JUDGMENT : CHEEKATI MANAVENDRANATH ROY, J. 1. This appeal is preferred against the judgment dated 2.5.2013 passed in Sessions Case No.58 of 2012 on the file of the learned Third Additional Sessions Judge, Kheda at Nadiad, whereby the sole accused-respondent was acquitted of the charge under Section 302 of the INDIAN PENAL CODE . 2. Facts germane to dispose of this appeal may briefly be stated as follows:- 2.1 It is the case of uxoricide. As per the prosecution case, Rakshaben is the legally wedded wife of the accused (hereinafter referred to as “the deceased”). Their marriage was solemnized about seven to eight years back, prior to the date of offence. They were blessed with one son by name Prakash, aged about two and a half years, during their lawful wedlock. Both the accused and the deceased, who is the wife of the accused, are living along with their son under one roof in one house in the Village-Moti Timbli, Taluka-Mahemadavad. 2.2 While they were living together, it is stated that, on 9.4.2012, the accused demanded her to give her silver ornaments for the purpose of taking alcohol at about 5 p.m. on that day. It appears that when she refused to give her silver ornaments that there was some quarrel between both of them, and the accused beat her. When she tried to run away from the house, he caught hold of her and has taken kerosene tin, which is available in the house, and poured kerosene on his wife and set her ablaze and ran away from the house. The sister of the deceased examined as PW-1, is their neighbour. As the deceased and his sister, PW-1, married two brothers, i.e. the accused and his own brother, they are living in side by side houses. So, on hearing the shouts of the deceased, who was in flames, it is stated that, PW-1 immediately reached the house and extinguished the fire of her sister and, thereafter, she and her husband took her to Maha Gujarat Hospital. Treatment was given to her in the said hospital on 9.4.2012 itself. On the next day, i.e. on 10.4.2012, on the intimation given by the hospital authority, police reached the hospital and recorded the statement of the victim. She has given a detailed account in her statement as to how she sustained burn injuries. Treatment was given to her in the said hospital on 9.4.2012 itself. On the next day, i.e. on 10.4.2012, on the intimation given by the hospital authority, police reached the hospital and recorded the statement of the victim. She has given a detailed account in her statement as to how she sustained burn injuries. She stated clearly as to how she was beaten and how she was set ablaze by the accused, stating that on the evening of 9.4.2012, the accused demanded her to give him silver ornaments for the purpose of consuming alcohol and when she refused to give the same that the accused started beating her and when she tried to run away from the other side door of the house, that he caught hold of her and brought her back into the house and, thereafter, poured kerosene on her and set her ablaze and that PW-1 came and extinguished the fire on her. The police registered the said statement of the victim as an FIR initially for the offence punishable under Section 307 of IPC. On the same day, i.e. on 10.4.2012, on the requisition given by the hospital authorities, the Executive Magistrate examined as PW-8, reached the hospital and recorded the dying declaration of the victim. In her dying declaration also, she stated that the accused beat her and poured kerosene on her and set her ablaze. 2.3 After treating her in Maha Gujarat Hospital, as her condition was serious, she was referred to Civil Hospital, Ahmedabad, one week thereafter i.e. on 17.4.2012. PW-6 treated her in the said hospital and opined on 17.4.2012 that her condition was serious. She was treated in Civil Hospital, Ahmedabad, from 17.4.2012 to 23.4.2012 and on 23.4.2012, it is stated that she was taken away from the hospital by her family members against medical advice and that again she was brought to the hospital on 26.4.2012 in a serious condition and on that day, she died due to septic burn injuries. After receiving her death intimation, police altered the FIR from offence punishable under Section 307 of IPC to an offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC. After inquest was held over her dead-body, autopsy was held over her dead-body. PW-5 is the doctor, who has held autopsy over her dead-body. He opined that she died due to cardio-respiratory septic shock falling burns. After inquest was held over her dead-body, autopsy was held over her dead-body. PW-5 is the doctor, who has held autopsy over her dead-body. He opined that she died due to cardio-respiratory septic shock falling burns. Accordingly, he has issued a postmortem report to that effect. Exh.17 is the said postmortem report. Exh.18 is the injury certificate issued stating that as she suffered 95% of burn injuries that she died of the said septic burn injuries. 2.4 During the course of investigation, the accused was arrested on 11.4.2012. After examining the witness and after completion of the investigation, police found that the accused poured kerosene on her and set her ablaze and she sustained severe burn injuries at his hands and, ultimately, succumbed to the said injuries and that the accused committed murder of the deceased. Therefore, they have filed charge-sheet on completion of investigation against the accused for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC. 2.5 The trial Court, after taking cognizance of the offence, framed sole charge under Section 302 of IPC against the accused. The same was read over and explained to him. The accused denied the said charge and claimed to be tried. 2.6 In the trial that took place, the prosecution got examined PW-1 to PW-14 witnesses and got marked 19 exhibits to substantiate its case against the accused. 