JUDGMENT : Vivek Singh Thakur, J. Appellants are defendants in present matter, whereas, respondent is plaintiff, in Civil Suit No.70 of 2015, titled as Lekh Ram vs. Dharam Singh & others, in the Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division), Court No.4, Mandi, H.P., filed for permanent prohibitory and mandatory injunction against the defendants on the ground that the suit land is in joint ownership and possession of the plaintiff, defendants and other co-sharers and property has not been partitioned, but defendants without getting the land partitioned have started raising construction on the valuable portion of the suit land on 15.02.2015 by occupying valuable portion forcibly for their personal use without consent and permission of the plaintiff and other co-sharers and construction raised as such shall cause irreparable loss and injury to the plaintiff and other co-sharers which cannot be compensated otherwise. 2. Defendants contested the suit by filing written statement stating therein that suit land, though, is in joint ownership and possession of the parties, but parties are residing separately in their houses and cultivating and possessing the land separately from each other by raising construction of their houses upon the land for the last so many years and are enjoying the usufruct of the land of their share separately. Further that old houses and cowsheds etc. of defendants were existing upon the land comprised in Khasra No.126, for the last more than 40 years which was in possession of the defendants. It was also stated that plaintiff himself had raised construction of a house upon the suit land and was also raising construction upon the suit land without seeking partition and, thus, it was inequitable act on his part to file present suit against the defendants. It was also contended that defendants were neither raising construction nor changing nature of the suit land as alleged. 3. Suit was dismissed by the Trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 23.12.2017. 4. Being aggrieved, plaintiff had filed Civil Appeal No.1 of 2018, titled as Lekh Ram vs. Dharam Singh & others, against the judgment and decree dated 23.12.2017, passed by Trial Court. 3. Suit was dismissed by the Trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 23.12.2017. 4. Being aggrieved, plaintiff had filed Civil Appeal No.1 of 2018, titled as Lekh Ram vs. Dharam Singh & others, against the judgment and decree dated 23.12.2017, passed by Trial Court. Vide judgment and decree dated 31.10.2018, passed by the District Judge, Mandi, H.P., by setting aside judgment and decree dated 23.12.2017 of the Trial Court, decree was passed in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants by restraining the defendants from raising any construction over the suit land/property in any manner till the suit land is partitioned through process of law. 5. Defendants have assailed judgment dated 31.10.2018 passed by the District Judge, Mandi, by filing present appeal. 6. Vide order dated 10.01.2019, appeal was admitted on following substantial questions of law:- “1. Whether the First Appellate Court has misread the oral as well as documentary evidence of the parties especially the statement of PW-2 Anjana Kumari, DW-1 Kushal Singh, document Ext. PW1/C, Jamabandi which has materially prejudiced the case of the appellant? 2. Whether the suit of the respondent/plaintiff is vague, indefinite and uncertain, as no spot map and demarcation report has been filed by the respondent/plaintiff in order to prove the alleged construction?” 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record. 8. It has been contended on behalf of the defendants that impugned judgment and decree is result of misreading of oral as well as documentary evidence led by the parties by referring various judgments in paragraph 14 of the impugned judgment, ratio of which, in fact, is in favour of the defendants and against the plaintiff as the suit of the plaintiff was vague, indefinite, uncertain and without any evidence substantiating the claim of the plaintiff, with respect to raising construction by the defendants, causing irreparable loss and injury to the plaintiff and occupying valuable portion of the land by the defendants forcibly for their personal use. 9. To the contrary, learned counsel for the plaintiff has supported the judgment and decree by referring case law relied upon by the District Judge and reasons assigned therein to pass judgment and decree in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants. 10. 