ORDER : (Per Hon’ble Sri Justice T.Vinod Kumar) This Writ Petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is filed by the petitioner/applicants, with the following prayer: It is prayed that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to issue writ, order or direction, more particularly one in the nature of writ of certiorari by calling for the records from the Hon'ble Special Court under the A.P. Land Grabbing (P) Act, Hyderabad in LGC No.167 of 1997 and consequently quash the Judgement and Decree passed by the Special Court in LGC No.167 of 1997, dated 18.03.2010 declaring the same as illegal, arbitrary and violative of principles of natural justice holding that the Government is the owner of the schedule property and declare the Respondents herein as land grabbers in respect of land admeasuring Ac.197.32 Gts in Sy.No.74 of Marredpally Paigah and Ac.27.27 Gts in Sy.No.844/1 and Ac.4.33 Gts in Sy No. 74 of Marredpally Paigah of Malkajgiri village, situated at Mahendra Hills Hyderabad and direct the Special Court to grant all the reliefs that were sought in LGC No.167 of 1997 and pass such other order or orders as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in facts and circumstances of this case. 2. The Writ Petitioner herein is the applicant in the L.G.C.No.167 of 1997 before the Special Court under A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act (for short ‘the Act’). 3. The respondents herein are the respondents therein. 4. The Special Court on the request of the Counsel appearing for the parties and considering the issues involved in the following mentioned cases are one and the same clubbed the LGC No.167 of 1997 with LGC No.115 of 1999; LGC No.16 of 2008; LGC No.17 of 2008; LGC No.18 of 2008; LGC No.19 of 2008; LGC No.20 of 2008; LGC No.21 of 2008; LGC No.22 of 2008; and LGC No.23 of 2008, and by Common judgment dated 18.03.2010 dismissed all the LGCs filed by the applicant. Aggrieved by the Judgment passed in L.G.C No. 167 of 1997, the present Writ Petition is filed. I. Case of the Applicant before Special Court: 5. The petitioner/applicantthrough MRO filed the underlying application vide LGC No.167 of 1997 claiming the land admeasuring Ac.197.32 gts in Sy.No.74 of Marredpally (Paigah) and Ac. Aggrieved by the Judgment passed in L.G.C No. 167 of 1997, the present Writ Petition is filed. I. Case of the Applicant before Special Court: 5. The petitioner/applicantthrough MRO filed the underlying application vide LGC No.167 of 1997 claiming the land admeasuring Ac.197.32 gts in Sy.No.74 of Marredpally (Paigah) and Ac. 27.27 gts of Sy.No.844/1 of Malkajgiri village are classified as Government landas per pahani pathrika of 1356 Fasli; and that the respondents as shown before the Special Court have grabbed the same therefore, are to be declared as land grabbers under the Act. 6. The case of the applicant in the underlying application as set out in the concise statement in brief is as under: i. The Nazim Atiyat in an application filed by Nawab Zaher Yar Jung conducted Inam enquiry of Paigah Asmanjahi and passed orders on 28.10.1968, wherein it was pointed out 107 Villages were escheated to the Government. Aggrieved by the said order, an appeal was filed to the Board of Revenue and the same was dismissed. Subsequently, W.P.No.3530 of 1977 was filed and the same was also dismissed and then a writ appeal vide W.A.No.289 of 1978 was filed which was allowed by order dated 20.12.1993 directing the Board of Revenue to scrutinize the relevant revenue record and to ascertain whether the 72 villages form’s part and parcel of Asmanjahi paigah or not and to pass appropriate order. ii. Further, there are no sub-divisions for Sy No.74 and it is only a ‘Gut number’ thereby the respondents are illegally claiming the sub-division of Sy.No.74 though no such sub-divisions records are available in survey and settlement Department. iii. The Government had appointed Sri KV Natrajan, commissioner of Land Revenue as one man commission to cause enquiry into the lands of Sy No.74 of Marredpally village and Sy No.844/1 of Malkajgiri village who submitted his report to the Government with his recommednations, which was accepted by the Government vide Memo dated 10.02.1994. Accordingly, the boundaries of Sy.No.74 of Marredpally and 844/1 of Malkajgiri Villages were duly identified. iv. The respondents are trying to encroach the Government land in Sy. No.74 by fictious and spurious documents and thus such activity tantamount to the land grabbing and hence they should be declared as land grabbers. Accordingly, the boundaries of Sy.No.74 of Marredpally and 844/1 of Malkajgiri Villages were duly identified. iv. The respondents are trying to encroach the Government land in Sy. No.74 by fictious and spurious documents and thus such activity tantamount to the land grabbing and hence they should be declared as land grabbers. v. The entire land is a rocky land and is unfit for any agricultural operations, which itself creates the doubt about the so-called assignments, which is a handywork of the then patwaries. vi. The cause of action arose in the year 1994 when One-Man Commission submitted his report demarcating land in Sy.Nos.74 and 844/1 of Marredpally and Malkajgiri Village. 