JUDGMENT : (H.P. SANDESH, J.) Heard learned counsel for the appellant and the learned Additional Government Advocate for the respondents. 2. This appeal is filed against reversal of the judgment of the Trial Court, wherein the Trial Court granted the relief of declaration declaring the date of birth of plaintiff as 13.07.1964 and also directed to enter the date of birth as 13.07.1964 instead of 03.07.1964 in the school records maintained by them. 3. The factual matrix of the case of the plaintiff before the Trial Court is that he was born on 13.07.1964 at Cheluvamba Hospital, Mysore and Mysore City Corporation has issued the birth certificate in this regard. But, in the SSLC Marks card, the date of birth is mentioned as 03.07.1963 instead of 13.07.1964. The plaintiff is working as Lecturer in D. Banumaiah Arts and Commerce College. The said fact is noticed by the plaintiff while entering the family members’ name in the service register. Immediately, the plaintiff obtained for the birth certificate before Mysore City Corporation and noticed that his date of birth is wrongly mentioned as 03.07.1963 in the school records. The plaintiff approached the defendant No.4 to change the date of birth in the school records. But defendant No.4 directed to approach defendant No.3 and then the plaintiff approached the defendant No.3 and defendant No.3 directed the plaintiff to obtain the decree from the competent Court of law. Thereafter, plaintiff issued statutory legal notice to the defendants and after receipt of the notice also, the plaintiff has not changed the date of birth. Hence, the plaintiff has filed the suit. 4. In pursuance of the suit summons, though the defendants are served with notice, they did not choose to appear. Hence, the plaintiff examined himself as P.W.1 and got marked the documents as Exs.P1 to P6. The defendants have not chosen to produce the evidence or mark any documentary evidence. 5. The Trial Court having considered the material on record, particularly the documents at Exs.P1 to P6, comes to the conclusion that plaintiff has made out the case that his date of birth is 13.07.1964 and in his school records, the same is wrongly entered as 03.07.1963, particularly considering the document of Ex.P1, birth certificate issued by the Mysore City Corporation. The Trial Court having considered the material on record, particularly the documents at Exs.P1 to P6, comes to the conclusion that plaintiff has made out the case that his date of birth is 13.07.1964 and in his school records, the same is wrongly entered as 03.07.1963, particularly considering the document of Ex.P1, birth certificate issued by the Mysore City Corporation. In the birth certificate, the age of the appellant is mentioned as 13.07.1964 and plaintiff was born in Cheluvamba Hospital at Mysore and the same was entered by the Mysore City Corporation and they issued the birth certificate. The plaintiff has specifically stated that due to mistake, his date of birth was wrongly mentioned in the school records as 03.07.1963 and also comes to the conclusion that no reasons are made out to disbelieve the oral evidence of the plaintiff in this regard and answered issue No.1 in ‘affirmative’ and comes to the conclusion that the same has to be corrected. 6. The Trial Court also taken note of the judgment in the case of STATE OF KARNATAKA VS. T. SUNDAR RAJ reported in 1987 KLJ 387 , wherein at paragraph No.18, it is held that even in case of Government service, the suit for declaration of age or birth could be maintained if the relief claimed does not relevant to his conditions of service and also taken note of other judgment in the case of STATE OF KARNATAKA VS. GURUBASAPPA reported in ILR 1996 KARNATAKA 1175, wherein also it is held that since no relief of declaration and consequential relief correction of date of birth is not sought, it cannot be said that suit was not maintainable. Here the plaintiff not claimed the relief relating to his service conditions or to change the date of birth in his service records. Thus, there is no legal impediment to grant the relief's claimed in the suit. The Trial Court passed this judgment on 07.04.2012. 7. Being aggrieved by the same, the State filed the appeal before the First Appellate Court in R.A.No.214/2021 and the First Appellate Court having considered the grounds urged in the appeal, formulated the points whether the judgment and decree of the Trial Court requires interference. The Trial Court passed this judgment on 07.04.2012. 7. Being aggrieved by the same, the State filed the appeal before the First Appellate Court in R.A.No.214/2021 and the First Appellate Court having considered the grounds urged in the appeal, formulated the points whether the judgment and decree of the Trial Court requires interference. The First Appellate Court having considered the material on record and also the grounds urged in the appeal, comes to the conclusion that in order to substantiate his contention, the plaintiff examined himself as P.W.1 and relied upon birth certificate, copy of the legal notice, postal acknowledgments and endorsement as per Exs.P1 to P5. The birth certificate is marked as Ex.P1 which reveals the date of birth as 13.07.1964 and also taken note of the documents which have been produced before the Court. The First Appellate Court comes to the conclusion that the Trial Court relying upon the document at Ex.P1 has decreed the suit and comes to the conclusion that it warrants interference by this Court and contend that as per Section 6 of the Age Determination Act, the Court has no jurisdiction to determine the date of birth of an employee under the Act, but inspite of it, the Trial Court has proceeded with the matter and decreed the suit, which is against the principles of natural justice. 