JUDGMENT : Heard Mr. A.K. Purkayastha, learned counsel for the petitioners. Also heard Mr. N. Ratan, learned Additional Advocate General, State of Arunachal Pradesh for the State respondents and Mr. T. Tagum, learned counsel for the respondent No.11. 2. In this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, 4(four) petitioners, namely, Smt. Yapi Regon, her daughter Miss Trisha Regon, her two sons Mr. Johnson Regon and Mr. Gemoling Regon, have challenged the decision dated 30.06.2022, by which the claim of the petitioners for payment of Ex-Gratia compensation in terms of Government notification dated 06.11.2019 was rejected and also to issue direction to the respondent authorities to provide Ex-Gratia compensation of Rs.50,00,000/- in terms of the aforementioned notification. Background facts:- 3. The background facts leading to filing of the present petition are adumbrated herein below:- “The husband of the petitioner Late Amost Regon was serving as Constable in 5th Indian Reserve Battalion, Roing and he was posted at Shantipur Checkgate of Lower Dibang Valley District, Arunachal Pradesh. On 12.05.2020, at around 1830 hours, late Constable Amost Regon was on round the clock duty at Shantipur Checkgate in view of the Covid-19 pandemic along with his section of personnel from D-Coy of 5th IRBN and they were entrusted with the responsibility of patrolling along with the porous Assam-Arunachal Pradesh border. On that day, he got an information that some miscreants of Assam were trying to enter through Daran village into Arunachal Pradesh and to cross check the aforesaid information, constable Amost Regon went to the said village on his motorcycle and he has cross check the information on spot verification of the fact and while he was returning to the check gate, he met with an accident by colliding with the iron barricade of the check gate and got serious injuries and he was taken to the District Hospital, Roing, where he was declared brought dead. Thereafter, one FIR was lodged with the Roing Police Station by the petitioner No.1, upon which the Officer-In-Charge, Roing Police Station registered one FIR, being FIR No.26/2020, dated 12.05.2020 under Section 279/304(A) IPC and carried out investigation and during the course of investigation, the investigating officer got the post mortem conducted on the dead body of the deceased and thereafter, handed over the same to his family members for performing his last rites and after completion of investigation, the I.O., namely, Mohan Mili has submitted final report, being Final Report No.55/2020 on 07.10.2020 under Section 173 before the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Roing. Thereafter, on 28.12.2020 the petitioner No.1 filed an application with the Office of the Superintendent of Police, Roing, Lower Dibang Valley District for providing Ex-Gratia compensation. Then the said application was forwarded to the Deputy Commissioner, Lower Dibang Valley District for constituting a board to assess the admissibility of Ex-Gratia compensation to Government servant, who lost his life while on duty. Thereafter, the Deputy Commissioner, Roing, Lower Dibang Valley District had returned the said letter along with filled up form stating the reason that the matter pertaining to Ex-Gratia payment to the husband of the petitioner No.1 does not fall under their purview vide letter dated 11.01.2022. Thereafter, the matter was again taken up with the Deputy Commissioner informing that in terms of Government notification No.HMB(A)-11/97/Pt, dated 06.11.2019, Ex-Gratia is entitled to all those State Police personnel of Arunachal Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh Armed Police Battalion and IRBN personnel irrespective of their rank, who are killed or permanently disabled or grievously/seriously injured while fighting terrorists/militants, criminals, underground elements or while performing law and order duties or disaster management duties in the State of Arunachal Pradesh. Thereafter, the Deputy Commissioner, Roing, has forwarded the application to the District Disaster Management Office, Lower Dibang Valley District for immediate necessary action vide letter dated 22.02.2022. Thereafter, the District Disaster Management Office, Lower Dibang Valley District has constituted a District Level Board comprising of the Sub-Divisional Officer, Roing, as Chairman, the District Disaster Management Officer as Member and the DSP, Roing as Member. The said District Level Board thereafter duly examined the feasibility and reasonableness of the claim of the petitioner No.1 herein and found that the husband of the petitioner No.1 is entitled to the Ex-Gratia payment and therefore, made recommendation to the Deputy Commissioner, Roing for consideration. The said District Level Board thereafter duly examined the feasibility and reasonableness of the claim of the petitioner No.1 herein and found that the husband of the petitioner No.1 is entitled to the Ex-Gratia payment and therefore, made recommendation to the Deputy Commissioner, Roing for consideration. Thereafter, the Deputy Commissioner, Roing, Lower Dibang Valley District, has forwarded the proceeding/recommendation of the District Level Board along with Form-A with all required documents to the Secretary, Home, Government of Arunachal Pradesh, Itanagar for assessment and admissibility of Ex-Gratia payment to the husband of the petitioner No.1 vide his letter dated 24.03.2020. Thereafter, the matter was placed before the State Level Screening Committee comprising of Commissioner (Home) as Chairman, Secretary (Finance) as Member and Inspector General of Police (HQ) as Member and the said screening committee in the meeting held on 17.06.2022 had examined the case of the husband of the petitioner No.1 along with 6(six) others and after detail scrutiny, the committee found that only the next of kin of the victim at Sl. No.3, late Abtar Chakma is eligible and rest of the victims (personnel) does not cover under the aforementioned Ex-Gratia grant guidelines. Being aggrieved, the petitioners approached this Court by filing the present petition.” 