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2025 DIGILAW 732 (CAL)

Central Bank of India v. Sanjay Sutradhar

2025-10-27

LANUSUNGKUM JAMIR, RAI CHATTOPADHYAY

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JUDGMENT : Rai Chattopadhyay, J. 1. A judgment of the Hon'ble Single Judge dated November 22, 2023, in writ petition No. WPA 8312 of 2020, is under challenge in the instant appeal. Likewise, the Award of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal dated November 11, 2019, which was challenged in the said writ petition and upheld by the Hon'ble Single Judge, has also been assailed here. The subject matter of dispute is in relation to the alleged unauthorised and illegal termination of service of the respondent No.1 by the present appellant and the respondent's claim for reinstatement in service. The dispute was referred for adjudication by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court to adjudicate upon the following : “Schedule Whether employer – employee relationship existed between Shri Sanjay Sutradhar and the Central Bank of India, in relation to Hill Cart Road Branch, Siliguri? If yes, whether the termination of Shri Sanjay Sutradhar from service w.e.f. 31st December, 2007 is justified and legal? What relief the workman is entitled to?” 2. On contest, the Tribunal has passed an Award dated November 11, 2019, thereby holding inter alia that the respondent No.1 has been in continuous service and has actually worked for more than 240 days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of reference. That the respondent/workman could not have been denied the protection under section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. That, since he has been found to have been terminated without compliance with the provisions thereof, such termination was held to be illegal and the respondent/workman was directed to be reinstated in service with 50% back wages as stands due. 3. Challenging the said Award, the appellant/Bank filed the writ petition before the Hon'ble Single Judge, which has been disposed of vide the judgment impugned. The Court has scrutinised the Award assailed before it. The Court finds no jurisdictional error committed by the Tribunal. Therefore, the Court has not interfered with the Award of Tribunal and its findings on fact and dismissed the writ petition. Hence, the writ petitioner/appellant has filed the present appeal. The respondent’s case: 4. The respondent was working in the appellant Bank, at Siliguri Branch, as a peon (Class-IV staff), with effect from January 1, 1986 till December 31, 2007. He has worked there in the said capacity continuously and uninterruptedly for 22 years as mentioned above. 5. Hence, the writ petitioner/appellant has filed the present appeal. The respondent’s case: 4. The respondent was working in the appellant Bank, at Siliguri Branch, as a peon (Class-IV staff), with effect from January 1, 1986 till December 31, 2007. He has worked there in the said capacity continuously and uninterruptedly for 22 years as mentioned above. 5. During his service period, he has been paid monthly wages to the tune ranging from Rs.800/- to Rs.3000/- per month. Initially, wages have been disbursed to him through vouchers. Later on, the same used to be paid through his bank account and by way of debiting the Bank's “Profit & Loss Account”. 6. All of a sudden, due to the verbal order of the Chief Manager of the Bank, the respondent has been terminated with effect from January 1, 2008. 7. The respondent has alleged gross illegality and arbitrariness having been made by the appellant Bank by terminating him without following the due process of law. Hence, he has raised an industrial dispute which has culminated in the Award of the Tribunal dated November 11, 2019, challenged in the writ petition. Counter case of the appellant: 8. The appellant says that the respondent's claim to be the workman of the appellant Bank is only unfounded and baseless. That the respondent was never appointed in the Bank and no appointment letter was ever issued to him. It says that there was no employer- employee relationship between the Bank and the respondent. Therefore, according to the appellant, the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 would not be applicable in the case of the present respondent. 9. According to the appellant, the respondent has failed to prove any employer-employee relationship between the Bank and himself in the proceedings or that he has been a workman of the Bank. In such view of the facts, the Tribunal's decision is erroneous and perverse, whereas the decision of the Hon'ble Single Judge to uphold the Award of the Tribunal is also not maintainable. Hence, for setting aside both, it has filed the instant appeal. The appellant’s arguments: 10. Mr. Bishwambhar Jha has represented the appellant. He has submitted that the respondent no. 1 initally volunteered to maintain the two wheelers outside the Hill Cart Road Branch of the municipality cycle stand. He did so voluntarily and in the capacity of an agent. Hence, for setting aside both, it has filed the instant appeal. The appellant’s arguments: 10. Mr. Bishwambhar Jha has represented the appellant. He has submitted that the respondent no. 1 initally volunteered to maintain the two wheelers outside the Hill Cart Road Branch of the municipality cycle stand. He did so voluntarily and in the capacity of an agent. He claimed by letter dated 10.01.2006 that some charges be paid to him for maintaining his family. The activities of the respondent no. 1 in maintaining the two wheelers outside the branch premises had nothing to do with the activities of the appellant Bank at the said branch. The respondent no. 1 was not engaged by the Bank to maintain the two wheelers of the customers or the other persons who were coming to the branch