JUDGMENT : 1. This writ petition is directed against the order dated 29.05.2019 passed by the Divisional Commissioner, Ajmer (for short “the Arbitrator”) as also the award dated 10.07.2019 passed by the Competent Authority cum the Sub-Divisional Officer, Beawar, District Ajmer (hereinafter referred to as “the Competent Authority”) under the Railways Act, 1989 (for brevity “the Act of 1989”). 2. The relevant facts in brief are that the land acquisition proceeding under Chapter IV-A of the Act of 1989 came to be initiated qua the subject land by issuance of a notification dated 16.03.2009 under Section 20-A (1) of the Act of 1989. Thereafter, the notification dated 21.01.2010 under Section 20-E (1) of the Act of 1989 was published. The Competent Authority, vide its award dated 10.03.2011, assessed the compensation of Rs. 47,58,247/- payable to the respondents No.3 and 4, the Khatedars of the subject land. The award was assailed by the respondents No.3 and 4 under Section 20-F (6) of the Act of 1989 before the Arbitrator who, vide its judgment dated 07.09.2012, held that the compensation was payable Rs. 700 per sq. ft. and the matter was remanded back to the Competent Authority for reassessment of the compensation amount as also to give his decision on the claim of the respondents No.3 & 4 about the subject property having been leased Rs. 2,00,000/- per month for marriage ceremonies. The judgment was assailed by the petitioner by way of a Civil Miscellaneous Application No.33/2012 (221/2012) filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for brevity “the Act of 1996”). The learned Additional District Judge No.1, Ajmer (for brevity “the learned District Court”) vide its judgment dated 22.12.2016, allowed the objection application, quashed and set aside the judgment dated 07.09.2012 passed by the Arbitrator and remanded the matter back to him to decide it afresh after affording both the parties an opportunity of hearing. The judgment dated 22.12.2016 was assailed by the respondents No.3 & 4 by way of SB Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No.1065/2017 before this Court which came to be allowed vide judgment dated 12.09.2018. While allowing the appeal, the judgment dated 22.12.2016 was quashed and set aside and it was observed that in case, the respondent No.1 (petitioner herein) feels aggrieved by the order of the Competent Authority regarding calculation and lease amount, it will be open to it to raise objections according to law. While allowing the appeal, the judgment dated 22.12.2016 was quashed and set aside and it was observed that in case, the respondent No.1 (petitioner herein) feels aggrieved by the order of the Competent Authority regarding calculation and lease amount, it will be open to it to raise objections according to law. A petition for special leave to appeal preferred by the petitioner against the judgment dated 12.09.2018 came to be dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India vide order dated 05.03.2019. In the meanwhile, the petitioner filed an application before the Arbitrator under Section 151 CPC praying therein for staying the proceeding pending before the Competent Authority pursuant to judgment dated 07.09.2012 inasmuch as a review petition preferred by it against the judgment dated 12.09.2018 was subjudice before this Court. The application came to be dismissed by the Arbitrator vide its order dated 29.05.2019 and the Competent Authority recalculated the amount of compensation payable to the respondents No.3 & 4 vide its order dated 12.07.2019, which are subject-matter of challenge in the writ petition. 3. Assailing the orders impugned, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner-Shri K.K. Sharma, would submit that the Competent Authority has failed to appreciate that since, the subject land was not being used for commercial purpose, compensation could not have been assessed Rs. 700/- per sq. ft. applicable for the commercial land. He submits that even otherwise, in absence of a specific finding that the entire land was put to commercial use, assessment of the compensation applying the commercial rate for the entire piece of land is bad in law. Referring to the findings recorded by the learned District Court in its judgment dated 22.12.2016 while allowing the objection raised by the petitioner under Section 34 of the Act of 1996, Shri Sharma submits that a categorical finding was recorded therein that the judgment dated 07.09.2012 passed by the Arbitrator was non-speaking one inasmuch as it was not supported by any reasoning and this finding has not been disturbed by this Court in its judgment dated 12.09.2018 while allowing the SB Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No.1065/2017 preferred there-against. He submits that in view of this finding, the reassessment of compensation by the Competent Authority vide its order dated 12.07.2019 passed pursuant to judgment dated 07.02.2012 is rendered illegal and void ab initio. 4. He submits that in view of this finding, the reassessment of compensation by the Competent Authority vide its order dated 12.07.2019 passed pursuant to judgment dated 07.02.2012 is rendered illegal and void ab initio. 