4. The respondent authorities filed their affidavit-in-opposition denying the claims made by the petitioners. The stand taken by the respondent authorities is that though the husband of the petitioner No.1 was on duty on that day, he was not on Covid duty at the relevant point of time. He went to cross check the information received about illegal entry of some miscreants from Assam to Arunachal Pradesh and as he was returning after attending the Covid-19 pandemic duty to the check gate, he met with an accident and he died consequently and as such, it cannot be said that he was on Covid-19 pandemic duty at the relevant point of time and therefore, it is contended to dismiss the petition. Submissions:- 5. Mr. Purkayastha, learned Senior counsel for the petitioners submits that the stand taken by the respondent authorities are totally irrelevant and contrary to the established principle laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in host of authorities. Mr. Submissions:- 5. Mr. Purkayastha, learned Senior counsel for the petitioners submits that the stand taken by the respondent authorities are totally irrelevant and contrary to the established principle laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in host of authorities. Mr. Purkayastha further submits that the District Level Screening Committee has rightly assessed the case of the husband of the petitioner No.1 and arrived at a just finding, but the State Level Committee has repudiated the claim of the petitioner No.1 and no ground has been assigned for the same. It is simply stated that the case of the husband of the petitioner No.1 never comes under the purview of the Government notification in that regard. Mr. Purkayastha has referred following decisions in support of his submission:- (i) Rajanna v. Union of India, reported in 1995 Supp(2) SCC 601; (ii) National Iron and Steel Co. v. Monorama Dassi, reported in AIR 1953 Cal 143 ; (iii) Manju Sarkar & Ors. v. Mabish Miah & Ors., reported in (2014) 14 SCC 21 ; (iv) Poonam Devi & Ors. v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., reported in (2020) 4 SCC 55 ; (v) National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Sabita Gope, reported in 2000 (1) GLT 27. 6. On the other hand, Mr. Ratan, learned Additional Advocate General, State of Arunachal Pradesh, submits that the case of the husband of the petitioner No.1 is not covered under the notification issued by the Government and in view of the said Notification dated 6.11.2019, the Ex-Gratia compensation of Rs.50,00,000/- can be provided to the Officers or Staff of State Police irrespective of the rank who die while fighting any terrorist, criminal, underground elements or while performing law and order duty or disaster management duty in the State of Arunachal Pradesh and since the husband of the petitioner No.1 was not performing disaster management duty at the time of accident, he is not entitled to the said Ex-Gratia compensation. Further submission of Mr. Further submission of Mr. Ratan is that the husband of the petitioner No.1 though went to cross check the information received about illegal entry of some culprits from Assam into the Arunachal Pradesh, he was on disaster management duties and as soon as he had completed cross checking of information and returning to Shantipur checkgate, he was not on disaster management duties though he was on normal duties and as such, the said compensation cannot be granted to the husband of the petitioner No.1 and therefore, Mr. Ratan contended to dismiss the petition. In support of his submission, Mr. Ratan has relied upon two decisions – one of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Kanchan Dua v. Union of India & Anr., reported in (2020) 18 SCC 709 and another decision of this Court in Smt. Punya Chutia v. State of Assam & Ors., reported in 2018 0 Supreme(Gau) 1759. 7. Having heard the submission of learned Advocates of both the parties, I have carefully gone through the petition and the documents placed on record and also gone through the decisions referred by learned Advocates of both the parties. The Issue Before This Court:- 8. It is not in dispute that at the time of accident, the husband of the petitioner No.1 was returning to Shantipur Check Gate after cross- checking the information about infiltration of miscreants” in Daran Village. It is also not in dispute that he met with the accident by dashing against the iron barricade of the Check Gate and got serious injuries and died consequently. Further, it is not in dispute that he was on official duty. What is disputed is that he was not performing the disaster management duty at that time as the disaster management duty ends at village Daran where he went to cross-check the information regarding infiltration of miscreants, which was forbidden to prevent outbreak of Covid 19 Pandemic. 