ORDER : E.S.INDIRESH, J. Heard the learned counsel for the parties. In these writ petitions, petitioner in 201056/2025 is challenging notice dated 02.04.2025 (Annexure-D) issued by respondent No.1 and in WP No.201086/2025, petitioner is assailing the notice dated 11.04.2025 (Annexure-D) issued by respondent No.1. The impugned notices are issued for the purpose of election to the post of Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha of Municipality of respondent No.1 - Sindagi. 2. In W.P.No.201056/2025, it is the case of the petitioner that, the petitioner has been elected as a Counselor of the respondent No.1, which consisting of 23 elected members apart from the nominated members by the State. The grievance of the petitioner in the writ petition by challenging the notice dated 02.04.2025 (Annexure-D), that, the said notice dated 02.04.2025 has been issued, calling upon no confidence motion against the petitioner and to conduct election on 11.04.2025 as the same is contrary to Section 42(9) of the Karnataka Municipality Act, 1964 (herein after referred to as ‘Act’) and therefore, sought for interference of this Court. 3. In W.P.No.201086/2025, the petitioner is assailing the fresh Special General Body meeting dated 11.04.2025 (Annexure-D), wherein, the respondent-Municipality by following the order dated 09.04.2025 in W.A.No.200112/2025, had fixed the date of no confidence motion and to conduct the election on 16.04.2025, it is contended that, same is impermissible in law as the said dated fixed for no confidence motion on 16.04.2025 is contrary to the judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench in Misc. Bench No.8288/2017 disposed off on 25.04.2017, and accordingly, it is submitted by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that, issuance of corrigendum dated 11.04.2025 is contrary to the judgment of the Allahabad High Court referred to above as well as it is argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that there is illegality in the original notice dated 02.04.2025 and the same cannot be continued by issuance of the corrigendum dated 11.04.2025, as the illegality will be continued by the respondent-Municipality by issuing the corrigendum. Accordingly, it is submitted that, interference is called for in these writ petitions. 4. Per contra, Sri. Accordingly, it is submitted that, interference is called for in these writ petitions. 4. Per contra, Sri. Ameet Kumar Deshpande, learned Senior counsel representing the private respondent Nos.2 to 13 in W.P.No.201086/2025 contended that, by referring to the order dated 16.04.2025 (Annexure-R3) and order dated 23.04.2025 which is at (Annexure-R4), passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP No.10588/2025 and contended that, there is no illegality in issuance of the corrigendum dated 11.04.2025 and same shall merge with the orders passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and therefore, sought for dismissal of the writ petitions. 5. It is also submitted by the learned Senior counsel appearing for the private respondents that even if there is any flaw in procedure for issuance of notice by way of issuance of corrigendum and in this regard, he refers to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of K.Narasimhiah V/s H.C. Singri Gowda and others reported in AIR 1966 SCC 330 and the order passed by the Division Bench of this Court in W.A.No.160/2025 dated 06.03.2025 and contended that, even if there is illegality committed by the authorities insofar as calculating days as per proviso to Section 42(9) of the Act and same has been rectified by way of issuance of corrigendum and accordingly, he sought for dismissal of the writ petitions. 6. It is also submitted by learned Senior counsel that pursuant to order passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, election has been conducted on 16.04.2025 and the results have been declared, which is subject to the result of the writ petitions and by referring to the said aspects, it is submitted by learned Senior counsel that the petitioners herein have lost the confidence of the Members/Councilors of Sindagi Municipality and accordingly, he sought for dismissal of the writ petitions. 7. In addition to this, the learned Senior counsel appearing for the private respondents refers to the order dated 09.04.2025 passed in W.P.No.200112/2025 and submitted that, a submission has been made by the learned counsel representing for Municipality for issuance of corrigendum notice and same has been confirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and in that view of the matter, nothing survives for consideration in these petitions. 8. Sri. 8. Sri. D.P.Ambekar, learned counsel appearing for respondent-Municipality refers to the submission made before the Division Bench referred to above, and pursuant to the same, the corrigendum has been issued and therefore, it is submitted that the submission made by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners cannot be accepted. 9. Learned counsel representing the respondent- Municipality has also places reliance on the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in W.A.200087/2022, disposed of on 22.07.2022 and by referring to paragraph Nos.15 and 16 of the said judgment, submitted that, fixing the date for issuance of notice is only a directory in nature and therefore, sought for dismissal of the petitions. 10. Having taken note of the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for the parties, before questions to be answered in these writ petitions is with regard to validity of notice dated 02.04.2025 and the corrigendum notice dated 11.04.2025 issued by the respondent-Municipality for conducting fresh election to the post of Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha of Sindagi Municipality as the members of the counselors have pointed out about no confidence motion against the petitioners herein. In the backdrop of these aspects, the petitioners herein have challenged both the original notice dated 02.04.2025 and corrigendum notice dated 11.04.2025. 11. In the notice dated 02.04.2025, the Municipality has initiated no confidence motion against the petitioners pursuant to the representation made by the councilors and also for fixing the date of no confidence and to elect the new President and Vice-President on 11.04.2025. The said notices are challenged before this Court in these petitions. 