Order : (Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J.) 1. The petitioner seeks to challenge legality and propriety of order dated 15.12.2023 by which the appellate authority, i.e., the Principal Chief Conservator of Forest has dismissed the appeal of the petitioner and has confirmed the order passed by the disciplinary authority, i.e., the Chief Conservator of Forest, Jagdalpur, Circle Jagdalpur, District Bastar, Chhattisgarh. The disciplinary authority has held the petitioner guilty of the charges and has imposed punishment of withholding of two increments with cumulative effect meaning thereby two increments earned by the petitioner was cut off as a major penalty forever and he could not be able to get higher pay scale which he would have got if the impugned punishment order would not have been passed. The effect of the punishment order would be that in future the earned two years’ increments by the petitioner would not be counted in his time scale of pay as major penalty. The petitioner has filed this petition inter alia with the following reliefs: “10.1 This Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash/ set-aside the impugned Order Kramank/770 New Raipur, dated 15/12/2023 issued by the Principal Chief Conservator of Forest & Head of Forest Forces, arising out of Order Kramank/602 New Raipur, dated 09/10/2023 issued by the Additional Principal Chief Conservator of Forest, (Administrative Non-Gazette) & Order Kramank/ Stha./284, Jagdalpur dated 26/12/2022 issued by the Chief Conservator of Forest, Jagdalpur Circle, Jagdalpur, District Bastar, C.G. 10.2 This Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to call for entire records of D.E. from the office of the respondents in respect of petitioner's claim for kind perusal of this Hon'ble High Court. 10.3 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to call for the explanation from all the respondent authorities and if necessary direct the external agency to make an enquiry in this regard and submit report against the respondent authorities, if found that the authorities are deliberately passed impugn order to harass the petitioner. 10.4 This Hon'ble court may kindly be pleased to direct the Respondents to provide the cost of the petition and other expenses suffered by the petitioner and pay compensation for undue suffering of the petitioner. 10.5 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to pass any other order for which the petitioner is entitled and the Hon'ble Court may deem it fit in favour of the petitioner.” 2. 10.5 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to pass any other order for which the petitioner is entitled and the Hon'ble Court may deem it fit in favour of the petitioner.” 2. It has been submitted by the petitioner that he is working as a Deputy Ranger in the Forest Department. In the year 2019, he was posted as a Forest Range Officer (Production) at Bhopalpatnam. During his tenure, bamboos were harvested for the year 2021-22 under the guidance and supervision of the petitioner. Out of total 6 bamboo coopers, about 5 bamboo cooper were harvested for commercial purposes as per Chhattisgarh Forest Manual. The higher authorities have inspected the work of harvesting of bamboos and upon their certification and verification a sum of Rs.43,81,168 was given to the petitioner for payment towards labourers. The petitioner in the month of February – March of 2021 has paid a total sum of Rs.43,81,168. There was no complaint from any corner either from the side of labourers or any other person as the concerned labourers who were engaged in the work have received the amount to the utmost satisfaction of their work. Subsequently, a charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner with an allegation that some oral complaints have been made against the petitioner that he has not paid Rs.9,92,386 to the labourers. Upon receipt of charge-sheet on 20.9.2021, the petitioner has filed an application for getting relevant documents in respect of the departmental inquiry initiated against him. The petitioner requested the authorities to give the list of documents, evidence of witnesses and copy of the vouchers on the basis of which allegations were made against him in order to file a suitable reply. However, the authorities did not provide him the documents sought by him and ultimately the petitioner filed his reply on 25.10.2021. However, the respondents authorities were not satisfied with the explanation given by the petitioner and, therefore, the impugned order has been passed. Though the documents were not supplied to the petitioner, but the petitioner has filed his reply on 25.10.2021 in which the petitioner in categorical terms has denied allegations made against him. However, the respondents authorities were not satisfied with the explanation given by the petitioner and, therefore, the impugned order has been passed. Though the documents were not supplied to the petitioner, but the petitioner has filed his reply on 25.10.2021 in which the petitioner in categorical terms has denied allegations made against him. Vide application dated 29.11.2021 and 7.12.2021 the petitioner raised objection stating that the Inquiry Officer in the case is not competent and eligible to be an Inquiry Officer of the case because the Inquiry Officer himself has made recommendations for taking action against the petitioner and it would be undesirable to make him an Inquiry Officer, however, no action has been taken by the authorities concerned and without considering the aforesaid important aspect, major punishment has been imposed upon the petitioner which has been stated in the opening paragraph of this order. The further case of the petitioner is that he was not granted proper opportunity of hearing and the order of punishment which is to be made in the impugned order has been passed in a very casual and cursory manner. Hence, the petitioner has preferred this petition for quashment of order of punishment. 3. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents/State submits that each and every documents sought by the petitioner has been supplied to him. No prejudice was caused to the petitioner. The appointment of Inquiry Officer is in accordance with law; the petitioner has been given due opportunity of hearing, the petition is sense merits and the same is liable to be dismissed in limine. 4. I have heard the respective parties and perused the record. 5. The State/respondents have come with a plea while negating the objections raised by the petitioner stating that though the documents were sought by the petitioner, however, since the documents were already handed over to the petitioner the impugned order has been passed. The disciplinary authority has passed the order of punishment which has been narrated in earlier paragraph of this order. In the appeal, the petitioner has urged that the departmental inquiry has been initiated against him with bias attitude of the Inquiry Officer of this case as he was the person who has recommended for the departmental inquiry. The appellate authority has overlooked the provisions contained in the service jurisprudence. In the appeal, the petitioner has urged that the departmental inquiry has been initiated against him with bias attitude of the Inquiry Officer of this case as he was the person who has recommended for the departmental inquiry. The appellate authority has overlooked the provisions contained in the service jurisprudence. The contention of the petitioner is that the person who has made preliminary inquiry and has recommended for initiation of departmental inquiry could not and cannot be appointed as the Inquiry Officer, as no one can be made a judge of his own cause, in this case. The second contention raised by the petitioner is that even after repeated demands made by the petitioner the relevant documents have not been supplied to the petitioner, as such the entire case of the petitioner is prejudiced and pre- minded and the respondents authorities are bent upon to punish the petitioner in any manner. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that the entire departmental inquiry vitiates only on the ground that even after repeated requests the Inquiry Officer has not been changed, and this is the said officer who has recommended for initiation of the departmental inquiry as such he was not competent. Due to the aforesaid reasons, the Inquiry Officer was prejudiced against the petitioner. The documents sought by the petitioner includes the so called previous inquiry made is not in accordance with law and is vitiated on the ground that the documents were not supplied to the petitioner which caused prejudice to him. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that major punishment has been imposed upon the petitioner without there being any reason, which is not in accordance with law. 6. The question for consideration of this case is based on two fold of argument raised by the petitioner. The first argument is that the departmental inquiry has been initiated on the basis of recommendations made by an officer who has been appointed as inquiry officer in this case despite repeated objections made by the petitioner and as such it has caused prejudice to the petitioner. The second limb of argument raised by the petitioner is that the petitioner has not been given ample opportunity to produce defence witnesses in support of his contention which is mandatory as per sub-rule 17 of Rule 14 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966. The second limb of argument raised by the petitioner is that the petitioner has not been given ample opportunity to produce defence witnesses in support of his contention which is mandatory as per sub-rule 17 of Rule 14 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966. In addition to aforesaid two important contentions, the petitioner has also submitted that the entire departmental inquiry is the outcome of prejudice and revengeful attitude of the respondents authorities which is far away from the truth as well as the evidence. The respondents authorities are pre-determined to punish the petitioner. The inquiry is also vitiated for not being carried out in accordance with rules. The whole initiation of the departmental inquiry against the petitioner is a result of prejudice, arbitrariness with mala fide intentions to victimise the petitioner and spoil his service career as also to harass him mentally and financially. The decision to conduct an inquiry against the petitioner on fake and manipulated charges is whimsical. 7. I have given a thoughtful consideration to the matter while considering the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner. 8. A five Judges Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of A.K. Kraipak and others v. Union of India and others, 1969 (2) SCC 262 , has considered the aspect of the principle of one cannot be a Judge of his own cause and the principle of natural justice and held that the said principles should be given effect in their true spirit. The Bench held as under: “15. It is unfortunate that Naqishbund was appointed as one of the members of the selection board. It is true that ordinarily the Chief Conservator of Forests in a State should be considered as the most appropriate person to be in the selection board. He must be expected to know his officers thoroughly, their weaknesses as well as their strength. His opinion as regards their suitability for selection to the All India Service is entitled to great weight. But then under the circumstances it was improper to have included Naqishbund as a member of the selection board. He was one of the persons to be considered for selection. It is against all canons of justice to make a man judge in his own cause. It is true that he did not participate in the deliberations of the committee when his name was considered. He was one of the persons to be considered for selection. It is against all canons of justice to make a man judge in his own cause. It is true that he did not participate in the deliberations of the committee