8.1. In view of the stand taken by the parties in their pleadings and in view of the submissions advanced at the Bar, by their respective counsels the issue, to be answered by this court can be formulated as under:- (i) Whether, the husband of the petitioner No.1, was performing disaster management duty at the time of accident, as specified in the Notification, dated 06.11.2019 ? 9. 9. It appears that the claim of the petitioners for Ex-Gratia payment of Rs.50,00,000/- is based on the Notification, dated 06.11.2019, vide No.HMB(A)-11/97/Pt. The scheme launched under the said notification is called as “Arunachal Pradesh Ex-Gratia Grant (State Police, Fire & Emergency Services, Indian Armed Forces and Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF) Personnel) Policy, 2019. The objectives of the said scheme are stated as under:- (a) To provide Ex-Gratia grant to all those State Police Personnel viz. Arunachal Pradesh Police, Arunachal Armed Police Battalion & IRBN Personnel, irrespective of rank, who killed or permanently disabled or grievously/seriously injured while fighting terrorist/militants, criminals, and underground elements or while performing law and order duties or disaster management duties in the State of Arunachal Pradesh. (b) To provide Ex-Gratia grant to all those fire and emergency services personnel of the State Government irrespective of rank, who are killed or permanently disabled/grievously/ seriously injured while performing fire and emergency duties/services or disaster management duties in the State of Arunachal Pradesh. (c) To provide Ex-Gratia grant to permanent residents of Arunachal Pradesh employed in CAPF/Indian Armed Forces, who are killed/permanently disabled or grievously/seriously injured while performing law and order duties/disaster management duties or while performing duties during encounter with militants/CI Operations/Border Skirmishes/War anywhere in the country. (d) To provide Ex-Gratia grant to the next of kin of Central Armed Police Forces/Indian Armed Forces who get killed/permanently disabled or grievously/seriously injured while performing counter insurgency operation duties/law and order duties/disaster management duties in the State of Arunachal Pradesh at the request of State Government. (e) To declare as Martyrs all those State Police/Fire and Emergency services personnel of the Government of Arunachal Pradesh and permanent residents of Arunachal Pradesh belonging to CAPF/Indian Armed Forces who get killed while performing their respective duties mentioned above and to provide employment to the next of kin dependent of the Martyr in a suitable job. 10. It also appears that the amount of Ex-Gratia payment is Rs.50,00,000/- in case of death and in case of injury the amount is Rs.10,00,000/- and the said scheme also provides for the procedure to be followed to avail Ex-Gratia grant under the policy. 10. It also appears that the amount of Ex-Gratia payment is Rs.50,00,000/- in case of death and in case of injury the amount is Rs.10,00,000/- and the said scheme also provides for the procedure to be followed to avail Ex-Gratia grant under the policy. In the instant petition, there is no dispute about the procedure being followed by the petitioners in preferring the petition claiming Ex-Gratia compensation and as such, the only issue to be decided by this Court is whether the husband of the petitioner No.1 was on disaster management duty or not at relevant time of his accident leading to his death. 11. It is an admitted position that at the relevant time, the husband of the petitioner No.1 went to cross check the information received about entry of some miscreants into the State of Arunachal Pradesh through porous border between the two States at Daran village and he was returning to the check gate by his motorcycle and while he reached the Shantipur check-gate, his motorcycle collided with the iron barricade and thereby met with an accident and got serious injuries and while he was taken to the Roing District Hospital, he was declared brought dead. An FIR was lodged in this regard and other relevant documents, including the post mortem report of the deceased, clearly established the fact that he died due to the injuries sustained in a motorcycle accident. 11.1. It also appears that the FIR was lodged by H/Ct. Tertem Perme, Section- Commander, D-Coy, 5th IRBN, Roing. Said FIR is enclosed with the petition at page 156. It is to be noted here based upon this FIR Roing P.S. Case No. 26/2020, under sections 279/304(A) IPC has been registered and investigation was carried out. For ready reference, the FIR is reproduced herein below:- To The Officer-in-Charge, Roing Police Station, Dated Roing 12th of May 2020, Subject:- First Information Report, Sir, With due regards I am to inform your good - self that today at around 1830 hours our Ct. Amost Regon S/O- Lt. Nopang Regon, 34/M who was on round the clock duty at Shantipur Check-gate in view of the pandemic of Covid-19 and was along with our section of force (D-Coy, 5th IRBn) was entrusted with the responsibility of patrolling along the porous Assam Arunachal boundary had died after his motor cycle (9 AR-16-5335) collided with a barricade at Forest Check-gate. Nopang Regon, 34/M who was