12. The interim order has been passed by this Court in W.P.No.201056/2025. The Division bench of this Court by order dated 09.04.2025, according to the submission made by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent-Municipality, comes to the conclusion that there is no impediment for issuance of corrigendum to conduct the election as per the date fixed in the notice, as on 16.04.2025. The said order was challenged before the Hon’ble Supreme Court as per Annexures-R3 and R4 respectively. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the order dated 16.04.2025, held as under: “In the meantime, the order of the Single Judge and the impugned order of the Division Bench may also be filed after obtaining true copies from the official website of the High Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the order dated 16.04.2025, held as under: “In the meantime, the order of the Single Judge and the impugned order of the Division Bench may also be filed after obtaining true copies from the official website of the High Court. It has been informed that the meeting of 'No Confidence' which is scheduled for today has already been commenced. As an ad-interim measure, it is provided that the meeting shall continue and the result of the same be declared but the same will not be given effect till the next date fixed i.e. 23rd April, 2025.” 13. In the order dated 23.04.2025, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows: “Considering the submissions noted above, we dispose of this petition while directing that the interim order dated 16 th April, 2025 shall continue till the disposal of the writ petition by the High Court. The High Court is requested upon an appropriate application being filed by the parties for early disposal of the writ petition to consider the same.” 14. Taking into consideration the order passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on 16.04.2025 and 23.04.2025, in which, confirming the order passed by the Division Bench of this Court, wherein, the submission made by the learned counsel representing the respondent-Municipality for issuance of the fresh corrigendum has been accepted. In that view of the matter, I am of the view that, the first contention raised by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners with regard to the fact that issuance of original notice and corrigendum suffers from Section 42 (9) of the Act, cannot be accepted. In this connection, I have gone through the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in W.A.No.200037/2022, wherein, this Court at paragraph 17 has held that proviso to Section 49 of the Act is of directory in nature. It is also forthcoming from the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in W.A.No.160/2025, wherein, this Court at paragraph 6.5.3 to 6.5.6 held as follows: “6.5.3 A thing irregularly done is not regularly done. It is not in conformity of rule or principle. The concepts “illegal”, “irregular” and “procedurally irregular”, are often understood in terms of their degree which they bear to be not in conformity with rule of particular course of action. It is not in conformity of rule or principle. The concepts “illegal”, “irregular” and “procedurally irregular”, are often understood in terms of their degree which they bear to be not in conformity with rule of particular course of action. The illegality is a breach of law in substantive way and in its high degree which will taint and vitiate the action. 6.5.4 One who commits “illegality” has to be denied the assertion of his right and he stands disentitled to relief in law. Irregularity, as noticed, is breach of procedure of rule or some orderly conduct but not of such nature which could be said to be in the nature of a debilitating defect. It is pardonable in law. The concept of procedural irregularity is indicative of lapse of minor nature in procedure which could not affect adversely rights of a party, nor would exceptionally reverse the obligation of the order side.” 15. Taking into consideration the declaration of law made by the Full Bench of this Court as well as the Division Bench, it is expedient to consider the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court at paragraph Nos.14 and 15 in the case of K.Narasimhaiah stated supra, wherein, it is held as follows: “14. It is necessary also to remember that the main object of giving the notice is to make it possible for the Councillors to so arrange their other business as to be able to attend the meeting. For an ordinary general meeting the notice provided is of seven clear days. That is expected to give enough time for the purpose. But a lesser period-of three clear days-is considered sufficient for "special general meetings generally. The obvious reason for providing a shorter period of such meetings is that these are considered more important meetings and Councillors are expected to make it convenient to attend these meetings even at the cost of some inconvenience to themselves. Where the special general meeting is to dispose of some matter of great urgency it is considered that a period of even less than three clear days' notice would be sufficient. 15. Where the special general meeting is to dispose of some matter of great urgency it is considered that a period of even less than three clear days' notice would be sufficient. 15. A consideration of the object of these provisions and the manner in which the object is sought to be achieved indicates that while the legislature did intend that ordinarily the notice as mentioned should be given it could not have intended that the fact that the notice is of less than the period mentioned in the section and thus the Councillors had less time than is ordinarily considered reasonable to arrange his other business to be free to attend the meeting, should have the serious result of making the proceedings of the meeting invalid.” 16. Following the declaration of law made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as this Court refers to above, the flaw made in the notice dated 02.04.2025, same has been rectified by in corrigendum noted dated 11.04.2025, which has been confirmed by the Division Bench of this Court as well as by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Hence, I am of the view that, no interference is called for in these petitions. Accordingly, the judgment referred to by the learned counsel representing the petitioners in Surendra Kumar Yadav stated supra, is not applicable to the facts of the present case, as issuance of corrigendum has been made pursuant to the order passed by the Division Bench of this Court, which came to be confirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 17. In the result, the writ petitions are dismissed.