/2010 of the First Appellate Court. This Court admitted both these Regular Second Appeals on the following substantial questions of law. 7. The plaintiff filed R.S.A No.852/2015 challenging the judgment and decree in Cross Objection in A.S No.357/2010 of the First Appellate Court. The plaintiff filed R.S.A No.853/2015 challenging the judgment and decree in A.S No. 357/2010 of the First Appellate Court. This Court admitted both these Regular Second Appeals on the following substantial questions of law. 1.Whether the finding of the lower appellate court that the properties in C schedule to the Exhibit A11 partition is not a joint family property and it is a self acquired property of the late 1st defendant is sustainable in law in view of the settled position of the Hindu Mitakshara Law? 2. Whether the appellant is entitled to get right by birth over the plaint schedule properties under the Hindu Mitakshara Law? 3. Whether findings of the first appellate court that Exts.B1 to B7 are valid documents and holding the same executed by the late 1 st defendant is legal? 4. Whether the 1 st defendant had the right and authority to execute the settlement deeds and Wills in favour of his wife and children? 8. I heard the learned counsel for the appellant Sri.O Ramachandran Nambiar and the learned Senior Counsel for the respondents 1 to 4 Sri N.N.Sugunapalan instructed by Adv.Sri.S. Sujin. 9. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that there is ample evidence before the Trial Court to prove that Plaint A schedule properties are ancestral properties derived by the 1 st defendant as per C schedule of Ext. A11 Partition Deed. Raman was an agriculturist. There was enough evidence to hold that there was ancestral joint family property. The properties acquired by the 1 st defendant and his two brothers as per Ext.A5 to A10 by their joint efforts using the profits from the joint family nucleus. The acquisition of the properties in the joint names of all the brothers who constituted the coparcenary alone is sufficient to hold that the said properties are purchased out of the nucleus of the joint family property. Ext.A11 itself would reveal that ancestral properties are available in the joint family. Even though it is stated that the rest of the properties are acquired by them by their individual and joint efforts, the same is proved to be incorrect on account of the attending circumstances. Ext.A11 itself would reveal that ancestral properties are available in the joint family. Even though it is stated that the rest of the properties are acquired by them by their individual and joint efforts, the same is proved to be incorrect on account of the attending circumstances. Learned Counsel contended that it is admitted by the defendants 2 to 5 that Exts.A1 to A4 are of ancestral properties. Exts.A12 to A14 would prove that the properties covered therein are joint family properties. When DW1 himself admits that his knowledge is only hearsay, his evidence could not be relied on even in the absence of any cross examination. 10. The learned counsel for the appellant cited the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bhagwan Dayal v. Mst. Reoti Devi [ AIR 1962 SC 287 ], in which the g eneral principle laid down is that every Hindu family is presumed to be joint unless the contrary is proved, but this presumption can be rebutted by direct evidence or by course of conduct. The learned counsel cited the decision of the Patna High Court in Jugal Kishore Singh & Ors. v. Govind Singh & Ors. [AIR 1992 Patna 128], in which it is held that where the parties are governed by Mitakshara Hindu Law, there is a presumption of jointness, and the burden to prove partition is on the person who asserts. 11. The learned counsel cited the decision of this Court in Abdulla Kunji Pokkarukutty & Anr. V. Ayyappan Ravunny [ AIR 1973 Ker. 192 ] and the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Jandhyala Sreerama Sarma & Ors v. Nimmagadda Krishna Venamma & Ors. [ AIR 1957 AP 434 ] to substantiate the normal presumption that the senior most member is the manager of the Hindu joint family and that if anybody wants to displace the ordinary presumption, it is incumbent on that person to prove the facts rebutting the said presumption. 