on round the clock duty at Shantipur Check-gate in view of the pandemic of Covid-19 and was along with our section of force (D-Coy, 5th IRBn) was entrusted with the responsibility of patrolling along the porous Assam Arunachal boundary had died after his motor cycle (9 AR-16-5335) collided with a barricade at Forest Check-gate. The said personnel Amost Regon was on duty at the time of the accident and had gone to cross-check the information that some miscreants from Assam were trying to enter through the Daran Village into Arunachal Pradesh. While on his return he met with the accident and was immediately rushed to District Hospital Roing where he was declared brought dead. This is for favour of your kind information and necessary action please. Yours faithfully, Sd/ H/Ct. Turtem Perme, 38th/M, Section- Commander, D-Coy, 5th IRBn, Roing. 11.2 Thus, a bare perusal of the FIR indicates that the husband of the petitioner was serving in the section of force of D-Coy, 5th IRBn, Roing as constable. He was on round the clock duty at Shantipur Check-gate in view of the pandemic of Covid-19 and was entrusted with the responsibility of patrolling along the porous Assam-Arunachal boundary, along with the section of force (D-Coy, 5th IRBn). He was on duty at the time of the accident and had gone to cross-check the information that some miscreants from Assam were trying to enter through the Daran Village into Arunachal Pradesh. 11.3. It is to be noted here that at no point of time this FIR has been disputed by the state respondent. The facts in the FIR clearly indicates that the husband of the petitioner No.1 was on round the clock duty at Shantipur Check-gate in view of the pandemic of Covid-19 and was entrusted with the responsibility of patrolling along the porous Assam Arunachal boundary, along with the section of force (D-Coy, 5th IRBn) and he had gone to cross-check the information relating to attempt made by some miscreants from Assam to enter through the Daran Village into Arunachal Pradesh. In the given factual background, which were not disputed at any point of time by the state respondents, goes a long way to indicate that he was on duty which very much relates to management of Covid-19 pandemic. In the given factual background, which were not disputed at any point of time by the state respondents, goes a long way to indicate that he was on duty which very much relates to management of Covid-19 pandemic. And on such count the death of the husband of the petitioner No.1 comes under the objective No. (a) of the Scheme, “Arunachal Pradesh Ex-Gratia Grant (State Police, Fire & Emergency Services, Indian Armed Forces and Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF) Personnel) Policy, 2019, lunched under Notification, dated 06.11.2019, vide No.HMB(A)-11/97/Pt. 11.4. In view of above factual backdrop, the submission of Mr. Ratan, learned Additional Advocate General, State of Arunachal Pradesh, that the husband of the petitioner was not on disaster management duty, though he was on official duty, left this court unimpressed. Having not been disputed the FIR at page No. 156 of the petition and the facts mentioned therein, which clearly indicates that he was on round the clock duty and entrusted with the responsibility of patrolling along the porous Assam Arunachal boundary and went to cross-check information about infiltration of miscreants from Assam to Arunachal through Daran village, the stand taken by the state respondent that his duty relating to Covid -19 pandemic was over as soon as he completed cross-checking of the information relating to infiltration of miscreants in to Arunachal through Daran village, and that he met with the accident while he reached Forest Check gate, the stand of the state respondent is too feeble to impress this court that he was not on disaster management duty. 11.5. Even for the sake of argument, if we accept the contention that the husband of the petitioner was not on disaster management duty, but he was on official duty since he was returning to Check-gate after cross-checking the information about infiltration of miscreants from Assam through Daran village to Arunachal, yet, the said accident was arising out of and in course of employment of the husband of the petitioner No.1. There cannot be any doubt that there would be notional extension of the actual duty to include the journey of this kind in his motor cycle between the Shantipur Check-gate and Daran village as the principle, under the Workmen's Compensation Act for determining whether an accident arose out of and in the course of the employment of the workman should be equally applicable to the Scheme, since both have the same object. Reference in this context can be made to following decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court. 11.6 In the case ESI Corpn. v. Francis De Costa, reported in (1996) 6 SCC 1 , Hon’ble Supreme Court had the occasion to deal with the issue of “arising out of and in the course of employment”, and discussed a decision of American Supreme Court in the case of Dover Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Isabella Craig [1940 AC 190 : (1939) 4 All ER 558, HL],. In the said decision, it was observed by Lord Wright that- “Nothing could be simpler than the words ‘arising out of and in the course of the employment’. It is clear that there are two conditions to be fulfilled. What arises ‘in the course’ of the employment is to be distinguished from what arises ‘out of the employment’. The former words relate to time conditioned by reference to the man's service, the latter to causality. Not every accident which occurs to a man during the time when he is on his employment — that is, directly or indirectly engaged on what he is employed to do — gives a claim to compensation, unless it also arises out of the employment. Hence the section imports a distinction which it does not define. The language is simple and unqualified.” 