premises. In fact, the said activity had been taken over by the local municipal authority; and it is the duty of the said local municipal authority to maintain roads and of the executive authority of the 'State' to maintain traffic at around the place. Hence, any relationship as employer and employee between the Bank and the respondent, has been denied by the said appellant. However, he pleaded that he might come at irregular intervals for cleaning the desk, computers and equipment/apparatus at the branch. Such occasional dusting work would also make him earn something. Though a peon was posted at the Branch as against a sanctioned post, out of pure compassion, the respondent no. 1 was allowed to carry on with such dusting work occasionally for half-an- hour a day. That, the respondent no. 1 was not even a temporary or casual employee in connection with the banking business of the petitioner at the Hill Car Road Branch. 11. A letter of the respondent dated January 10, 2006, has been referred to by the appellant to submit that, according to his own statement made therein, the respondent maintained and looked after the two- wheelers parked outside the Bank premises, only voluntarily and requested some payment to be made to him by the Bank for the said activity done by him. 12. Further, Mr. 12. Further, Mr. Jha has submitted that the Bank later on and pursuant to the letter of the respondent No.1 dated March 3, 2005, has engaged him to discharge the duty of maintaining the cycle and motorbike stand outside the bank premises, on a contract basis for a limited period of three months only. It has been submitted that after the expiry of the stipulated period of contract, such a contractual relationship between the appellant and the respondent had come to an end. That whatever the respondent has claimed in his letter submitted before the Assistant Labour Commissioner [in short “ALC”], that he has been a casual worker, – Class IV staff of the Bank, from January 1986 to December 2007, is an exaggerated fact, and only baseless, in view of the records. 13. It is submitted that before the ALC, the appellant/Bank had taken a categorical stand of having no relationship with the respondent No.1 as an employer of him. It is submitted that certain sporadic payments have been made to him in lieu of random and occasional services obtained from the said respondent. Mr. Jha has specifically relied upon the fact that even the respondent has not denied and disputed the fact that no appointment letter was ever received by him from the appellant/Bank. He has submitted that the respondent's stand differs when at one hand he raises an industrial dispute and on the other hand he raises another dispute under the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act 1948 and the liability of the bank as a principal employer under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970. 14. According to the appellant, neither the primary issue of existence of a master-servant relationship between the appellant and the respondent nor the secondary issue with regard to the justifiability of termination of the respondent from service, as referred to before the tribunal for adjudication, could be proved with the aid of appropriate ocular or documentary evidence produced before the said tribunal. Furthermore, the appellant was not allowed to conclude its cross- examination. Thus, not only was the Award based on uncontested evidence but also the appellant’s vital right of audience has been jeopardised due to the said Award of the tribunal. 15. Furthermore, the appellant was not allowed to conclude its cross- examination. Thus, not only was the Award based on uncontested evidence but also the appellant’s vital right of audience has been jeopardised due to the said Award of the tribunal. 15. According to the appellant, all these facts as well as the gross illegality in the Award of the tribunal have been overlooked by the Hon’ble Single Judge in the impugned judgment dated November 22, 2023. The Court’s findings in the said judgment are termed as erroneous and not grounded on the proper appreciation of the records. 16. In support of his argument, Mr. Jha has referred to the following judgments: (i) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. Vs. Dan Bahadur Singh And Others reported at (2007) 6 SCC 207 (ii) Union of India and Others Vs. Vartak Labour Union (2) reported at (2011) 4 SCC 200 (iii) University of Rajasthan and Another Vs. Prem Lata Agarwal reported at (2013) 3 SCC 705 (iv) Secretary, State of Karnataka and Others Vs. Umadevi (3) and Others reported at (2006) 4 SCC 1 The respondent ’ s argument: 17. Mr. Pratik Majumder, learned advocate has appeared and submitted on behalf of the respondent No.1, that the plea taken by the appellant/Bank of not there being any relationship between the parties as employer and the employee, is beyond the statutory principles and scope of the law. In this regard, he has referred to the statutory definition of the term “workman” as appearing under section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947. With reference to the same, he has submitted that the provision explicitly stipulates that terms of employment can be expressed or implied, that is, such terms need not be reduced in writing like an appointment letter or contract of service. That, if by the behavior and conduct of the parties employer-employee relationship can be established, then in that event, a person has to be considered a workman of the employer and he cannot be terminated from service without following the procedure laid down in Section 25F of the said Act. The submission of the bank that the workman could not produce any appointment letter or any documentary evidence to prove existence of employer-employee relationship is therefore said to be without any basis. 