9. To the contrary, learned counsel for the plaintiff has supported the judgment and decree by referring case law relied upon by the District Judge and reasons assigned therein to pass judgment and decree in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants. 10. Suit land has been described in paragraph 1 of the plaint as land comprised in Khata Khatauni No.120/149, Khasra No.18, 24, 28, 39, 40, 48, 49, 17, 27, 29, 36, 57, Kitas 12, measuring 4-8-17 bighas, situated in Mohal Mandal/202, Tehsil Balh, District Mandi, H.P. Plaintiff to identify the suit land has relied upon Jamabandi for the year 2011-12 Ex.PW.1/C. 11. Perusal of Jamabandi clearly reflects that in column of ‘ownership’, plaintiff and defendants, have been shown as co-sharers alongwith other owners. However, in column of ‘possession and cultivation’ group of co-sharers has been shown in separate possession comprising in Khasra numbers mentioned in Column No.6 of Jamabandi. In these groups of co-sharers, Jamabandi indicates that the plaintiff alongwith Narvada Devi and Chinta Devi, is in exclusive possession of land comprising in Khatauni No.149/154 in Khasra Nos.18, 24, 28, 39, 40, 48 and 49, Kitas 7, measuring 02-08-07 bighas. Whereas, defendants Dharam Singh, Kushal, Shakuntala Devi, Damyanti alongwith Amar Singh, Raju Ram, Dharma Devi, Nandi Devi, Jamna Devi, Tara Devi, Saraswati Devi and Kamla Devi have been shown in exclusive possession of land comprised in Khatauni No.150/155 in Khasra Nos17, 27, 29, 36 and 57, measuring 02-10-10 bighas. 12. There is no other record placed and proved on record to indicate that the suit land is in joint ownership and possession of the plaintiff and defendants alongwith other co-sharers. Though land is in joint ownership, but Jamabandi Ex.PW.1/C reflects that parties to the lis are in independent possession of certain Khasra numbers separately. Khasra Nos.18, 24, 28, 39, 40, 48 and 49 are in possession of plaintiff and others, whereas, Khasra Nos.17, 27, 29, 36 and 57 are in separate possession of defendants alongwith some other co-sharers, but the District Judge has failed to take notice of this document. 13. It is claim of the plaintiff that land is in joint ownership and possession and, therefore, before partition no construction can be raised by the defendants. There is nothing on record that partition proceedings are pending and have been initiated to partition the suit land much less pending in any competent Court. 13. It is claim of the plaintiff that land is in joint ownership and possession and, therefore, before partition no construction can be raised by the defendants. There is nothing on record that partition proceedings are pending and have been initiated to partition the suit land much less pending in any competent Court. In examination-in-chief, on affidavit, plaintiff has reiterated the averments made in the plaint. Though he has stated that defendants are raising construction on two biswas of land, but he has stated that he was not able to tell Khasra number of the land on the back side of the photograph Ex.PW/B-1 to Ex.PW/B-4. 14. PW.2 Anjana Kumari, who was President of Gram Panchayat Mandal from the year 2011 to 2016, has been examined by the plaintiff to substantiate his claim. Though in examination-in-chief, she has stated that Dharam Singh and Kushal Singh (defendants) were doing construction work on the spot, which was a joint land of the parties, but in cross-examination she has stated that she was not knowing that on which Khasra number construction was going on. Though she has denied that plaintiff has raised two storeyed house on the spot, however, self stated that first storey was constructed earlier, but she was not able to tell the time. However, she has also stated that second storey has been constructed by the plaintiff during her tenure. She has also admitted that the land whereupon the construction was being raised, an old house of defendant-Kushal Singh was existing. She has also stated that she did not know that an old house of defendants had fallen, but self stated that it was demolished. 15. She has categorically stated that on the spot, parties and others have their houses, cowsheds and parties have their separate houses with separate kitchens and cowsheds and parties were also cultivating their respective land separately. She was not able to tell that plaintiff has raised construction without partition. 16. Defendants have examined only one witness, i.e. DW-1 Kushal Singh, who in his affidavit (Ex.DW.1/A) and in examination-in-chief, has reiterated the stand taken in written statement. In cross-examination, he has admitted that though land is in joint ownership, but possession of the parties is separate. She was not able to tell that plaintiff has raised construction without partition. 