12. The learned counsel cited the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mallesappa Bennappa Desai & Anr. v. Desai Mallappa @ Mallesappa & Anr. 12. The learned counsel cited the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mallesappa Bennappa Desai & Anr. v. Desai Mallappa @ Mallesappa & Anr. [ AIR 1961 SC 1268 ] to substantiate the point that where a Manager of a Hindu Joint Family claims that any immovable property had been acquired by him with his own separate funds and not with the help of joint family funds of which he was in possession and charge, it is for him to prove by clear and satisfactory evidence his plea that purchase money proceeded from separate fund and that the onus of proof must in such a case be placed on the manager and not on his coparceners. If the said principle is applied to the present facts of the case, the burden is entirely on defendants 2 to 5 to prove that the properties were acquired by the first defendant with his own separate funds and not with the help of joint family funds. The learned counsel cited the decision of Madras High Court in Sankara Narayanan & Anr. v. The Official Receiver, Tirunelveli & Ors [AIR 1977 Madras 171] to substantiate the point that the onus is on the Kartha to prove that the property was acquired by separate funds. The learned counsel cited the decision of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in Parma Nand v. Sudama Ram & Ors. [ AIR 1994 HP 87 ] in which it is held that when possession of an adequate nucleus is shown the onus shifts on the person who claims the property as self acquired to show that he has purchased the property in question with his individual resources without the aid of joint family assets. Counsel contended that since the joint family nucleus is proved, the burden is on the defendants 2 to 4 to show that the plaint schedule property is the self acquired property of the 1 st defendant. 13. The learned counsel cited the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Yudhishter v. Ashok Kumar [ AIR 1987 SC 558 ] to substantiate the point that the moment when a son is born he gets share in the father's property and becomes part of the coparcenary and that his right accrues to him not on the death of the father or inheritance from the father but with the very fact of his birth. 14. 14. The learned counsel cited the decision of the Orissa High Court in Binod Jena & Anr. v. Abdul Hamid Khan & Ors. AIR 1975 Orissa 159] reiterating the leading principle in the Hindu law that in the absence of proof of division, the presumption is that every Hindu family is joint in food, worship, and estate and this presumption is stronger in the case of brothers than in the case of cousins and the farther one goes from the founder of the family the presumption becomes weaker and weaker; that where two brothers of a joint family acquires property by their joint labour such properties, in the absence of a clear indication to the contrary, would also be presumed to be owned by them as joint family property and their male issues would necessarily acquire a right by birth in such properties and that the burden is on the person who alleged that the two brothers were separate at the time of acquisition. 15. The learned counsel cited the decision of this Court in Narayanan Nair v. Taluk Land Board [ 1987 (1) KLT 760 ], in which the term ancestral property is explained. It is useful to extract Paragraph No.3 of the said decision. “3. The term "ancestral property" denotes the property which descends upon one person in such manner that his main issue acquired certain rights in it as against him. It would be ancestral property if the father had inherited the same as an unobstructed property and it is not an ancestral property if it has been inherited by him as obstructed property. In the case of ancestral property father had a vested interest in the property before the inheritance fell in and therefore his son acquires similar interest in the property before descent took place. Hence all property which a man inherits from a direct male ancestor not exceeding three degrees higher than himself is ancestral property.” 16. The learned counsel for the appellant concluded his arguments by submitting that the plaintiff has adduced sufficient evidence for proving the existence of a joint family and the existence of joint family property, and defendants 2 to 5 failed to establish that the later acquisitions are their self-acquired properties without the aid of joint family property. 17. The learned counsel for the appellant concluded his arguments by submitting that the plaintiff has adduced sufficient evidence for proving the existence of a joint family and the existence of joint family property, and defendants 2 to 5 failed to establish that the later acquisitions are their self-acquired properties without the aid of joint family property. 17. On the other hand, the learned Senior counsel for the contesting respondents contended that the presumption available is only with respect to the joint family and there is no presumption that joint family is having nucleus. The party who claims that the properties are purchased using the joint family funds, has to prove that the joint family was having nucleus and the same was adequate for the acquisition of the properties in the name of members of the joint family. DW1 has specifically stated in his chief affidavit that three brothers have different businesses and different houses, and they have been residing separately. The said evidence was not cross examined by the plaintiff. The plaintiff can claim that the plaint schedule properties are ancestral properties only if it is proved that the members have been residing together. 