Bhalchandra S/o Govind Mahashabde v. Anant s/o Gangadhar Mayee
2025-04-16
M.S.JAWALKAR
body2025
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : M. S. JAWALKAR, J. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard learnedCounsel for both the parties. 2. Being aggrieved by the impugned Judgment dated21th July 2022 passed by State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission Circuit Bench, Nagpur in Revision Petition No. RBT/RP/19/18 in Complaint Case No.CC/19/4 and thereby allowed the Revision Petition and directed DCC to decide the complaint expeditiously. 3. It is complaint of The respondent that he is one of the land owner of the ancestral plot situated at Gupte Road, Akola, Distt. Akola bearing Nazul Plot no. 8/37, majoring 390.2 sq. Mtrs. and after the death of his father, the respondent alongwith hisyounger brother and LRs of elder brother became joint owners of the said plot. All the joint owners executed memorandum of understanding and decided to develop the said plot. Development Agreement was executed on 29.4.2016 by all the land owners in favour of petitioners. By this agreement the Petitioner developed and constructed the flat scheme under the provisions of Maharashtra Apartment Ownership Act. Accordingly Deed of Declaration executed on 31.1.2017. As per Agreement of Development total cost of the plot was decided to be Rs. 44,39,000/- but present respondent and one of his brother Vinayak Gangadhar Mayee decided to retain flats in lieu of cost of land and rest of the three LRs of Kamlakar Mayee received proportionate cost of the land Rs. 11,75,100/- from the Petitioner. Accordingly Deed of Declaration was executed on 31.1.2017. Irrevocable power of attorney was also executed on 29.4.2016 in favour of Petitioner. 4. Respondent is the land owner and Petitioner is the builders and developers and he has constructed one flat scheme on plot no.8/37 at Gupte road Akola. Out of said flat scheme, one flat no. 201 was retained by respondent. After completion of flat scheme as per Deed of Declaration, the petitioner executed Sale deed in favour of respondent of Flat no. 201 and put him in physical possession of the flat. But the respondent being unsatisfied filed consumer complaint against the petitioner u/s 12 of consumer protection Act, 1986. The complaint admitted and petitioner received notice from District Commission Washim. The petitioner filed application for time to file reply and supply copy of complaint and documents. The petitioner filed application for dismissal of complaint on the ground of maintainability and again sought time for filing written statement.
The complaint admitted and petitioner received notice from District Commission Washim. The petitioner filed application for time to file reply and supply copy of complaint and documents. The petitioner filed application for dismissal of complaint on the ground of maintainability and again sought time for filing written statement. The respondent raised objection and asked to proceed without written statement of petitioner on the ground of limitation of 45 days as well as filed reply to the application for dismissal of complaint. The petitioner has filed application for grant of permission to file written statement. District commission Washim allowed application of petitioner and granted permission to file written statement subject to cost of rs 8800/-. The respondent prefers Revision against the said order before The State Commission, Circuit Bench, Nagpur which came to be allowed abd order dated 6/7/2019 set aside permission to file written statement was rejected to the petitioner. Hence, being aggrieved from the said order of State Commission Nagpur, the instant petition is being filed as there is no any other remedy provided under Consumer Protection Act 1986 as well as 2019. 5. Learned Counsel for petitioner contended that the Learned Members of State Commission failed to consider the settle principle that equal opportunity should be given to the litigants to contest the matter on merits and by following this principle of law, Learned District Commission granted permission to file written statement so as to fare adjudication of the issues by imposing cost of Rs. 8800/- But the Learned Members of said Commission set aside the said order dated 06.07.2019 and delivered impugned Judgment dated 21.07.2022 which needs to be quashed and set aside. It is submitted that Learned District Commission rightly held that the Petitioner has not committed willful default and delay in filing written statement beyond stipulated period of 45 days. On the other hand application in respect of maintainability of complaint was under consideration of the District Commission and therefore in view of Judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in between Reliance vs M/s. Mampee delivered in the year 2017 would be applicable to the case of Petitioner and Learned District Commission rightly delivered order dated 06.07.2019. But the said order set aside by impugned Judgment dated 21.07.2022 by State Commission, Circuit Bench, Nagpur which needs to be quashed and set aside. 6.
But the said order set aside by impugned Judgment dated 21.07.2022 by State Commission, Circuit Bench, Nagpur which needs to be quashed and set aside. 6. Learned Counsel for petitioner relied on following citations: i) Diamand Exports and Am: Vs. United India Insurance Company Limited and Ors. In Civil Appeal No.7546 of 2021 in the Supreme Court of India. 7. Learned Counsel for Respondent contended that there is specific Provision under Consumer Protection Act, 2019 vide section 38 (3) (a) that, Opposite Party has to give his written statement within period of thirty days or such extended period not exceeding 15 day thus, the Petitioner as was duly served on 15-02-2019 ought to have filed Written Statement on or before 01-04-2019 i.e. within stipulated period of 45 days, but, in the present case the Petitioner failed to file the written statement within 45 days and after delay of 44 days beyond stipulated period the Petitioner sought permission to file written statement on record. It is respectfully submitted that, the Hon'ble Apex Court in New India Assurance Company Ltd. V/s. Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage Pvt. Ltd. has observed that District Consumer Forum has no power to extend the time to file written statement beyond 45 days and the period commences from date of receipt of notice which is perfectly legal and needs to be confirmed. 8. Learned Counsel for respondent relied on following citations: i) Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd Vs. Perfect Prints I (2015) CPJ536(NC) ii) Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. Vs. Naim s/o Hamid Khan in Writ Petition No.1162 of 2019 of this Court 9. Heard both the parties. Considered the impugned order and documents placed on record as well as citations relied on by both the parties. 10. The preliminary objection is raised by the learned counsel for the respondent that the remedy of revision is available with the petitioner filed it before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission. He relied on Full Bench decision of the National Consumer Dispute Redrssal Commission in Oriental Insurance Company Limited (supra).