16. Defendants have examined only one witness, i.e. DW-1 Kushal Singh, who in his affidavit (Ex.DW.1/A) and in examination-in-chief, has reiterated the stand taken in written statement. In cross-examination, he has admitted that though land is in joint ownership, but possession of the parties is separate. He has also admitted the suggestion that land situated in another Village Majiathal, is also in joint ownership with rider that parties are in separate possession of their share in that Village also. In cross-examination, he has also stated that he was raising construction in Khasra No.45 and this fact, he noticed when he obtained copy of document from Lok Mitra Kendra. He has further submitted that defendants were having old house in the said Khasra number which is situated at a distance of 50 feet. Though plaintiff, in plaint, has stated that the defendants are occupying valuable land forcibly causing irreparable loss and injury to the plaintiff, but neither in evidence or otherwise in examination-in-chief nor in cross-examination or by placing and proving on record any other documents, plea taken in the plaint has been proved. 17. It is settled law that pleadings without evidence are of no help to the party. Though defendant in cross-examination has denied to accept the construction being raised on the land visible in the photographs placed on record by the plaintiff, but such denial is of no use to the plaintiff because plaintiff has categorically stated in the plaint or in his evidence about specific Khasra number or identity of the land whereupon construction is visible in the photographs. 18. Plaintiff’s witness PW.2-Anjana Kumari herself admitted that parties are in separate possession of the land 19. The District Judge to pass judgment and decree in favour of the plaintiff has placed reliance upon following judgments:- “ Prabhu Nath and another vs. Sushma , 2014 (2)Shimla Law Cases 1003; Shiv Chand vs. Manghru and others , 2007 (1) SLJ (H.P.) 641 ; Brij Lal vs. Puran Chand , 2011 (1) Him. L.R. 80 ; Nagesh Kumar vs. Kewal Krishan , AIR 2000 H.P. 118 ; Sant Ram Nagina Ram vs. Daya Ram Nagina Ram , AIR 1961 Punjab 528 ; and Girdhari Lal and another vs. Amin Chand H.L.J 2017 (H.P.) 326. 20. L.R. 80 ; Nagesh Kumar vs. Kewal Krishan , AIR 2000 H.P. 118 ; Sant Ram Nagina Ram vs. Daya Ram Nagina Ram , AIR 1961 Punjab 528 ; and Girdhari Lal and another vs. Amin Chand H.L.J 2017 (H.P.) 326. 20. Ratio of judgments, has to be applied to the facts of the case. For discussion hereinafter, the District Judge has failed to follow the ratio of law laid down in judgments as well as other judgments referred hereinafter. The District Judge has referred the judgment passed by this High Court in Prabhu Nath’s case, wherein by referring judgments in Nagesh Kumar’s, Shiv Chand’s and Brij Lal’s cases, injunction granted by the Court in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants, who were co-sharers, not interfered with by the High Court by referring principle that possession of co-sharer in the joint land is possession of all co-sharers and co-sharers cannot change nature of the suit land, detrimental of other co-sharers unless land is partitioned. 21. The District Judge has also referred judgment in Sant Ram Nagina Ram's case, by recording that it was summarized in the said judgment that till the land is not partitioned amongst co-sharers, all the co-sharers are entitled to use every inch of the land as they are owners in possession of the entire land and none of the co-sharer of the joint land is entitled to raise construction without consent of other co-sharers unless the said land is partitioned. This judgment has also been relied upon in Brij Lal’s and Prabhunath’s cases referred supra. 22. District Judge has also referred judgment in Girdhari Lal and another vs. Amin Chand , Latest HLJ 2017 (HP) 326, wherein by referring judgment in Sant Ram Nagina Ram’s case and Laxmidevamma and others vs. Ranganath and others, (2015) 4 SCC 264 , suit of the plaintiff for injunction against co-sharers was dismissed for his consent to lay foundation. 23. In Sant Ram Nagina Ram’s case, Division Bench of the then Punjab High Court, after considering various authorities, has concluded as under:- “78. The weight of the authorities and the principles which have been discussed above, give rise to the following propositions - (1) A co-owner has an interest in the whole property and also in every parcel of it. In Sant Ram Nagina Ram’s case, Division Bench of the then Punjab High Court, after considering various authorities, has concluded as under:- “78. The weight of the authorities and the principles which have been discussed above, give rise to the following propositions - (1) A co-owner has an interest in the whole property and also in every parcel of it. (2) Possession of the joint property by one co-owner is in the eye of law, possession of all even if all but one are actually out of possession. (3) A mere occupation