11.7. Thereafter, Hon’ble Supreme Court in para No. 29, of the decision in Francis De Costa (supra) had held as under:- “29. Although the facts of this case are quite dissimilar, the principles laid down in this case are instructive and should be borne in mind. In order to succeed, it has to be proved by the employee that (1) there was an accident, (2) the accident had a causal connection with the employment and (3) the accident must have been suffered in the course of employment. In order to succeed, it has to be proved by the employee that (1) there was an accident, (2) the accident had a causal connection with the employment and (3) the accident must have been suffered in the course of employment. In the facts of this case, we are of the view that the employee was unable to prove that the accident had any causal connection with the work he was doing at the factory and in any event, it was not suffered in the course of employment.? 11.8. In the case of Rajanna (supra), the claim was on account of the permanent partial disablement suffered by the appellant as a result of certain injuries sustained by him in a motor accident on 20-6-1986, while travelling in a SPG vehicle. The real question for decision before the Hon’ble Supreme Court was whether the meaning of the expression “actual VIP security duty” in a circular dated 13-6-1986, of the Cabinet Secretariat of the Central Government providing for grant of ex gratia payment to the Special Protection Group (SPG) Personnel. The material part of the circular, providing for ex gratia payment to be made to the SPG personnel who suffer permanent partial disablement as a result of injuries received while performing actual VIP security duty is as under:- “(iii) Rs 50,000 (Rupees Fifty thousand only) to the SPG personnel who suffer permanent partial disablement as a result of injuries received while performing actual VIP security duty.” 11.9. The Central Administrative Tribunal, Delhi had rejected the claim of the appellant with the reasoning that “actual VIP security duty” means the actual period when the person is providing security to the VIP on commencement of the duty hours and it does not include the journey to and from the duty post. 11.10. Thereafter, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the admitted facts clearly show that the appellant sustained injuries resulting in his permanent partial disablement in a motor accident when he was travelling from the staff quarters to the South Block for duty in the official SPG vehicle provided for that purpose. This road journey was not in his private vehicle or a public transport in which any member of the public could travel but in an official SPG vehicle meant for carrying the SPG personnel on duty. This road journey was not in his private vehicle or a public transport in which any member of the public could travel but in an official SPG vehicle meant for carrying the SPG personnel on duty. On these facts, it cannot be doubted that there would be notional extension of the actual duty to include the journey of this kind in the official SPG vehicle between the staff quarters and South Block. The principle under the Workmen's Compensation Act for determining whether an accident arose out of and in the course of the employment of the workman should be equally applicable to the circular since both have the same object. 11.11. While arriving at such a finding, Hon’ble Supreme Court had referred to some of its earlier decisions under the Workmen's Compensation Act. 10. In Saurashtra Salt Manufacturing Co. v. Bai Valu Raja reported in AIR 1958 SC 881 the general rule was indicated thus: “As a rule, the employment of a workman does not commence until he has reached the place of employment and does not continue when he has left the place of employment, the journey to and from the place of employment being excluded. It is now well settled, however, that this is subject to the theory of notional extension of the employer's premises so as to include an area which the workman passes and repasses in going to and in leaving the actual place of work. There may be some reasonable extension in both time and place and a workman may be regarded as in the course of his employment even though he had not reached or had left his employer's premises. The facts and circumstances of each case will have to be examined very carefully in order to determine whether the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment of a workman, keeping in view at all times this theory of notional extension. *** It is well settled that when a workman is on a public road or a public place or on a public transport he is there as any other member of the public and is not there in the course of his employment unless the very nature of his employment makes it necessary for him to be there. *** It is well settled that when a workman is on a public