Order : (ANOOP KUMAR DHAND, J.) 1. By way of filing the instant writ petition, a challenge has been led to the impugned order dated 29.09.2006 passed by the respondents by which the petitioner has been punished with penalty of Censure and a recovery of amount to the tune of Rs.5 Lakhs from his Leave Encashment dues. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that a charge- sheet under Regulation 60 of the Food Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as “the Regulations of 1971”) was served with certain charges on the petitioner on 22.09.2006 just seven days before his retirement i.e. on 30.09.2006 for the charges pertaining to year 2002-04. Learned counsel submits that two days time was granted to the petitioner for filing reply and without conducting any enquiry as per the requirement of Regulation 60-B of the Regulations of 1971 straightway the petitioner has been punished with the aforesaid punishment order. Learned counsel submits that the order was passed in a hasty manner without taking into account the defence/reply submitted by the petitioner. Learned counsel submits that unless and until an enquiry is conducted against the petitioner, he cannot be held guilty for any misconduct, hence under these circumstances, the respondents have violated the principles of natural justice. In support of his submissions, he has placed reliance upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Food Corporation of India versus Sarat Chandra Goswami reported in 2014 (13) SCC 211 3. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents opposed the arguments raised by learned counsel for the petitioner and submitted that the petitioner has been punished with minor penalty and not a major penalty, hence under these circumstances, the respondents were not supposed to conduct an enquiry. Learned counsel submits that on the basis of the charge- sheet and reply submitted by the respondents, the Disciplinary Authority has passed an order of punishment holding the petitioner guilty and, accordingly, he was punished with penalty of censure and a recovery of amount of Rs.5 Lakhs from his Leave Encashment dues. Learned counsel submits that the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority was appealable before the statutory authority but without availing the alternative statutory remedy, the petitioner has straightway approached this Court by way of filing this writ petition. Hence, the writ petition is liable to be rejected. 4. Learned counsel submits that the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority was appealable before the statutory authority but without availing the alternative statutory remedy, the petitioner has straightway approached this Court by way of filing this writ petition. Hence, the writ petition is liable to be rejected. 4. In rejoinder, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the punishment order was passed by the Managing Director and the appellate authority was the Chairman and at that relevant time the same person was holding both the aforementioned posts, hence under these circumstances, there was no logic in filing the appeal against the same authority, hence under these circumstances, the petitioner has approached this Court by way of filing this writ petition. 5. Heard and considered the submissions made at Bar and perused the material available on record. 6. Perusal of the record indicates that the due date of retirement of the petitioner was 30.09.2006 and just seven days before his retirement, a charge-sheet in question was served upon the petitioner under Regulation 60 of the Regulations of 1971 on 22.09.2006 pertaining to the charges occurring in the year 2002- 04. It appears that the respondents were sleeping over the matter and they did not take any action against the petitioner at the relevant time and they woke up at the fag end of the service of petitioner, i.e. just seven days before the retirement of the petitioner. The memorandum of charge-sheet was served on 22.09.2006 with various charges against which the petitioner submitted a detailed representation with regard to his defence on the said charges but without holding any enquiry as contemplated under Regulation 60-B of the Regulations of 1971 straightway the punishment order was passed by the respondents holding the petitioner as guilty and, accordingly, the punishment of censure and recovery of amount of Rs.5 Lakhs from the Leave Encashment dues of the petitioner was passed. 7. In the considered opinion of this Court, the respondents were supposed to conduct an enquiry before passing the impugned order. Such action on the part of the respondents has resulted in violation of principles of natural justice. 8. A similar controversy came up before the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sarat Chandra Goswami (supra) wherein the facts were identical and the delinquent therein was also punished with the same penalty of Censure and recovery of a sum of Rs. 5 Lakhs. 8. A similar controversy came up before the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sarat Chandra Goswami (supra) wherein the facts were identical and the delinquent therein was also punished with the same penalty of Censure and recovery of a sum of Rs. 5 Lakhs. The aforesaid action taken by the respondent-Food Corporation of India was assailed by the delinquent -Sarat Chandra Goswami before the concerned High Court and the punishment order was quashed by the High Court in his Writ Petition No.16812/2006. The aforesaid order was assailed by the FCI before the Hon’ble Apex Court by way of filing Civil Appeal No.7201–7202 of 2008, however, the same was dismissed on 21.05.2014 with the following observations and directions:- “5. The controversy, as it seems to us, centres around interpretation of Regulation 60 and hence, we think it appropriate to reproduce the said Regulation. It reads as follows: "(60) Procedure for imposing minor penalties: (1) Subject to the provisions of Sub-regulation (3) of Regulation 59, no order imposing on an employee any of the penalties specified in clauses (i) to (iv) of Regulation 54 shall be made except after: (a) informing the employee in writing of the proposal to take action against him and of the imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour on which it is proposed to be taken, and giving him a