4. Learned Senior Counsel, inviting attention of this Court towards the findings recorded by this Court in para No.13 of the judgment dated 12.09.2018, submits that since, it was categorically held that in view of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Kinnari Mullick and Ors. vs. Ghanshyam Das Damani, AIR 2017 Supreme Court 2785, the learned District Court erred in remanding the matter back vide its judgment dated 22.12.2016, the matter ought to have been decided by the learned District Court under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 or by the Arbitrator, afresh. Referring to the findings of the learned District Court in Para 26 of the judgment dated 22.12.2016 whereby, it was held that the Arbitrator has held the compensation to be payable at the commercial rate Rs. 700/- per sq. ft. effective as on 26.08.2009 whereas, notification under Section 20-A (1) of the Act of 1989 was published on 16.03.2009, Shri Sharma, referring to and relying upon the provisions of Section 20-F (8) of the Act of 1989, submits that the compensation was to be determined taking into consideration the market value of the land on the date of publication of the notification under Section 20-A (1) of the Act of 1989. He contends that in view thereof, the Competent Authority erred in assessing the compensation Rs. 700/- per sq. ft. which was made effective from 26.08.2009, i.e., post publication of the notification under Section 20-A (1) of the Act of 1989. He, therefore, prays that writ petition be allowed and the order dated 29.05.2019 as also the award dated 10.07.2019 passed by the Arbitrator and the Competent Authority respectively, be quashed and set aside. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents No.3 and 4-Shri Sanjeev Arora, raising a preliminary objection as to maintainability of the writ petition, would submit that after remand, the Competent Authority has reassessed the compensation as per the direction issued by the Arbitrator and if the petitioner feels aggrieved there-against, it has an alternative and efficacious remedy as provided under Section 20-F (6) of the Act of 1989 to approach the Arbitrator as it had done earlier. He submits that this Court should not interfere with the order of the Competent Authority directly and should relegate the petitioner to the alternative remedy available under the law. 5. Qua the challenge to the order dated 12.07.2019 passed by the Competent Authority on its merit, learned counsel submits that he has not adjudicated upon anything new; but, has simply recomputed the compensation payable to the respondents No.3 & 4 as per the direction(s) issued by the Arbitrator as upheld by this Court vide its judgment dated 12.09.2018 in S.B. Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No.1065/2017. 6. Learned counsel-Shri Arora further submits that once this Court has upheld the judgment dated 07.09.2012 passed by the Arbitrator while setting aside the judgment dated 22.12.2016 passed by learned District Court, the Arbitrator had become functus officio, had no jurisdiction to entertain the application under Section 151 CPC and had rightly dismissed the application vide its order dated 29.05.2019. He submits that in any case, the review petition filed by the petitioner against the judgment dated 12.09.2018 passed by this Court came to be dismissed vide order dated 08.09.2022 and the judgment of the Arbitrator dated 07.09.2012 attained finality. He submits that in view of dismissal of the special leave to petition preferred by the petitioner against the judgment of this Court dated 12.09.2018, the application filed by the petitioner under Section 151 CPC was rendered of no consequence and the Arbitrator did not err in dismissing it vide order impugned dated 29.05.2019 as he had already become functus officio. 7. With regard to the submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner based on the observations by the learned District Court in its judgment dated 22.12.2016 with regard to the validity of the award passed by the Arbitrator, inviting attention of this Court towards the findings recorded in the judgment dated 12.09.2018, he submits that it was held that since, at the time of final hearing before the Arbitrator, the respondent No.1(petitioner herein) did not raise any objection regarding the two applications, it has to be presumed by virtue of the provisions contained under Section 4 of the Act of 1996 that it has waived its rights. He submits that it was further held that the finding of the Arbitrator adjudicating the rate of acquired land Rs. 700/- per sq. ft. He submits that it was further held that the finding of the Arbitrator adjudicating the rate of acquired land Rs. 700/- per sq. ft. and directing the Competent Authority to recalculate the compensation considering this rate, did not require any interference. He submits that in view of the fact that the judgment dated 12.09.2018 has attained finality inasmuch as the SLP (C) No.3262/2019 as also the SB Civil Review Petition No.76/2019 both preferred by the petitioner thereagainst came to be dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India and by this Court vide orders dated 05.03.2019 and 08.09.2022 respectively. 8. He, therefore, prays for dismissal of the writ petition. 9. Heard. Considered. This Court finds substantial force in preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondents No.3 and 4 as to maintainability of this writ petition against the order impugned dated 12.07.2019 passed by the Competent Authority and Sub- Divisional Officer, Beawar, District Ajmer. 10. Indisputably, the petitioner had an alternative and efficacious remedy of approaching the Arbitrator under Section 20-F (6) of the Act of 1989 against the order dated 12.07.2019. On an earlier occasion, against the initial award dated 10.03.2011 passed by the Competent Authority assessing the compensation payable to the respondents No.3 and 4 qua the subject land, the respondents No.3 & 4 had resorted to the remedy available under Section 20 F(6) of the Act of 1989 and the writ petition is bereft of any averment as to why writ jurisdiction of this Court is invoked this time without exhausting the alternative statutory remedy available to the petitioner. A Full Bench of the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court has, in case of Chandrama Singh vs. Managing Director, U.P. Cooperative Union, Lucknow & Ors., 1991 (2) UPLBEC 898 while deciding a reference, held as under: “4. Ordinarily, remedy of reference, envisaged under the