road or a public place or on a public transport he is there as any other member of the public and is not there in the course of his employment unless the very nature of his employment makes it necessary for him to be there. A workman is not in the course of his employment from the moment he leaves his home and is on his way to his work. He certainly is in the course of his employment if he reaches the place of work or a point or an area which comes within the theory of notional extension, outside of which the employer is not liable to pay compensation for any accident happening to him.” In the facts of that case, the employer was held not liable only because the accident occurred when the workman was travelling in a boat not provided by the employer but a public transport in which any other member of the public could travel and it was not incumbent on the workman to adopt that mode of travel. Applying the test in the present case, it is clear that since the appellant was travelling in the official SPG vehicle in which he was required to travel from the staff quarters to the South Block, that vehicle not being available to anyone other than the SPG personnel, the appellant was at a place or a point or an area which came within the theory of notional extension of the official premises for performance of “actual VIP security duty”. In other words, that official SPG vehicle was a notional extension of the official premises and, therefore, the appellant was deemed to be on actual VIP security duty, while travelling in it from the staff quarters to the South Block in these circumstances. 11. In Mackinnon Mackenzie & Co. (P) Ltd. v. Ibrahim Mahmmed Issak reported in (1969) 2 SCC 607 : (1970) 1 SCR 869 the test for this purpose was indicated as under: “To come within the Act the injury by accident must arise both out of and in the course of employment. The words ‘in the course of the employment’ mean ‘in the course of the work which the workman is employed to do and which is incidental to it’. The words ‘in the course of the employment’ mean ‘in the course of the work which the workman is employed to do and which is incidental to it’. The words ‘arising out of employment’ are understood to mean that ‘during the course of the employment, injury has resulted from some risk incidental to the duties of the service, which, unless engaged in the duty owing to the master, it is reasonable to believe the workman would not otherwise have suffered. In other words there must be a causal relationship between the accident and the employment. The expression ‘arising out of employment’ is again not confined to the mere nature of the employment. The expression applies to employment as such — to its nature, its conditions, its obligations and its incidents. If by reason of any of those factors the workman is brought within the zone of special danger the injury would be one which arises ‘out of employment’. To put it differently if the accident had occurred on account of a risk which is an incident of the employment, the claim for compensation must succeed, unless of course the workman has exposed himself to an added peril by his own imprudent act.” (emphasis supplied) This indicates that there must be a causal relationship between the accident and the employment; or the accident must be related to a risk which is an incident to the employment. The House of Lords in Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Co. v. Highley [1917 AC 352 : 86 LJKB 715] relied on in the above decision, indicated the test as under: “There is, however, in my opinion, one test which is always at any rate applicable, because it arises upon the very words of the statute, and it is generally of some real assistance. It is this: Was it part of the injured person's employment to hazard, to suffer, or to do that which caused his injury? If yes, the accident arose out of his employment.” 12. In Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 33, 4th Edn., the summary is stated thus:- “490. Accident travelling to and from work.— The course of employment normally begins when the employee reaches his place of work. If yes, the accident arose out of his employment.” 12. In Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 33, 4th Edn., the summary is stated thus:- “490. Accident travelling to and from work.— The course of employment normally begins when the employee reaches his place of work. To extend it to the journey to and from work it must be shown that, in travelling by the particular method and route and at the particular time, the employee was fulfilling an express or implied term of his contract of service. One way of doing this is to establish that the home is the employee's base from which it is his duty to work and that he was travelling by direct route from his home to a place where he was required to work, but that is only one way of showing this; the real question at issue is whether on the particular journey he was travelling in the performance of a duty, or whether the journey was incidental to the performance of that duty and not merely preparatory to the performance of it. If the place where the accident occurs is a private road or on the employer's property, the accident is in the course of the employment because he is then at the scene of the accident by reason only of his employment and he has reached the sphere of his employment. The test is whether the employee was exposed to the particular risk by reason of his employment or whether he took the same risks as those incurred by any member of the public using the highway. 