18. The learned Senior Counsel for the contesting respondents cited the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mudigowda Gowdappa Sankh v. Ramachandra Rev Gowda Sankh [ (1969) 1 SCC 386 ] to substantiate the point that there is no presumption that a Hindu family merely because it is joint, possess any joint property; that the burden of proving that any particular property is joint family property is in the first instance upon the person who claims it as a coparcenary property; that if the possession of a nucleus of a joint family is either admitted or proved any acquisition made by a member of that family is presumed to be joint family property; that it is only after possession of an adequate nucleus is shown the onus shifts on to the person who claims the property as self-acquisition to affirmatively make out that the property was acquired without the aid from the family estate. On the strength of the said decision, the learned Senior Counsel contended that there is no evidence as to the nucleus of a joint family and that the same was adequate to acquire the properties purchased in the name of three brothers who are the sons of Raman. 19. On the strength of the said decision, the learned Senior Counsel contended that there is no evidence as to the nucleus of a joint family and that the same was adequate to acquire the properties purchased in the name of three brothers who are the sons of Raman. 19. The learned Senior Counsel cited the decision of this Court in Viswanathan v. Ramankutty & Ors. [ 1975 KLT 434 ], in which the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mudigowda (supra) is followed after referring to the texts on Hindu Law. The learned Senior Counsel cited the decision of this Court in Vilasini v. Kuttappu [ 1989 (1) KLT 502 ] and contended that in the case of acquisitions without the aid of a family nucleus, the presumption of joint family property can be drawn only if it is established that the acquirers were living together under the same roof and the acquisitions were made by joint labour. The learned Senior Counsel pointed out that if the acquisitions were made only for treating it as a partnership property, it is governed by the Partnership Act, and on the death of one of the members, it will devolve upon his legal heirs and not by survivorship. 20. The learned Senior Counsel concluded by citing the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India & Ors. v. Vasaavi Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. & Ors. [ (2014) 2 SCC 269 ] that in a title suit, the plaintiff has to establish his title and weakness of the defendant is not a ground for declaring title to the plaintiff. Questions of law Nos.1 and 2 21. These two Substantial questions of law decide the fate of R.S.A No.853/2015. 22. Certain principles can be deduced in the light of the law laid down in the aforesaid decisions cited by both sides. Every Hindu family is presumed to be joint in the absence of any evidence to the contrary. Such a presumption would not lead to the presumption that the joint family is having joint property. Once it is proved that there existed a joint family property and income is generated out of it, all further acquisitions are presumed as acquisitions by the joint family, even if the same are purchased in the names of members. The burden of proving a joint family nucleus is on the person who asserts it. Once it is proved that there existed a joint family property and income is generated out of it, all further acquisitions are presumed as acquisitions by the joint family, even if the same are purchased in the names of members. The burden of proving a joint family nucleus is on the person who asserts it. In the absence of proof of sufficient joint family nucleus, all subsequent acquisitions in the names of the members are presumed as their self-acquired properties. When the properties are purchased in the name of the Manager or some of the Senior members of the joint family, the presumption of joint family property is more stronger. If any of the members claim that a property is his self-acquired property without any aid from a joint family fund, the burden is entirely on such person to prove it. If any member claims partition and individual allotment, it is for him to prove it. 23. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principles of law, the pleadings and evidence of the case are to be appreciated. 