8. The First Appellate Court referred the judgment in CIVIL APPEAL NO.1009/2020 in the case of BHARAT COKING COAL LIMITED & OTHERS VS. SHYAM KISHORE SINGH and comes to the conclusion that while seeking the relief of correction of date of birth, the correction cannot be claimed as a matter of right, unless a clear case on the basis of materials which can be held to be conclusive in nature, is made out, the Court or the Tribunal should not issue a direction, on the basis of materials which make such claim only plausible. It is also observed in paragraph No.26 that onus is on the applicant to prove the wrong recording of his date of birth, in his service book and it is also laid down, time and again, the Court has expressed the view that if a Government servant makes a request for correction of the recorded date of birth after lapse of a long time of his induction into the service, particularly beyond the time fixed by his employer, he cannot claim as a matter of right, the correction of his date of birth, even if he has good evidence to establish that the recorded date of birth is clearly erroneous. No Court or the Tribunal can come to the aid of those who sleep over their rights as held in the judgment reported in (1993) (2) SCC 162 . The First Appellate Court having considered this principle, as well as the material available on record, made an observation that plaintiff had approached the Court after 13 years as he has served as Assistant Professor and at the age of 46 years approached the Court seeking the necessary relief for which he is not entitled and also comes to the conclusion that the respondent is not entitled for the suit relief. Hence, the judgment requires to be set aside and the very suit itself is not maintainable. Being aggrieved by the judgment of the First Appellate Court, the present second appeal is filed before this Court. 9. This Court, while admitting the appeal, framed the following substantial question of law: “Whether the First Appellate Court is justified in reversing the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court by holding that the appellant being a civil servant was barred from seeking rectification of his date of birth in view of provisions of the Karnataka State Servants (Determination of Age) Act, 1974, when according to the appellant the said Act is not applicable to his case as he is not governed under Civil Service Rules?”. 10. Learned counsel for the appellant in his argument would vehemently contend that the First Appellate Court committed an error in applying the provisions of Karnataka State Servants (Determination of Age) Act, 1974 and the very approach is erroneous and the said Act is not applicable to the case of the appellant as he is not a Government Servant under Civil Service Rules. Learned counsel also brought to notice of this Court statement of objects and reasons of the Karnataka State Servants (Determination of Age) Act, 1974 and brought to notice of this Court Act 22 of 1974, although the provisions of the Karnataka Financial Code have been issued under the Constitution of India, they do not have the effect of excluding civil Courts from determining the date of birth for purpose of ascertaining the date of superannuation of Government servants. This has enabled Government servants to institute suits some time before the date of superannuation for determining their dates of birth and in many cases decrees have been passed determining the date of birth, which in many cases is different from the one determined under Article 404 of the Karnataka Financial Code. The counsel also brought to notice of this Court definition of ‘State Servant’ in this Act, wherein it is stated that ‘State Servant’ means a person who is a member of a civil service of the State of Karnataka or who holds a civil post under the State of Karnataka. The counsel referring the definition would contend that this appellant, who is a private employee, though he is getting grant-in-aid and salary, he is not a civil servant as defined under Section 2 and he is not a civil servant. 