when his name was considered. But then the very fact that he was a member of the selection board must have had its own impact on the decision of the selection board. Further admittedly he participated in the deliberations of the selection board when the claims of his rivals particularly that of Basu was considered. He was also party to the preparation of the list of selected candidates in order of preference. At every stage of his participation in the deliberations of the selection board there was a conflict between his interest and duty. Under those circumstances it is difficult to believe that he could have been impartial. The real question is not whether he was biased. It is difficult to prove the state of mind of a person. Therefore what we have to see is whether there is reasonable ground for believing that he was likely to have been biased. We agree with the learned Attorney-General that a mere suspicion of bias is not sufficient. There must be a reasonable likelihood of bias. In deciding the question of bias we have to take into consideration human probabilities and ordinary course of human conduct. It was in the interest of Naqishbund to keep out his rivals in order to secure his position from further challenge. Naturally be was also interested in safeguarding his position while preparing the list of selected candidates. 20. The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words they do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it. The concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. In the past it was thought that it included just two rules namely: (1) no one shall be a judge in his own case (Nemo debet esse judex propria causa) and (2) no decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing (audi alteram partem). In the past it was thought that it included just two rules namely: (1) no one shall be a judge in his own case (Nemo debet esse judex propria causa) and (2) no decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing (audi alteram partem). Very soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged and that is that quasi-judicial enquiries must be held in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. But in the course of years many more subsidiary rules came to be added to the rules of natural justice. Till very recently it was the opinion of the courts that unless the authority concerned was required by the under which it functioned to act judicially there was no room for the application of the rules of natural justice. The validity of that limitation is now questioned. If the purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice one fails to see why those rules should be made inapplicable to administrative enquiries. Often times it is not easy to draw the line that demarcates administrative enquiries from quasi-judicial enquiries. Enquiries which were considered administrative at one time are now being considered as quasi-judicial in character. Arriving at a just decision is the aim of both quasi-judicial enquiries as well as administrative enquiries. An unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have more far reaching effect than a decision in a quasi-judicial enquiry. As observed by this Court in Suresh Koshy George v. The University of Kerala and Others the rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a court that some principle of natural justice had been contravened the court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case.” 9. Whenever a complaint is made before a court that some principle of natural justice had been contravened the court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case.” 9. The main consideration is to the effect whether first contention raised by the petitioner in respect of appointment of a person as inquiry officer who has recommended for departmental inquiry against the petitioner can be made an inquiry officer is to be considered on the principle that no one can be a judge of his own cause. It is a sacrosanct principle of the service jurisprudence. In the aforesaid aspect of the matter, when the law in this field is taken into consideration, it is found that time and again the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that no one can be a judge of his own cause. In the present matter, since the inquiry officer has initiated and recommended for departmental inquiry against the petitioner, therefore, he cannot be appointed as an inquiry officer. The petitioner has raised objection in this respect, however, it has not been given heed to. As such, for this ground alone, the departmental inquiry is vitiated and as such no further order can be passed while punishing the petitioner. 10. The second aspect of the matter is in respect of principle of natural justice. The petitioner has not been given proper opportunity of hearing to adduce his evidence through witnesses which is also not in accordance with law. When any punishment order is to be passed, which bears civil consequence, the principle which is required to be taken into consideration is principle of natural justice, i.e., audi alteram partem. Since by the impugned order the petitioner has been punished with major punishment being withholding of two increments with cumulative effect and in such circumstances, it is incumbent upon the authorities to give proper opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and he should be given opportunity to adduce evidence through his witnesses which in the present matter has not been done and therefore too, the impugned order passed by the disciplinary authority and confirmed by the appellate authority is not in accordance with law and the same is liable to be quashed. 11. 11. Accordingly, the impugned order passed by the disciplinary authority and confirmed by the appellate authority is liable to be quashed in toto and hence both the orders are hereby quashed. The petitioner be given all service benefits in consequence of this order. 12. With the aforesaid observations and directions, the writ petition is allowed.