24. The existence of a Hindu joint family under the managership of Raman, father of the 1st defendant, is not disputed. The existence of joint family property is also proved by Exts.A1 to A5. The subsequent acquisitions are proved by Exts.A6 to A10. Exts.A6 to A10 acquisitions were made in the names of all three sons of Raman jointly. The plaintiff claimed that Raman was an agriculturist, and using the income from joint family property, the subsequent acquisitions were made. On the other hand, defendants 2 to 5 contended that Raman was a toddy tapper and he was not having sufficient income to acquire the properties. In Exts.A1 to A4, Raman and his sons are referred to as Agriculturists. The defendants 2 to 5 could not adduce any evidence to prove that Raman was a toddy tapper. The pleading of defendants 1 to 5 is that apart from agriculture, the 1st defendant had several other businesses such as Paddy Procuring Agency, Abkari contract, Fertilizer business, Etc. This pleading is made to show that the 1 st defendant was having income from his own business to acquire the properties. There is no evidence to prove the aforesaid businesses of the 1 st defendant. Rakkandi is the Senior most son of Raman. This pleading is made to show that the 1 st defendant was having income from his own business to acquire the properties. There is no evidence to prove the aforesaid businesses of the 1 st defendant. Rakkandi is the Senior most son of Raman. The presumption is that after the death of Raman, Rakkandi was the Manager of the joint family. The properties covered by Exts.A6 to A10 are purchased in the joint names of three brothers. The defendants, 1 to 5, contended that the brothers were having individual business and residence. In such a case, the reason for purchasing Ext.A6 to A10 properties in their joint names is not disclosed by defendants 1 to 5. There is no evidence with respect to the separate income and contribution of each of the brothers to purchase Ext.A6 to A10 properties. Ext.A1 is the lease deed of the year 1946 executed by Rakkandi in favour of the intermediary. Rakkandi (Senior) was the Manager of the joint family before Raman. On the death of Rakkandi (Senior), Raman became the Manager. Ext.A2 is the Kanam assignment Deed of the year 1957 in the name of all three brothers. Ext.A3 of the year 1953 and Ext.A4 of the year 1952 are Assignment Deeds in favour of Raman when he was the Manager. Ext.A5 is the Assignment Deed of the year 1957 in the name of all three brothers. Exts.A6 to A10 are Assignment Deeds in favour of the three brothers. Exts.A1 to A10 would prove that the properties were purchased either in the name of the Manager or in the names of all the three brothers. Exts A1 to A4 would prove that the agricultural properties therein were the joint family nucleus. Since all the properties are agricultural properties, it could easily be presumed that those properties were income generating properties. In the absence of any proof of separate income for the three brothers, it could only be presumed that the acquisitions, as per Exts.A5 to A10, are made for the joint family. Ext.A11 partition among the three brothers and their mother was executed on 10.02.1973. After Ext.A11, the 1 st defendant purchased jenmom rights from the Jenmee Tharavadu as per Exts.A12 and A13. Rakkandi also purchased jenmom rights from the Jenmee Tharavadu as per Ext.A14. Ext.A11 partition among the three brothers and their mother was executed on 10.02.1973. After Ext.A11, the 1 st defendant purchased jenmom rights from the Jenmee Tharavadu as per Exts.A12 and A13. Rakkandi also purchased jenmom rights from the Jenmee Tharavadu as per Ext.A14. Ext.A15 is the Partition Deed of the year 1948 in the Jenmee Tharavadu, in which it is specifically stated that the properties are outstanding on agricultural lease in favour of the family of the plaintiff and the defendants. By these documents, the plaintiff has sufficiently proved that the plaint schedule properties are joint family properties. The defendants 1 to 5 could not adduce any evidence to prove that the properties are self acquired properties of the three brothers. 25. The learned Senior Counsel for the contesting respondents pointed out that the 5 th defendant/DW1 has specifically deposed that the three brothers started residing separately in independent houses after their marriage, and this evidence is not cross-examined by the plaintiff. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant, DW1 has specifically stated in cross-examination that he was born in the year 1974, and his knowledge with respect to matters before 1974 is only hearsay. In such a case, the evidence of DW1 could not be relied on by defendants 2 to 5, even if he was not cross-examined on all points. When a Witness admits that what is deposed by him is from hearsay knowledge, his evidence could not be relied on, even if he was not cross-examined by the opposite party. 