11. Learned counsel for the appellant, in support of his argument, he relied upon the judgment in DR. S.L. AGARWAL VS. THE GENERAL MANAGER, HINDUSTAN STEEL LTD. reported in AIR 1970 SC 1150 , wherein it is observed that protection of Clause (2) extends to person referred to in Clause (1). The counsel also brought to notice of this Court paragraph No.9, wherein discussion was made about the employee who is working in Hindustan Steel Limited and detailed discussion was made and brought to notice of this Court paragraph No.10, wherein the Apex Court has observed that it has its independent existence and by law relating to Corporations it is distinct even from its members. In these circumstances, the appellant, who was an employee of Hindustan Steel Limited, does not answer the description of a holder of a civil post under the Union as stated in the article. The appellant was not entitled to the protection of Article 311. In these circumstances, the appellant, who was an employee of Hindustan Steel Limited, does not answer the description of a holder of a civil post under the Union as stated in the article. The appellant was not entitled to the protection of Article 311. The counsel referring this judgment would contend that though Hindustan Steel Limited getting the aid from the Central Government and comes to the conclusion that he is not holding any civil post. 12. Per contra, the learned Additional Government Advocate for the respondents would vehemently contend that the First Appellate Court while reversing the findings of the Trial Court comes to the conclusion that suit is maintainable, apart from assigning other reason. She would vehemently contend that the appellant was getting his salary under the aid of granting code. Hence, the Act referred above is applicable to the case on hand and therefore, cannot contend that said Act is not applicable to the present case, as he is not governed under Civil Service Rules. She would contend that when salary is disbursed under grant-in-aid code, cannot contend that he is not a civil servant. She would further contend that First Appellate Court having reassessed the material on record, in paragraph No.24 held that as per Section 6 of the Age Determination Act, the Court has no jurisdiction to determine the date of birth of an employee under the Act, but inspite of it, the Trial Court has proceeded with the matter and decreed the suit which is against the principles of natural justice. She would contend that there was delay in approaching the Court also and appellant had rendered the service of 13 years and thereafter itself, approached the Court. Hence, the First Appellate Court has not committed any error and reasons are given while reversing the judgment of the Trial Court. 13. Having heard learned counsel for the appellant and the learned Additional Government Advocate for respondents and the substantial question of law framed by this Court, this Court has to analyze the material on record. It is not in dispute that the appellant was working as Lecturer at D. Banumaiah Arts & Commerce College. 13. Having heard learned counsel for the appellant and the learned Additional Government Advocate for respondents and the substantial question of law framed by this Court, this Court has to analyze the material on record. It is not in dispute that the appellant was working as Lecturer at D. Banumaiah Arts & Commerce College. It has to be noted that in the plaint itself, it is specifically stated that cause of action arose to him for correction of date of birth on 28.02.2009, the date of absorption, while giving the details of family members to the service records, when the same was noticed. Immediately, he had approached the concerned and concerned have given endorsement that they have to approach the competent Court of law and said endorsement is marked as Ex.P6 and on issuance of Ex.P6 only, he has issued legal notice as per Ex.P2 and the same is served on the defendants in terms of Exs.P3 to P5 and they have not taken any decision for correction of the same. Hence, he had approached the Civil Court seeking the relief of declaration to correct the date of birth. While seeking such relief, specific averment is made in the plaint that he was born at Cheluvamba Hospital, Mysore and the same is communicated to the concerned Corporation and there was an entry in the Mysore City Corporation that his date of birth is 13.07.1964 and also obtained certificate from the corporation in terms of Ex.P1. 14. It has to be noted that entry was made long back and this entry was more than 30 years old and there is presumption in respect of 30 years old document and the same need not be proved by examining any of the persons under Section 35 of the Evidence Act. The Trial Court also taking note of Ex.P1 i.e., the birth certificate, wherein it is stated that his date of birth is 13.07.1964, the defendants have not disputed the same by filing any statement of objections and even for the legal notice also, they have not given any reply or denied the same and taking into note of the fact that a mistake has crept in while mentioning the date of birth as 03.07.1963 instead of 13.07.1964, comes to the conclusion that no reasons are made out to disbelieve the oral or documentary evidence and accepted the same. 15. 