2.7 At the culmination of the trial, after considering the evidence on record and on appreciation of the same, the trial Court found the accused not guilty for the said sole charge under Section 302 of IPC and acquitted him of the said charge by the impugned judgment. 3. Aggrieved by the impugned judgment of acquittal, the State has preferred the instant appeal, challenging the legality and validity of the said judgment of acquittal. 4. When the appeal came up for hearing, we have heard the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, Ms.Krina Calla, for the State. Despite service of notice of rule, the respondent did not appear before the Court and he did not turn up for hearing in this appeal. The matter was listed for final hearing on our Board on 12.6.2025. As the respondent did not turn up for hearing on that day inspite of service of notice on him, to give a fair opportunity to him, we have ordered to list the appeal for hearing on 10.7.20215. The matter was listed for final hearing on our Board on 12.6.2025. As the respondent did not turn up for hearing on that day inspite of service of notice on him, to give a fair opportunity to him, we have ordered to list the appeal for hearing on 10.7.20215. On that day also, he did not appear and there was no representation also on his behalf. So, as the appeal is listed on the Board under the caption “critically old matters” for final hearing and as it is an old appeal of the year 2013, we have directed to list the matter finally today i.e. on 11.7.2025, stating that if the respondent fails to turn up for hearing that the appeal will be heard and disposed of as per the material available on record on merits. Today also, he did not appear. Thus, inspite of affording ample opportunity to him, he did not make his appearance and did not turn up for hearing in the appeal. Therefore, we are constrained to go through the evidence and material on record and to dispose of this appeal on merits, as per the material available on record. 5. As noticed supra, it is a case of uxoricide of committing murder of wife by the accused. The fact that the deceased is the wife of the accused, and the accused and the deceased used to reside under one roof in their house along with their minor son of two and a half years age is not in dispute. The said material fact is absolutely incontrovertible fact in this case. 6. The case of the prosecution is mainly based on the dying declaration of the deceased, which is at Exhibit-30, recorded by the Executive Magistrate, examined as PW-8. Apart from the said dying declaration, prosecution also relied on the evidence of the own sister of the deceased examined as PW-1, father and mother of the deceased, who are examined as PW-2 and PW-3. PW-2 and PW-3 are not the eye witnesses to the incident of the accused beating the deceased and setting her ablaze. PW-1, who is her sister, married the real brother of the deceased and they are living in the side house of the accused as their neighbours. PW-2 and PW-3 are not the eye witnesses to the incident of the accused beating the deceased and setting her ablaze. PW-1, who is her sister, married the real brother of the deceased and they are living in the side house of the accused as their neighbours. As per the version of the prosecution, PW- 1 heard shouts of the deceased in the evening of 9.4.2012 and she immediately reached the house of the accused and found the deceased engulfed in flames and she immediately extinguished the fire on her and she along with her husband, who is also the own brother of the deceased took her to the hospital. The brother of the accused, who is also husband of PW-1, initially lodged a report with the police on 9.4.2012 stating that there was a blast in the house of the accused, while the deceased was doing work in the house and she caught fire in the said blast of the kerosene stove. But he was not examined in this case. The said report presented by him before the police is marked as Exhibit-40 through investigation officer, who is examined as PW-11. 7. The said witnesses, who are PW-1 to PW-3, who are the parents and sister of the deceased turned hostile in this case and did not support the case of the prosecution. PW-1, own sister of the deceased, has married own brother of the accused. So, for the reasons best known to her, she turned hostile during the course of trial and did not support the prosecution version. Therefore, on the ground that the material witnesses in this case turned hostile and did not support the prosecution case and also on the ground that there was a settlement of the dispute within the family members of the accused, and as there is a young child, who is the minor son of the accused, the trial Court held that the accused is not found guilty for the charge under Section 302 of IPC and, thereby acquitted him. But the trial Court did not properly appreciate the material evidence on record and particularly Exhibit-30, which is the dying declaration of the deceased and also the initial statement given by the deceased to the police immediately after the occurrence of the incident, which is Exhibit-43, wherein she narrated the events clearly and has given a detailed account of the facts as to how she was beaten and was set on fire by the accused. 