18. The submission of the bank that the workman could not produce any appointment letter or any documentary evidence to prove existence of employer-employee relationship is therefore said to be without any basis. 18. Reliance in this regard is being place on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Devinder Singh Vs. Municipal Council, Sanaur reported in (2011) 6 SCC 584 – paragraphs – 12-20. 19. It has been further stated that Section 2(s) of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 defines Workman as any person employed including an apprentice and does not differentiate between permanent, temporary, casual, contractual or ad-hoc workers. At the very outset reliance is being placed upon Ground no. VI of the memorandaum of Appeal where the bank categorically states that respondent no. 1 was engaged on ad-hoc basis thus establishing existence of employer-employee relationship. 20. Reliance is also placed on a communication of the bank dated 16 th July, 2010 wherein it has been categorically mentioned that successive Branch Managers have continued to engage the respondent no. 1 in the services of the bank and thus the respondent no. 1 is an employee of the bank. 21. Mr. Majumder, learned advocate for the respondent no. 1 has mentioned that in the written statement filed by the bank before the Learned Tribunal, the appellant bank has admitted in paragraph 9 that the respondent no. 1 employed by Branch Managers and he was paid salary for cleaning desk, PC and other clerical works and supplying water to the staff members of the bank. Further in the exhibits filed by the appellant bank they have exclusively admitted that they have paid Festival Advance at the rate of Rs. 3000/- in the year 2004 to the respondent no. 1 by debiting from bank's internal account. 22. It has been mentioned that the employer-employee relationship is also established from the communication of the bank dated 5th January, 2009 where the bank has admitted in the last sentence of first paragraph that the nature of engagement of the respondent no. 1 was entirely ad-hoc thus proving that he was an ad-hoc employee of the bank. 23. Reliance is also placed on the credit vouchers by which the respondent no. 1 was paid salary/wages. If the respondent no. 1 was working for an outside agency then why did the bank made payments to the respondent no. 1 was entirely ad-hoc thus proving that he was an ad-hoc employee of the bank. 23. Reliance is also placed on the credit vouchers by which the respondent no. 1 was paid salary/wages. If the respondent no. 1 was working for an outside agency then why did the bank made payments to the respondent no. 1 on monthly basis for 20 years. Moreover, it has also been observed by the learned Tribunal in its order that the bank failed to provide the name of the agency for which the respondent no. 1 worked. This shows that the story of respondent no. 1 working for an outside agency is a cooked up and a fabricated story as well as an afterthought tried to established by the bank to cover up their laches, illegality and inaction. 24. Mr. Majumder, learned advocate has further submitted that, it is a settled principle of law and also a well-established principle that this Hon'ble Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot re-appreciate evidence and arrive at a finding of facts, unless and otherwise the tribunal had either exceeded its jurisdiction or acted perversely. 25. That the Hon'ble Court only interferes with the order of the Tribunal only if there is any illegality on procedural level and in case where the decision of the Learned Tribunal has been arrived at in gross violation of legal principles and/or its decision is ex-facie illegal arbitrary, unlawful and unconstitutional. 26. It is submitted that, the Tribunal upon considering all pleadings, documents and evidences on record has come to a confirmed conclusion that there exists genuine employer-employee relationship between the appellant bank and the respondent no.1 and the said findings have been upheld by the Hon'ble Single Bench of this Hon'ble High Court and thus when two judicial forums have come to the same finding this Hon'ble Division Bench should not interfere with such findings. On the contrary this Hon'ble Division Bench should dismiss the appeal of the bank in limini. 27. In the above background it is further submitted that the Learned Tribunal had also mentioned in paragraph 10 of its order that that the bank had also issued a circular dated 12th March, 1991 with regard to absorption of temporary employees who have put in 240 days of service vide Ext-04 of the bank. 28. 27. In the above background it is further submitted that the Learned Tribunal had also mentioned in paragraph 10 of its order that that the bank had also issued a circular dated 12th March, 1991 with regard to absorption of temporary employees who have put in 240 days of service vide Ext-04 of the bank. 28. Reliance in this regard is being place on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Bhuvnesh Kumar Dwivedi v/s HINDALCO Industries Limited reported in (2014) 11 SCC 85 - paragraphs-18-22. Discussion & decision: 29. While reviewing decision of a specialized tribunal. Like the Central Government Industrial Tribunal, the High Court's power is enough wide but not an unfettered one. The High Court's role is primarily supervisory, ensuring that tribunal acts within its jurisdiction and follow principles of natural justice. It does not function as an appellate court to re-assess factual findings or substitute its judgment for that of the tribunal, unless there is manifest illegality, perversity, or jurisdictional error. In Sadhu Ram v. Delhi Transport Corporation (1983) 4 SCC 156 , the Supreme Court has held that the High Court should not act as an appellate authority over tribunals created under special legislation. That, the