15. This Court would like to reply upon the judgment of Apex Court in the case of NARINDER KAUR VS. PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT AND OTHERS reported in (2011) 11 SCC 553 wherein, the Apex Court has held with regard to presumptive value of Municipal records. It is held that considering presumptive value which attaches to birth and deaths records of Municipal Council which supported appellant’s, appellant’s prayer for change of date of birth as prayed was allowed relying on the application filed under Sections 35 and 114 Iii(e) of the Evidence Act, 1872. 16. The First Appellate Court while reversing the same, given the reason that he had approached the Court belatedly and no doubt, an observation is made in paragraph No.27 that appellant is seeking the relief of declaration belatedly, but when the plaint itself disclose the cause of action as stated that his appointment was confirmed on 28.02.2009 and within a span of 2 years, an attempt was made for correction of date of birth and the same was not done and an endorsement was issued in terms of Ex.P6 and immediately, the appellant filed the suit, that too within a period of limitation. 17. It is also important to note that the First Appellate Court though not directly stated that Karnataka State Servants (Determination of Age) Act, 1974 is applicable, but in paragraph No.24 made an observation that Section 6 of the Age Determination Act, the Court has no jurisdiction to determine the date of birth of an employee under the Act. Hence, it is clear that the First Appellate Court taken note of the very same Act. But, in the case on hand, in view of the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant that he is not a State Government Servant as well as Civil Rules not applicable to the appellant, who is servant in a private Aided College and also definition of ‘State Servant’ in this Act, wherein it is stated that ‘State Servant’ means a person who is a member of a civil service of the State of Karnataka or who holds a civil post under the State of Karnataka. When such being the case, he is not governed under Civil Service Rules and also not holding any post under State of Karnataka and also it has to be noted that he was working in a private college and the very Act is not applicable and there is a force in the contention of learned counsel for the appellant that he is not holding any Civil Service of the State of Karnataka. When he was not having civil post under State of Karnataka, the very observation made by the Trial Court is erroneous. 18. The learned counsel for the appellant also relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in AIR 1970 SC 1150 , wherein also discussion was made with regard to protection of Clause (2) extends to person referred to in Clause (1). The counsel also brought to notice of this Court paragraph No.9, wherein discussion was made about the employee who is working in Hindustan Steel Limited and detailed discussion was made and brought to notice of this Court paragraph No.10, wherein the Apex Court has observed that it has its independent existence and by law relating to Corporations it is distinct even from its members. In these circumstances, the appellant, who was an employee of Hindustan Steel Limited, does not answer the description of a holder of a civil post under the Union as stated in the article. The appellant was not entitled to the protection of Article 311. When such observation is made, in the case on hand, he is an employee of private aided institution and he is also governed under Karnataka Secondary Education Board. When such being the case, he cannot be termed as a Civil Servant, but very approach of the First Appellate Court is erroneous. It is also important to note that after 13 years, he has approached the Court and the very contention of the First Appellate Court that no cause of action is erroneous and cause for the suit arose on and from 28.02.2009, since his service was confirmed in 2009, since was absorbed into service on the said date. When such being the case, said observation is erroneous and the right will accrue to a person, when he is appointed as a permanent employee, since he was absorbed into service on the said date. When such being the case, said observation is erroneous and the right will accrue to a person, when he is appointed as a permanent employee, since he was absorbed into service on the said date. In the case on hand, he was permanent employee in the year 2009 and the reason assigned by the First Appellate Court is erroneous and categorically claimed that while giving family details to service register noticed error and immediately, he approached the respondents and thereafter, gave notice and endorsement was issued in terms of Ex.P6 and then cause of action arose to him to approach the Court. Hence, I answer the substantial question of law framed by this Court as ‘affirmative’ that the appellant has proved that he is not a civil servant and also not barred from seeking rectification of his date of birth and Karnataka State Servants (Determination of Age) Act, 1974 is not applicable, as he is not governed under Civil Service Rules. 19. In view of the discussion made above, I pass the following: ORDER (i) The regular second appeal is allowed. (ii) The judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court is set aside and consequently, the judgment and decree of the Trial Court is restored.