10. The preliminary objection is raised by the learned counsel for the respondent that the remedy of revision is available with the petitioner filed it before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission. He relied on Full Bench decision of the National Consumer Dispute Redrssal Commission in Oriental Insurance Company Limited (supra). In fact, the matter was referred to the Larger Bench as there were divergence of opinion on the question as to whether against an order made by the State Commission (interim or final) under Section 25 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and an order other than a final order, under Section 27, an Appeal under Section 27(1) (ii) or a Revision Petition under Section 21(b) or none of the either would be maintainable before the National Commission. In several of the orders of the National Commission has taken the view that against such orders an Appeal under Section 27-A of the Act and not a Revision Petition under Section 21(b) of the Act would be maintainable. 11. Section 19 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 provides appeal, if any person is aggrieved by an order made by the State Commission in exercise of its powers conferred by sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of Section 17 may prefer an appeal against such order to the National Commission. 12. Section 17 of the Act provides about jurisdiction of State Commission which includes original, Appellate and revisional jurisdiction of the State Commission. 13. Section 19 of the Act provides appeal to National Commission if any person aggrieved by an order made by the State Commission in exercise of its powers conferred by sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of Section 17. That means an appeal is provided in the complaint where the value of the goods or services and compensation, if any, claimed exceeds Rs. 20 lakh but does not exceed Rs. 1 Crore i.e. original complaint is filed before the State Commission, in that matters, the appeal would lie to the National Commission. 14. Section 21 of the Act provides jurisdiction of the National Commission which also have jurisdiction to entertain complaints where the claim exceeds Rs. 1 Crore, then Appellate Jurisdiction to entertain the appeal against the order of State Commission and revisionary jurisdiction. 15. Section 25 of the Act provides enforcement of orders of the District Forum, the State Commission or National Commission. 16.
1 Crore, then Appellate Jurisdiction to entertain the appeal against the order of State Commission and revisionary jurisdiction. 15. Section 25 of the Act provides enforcement of orders of the District Forum, the State Commission or National Commission. 16. The Full Bench held in Oriental Insurance Company Limited (supra) when no appeal lies against any order of State Commission then National Commission has been given power to entertain revision petition, naturally revision will lie against an order against which no appeal lies. In such circumstances, the Full Bench was of the view that revision lies against interim order or final order passed by State Commission under Section 25 of the Consumer Protection Act. 17. The Full Bench in Oriental Insurance Company Limited (supra), the reference was answered. Though Clause (i) to (iv) ofanswer to reference relate to the order passed in execution proceedings, however, Clause (v) and (vi) are in respect of an appeal before the National Commission and revision before the National Commission respectively. In Clause (vi), it is specifically held that "no appeal is maintainable against an order passed by the State Commission, in exercise of its appeallate or revisional jurisdiction. However, such an order can be challenged before this Commission, by way of a Revision Petition under Section 21(b) of the Act. 18. Section 21 provides jurisdiction of the National Commission and Section 21(b) provides revisional jurisdiction of National Commission. As such, what contended by the respondent that Full Bench decision is only in respect of provisions of Execution Proceedings, cannot be accepted. 19. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on Diamand Exports and anr. (supra) in support of her contention wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court cited judgment of the Constitution Bench in New India Assurance Company Limited V/s. Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage Private Limited [ (2020) 5 SCC 757 decided on 4th March 2020, wherein in para 62 (i.e. para 8 in Diamand Exports case) held as under:- "62.
(supra) in support of her contention wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court cited judgment of the Constitution Bench in New India Assurance Company Limited V/s. Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage Private Limited [ (2020) 5 SCC 757 decided on 4th March 2020, wherein in para 62 (i.e. para 8 in Diamand Exports case) held as under:- "62. To conclude, we hold that our answer to the first question is that the District Forum has no power to extend the time for filing the response to the complaint beyond the period of 15 days in addition to 30 days as is envisaged under Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act; and the answer to the second question is that the commencing point of limitation of 30 days under Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act would be from the date of receipt of the notice accompanied with the complaint by the opposite parry, and not mere receipt of the notice of the complaint. " 20. However, this judgment is in respect of an issue whether the State Commission or District Forum has power to extend the time for filing response to the complaint beyond the period of 15 days in addition to 30 days as is envisaged under the Act. In view of the reference in Oriental Insurance Company Limited (supra), the right forum would be the National Commission though there is no bar to entertain the Writ Petition. 21. However, as held in Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd (supra)by this Court that, ''it becomes clear that the High Court notentertaining a writ Petition when an alternative remedy is available, is a rule of self imposed limitation, being more a rule of prudence and policy, rather that being a rule of law. The High Court has discretion to exercise the writ jurisdiction even when an alternative remedy is available to the petitioners. But such discretion could be exercise in favour of the petitioners, if they are able to make out an exceptional case showing that special facts and circumstances existed for exercise of such jurisdiction." 22. In the present matter, it is not the case that the petitioner was deprived opportunity to seek redressal of his grievance and therefore, this Court does not find any special facts and circumstances to justify exercise of writ jurisdiction. 23.
In the present matter, it is not the case that the petitioner was deprived opportunity to seek redressal of his grievance and therefore, this Court does not find any special facts and circumstances to justify exercise of writ jurisdiction. 23. As such, this Court is of the considered opinion that there is alternative efficacious remedy before the National Consumer Redressal Commission and as such, the petition is not maintainable and stands dismissed. At this juncture, learned counsel for the petitioner seeks interim relief to be continued for further four weeks so as to enable her to challenge the said order. As such, the interim relief to continue for further four weeks.