questions of fact decided by tribunals, including jurisdictional facts, are generally not open to interference unless there is a clear error or jurisdictional breach. That the High Court should not re-adjudicate disputes or substitute its judgment in place of that of the tribunal unless it finds the same as patently illegal due to jurisdictional breach or perversity palpable on the face of it. 30. It is the settled legal principle that industrial adjudication involves complex factual and legal issues, distinct from ordinary civil disputes. The Court's interference is permissible only if there are manifest errors, violations of law, or lack of jurisdiction. The Court cannot function as a court of appeal, and its review is limited to checking for illegality or perversity in the Tribunal's award. While exercising its power of judicial review as to an Award of the Industrial Tribunal, the High Court may intervene only if the tribunal acts beyond its jurisdiction or violates principles of natural justice or if the Award is perverse or illegal and also when the tribunal clutches at jurisdiction without proper basis. While exercising its power of judicial review as to an Award of the Industrial Tribunal, the High Court may intervene only if the tribunal acts beyond its jurisdiction or violates principles of natural justice or if the Award is perverse or illegal and also when the tribunal clutches at jurisdiction without proper basis. In cases of arbitrariness or manifest illegality in the Award, the High Court may also in exercise of its power of judicial review, interfare and set aside the tribunal's Award. The High Court may refrain from interfering thereto in case when the tribunal's jurisdiction is invoked properly following a valid reference or when the findings are supported by record and are not manifestly perverse. Mere re-judging of the facts or re-assessment of the evidence, is outside the jurisdiction vested under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Interference is justified only if Awards are contrary to law or are patently illegal. 31. The jurisprudence emphasizes a restrictive and cautious approach by the High Court in interfering with Industrial Tribunal Awards, respecting the specialized nature of the tribunals and their statutory jurisdiction. The Court's role is to guard legality, not to re-assess factual or discretionary decisions unless clear illegality or perversity is established. What the appellant in stead intends is that the Court reappreciates the evidence on record and substitutes the other view, in place of that attributed by the tribunal on assessing the evidence on record by itself. However, in view of the settled principles of law as discussed earlier, the High Court sitting in and exercising supervising capacity would be justified to forebear to do so, unless there is patent illegality or perversity in the Award or gross contradiction to the law. 32. So far as the Award dated November 11, 2019, of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal is concerned, the said tribunal appears to have considered the evidence on record thoroughly and in the right spirit of the same. The appellant has substantially put forth its contention that since the respondent has not proved in trial any appointment letter of him issued by the appellant, he has not been able to bring on record any master servant relationship of him and the appellant, on record. That, on that score the tribunal's Award is erroneous and unsustainable. 33. The appellant has substantially put forth its contention that since the respondent has not proved in trial any appointment letter of him issued by the appellant, he has not been able to bring on record any master servant relationship of him and the appellant, on record. That, on that score the tribunal's Award is erroneous and unsustainable. 33. However, as held by the Supreme Court in Devinder Singh (supra), an appointment letter is not the only and conclusive proof of the fact that there existed employer-employee relationship between the parties. The tribunal is found to have put in adequate considerations as to all the incidental facts and circumstances which have given rise to a causal connection as to their inter-se terms and relation. Continuous disbursement of salary to the respondent No.1 for a prolonged period, thereby acknowledging his service with the Bank, without however granting the employee other benefits of service, by itself assumes the taint of unfair labour practice held out by the appellant. It is pertinent to note that the employer's stand is also self-contradictory, in so far as, on one hand it denies any employer-employee relationship with the respondent, whereas on the other hand it accepts that the respondent has been a contractual worker with it. 34. The Hon'ble Single Judge in his judgment dated November 22, 2023, has duly considered all these aspects including that related to facts of the case as well as the principles of law. The High Court's lookout being that with respect to if any legal or jurisdictional error has been committed by the tribunal or not and not to substitute any other view in absence of the same, its final verdict in the said judgment dated November 22, 2023, cannot be termed as erroneous or unsustainable, as alleged. In stead this Court finds the judgment November 22, 2023, of the Hon'ble Single Judge, in accordance with the principles of law as well settled. This Court finds no cogent and justifiable ground to interfere into the same in any manner or to set aside the same. 35. For all the reasons as discussed above, the instant appeal is therefore liable to be dismissed. 36. Hence, the appeal being MAT 197 of 2024 is dismissed. 37. Urgent certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied to the parties upon compliance with all requisite formalities.