8. PW-8 is the Executive Magistrate, who recorded Exhibit- 30 dying declaration of the deceased. The trial Court dis- believed the said dying declaration on the ground that the doctor did not certify that she was in a fit state of mind to give the statement. No doubt, as can be seen from Exhibit-30, there is no certification of the doctor certifying that she is in a fit state of mind. The doctor has only certified that she is in a serious condition but that does not mean that she is not in a fit state of mind to give the statement. It is now well settled that even in the absence of certification of the doctor that the injured is in a fit state of mind, when it is found that the learned Magistrate, who recorded the dying declaration was satisfied that the injured is in a position to give the statement and, thereafter, recorded the statement, the said subjective satisfaction of the Magistrate regarding fit state of mind of the victim to give statement is sufficient to uphold the validity of the dying declaration and to accept the same. A Constitution Bench of five Judges of the Supreme Court had an occasion to deal with said proposition of law, in the case of Laxman v. State of Maharashtra , (2002) 6 SCC 710 wherein it is held that mere absence of doctor’s certification as to the fitness of the declarant’s state of mind would not ipso facto render the dying declaration unacceptable. Further held that evidentiary value of such declaration would depend upon the facts and circumstances of a particular case. Further held that when the fitness of the declarant’s state of mind was proved by the testimony of the Magistrate, who has recorded the dying declaration, said dying declaration can be accepted. 9. Further held that evidentiary value of such declaration would depend upon the facts and circumstances of a particular case. Further held that when the fitness of the declarant’s state of mind was proved by the testimony of the Magistrate, who has recorded the dying declaration, said dying declaration can be accepted. 9. We have meticulously gone through Exhibit-30 dying declaration and subjected the same to strict judicial scrutiny to ascertain whether PW-8, Executive Magistrate was satisfied with the fit state of mind of the declarant to give the statement before recording the dying declaration or not. Exhibit-30 is recorded in a question and answer form. The very first and preliminary question that is put by the Magistrate is (i) Right now are you conscious? and to the said question the victim answered affirmatively saying “Yes”. Then the Magistrate questioned her, (ii) Whether she is in a position to understand whatever is asked by him and to give reply to it? To the said question also she answered “Yes”. Then when the Magistrate has asked her name, her age etc. and she also answered all the said questions properly. She has also given name of her husband when questioned by the Magistrate. Therefore, after putting these preliminary questions, it is evident from the answers given by the injured to the said questions that she was in a fit state of mind to give the statement at that time i.e. on 10.4.2012, when her dying declaration was recorded. The said subjective satisfaction of the learned Magistrate to record a statement that she is in a fit state of mind is sufficient to accept the said dying declaration and to rely on it. The very fact that the doctor has certified that her condition is serious, by itself, do not establish that she is not in a fit state of mind. The doctor also did not in specific terms stated or certified that she is not in a fit state of mind to give the statement. Being in a serious condition is different from being not in a fit state of mind to give the statement. From the answers given to the questions put by the Magistrate, as discussed supra, it is clear that she can understand the nature of questions put to her and to answer the same. Being in a serious condition is different from being not in a fit state of mind to give the statement. From the answers given to the questions put by the Magistrate, as discussed supra, it is clear that she can understand the nature of questions put to her and to answer the same. So, that by itself, is sufficient to hold, without any hesitation, that at that time she was in a fit state of mind to give the statement. Therefore, the said dying declaration cannot be simply brushed aside, eliminated or discarded on the ground that there is no certification of the doctor regarding the fit state of mind to give the statement, particularly, in view of the law enunciated by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the above cited judgment wherein it is clearly held that dying declaration can be accepted even without the certification of the doctor. The trial Court, completely oblivious of the said legal position and ignoring the said law laid down by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court held that dying declaration cannot be accepted in the absence of certification of the doctor regarding fit state of mind of the declarant. The said finding runs contrary to the dictum laid down by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court and it is clearly unsustainable under law. Being ignorant of the said settled legal position, the said finding was recorded by the trial Court. It has completely lost sight of the fact that the Magistrate, who recorded the dying declaration has put preliminary questions to test her fit state of mind and the declarant has given proper answers to the said questions which clearly proves and indicates that she is in a fit state of mind. It also clearly shows that the trial Court did not subject the Exhibit-30 dying declaration to proper judicial scrutiny. He did not consider it in proper perspective, as per law, which ultimately led to an erroneous conclusion in discarding the same, which in turn led to miscarriage of justice in this case. It clearly shows that the learned trial Court did not read the contents of the dying declaration in its entirety. 10. The trial Court also grossly erred in discarding and rejecting the dying declaration on the ground that there is no corroboration to Exhibit-30 dying declaration. It clearly shows that the learned trial Court did not read the contents of the dying declaration in its entirety. 