of a larger portion or even of an entire joint property does not necessarily amount to ouster as the possession of one is deemed to be on behalf of all. (4) The above rule admits of an exception when there is ouster of a co-owner by another. But in order to negative the presumption of joint possession on behalf of all, on the ground of ouster, the possession, of a co-owner must not only be exclusive but also hostile to the knowledge of the other, as, when a co-owner openly asserts his own title and denies that of the other. (5) Passage of time does not extinguish the right of the co-owner who has been out of possession of the joint property except in the event of ouster or abandonment. (6) Every co-owner has a right to use the joint property in a husband like manner not inconsistent with similar rights of other co-owners. (7) Where a co-owner is in possession of separate parcels under an arrangement consented to by the other co-owners, it is not open to any one to disturb the arrangement without the consent of others except by filing a suit for partition. (8) The remedy of a co-owner not in possession, or not in possession of a share of the joint property, is by way of a suit for partition Or for actual joint possession, but not for ejectment. Same is the case where a co-owner sets up an exclusive title in himself. (9) Where a portion of the joint property is, by common consent of the co-owners, reserved for a particular common purpose, it cannot be diverted to an inconsistent user by a co-owner; if he does so, he is liable to be ejected and the particular parcel will be liable to be restored to its original condition. (9) Where a portion of the joint property is, by common consent of the co-owners, reserved for a particular common purpose, it cannot be diverted to an inconsistent user by a co-owner; if he does so, he is liable to be ejected and the particular parcel will be liable to be restored to its original condition. It is not necessary in such a case to show that special damage has been suffered.” 24. In paragraph 78 (7) it has been observed that where a co-owner is in possession of separate parcels under an arrangement consented to by the other co-owners, it is not open to any one to disturb the arrangement without the consent of others except by filing a suit for partition. 25. In present case, it has come in evidence of plaintiff itself especially in statement of PW.2 and Jamabandi Ex.PW.1/C that parties to the lis are in separate possession of a specific portion/share of joint property, which has also been recorded in revenue record and further that there is no evidence that plaintiff had filed any suit for partition. Plaintiff has also failed to establish any irreparable loss being caused to him for construction being allegedly raised by the defendants and also any act of defendants occupying valuable portion of the land particularly the land, which is in separate possession of the plaintiff in Jamabandi Ex.PW.1/C. Plaintiff has also not come with clean hands as suit land shown by him in joint ownership and possession, is not in joint ownership and possession of parties, but parties in possession of separate Khasra number, though with joint ownership. 26. In Nagesh Kumar’s case, it has been observed as under:- “16. A co-sharer is entitled to claim injunction when another co-sharer threatens to exclusively appropriate joint land to himself to the detriment of other co-sharers by constructing a structure thereon.” 27. It is apparent from the aforesaid paragraph that injunction can be granted for threat of appropriation of joint land exclusively by co-sharer for himself, but to the detriment of other co-sharers. In present case land is not in joint possession, but in exclusive possession of respective parties and there is absence of evidence that action of defendants is detrimental to other co-sharers especially to the plaintiff. 28. In present case land is not in joint possession, but in exclusive possession of respective parties and there is absence of evidence that action of defendants is detrimental to other co-sharers especially to the plaintiff. 28. It is settled law that pleadings in absence of proof cannot be made basis for deciding an issue in favour of a party. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anvar P.V. vs. P.K. Basheer and others (2014) 10 SCC 473 has held as under:- “1. Construction by plaintiff, destruction by defendant. Construction by pleadings, proof by evidence, proof only by relevant and admissible evidence. Genuineness, veracity or reliability of the evidence is seen by the Court only after the stage of relevancy and admissibility. These are some of the first principles of evidence. What is the nature and manner of admission of electronic records is one of the principal issues arising for consideration in this appeal.” 