reasonable opportunity of making such representation as he may wish to make against the proposal; (b) holding an inquiry in the manner laid down in sub-regulation (3) to (23) of the Regulation 58, in every case in which the disciplinary authority is of the opinion that such inquiry is necessary; (c) taking the representation, if any, submitted by the employee under clause (a) and the record of inquiry, if any, held under clause (b) into consideration; (d) recording a finding on each imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (b) of Sub-Regulation (1, if in a case it is proposed, after considering the representation, if any, made by the employee under clause (a) of the Sub-regulation, to withhold increment of pay and such withholding of increments is likely to affect adversely the amount of retirement benefits payable to the employees or to withhold increments of a pay for a period exceeding 3 years or to withhold increment of pay with cumulative effect for any period, m an inquiry shall be held in the manner laid down in Sub-regulation (3) to (23) of Regulation 58 before making any order imposing on the employee any such penalty.” 6. The interpretation of the said Regulation engaged the attention of this Court in A. Prahalada Rao (supra). A twoJudge Bench, adverting to the anatomy of the Regulation and taking into consideration the submissions advanced with regard to the abuse of the Regulation, came to hold as follows: "In our view, on the basis of the allegation that Food Corporation of India is misusing its power of imposing minor penalties, the Regulation cannot be interpreted contrary to its language. Regulation 60(1)(b) mandates the disciplinary authority to form its opinion whether it is necessary to hold inquiry in a particular case or not. But that would not mean that in all cases where an employee disputes his liability, a fullfledged inquiry should be held. Otherwise, the entire purpose of incorporating summary procedure for imposing minor penalties would be frustrated. If the discretion given under Regulation 60(1) (b) is misused or is exercised in an arbitrary manner it is open to the employee to challenge the same before the appropriate forum. It is for the disciplinary authority to decide whether regular departmental enquiry as contemplated under Regulation 58 for imposing major penalty should be followed of not. This discretion cannot be curtailed by interpretation, which is contrary to the language used. Further, Regulation 60(2) itself provides that in a case if it is proposed to withhold increments of pay and such withholding of increments is likely to affect adversely the amount of retirement benefits payable to an employee and in such other case as mentioned therein, the disciplinary authority shall hold inquiry in the manner laid down in Regulation 58 before making any order imposing any such penalty." 7. It is submitted by Mr, Chatterjee that the High Court has erroneously understood the ratio and ruled that an opinion has to be formed in writing. It is his further submission that when the reasons are manifest from the preliminary inquiry and from the show cause it was erroneous on the part of the High Court to emphasise on the formation of opinion. 8. Per contra, Mr. Chaudhary heavily relied on the authority in A. Prabhakar Rao (supra) and urged that the discretion vested in the disciplinary authority under the Regulations casts an obligation on it to form an opinion and formation of such opinion has to be in writing. 9. On a perusal of the order passed by the learned Single Judge, we find that he has taken note of the fact that there was no expression or formation of opinion. He has further recorded that the learned counsel for the Corporation had conceded that there was nothing to show that the Chairman-cum-Managing Director who had made the final order had recorded any opinion in writing before making the final order to the effect there was no need to hold a regular inquiry. From the principle stated by this Court in A. Prahalada Rao’s case it is quite limpid that though in all cases where the employees disputes his liability, a fullfledged enquiry is not expected to be held as that would frustrate the purpose of interpreting the summary procedure for imposing minor penalties, yet the discretion conferred under the Regulation 1960 (1)(b), if exercised in a arbitrary manner, it is open to the employee to challenge the same before the appropriate forum. The Court had further opined that the Regulation 60(1)(b) mandates the disciplinary authority to form its opinion whether it is necessary to hold an inquiry in a particular case or not. 10. Once it is held that there has to be formation of opinion and such an opinion is assailable in a legal forum, we are of the view that the said opinion has to be founded on certain objective criteria. It must reflect some reason. It can neither be capricious or fanciful but demonstrative of application of mind. Therefore, it has to be in writing. It must reflect some reason. It can neither be capricious or fanciful but demonstrative of application of mind. Therefore, it has to be in writing. It may be on the file and may not be required to be communicated to the employee but when it is subject to assail and, eventually, subject to judicial review, the competent authority of the Corporation is required to satisfy the Court that the opinion was formed on certain parameters indicating that there was no necessity to hold an enquiry. Thus, the High Court has correctly understood the principle stated in A. Prabhakar Rao (supra) and we do not find any fault with the same.” 9. In the considered opinion of this Court, the instant case is covered by the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sarat Chandra Goswami (supra) and this Court finds no valid reason to take a different view. 10. Accordingly, the writ petition stands allowed. The order dated 29.09.2016 passed by the respondents stands quashed and set aside. The respondents are directed to release the gratuity amount and all other retiral dues of the petitioner forthwith. 11. Needless to observe that the necessary exercise would be done by the respondents within a period of three months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order. 12. Stay application as well as all applications (pending, if any) also stand disposed of.