10. The trial Court also grossly erred in discarding and rejecting the dying declaration on the ground that there is no corroboration to Exhibit-30 dying declaration. Again the learned trial Judge has ignored the settled principles of law relating to appreciation of evidence of dying declaration. It is settled law that corroboration is not a rule of law, it is only a rule of prudence and abundant caution. When the dying declaration is trustworthy and reliable and when it is given voluntarily and when it inspires full confidence in the mind of the Court regarding the veracity of the statement given by the declarant, it can safely be relied on by the Court without insisting for any corroboration to it. It can be the sole basis for conviction, when it is found that it was given voluntarily and it is trustworthy and when it inspires confidence in the mind of the Court regarding the truthfulness of the version given by the declarant. 11. In the instant case, one should not lose sight of the fact, as per the facts of the prosecution case, that it is only the accused and deceased, who were available in the house. The incident has taken place within the four corners of their house. Therefore, one cannot expect any independent witnesses to be present when the incident took place to seek corroboration to the statement given by the deceased. Further, we absolutely do not find any reason for the deceased, who is the own wife of the accused, to give any false statement against him or to falsely implicate him in the case. When the incident took place within the four corners of the house, it is only the deceased, who is the victim, who is the best person to speak as to how she sustained the said burn injuries. She herself categorically stated in her dying declaration, Exhibit-30, that it is the accused who poured kerosene on her and set her ablaze. The said statement of the deceased clinchingly proves that it is the accused, who poured kerosene on her and set her ablaze and that he is responsible for her homicidal death. Exhibit-17 postmortem report proves that she died because of burn injuries. The said statement of the deceased clinchingly proves that it is the accused, who poured kerosene on her and set her ablaze and that he is responsible for her homicidal death. Exhibit-17 postmortem report proves that she died because of burn injuries. So, the cause of death of the deceased is because of severe burn injuries sustained by her. The statement given by the deceased in Exhibit-30, dying declaration proves that it is the accused, who caused burn injuries to her, which resulted in to her death. Therefore, he is responsible for her homicidal death. 12. Apart from Exhibit-30, dying declaration, we have on record the other evidence in the form of Exhibit-43. It is also a statement of the deceased recorded by the police. PW-13 is the police officer, who recorded Exhibit-43 the statement of the deceased. In the said statement also, she has given a detailed account of the facts and narrated the events regarding the manner in which the accused picked up a quarrel with her and beat her and poured kerosene on her and set her ablaze. She has clearly and unequivocally stated in Exhibit-43 that on 9.4.2012 the accused asked her to give her silver ornaments towards his alcohol expenses and when she refused to give the same that he started beating her and when she tried to run away that he caught hold of her and brought her back into the house and thereafter poured kerosene on her and set her ablaze. It is now well settled that when the injured gave a statement to the police and when it is registered as an FIR or when an injured gave a statement to the police under Section 161 of the CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE , wherein she has stated about the material facts as to who is responsible for the injuries sustained by her and when the injured subsequently succumbs to the said injuries that the said FIR or the statement given under Section 161 of the CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE to the police can also be treated as dying declaration. The law is well settled on this aspect also. The law is well settled on this aspect also. Recently, three Judge Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Harinder Rai vs. State of Bihar and others, 2023 Live Law (SC) 664 held that the statement by an injured person, which was later converted into an FIR is admissible in evidence and is to be treated as dying declaration or as the statement under Section 32 of the Indian EVIDENCE ACT . At paragraphs 91 and 92 of the said judgment, it is held as follows:- “91. Now further issue crops up about the treatment of the FIR/Bayan Tahriri as dying declaration and in this respect various earlier pronouncements of this Court have clarified the position of law that the statement by an injured person recorded as FIR can be treated as a dying declaration and such a statement is admissible under Section 32 of the Indian EVIDENCE ACT . It was also held that the dying declaration must not cover the whole incident or narrate the case history. Corroboration is not necessary for this situation; a dying declaration can be the sole basis for conviction. 