496. Accidents travelling to or from work in employer's transport.— An accident happening while an employed earner is, with the express or implied permission of his employer, travelling as a passenger to or from his place of work in any vehicle which is being operated by or on behalf of his employer, or which is provided by some other person in pursuance of arrangements made with his employer, must be deemed to arise out of and in the course of his employment, even though the employed earner is not obliged to travel by that vehicle, if it would have been deemed so to have arisen if he had been under an obligation to travel by it provided that the vehicle is not operated in the ordinary course of a public transport service.? (emphasis supplied) 13. There can be no doubt that there was a causal relationship between the accident in which the appellant sustained the injuries and his employment in the SPG for actual VIP security duty; and it was an incident of his employment to travel from the staff quarters to the South Block in the SPG vehicle according to the official arrangement. In our opinion, the meaning of the expression “actual VIP security duty” in the above circular must be the same as that of the words “in the course of the employment” in the Workmen's Compensation Act; and, therefore, the test for determining the liability for payment under the circular should also be the same. In our view, the Tribunal was in error in making an unduly strict and narrow construction of the expression used in the circular. 14. We are constrained to observe that the authorities concerned must adopt a humane approach and constru the circular liberally to advance its object instead of taking such a rigid and pedantic stand. Unless properly implemented, the scheme in the circular would be frustrated resulting in failure to achieve the avowed purpose.” 12. The legal proposition, which can be crystallized from the aforesaid decisions, is that there must be a causal relationship between the accident and the employment. And if the accident had occurred on account of a risk which is an incident of the employment, the claim for compensation must succeed. But, if the workman has exposed himself to an added peril by his own imprudent act then the claim must fail. Now, it is well settled that this is subject to the theory of notional extension of the employer's premises so as to include an area which the workman passes and re-passes in going to and in leaving the actual place of work. There may be some reasonable extension in both time and place and a workman may be regarded as in the course of his employment even though he had not reached or had left his employer's premises. In each case, the facts and circumstances have to be examined very carefully in order to determine whether the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment of a workman, keeping in view at all times this theory of notional extension. 13. In the instant case, the causal relationship between the accident and the employment is admitted. In each case, the facts and circumstances have to be examined very carefully in order to determine whether the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment of a workman, keeping in view at all times this theory of notional extension. 13. In the instant case, the causal relationship between the accident and the employment is admitted. The husband of the petitioner No.1 was on duty at the Shantipur Check-gate. He had gone to cross-check the information relating to entry of some miscreants into the State of Arunachal Pradesh in Daran Village, while Covid-19 pandemic was prevalent all over the country and inter-state movement of people was banned. It is also admitted that cross-checking of the information in Daran village was a duty relating to disaster management, i.e. to prevent spread of Covid-19 pandemic. The stand of the respondent authorities is that having gone to Daran village and cross-checking the information about the infiltration of miscreant from Assam, he had performed disaster management duty. But, as soon as he had accomplished that duty of cross checking the information his disaster management duty is over. His returning to the check-gate, after cross-checking the information has to be treated as official duty only, not on disaster management duty. However, in view of the ratio laid down in the cases discussed herein above, especially in case of Rajanna (supra), the husband of the petitioner No.1 has to be treated as on duty of disaster management duty, as stated in the Notification, dated 6.11.2019, though he was not on the duty of disaster management at the time of accident, as he was returning after performing disaster management duty. The “Disaster Management Duty” in the Notification, dated 06.11.2019, must be construed as the same as that of the word “in the course of employment” in the Workman Compensation Act, as held the case of Rajanna (supra). 14. I have also considered the submissions of Mr. Purkayastha, the learned counsel for the petitioner and also gone through the host of authorities, cited by him and I find sufficient force in his submission and the ratios, laid down in the authorities cited by him, also strengthened his submission. 