Industrial Disputes Act, is an adequate and efficacious remedy available to a person aggrieved by an illegal retrenchment. Of course, the aggrieved person can always prove that, on the facts and circumstances of his case, the remedy is neither adequate nor efficacious. But, unless he discharges the onus of proving that the remedy of reference is either inadequate or inefficacious he should pursue the remedy of reference under the Industrial Disputes Act. Of course, the aggrieved person can always prove that, on the facts and circumstances of his case, the remedy is neither adequate nor efficacious. But, unless he discharges the onus of proving that the remedy of reference is either inadequate or inefficacious he should pursue the remedy of reference under the Industrial Disputes Act. At this juncture, it would be pertinent to emphasis that it would not be enough for the person pleading inadequacy or inefficacy of the relief of reference under the Industrial Disputes Acts to make merely a bald statement that remedy of reference is either inadequate or inefficacious. It is imperative for him to clearly plead, demonstrate and prove as to how and in what manner the remedy of reference is inadequate or inefficacious, and in the absence of requisite pleading and material in support thereof it would not be permissible for him to raise the plea of inadequacy or inefficacy of the remedy of reference under the Industrial Disputes Acts. 5. Now, on the question of discretion of the High Court to decline to entertain a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India where an appropriate, adequate and efficacious remedy is available to the petitioner. In its decision rendered by a Bench of three Hon'ble Judges, presided by Hon'ble Mr. Justice Krishna Iyer, in K.K. Srivastava v. Bhupendra Kumar Jain, MANU/SC/0207/1977 : AIR 1977 SC 1703 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed thus (at p. 1704 of AIR) :- "It is well settled law that while Article 226 of the Constitution confers a wide power on the High Court there are equally well settled limitations which this Court has repeatedly pointed out on the exercise of such power. One of them which is relevant for the present case is that where there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy the Court should keep its hand off ....... Obviously, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has authoritatively and firmly ruled that where appropriate or equally efficacious remedy is available to the petitioner the High Court must not entertain a writ petition under Article 26 of the Constitution of India. No doubt in the said case the Hon'ble Supreme Court pointed out that it did not go to the extent of stating that if there were exceptional or extraordinary circumstances the High Court should still refuse to entertain a writ petition. No doubt in the said case the Hon'ble Supreme Court pointed out that it did not go to the extent of stating that if there were exceptional or extraordinary circumstances the High Court should still refuse to entertain a writ petition. The Hon'ble Supreme Court purported to carve out an exception to the normal practice observed by the High Courts in relegating the petitioner to the alternative remedy available to him, the exception being existence of exceptional or extraordinary circumstances." 6. Referring to its decision in the case of K.K. Srivastava (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in its decision, rendered by a Bench of three Hon'ble Judges, in the case of Bar Council of Delhi v. Surjeet Singh, MANU/SC/0286/1980 : AIR 1980 SC 1612 , pointed out that "If the alternative remedy fully covers the challenge ..... then that remedy and that remedy alone must be resorted to ......". The Hon'ble Court observed that "if the nature of the grounds of the challenge ...... are such that the alternative remedy is no remedy in the eye of law to cover the challenge, or, in any event, is not adequate and efficacious remedy, then the remedy of writ petition ..... is still available ...." 7. The principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India that where a statute provides a complete machinery for obtaining a relief against the order passed by the authorities the petitioner should not be permitted to invoke the jurisdiction of High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was noticed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in its decision in the case of Gujarat University v. N.U. Rajguru, MANU/SC/0380/1987 : AIR 1988 SC 66 wherein it referred to and relied upon the case of Sri K.K. Srivastava (supra). Delivering the judgment of the court his Lordship Hon'ble Mr. Justice K.N. Singh observed as follows (at p.70 of AIR 1988) :- "We do not consider it necessary to burden the judgment by referring to decisions of this Court laying down the principle that where a statute provides a complete machinery for obtaining relief against the orders passed by the authorities a petitioner cannot be permitted to abandon that machinery and to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution ......" 8. Having regard to the above noticed decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, it is ruled that where a complete machinery/remedy for obtaining relief is provided in statute and such machinery and remedy fully covers the grievance of the petitioner then, unless extraordinary or exceptional circumstances exist or the machinery/remedy does not cover the grievance of the petitioner or the machinery or remedy is demonstrated and proved by the petitioner to be inadequate or inefficacious, the petitioner has to be relegated to the alternative remedy and the Court should not entertain a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for redresssal of the grievance by the petitioner.” 