92. In the case of Munnu Raja and another v. State of M.P. the following observations are relevant:- Para 5. In regard to these dying declarations, the judgment of the Sessions Court suffers from a patent infirmity in that it wholly overlooks the earliest of these dying declarations, which was made by the deceased soon after the incident in the house of one Barjor Singh. The second statement which has been treated by the High Court as a dying declaration is Ex. P-14, being the FIR which was lodged by the deceased at the police station. The learned Sessions Judge probably assumed that since the statement was recorded as a FIR, it could not be treated as a dying declaration. In this assumption, he was clearly in error. After making the statement before the police, Bahadur Singh succumbed to his injuries and therefore the statement can be treated as a dying declaration and is admissible under Section 32 (1) of the EVIDENCE ACT . The maker of the statement is dead and the statement relates to the cause of his death.” 13. After making the statement before the police, Bahadur Singh succumbed to his injuries and therefore the statement can be treated as a dying declaration and is admissible under Section 32 (1) of the EVIDENCE ACT . The maker of the statement is dead and the statement relates to the cause of his death.” 13. In the case of Pradeep Bisoi Alias Ranjit Bisoi vs. State of Odisha , (2019) 11 SCC 500 , also the Apex Court held that the statement of the deceased recorded under Section 161 of the CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE can be considered as dying declaration after the injured succumbed to the injuries. It is held that the statement made by the deceased to Investigation Officer under Section 161 of the CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE falls within Section 32 (1) of the EVIDENCE ACT as it pertains to his cause of death. 14. Thus, as per the law and enunciated in the above-cited judgments, the said statement of the deceased under Exhibit- 43 given to the police can also be treated and accepted as dying declaration. It also clinchingly proves that it is the accused, who beat her and poured kerosene on her and caused the said severe burns injuries to her, which resulted into her death. So, it proves that the accused is responsible for her homicidal death. Thus, both Exhibit-30 and Exhibit-43, the last statement of the deceased, bears ample testimony of the fact that it is the accused, who poured kerosene on her and set her ablaze and committed murder of the deceased. 15. Further as per the statement of the deceased, as discussed supra, the accused was with the deceased under one roof in their house when the incident took place and when the deceased sustained burn injuries which resulted into her death. Again, the law is well settled that when wife sustains severe burn injuries, which resulted into her death when she was in the company of her husband, who is the accused, while they were residing under one roof, it is for the husband to explain as to how his wife sustained severe burn injuries, which resulted into her death when she was in his company under one roof in their house. Section 106 of the EVIDENCE ACT imposes an obligation on the husband to explain the said circumstances. Section 106 of the EVIDENCE ACT imposes an obligation on the husband to explain the said circumstances. Failure to explain as to how she sustained said severe burn injuries in his house and in his company or mere maintaining silence, without offering any explanation, leads to an inference and an irresistible conclusion that he is the culprit who has caused the said injuries to his wife which resulted into her death. 16. The Apex Court in the case of Trimukh Maroti Kirkan vs. State of Maharashtra , (2006) 10 SSC 681 has considered the entire law on the said proposition of law and authoritatively held in para 22 of the judgment as follows:- “22. Where an accused is alleged to have committed the murder of his wife and the prosecution succeeds in leading evidence to show that shortly before the commission of crime they were seen together or the offence took place in the dwelling home where the husband also normally resided, it has been consistently held that if the accused does not offer any explanation how the wife received injuries or offers an explanation which is found to be false, it is a strong circumstance which indicates that he is responsible for commission of the crime. In Nika Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh , (1972) 2 SSC 80 , it was observed that the fact that the accused alone was with his wife in the house when she was murdered there with 'khokhri' and the fact that the relations of the accused with her were strained would, in the absence of any cogent explanation by him, point to his guilt. In Ganeshlal v. State of Maharashtra, the appellant was prosecuted for the murder of his wife which took place inside his house. In Ganeshlal v. State of Maharashtra, the appellant was prosecuted for the murder of his wife which took place inside his house. It was observed that when the death had occurred in his custody, the appellant is under an obligation to give a plausible explanation for the cause of her death in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. The mere denial of the prosecution case coupled with absence of any explanation were held to be inconsistent with the innocence of the accused, but consistent with the hypothesis that the appellant is the prime accused in the commission of murder of his wife.” 16.1 Further, at the end of para-23, the Apex Court held as follows:- “The appellant in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. did not offer any explanation as to how she received the injuries which were found on her body.” 17. In the present case also, the accused did not explain anything in his statement under Section 313 CrPC to explain as to how his wife sustained burn injuries in his house while she was in his company which resulted into her death. 