29. In Manager, Reserve Bank of India, Bangalore vs. S. Mani and others, (2005) 5 SCC 100 , the Apex Court has held as under:- “19. Pleadings are no substitute for proof. No workman, thus, took an oath to state that they had worked for 240 days. No document in support of the said plea was produced. It is, therefore, not correct to contend that the plea raised by the respondents herein that they had worked continuously for 240 days was deemed to have been admitted by applying the doctrine of non-traverse. In any event the contention of the respondents having been denied and disputed, it was obligatory on the part of the respondents to add new evidence. The contents raised in the letters of the union dated 30.5.1988 and 11.4.1990 containing statements to the effect that the workmen had been working continuously for 240 days might not have been replied to, but the same is of no effect as by reason thereof, the allegations made therein cannot be said to have been proved, particularly in view of the fact that the contents thereof were not proved by any witness. Only by reason of non-response to such letters, the contents thereof would not stand admitted. The Evidence Act does not say so.” 30. It is also settled principle of law that evidence led by parties must be in consonance with their pleadings and evidence led contrary to pleadings cannot be considered. Only by reason of non-response to such letters, the contents thereof would not stand admitted. The Evidence Act does not say so.” 30. It is also settled principle of law that evidence led by parties must be in consonance with their pleadings and evidence led contrary to pleadings cannot be considered. Applying rule of divergence between pleading and evidence, any evidence contrary to pleading is to be ignored. No evidence can be looked into upon a plea which was never put forward. {(See Siddik Mahomed Shah vs. Mt. Saran and others, AIR 1930 Privy Council 57(1)}. Considering this issue, the Apex Court in Janak Dulari Devi and another vs. Kapildeo Rai and another, (2011) 6 SCC 555 , has held as under:- “9……….When what is pleaded is not proved, or what is stated in the evidence is contrary to the pleadings, the dictum that no amount of evidence, contrary to the pleadings, howsoever cogent, can be relied on, would apply…….” 31. In present case plaintiff, though co-owner but has failed to establish adverse effect upon his rights in the suit land on raising construction by defendants, which was necessary for the reason that plaintiff himself has already raised construction over the suit land. Therefore, impugned judgment and decree warrant interference. 32. In Jai Singh vs. Rajeev, Latest HLJ 2023 (H)(1) 162, it has been held as under:- “19. The fact that in past also different co-owners including the parties to suit have raised construction also weakens the case of plaintiffs. When plaintiffs had no objection when the co-owners had raised construction on different parts of the joint land in the same Khata, they must come out with special reasons to raise objections against construction being raised by defendant. Another fact which cannot be ignored is that there is another structure on suit land being used as “Panchayat Ghar”. At the same time of its construction again there was no objection. Admittedly, no other co-owners have raised any objection to the construction being raised by defendant. The conduct of plaintiffs smacks of some ulterior purpose than the assertion of any legal right. … … … 21. Injunction being a discretionary and equitable relief, courts have to analyse the entire available material to assess the existence of prima-facie case, irreparable loss and balance of convenience. The conduct of plaintiffs smacks of some ulterior purpose than the assertion of any legal right. … … … 21. Injunction being a discretionary and equitable relief, courts have to analyse the entire available material to assess the existence of prima-facie case, irreparable loss and balance of convenience. Learned Appellate Court has failed to assess and analysis the above noticed relevant material and has erred in granting the injunction in favour of plaintiffs.” 