15. Also, I have gone through the minutes of the Meeting of the Screening Committee, held on 17.06.2022, which is enclosed with the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondent Nos.2 and 3, as Annexure-1. 15. Also, I have gone through the minutes of the Meeting of the Screening Committee, held on 17.06.2022, which is enclosed with the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondent Nos.2 and 3, as Annexure-1. And I find that the said Committee on 17.06.2022, has considered the cases of 7 persons and found only one person, at Sl. No.3, is covered by the aforementioned scheme, dated 06.11.2019. And it also appears that no reason has been assigned as to why the husband of the petitioner No.1 was not covered by the scheme dated 6.11.2019. Though an explanation is put forwarded in the affidavit-in-opposition, yet the minutes of the meeting is silent and no reason, whatsoever, not to speak of a plausible one, was assigned in the same. 16. It is well settled in the case of Commissioner of Police, Bombay vs. Gordhandas Bhanji reported in 1952 SCR 135 , that when a public order publicly made, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned therein and the reason cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of an affidavit or otherwise. The relevant paragraph is quoted below:- “We are clear that public orders, publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what he intended to do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the acting and conduct of those to hum they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself.” 17. And as no reason, whatsoever, has been assigned for repudiating the claim of the petitioner herein, to the considered opinion of this Court, the said Minutes of the Meeting, failed to withstand the legal scrutiny and therefore, liable to be set aside on this count alone. 18. I have gone through the decisions referred by Mr. Ratan, learned Additional Advocate General for the State respondents. In the case of Kanchan Dua (supra), the husband of the petitioner, who was serving as Colonel in Army and he was moved to Rajouri for operational requirement in Operation Ran Vijay at the location of HQ 25 Infantry Division. 18. I have gone through the decisions referred by Mr. Ratan, learned Additional Advocate General for the State respondents. In the case of Kanchan Dua (supra), the husband of the petitioner, who was serving as Colonel in Army and he was moved to Rajouri for operational requirement in Operation Ran Vijay at the location of HQ 25 Infantry Division. In the morning of 25.01.1992, he was found dead in his room on account of cardiac arrest. The petitioner/appellant, who is the wife of the Colonel was denied Liberalised Family pension, although she was granted special pension. Liberalised Family Pension is available to members of the family on the death or disability in attributable/aggravated cases as provided in Category E in Part II. Said scheme was extended only to the Armed Forces personnel killed or disabled on account of injuries in action; in view of Part I of letter dated 24.02.1972. As the husband of the petitioner/appellant was found dead in his room on account of cardiac arrest, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that no relief can be granted to the petitioner/appellant. 18.1. On the other hand, Smti Punya Chutia (supra) was a case where claim for ex-gratia compensation of Rs. 5,00,000/ was refused to the petitioner, whose husband died in a motor accident while he was assigned the duty of personal security officer attached to the Chairman of Jute Mill, Silghat and while he was travelling in the vehicle with Chairman. It was held that since the ex-gratia compensation is applicable only to the police personnel engaged in counter insurgency operation in view of Notification dated 29.07.2006. And since the husband of the petitioner was not engaged in counter insurgency operation or matters connected thereto, it was, under these circumstances, held that the petitioner is not entitled to ex-gratia compensation. 18.2. But, it appears that these decisions are clearly distinguishable on fact from the facts of the present case. And Punya Chuita (supra) cannot be read as a precedent as no question of law was discussed therein. A decision is available as precedent only if it decides a question of law. (See - State of Punjab and Ors. vs. Surindar Kumar and Ors, reported in (1992) 1 SCC 489 ). In the given facts and circumstances, this court is of the view that the aforesaid two decisions would not come into assistance of Mr. Ratan, learned Additional Advocate general. 19. (See - State of Punjab and Ors. vs. Surindar Kumar and Ors, reported in (1992) 1 SCC 489 ). In the given facts and circumstances, this court is of the view that the aforesaid two decisions would not come into assistance of Mr. Ratan, learned Additional Advocate general. 19. In the result, I find sufficient merit in this petition and accordingly, the same stands allowed. 20. The respondent authorities are directed to grant Ex-Gratia compensation of Rs.50,00,000/- to the petitioners herein and the said exercise has to be carried out within a period of one month from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order. The petitioners shall obtain a certified copy of this judgment and place the same before the respondent authorities. The parties have to bear their own cost.