18. Further, in the instant case, the accused along with his family members hatched up a plot to distort the true facts and to project a concocted version by making an effort to convert the said murder into a case of accidental death. It is in the evidence of PW-11, who is the police officer that the brother of the accused has given a statement, which is at Exhibit-40 that on 9.4.2012 while deceased was working in the house that there was a blast of kerosene stove and she sustained the injuries in the said incident. But as can be seen from the scene of offence observation report, which is Exhibit-25, marked through the investigation officer examined as PW-14, the kerosene stove in the house is found intact and there are cooking vessels on the said kerosene stove. Therefore, the statement given by the brother that there was kerosene stove blast in the house, when she was working is a false statement and a concocted version. It is a deliberate attempt made to convert the homicidal death into an accidental death. It is a concerted effort made by all the family members to concoct the said story and that is the reason why all of them turned hostile during the course of trial. It is a deliberate attempt made to convert the homicidal death into an accidental death. It is a concerted effort made by all the family members to concoct the said story and that is the reason why all of them turned hostile during the course of trial. Even PW-1, who is the wife of the brother and the real sister of the deceased also stated when she has taken the injured to the hospital that the incident occurred due to blast of kerosene stove. This is recorded in the injury certificate Exhibit-15. So, it is a clear case where the said story of blast of kerosene stove was concocted by the family members. It is a clear case of offering a false explanation relating to the cause of death of the deceased. So this false explanation adds an additional link in the chain of events against the accused and further fortifies that the accused and the accused alone is the culprit who committed the said murder of the deceased. 19. Although when the injured was shifted from Maha Gujarat Hospital after giving treatment for one week in the said hospital to Civil Hospital Ahmedabad on 17.4.2012, the doctor certified that she was in a serious condition at that time, and not in a fit state of mind, this will not in any way affect the credibility of Exhibit-30 dying declaration. It is important to note that the dying declaration was recorded on 10.4.2012. At the time she was in a fit state of mind, as per the answers given by her to the questions put by the learned Magistrate. Subsequently, after one week, when her condition became more serious and when she was shifted to Civil Hospital Ahmedabad on 17.4.2012 then she was found to be not in a fit state of mind. Therefore, this will not have any adverse impact or effect on the Exhibit-30 dying declaration. 20. So, in view of the above discussion, we have absolutely no hesitation to hold that the trial Court did not properly appreciate the evidence on record, particularly the dying declaration and the trial Court has erroneously discarded said dying declaration and brushed it aside on untenable grounds contrary to the settled legal position, and thereby arrived at an erroneous conclusion. Dying declaration of the injured is a very vital piece of evidence. Dying declaration of the injured is a very vital piece of evidence. As the injured is the best person to speak how she sustained the injuries which resulted into her death and who caused the said injuries, it cannot be brushed aside and discarded on untenable grounds. Therefore, appreciation of evidence of the trial Court in this case is perverse in the nature of it. The trial Court completely ignored the statement of the deceased given to police, which can also be considered as dying declaration. The reasons given by the trial Court for discarding the dying declaration are clearly unsustainable in law. The reason given by the trial Court for acquitting the accused on the ground that there was settlement between the family members and that there was a minor son to the accused is grotesque in the nature of it. Thus, the judgment of the trial Court is opposed to all the basic tenets of law. Upon considering the evidence on record and on reappraisal of the same and, particularly after considering the dying declaration Exhibit-30 and Exhibit-43 and the fact that the accused did not offer any explanation and the fact that they all made a deliberate attempt to give a false and concocted explanation of accidental death, we have absolutely no hesitation to hold that the prosecution has proved the guilt of the accused to the hilt with acceptable legal evidence on record. The proved facts and circumstances of the case leads to irresistible conclusion that it is the accused and the accused alone and none-else who is the culprit, who committed the murder of the deceased in this case. Therefore, the impugned judgment warrants interference in this appeal and it is liable to be set aside. 21. In fine, the appeal is allowed by setting aside the impugned judgment dated 2.5.2013 passed in Sessions Case No.58 of 2012 on the file of the learned Third Additional Sessions Judge, Kheda at Nadiad, whereby the sole accused- respondent was acquitted of the charge under Section 302 of the INDIAN PENAL CODE . The accused is found guilty for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC and he is convicted for the said offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC. 22. The accused is found guilty for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC and he is convicted for the said offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC. 22. As the accused is not available before the Court, to question him on the quantum of sentence, issue Non-bailable warrant against the accused to secure his presence for the purpose of questioning him on the quantum of sentence and to impose sentence against him, returnable on 28 th July 2025.