33. The District Judge has also failed to consider following findings returned in Shiv Chand’s case :- “9. However, as regards question No.3, it is made out from the statement of Shiv Chand, one of the plaintiffs-appellants, who appeared as PW 1, that parties are not in joint possession, but in separate possession t the extent of half of the area of the suit property. Admittedly, the parties are not the owners of the suit land, as per averments contained in the pleadings and as per the testimony of PW 1, and it is the State Government, who is the owner of the property. Partition, as per procedure prescribed by law, cannot take place, unless the parties obtain a declaration that they have acquired title by prescription or by some other mode. The parties being not the owners and presumably their possession being adverse, the only manner by which they can separate their shares is by their own arrangement. In the present case, from the testimony of PW 1 Shiv Chand, appellant, it is clear that the parties are in separate possession of the since the times of their predecessor, because he has stated that the parties are in separate possession to the extent of their shares and that on the death of their predecessor, the appellants came in possession of that portion, which was held by their predecessor. In view of this statement of the plaintiff-appellant, it cannot be said that the parties are in joint possession, and if the parties are not in joint possession, the appellants are not entitled to the relief of injunction, asked for by them. Hence, this question is answered against the appellant.” 34. In present case also, as noticed supra, there is positive evidence of the plaintiff with respect to separate possession of the parties in Jamabandi Ex.PW.1/C and the statement of PW.2. 35. Hence, this question is answered against the appellant.” 34. In present case also, as noticed supra, there is positive evidence of the plaintiff with respect to separate possession of the parties in Jamabandi Ex.PW.1/C and the statement of PW.2. 35. Judgment in Brij Lal’s case is also not applicable in present case for distinguished facts mentioned in paragraph 8 of this judgment, wherein it has been recorded that partition proceedings were pending before the competent Authority and the defendants, who had failed to prove family partition alleged to be taken place between parties, rather had admitted that suit land was joint. Therefore, this judgment is also of no help to the plaintiff. 36. In Ashok Kapoor vs. Murtu Devi, 2016 (1) Shim. L.C. 207, following observations of the Court are relevant:- “46. On consideration of the various judicial pronouncements and on the basis of the dominant view taken in these decisions on the rights and liabilities of the co-sharers and their rights to raise construction to the exclusion of others, the following principles can conveniently be laid down:- (i) a co-owner is not entitled to an injunction restraining another co-owner from exceeding his rights in the common property absolutely and simply because he is a co-owner unless any act of the person in possession of the property amounts to ouster prejudicial or adverse to the interest of the co-owner out of possession. (ii) Mere making of construction or improvement of, in, the common property does not amount to ouster. (iii) If by the act of the co-owner in possession the value or utility of the property is diminished, then a co-owner out of possession can certainly seek an injunction to prevent the diminution of the value and utility of the property. (iv) If the acts of the co-owner in possession are detrimental to the interest of other co-owners, a co-owner out of possession can seek an injunction to prevent such act which is detrimental to his interest. (v) before an injunction is issued, the plaintiff has to establish that he would sustain, by the act he complains of some injury which materially would affect his position or his enjoyment or an accustomed user of the joint property would be inconvenienced or interfered with. (v) before an injunction is issued, the plaintiff has to establish that he would sustain, by the act he complains of some injury which materially would affect his position or his enjoyment or an accustomed user of the joint property would be inconvenienced or interfered with. (vi) the question as to what relief should be granted is left to eh discretion of the Court in the attending circumstances on the balance of convenience and in exercise of its discretion the Court will be guided by consideration of justice, equity and good conscience.” 47. The discretion of the Court is exercised to grant a temporary injunction only when the following requirements are made out by the plaintiff:- (i) existence of a prima facie case as pleaded, necessitating protection of the plaintiff’s rights by issue of a temporary injunction; (ii) when the need for protection of the plaintiff’s rights is compared with or weighed against the need for protection of the defendant’s right or likely infringement of the defendant’s rights, the balance of convenience tilting in favour of the plaintiff; and (iii) clear possibility of irreparable injury being caused to the plaintiff if the temporary injunction is not granted. In addition, temporary injunction being an equitable relief, the discretion to grant such relief will be exercised only when the plaintiff’s conduct is free from blame and he approaches the Court with clean hands.” 