26. DW 2 was examined as the attesting witness to Ext.B1 to B4, and DW3 was examined as the attesting Witness to Ext.B7 Will. They have not deposed anything with respect to the nature and character of the plaint schedule properties. Since DW1, who was born after Ext.A11, admitted that his knowledge prior to his birth is only hearsay and no document was produced by the defendants 2 to 5 to prove that the properties are self-acquired properties, practically no evidence is there before the Court to hold that the plaint schedule properties are the self-acquired properties of the three brothers. 27. In Ext.A11, the recital is that there are only a few ancestral properties, and the remaining are self-acquired properties of the three brothers. 27. In Ext.A11, the recital is that there are only a few ancestral properties, and the remaining are self-acquired properties of the three brothers. Even though the mother of the three brothers, Nagunni is a party to Ext.A11, it is seen that she was not having any pre-existing right over any of the properties mentioned therein. It appears that she was made a party to Ext.A11 only to ensure her maintenance. The properties partitioned as per Ext.A11 are joint family properties, though it stood in the joint names of its members. The 1 st defendant obtained C schedule properties in Ext.A11 as ancestral properties. Since the properties allotted to the 1 st defendant are ancestral properties, the plaintiff, being a member of the branch headed by the 1 st defendant is having birth right over the same along with the defendants 1 and 3 to 5. On the implementation of the Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act, 1976, the joint tenancy of the plaintiff and the defendants 1 & 3 to 5 became tenancy-in-common, having 1/5 share each. The plaint schedule properties are liable to be partitioned allotting 1/5 share each to the plaintiff and the defendants 1 and 3 to 5. The Substantial Question of law No. 1 is answered in the negative, and the Substantial Question of law No.2 is answered in the affirmative, both in favour of the appellant. Questions of law Nos.3 and 4 28. These two Substantial questions of law decide the fate of R.S.A No.852/2015. 29. The question to be considered is whether 1/5 share derived by the 1 st defendant is liable to be partitioned among his legal heirs or to be as settled in favour of the defendants 2 to 5 on the basis of Exts.B1 to B7. 30. Exts.B1 to B5 are the Settlement Deeds executed by the 1st defendant in favour of the defendants 2 to 4. The contention of the plaintiff is that defendants 2 to 5 executed those documents by threat, coercion, undue influence, and misrepresentation. The 1 st defendant who executed those documents filed a Written Statement specifically stating that he executed those documents freely, voluntarily, and knowing the contents. It is also stated that the 1 st defendant executed those documents with the intention to give those properties to defendants 2 to 5. The 1 st defendant who executed those documents filed a Written Statement specifically stating that he executed those documents freely, voluntarily, and knowing the contents. It is also stated that the 1 st defendant executed those documents with the intention to give those properties to defendants 2 to 5. The defendants 2 to 5 examined DW2 as the attesting witness of Exts.B1 to B4. DW2 has deposed that the 1 st defendant was having sound disposing capacity at the time of executing those documents. The defendants 2 to 5 examined DW3 as the attesting witness of Ext.B7 Will. The Trial Court and the First Appellate Court relied on the statement of the 1 st defendant in his Written Statement and the evidence of DWs 1 to 3 to uphold Exts.B1 to B7. There is no pleading in the plaint that the 1 st defendant was incapable of protecting his interest. There is nothing to doubt the evidence of the attesting witnesses. The learned counsel for the appellant could not point out any perversity in the matter of appreciation of pleadings and evidence with respect to Ext.B1 to B7 from the part of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court. The Trial Court rightly found that defendants 2 to 5 are entitled to the 1/5 share of the 1 st defendant on the basis of Exts.B1 to B7. 31. The Substantial Question of Law Nos. 3 and 4 are answered in the affirmative, both against the appellant. 32. In view of the above answers to the Substantial questions of law, R.S.A No.852/2015 is dismissed without costs confirming the judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court in the Cross Appeal in A.S.No.357/2010 and R.S.A No.853/2015 is allowed without costs setting aside the judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court in A.S.No.357/2010 and restoring the judgment and decree of the Trial Court in O.S No.345/2004.