13. On the pleadings contained in the instant petition the petitioner should not be allowed to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner had complained violation of the provision of Section 25-I of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and for redressal of his grievance an adequate and efficacious remedy of reference under the provisions of Section 10 of the said Act itself exists. The petitioner has neither pleaded nor proved the said remedy to be inadequate or inefficacious. He has also not demonstrated the existence of any exceptional on extraordinary circumstances to permit him to bypass the alternative remedy available to him under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The petition deserves to be dismissed on the ground of availability of alternative remedy to the petitioner.” 11. In view thereof, this Court does not find this writ petition to be maintainable so far as challenge to the award dated 10.07.2019 is concerned. 12. Even otherwise, if the order dated 10.07.2019 is examined on its merit, this Court finds that it is based entirely on the findings recorded by the Arbitrator in its judgment dated 07.09.2012 which were upheld by this Court vide its judgment dated 12.09.2018 while allowing the SB Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No.1065/2017. The Competent Authority has only recomputed the amount of compensation payable on acquisition of the land of the respondents No.3 and 4 Rs. 700/- per sq. ft. adding 60% additional amount alongwith interest @ 9% per annum as was directed by the Arbitrator vide judgment dated 07.09.2012 and has delivered no finding on its own. The Competent Authority has only recomputed the amount of compensation payable on acquisition of the land of the respondents No.3 and 4 Rs. 700/- per sq. ft. adding 60% additional amount alongwith interest @ 9% per annum as was directed by the Arbitrator vide judgment dated 07.09.2012 and has delivered no finding on its own. Although, the learned District Court has set aside the judgment dated 07.09.2012 passed by the Arbitrator vide its judgment dated 22.12.2016 recording the findings as contended by learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, i.e., that the order was non-speaking one and has assessed the DLC rate Rs. 700/- per sq. ft. as was prevalent on 26.08.2009 whereas, the notification under Section 20-A (1) of the Act of 1989 was issued on 16.03.2009 and as per the provisions of Section 20-F(8) of the Act of 1989, the market value of the land on the date of publication of the notification under Section 20-A (1) of the Act of 1989 was the relevant date; but, the judgment of the learned District Court was set aside by this Court vide its judgment dated 12.09.2018 while allowing the SB Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No.1065/2012 preferred by the respondents No.3 and 4 thereagainst recording the categorical findings that not deciding the two applications filed by the petitioner, did not amount to passing the order without reasoning inasmuch as the same were of no consequence as also for the reason that in absence of an objection by the petitioner at the time of final hearing before the Arbitrator, it amounted to waiver of its right qua these applications as envisaged under Section 4 of the Act of 1996. This Court further held that the assessment Rs. 700/- per sq. ft. pertained to factual aspect which required no interference. Since, the judgment passed by the District Court under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 was quashed and set aside by this Court vide judgment dated 12.09.2018 specifically reversing the findings recorded therein, the same are of no help to the petitioner in assailing the recomputation of the compensation by the Competent Authority vide order dated 12.07.2019. Since, the judgment passed by the District Court under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 was quashed and set aside by this Court vide judgment dated 12.09.2018 specifically reversing the findings recorded therein, the same are of no help to the petitioner in assailing the recomputation of the compensation by the Competent Authority vide order dated 12.07.2019. At the cost of repetition, it is observed that the judgment of this Court dated 12.09.2018 has attained finality inasmuch as the petition for special leave to appeal as also the review petition preferred thereagainst by the petitioner have been dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India and by this Court respectively. 13. So far as the challenge to the order dated 29.05.2019 is concerned, it is of no consequence. 14. Vide order dated 29.05.2019, the Arbitrator has dismissed an application filed by the petitioner under Section 151 CPC praying therein for issuing a direction to the Competent Authority to stay the proceeding in view of pendency of a review petition before this Court filed against the judgment dated 12.09.2018. Not only the special leave to petition was dismissed against the judgment dated 12.09.2018 but, ultimately, the review petition also came to be dismissed by this Court vide judgment dated 08.09.2022. Even otherwise, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner could not satisfy as to the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator to stay the proceeding pending before the Competent Authority once, after passing the judgment dated 07.09.2012, it had become functus officio. 15. In view of the reasons stated hereinabove, this Court finds no merit in the writ petition which is dismissed accordingly. 16. The amount deposited by the petitioner-railways with the Office of this Court is directed to be released in favour of the respondents No.3 & 4 forthwith in terms of the order dated 27.11.2024 passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Civil Appeal No.13298/2024 (arising out of SLP (C) No.639/2023). 17. Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.