37. Judgment in Girdhari Lal’s case is also not applicable in present case for distinguished facts. 38. In Piar Chand and others vs. Sandhya Devi and others, Latest HLJ 2017 (HP) 606=2017 (2) Shim. L.C. 1040, by taking into consideration of judgment in Ashok Kapoor’s case, it was held as under:- “24. Plaintiff has though pleaded that defendants are bent upon raising construction without partition, but has chosen to remain conspicuously silent about pendency of partition proceedings preferred by him or any other co-sharers. Pendency of partition proceedings can also be a reason to restrain a co-sharer from raising construction and enjoying the nature of the land in given facts and circumstances of the case. But in present case, it is also not the case of plaintiff. In my opinion, it is another point that without preferring or intending to prefer partition proceedings, petitioner may not be entitled to perpetual injunction as it is also not him or someone else. But in present case, it is also not the case of plaintiff. In my opinion, it is another point that without preferring or intending to prefer partition proceedings, petitioner may not be entitled to perpetual injunction as it is also not him or someone else. There is no pleading or evidence with respect to partition proceedings on record. … … … 26. Onus to prove its claim is upon plaintiff, who has failed to discharge his onus and in such a situation suit cannot be decreed. Learned District Judge has committed mistake by passing a decree in favour of plaintiff restraining defendants from raising construction over suit land only on the ground that defendants have collected material upon suit land and suit land is in joint ownership and possession of parties by ignoring the fact that plaintiff has already constructed house thereupon but has not established on record prejudice caused to him by proposed construction of defendants. 27. As discussed above, in case where one co-sharer himself has raised construction over the suit land, he will not have right to seek injunction unless he proves that construction by another co-sharer upon the land is in excess to share and/or prejudice or detrimental to legal rights of others and/or prejudice to co-sharers’ right of lawful enjoyment of the suit land or will diminish the value or utility of property in question having adverse affect on right of co-sharer(s).” 39. In Jai Singh vs. Rajeev, Latest HLJ 2023 (HP)(1) 162, it has been held as under:- “19. The fact that in past also different co-owners including the parties to suit have raised construction also weakens the case of plaintiffs. W”hen plaintiffs had no objection when the co-owners had raised construction on different parts of the joint land in the same khata, they must come out with special reasons to raise objections against construction being raised by defendant. Another fact which cannot be ignored is that there is another structure on suit land being used as “Panchayat Ghar”. At the time of its construction again there was no objection. Admittedly , no other co-owners have raised any objection to the construction being raised by defendant. The conduct of plaintiffs smacks of some ulterior purpose than the assertion of any legal right. … … … 21. At the time of its construction again there was no objection. Admittedly , no other co-owners have raised any objection to the construction being raised by defendant. The conduct of plaintiffs smacks of some ulterior purpose than the assertion of any legal right. … … … 21. Injunction being a discretionary and equitable relief, courts have to analyse the entire available material to assess the existence of prima-facie case, irreparable loss and balance of convenience. Learned Appellate Court has failed to assess and analysis the above noticed relevant material and has erred in granting the injunction in favour of plaintiffs.” 40. In present case, District Judge has failed to consider ratio of law referred supra, whereas plaintiff has miserably failed to establish his case in the pleadings as well as in evidence as discussed supra. 41. Substantial questions of law referred hereinsupra are answered accordingly. 42. In view of above discussion, District Judge has committed a mistake in passing judgment and decree dated 31.10.2018 in Civil Appeal No.1 of 2018, titled as Lekh Ram vs. Dharam Singh & others in favour of the plaintiff. Therefore, judgment and decree passed by the District Judge for permanent injunction restraining the defendants is set aside and suit preferred by the plaintiff is dismissed. 43. Appeal is allowed and disposed of, so also pending application(s), if any, in aforesaid terms.