7. The Special Court on taking cognizance of the application filed, has issued notice, wherein the respondent Nos.1 to 9 and respondent No.1590 i.e. party-in-person filed separate counters, setting up rival title, claiming to have purchased the land in Sy No.74 of Marredpally village from the predecessors-in-title who were in possession from 1950 onwards, and also claiming to have perfected their title by way of adverse possession. 8. Basing on the respective contentions urged, the Special Court had framed the following issues for consideration: - i. Whether the applicant is the owner of the application schedule property? ii. Whether the title set by the respondents is true, valid, and binding on the applicant? iii. Whether the respondents have perfected their title by way of adverse possession to the application schedule property? iv. Whether the application is not maintainable for not adding necessary parties? v. To what relief? 9. Before the Special Court, the applicant got examined RDO as PW-1 and Deputy Director, Survey and Land Records, Hyderabad as PW-2 and got marked documents as Exs.A-1 to A-17. 10. On behalf of the respondents, R.Ws-1 to 10 were examined and got marked documents as Exs.B-1 to B-185. II. Contentions of the petitioner/applicant before the Special; Court: 11. After the abolition of Jagirs by Jagir Abolition (Regulation) Act 1358 Fasli, the Marredpally village was included in Revenue Administration of Hyderabad. The Nazim Athiyat conducted Inam enquiry of PaigahAsmanjahi, wherein Nawab Zahir Yar Jung, Amir-e-Paigah filed claim application. 12. TheNazim AthiyatCourt passed orders on 28.10.1968, wherein it identified that 106½ villages were escheated to the Government where in Marredpally village is shown at Sl.No.93. Aggrieved by the said order, an appeal was filed to Board of Revenue which was dismissed. The Nazim Athiyat conducted Inam enquiry of PaigahAsmanjahi, wherein Nawab Zahir Yar Jung, Amir-e-Paigah filed claim application. 12. TheNazim AthiyatCourt passed orders on 28.10.1968, wherein it identified that 106½ villages were escheated to the Government where in Marredpally village is shown at Sl.No.93. Aggrieved by the said order, an appeal was filed to Board of Revenue which was dismissed. Further, the Writ Petition filed against the said order was also dismissed. However, in Writ Appeal vide W.A. No. 289 of 1978 filed against the order in W.P No. 3530 of 1977 and during the pendency of the Writ Appeal, the State Archives sent a list of 53 villages and another list of 18 villages on the basis of which W.A. No. 289 of 1978 was allowed vide order dated 20.12.1983 directing the Board of Revenue to scrutinize the relevant revenue record to ascertain whether the 72 villages form part and parcel of AsmanjahiPaigah or not and to pass appropriate order. 13. As per pahani of 1356 Fasli,there are no sub-divisions in Sy.No.74 and it is only a gut number. It is the case of the petitioner/applicant that, the respondents are illegally claiming the sub-division of Sy.No.74 of the subject land. 14. Further, the Government has appointed an Enquiry Officer to cause a detailed enquiry in respect of the land in Sy.No.74 of MarredpallyPaigah and Sy No.844/1 of Malkajgiri villages. A report dated 10.02.1994 was submitted which was accepted by the Government as per which the boundaries of Sy.No.74 of MarredpallyPaigah and Sy No.844/1 of Malkajgiri villages were duly identified. 15. As the respondents are trying to encroach the Government land in Sy. No.74 and also part of Sy. No.844/1 Marredpally Paigah which is under the Administrative Control of Marredpally Mandal, under fictitious and spurious documents by obtaining alleged layout from M.C.H./Cantonment Board, they should be declared as land grabbers and duly evicting them from the application schedule land. 16. Since the One-Man Commission report was accepted by the Government in the year 1994demarcating Sy.No.74 of MarredpallyPaigah and Sy.No.844/1 of Malkajgiri villages, the petitioner/applicant herein has filed theLGC No.167 of 1997, for relief of possession, compensation, profits and other reliefs. 17. Further, Amir-e-paiagh failed to establish his right over land in Marredpally village. 16. Since the One-Man Commission report was accepted by the Government in the year 1994demarcating Sy.No.74 of MarredpallyPaigah and Sy.No.844/1 of Malkajgiri villages, the petitioner/applicant herein has filed theLGC No.167 of 1997, for relief of possession, compensation, profits and other reliefs. 17. Further, Amir-e-paiagh failed to establish his right over land in Marredpally village. Hence, assignments made in favour of the respondents are of no avail; that the entire land being rocky and unfit for cultivation, the claim of assignment infavour of respondents predecessor in title creates a doubt about the so-called assignments. III. Contentions of the respondents before Special Court: 18. The respondents contended that,each of the respondent society acquired their respective lands through registered sale deeds after thorough investigation of title, and by obtaining necessary permissions from competent authorities, including layout sanctions from the Cantonment Board and exemptions under the Urban Land Ceiling Act. 19. Further, the subject land of Sy No.74 of Marredpally village and Sy No.844/1 of Malkajgiri village in question has consistently been treated as private patta land, with valid pattas granted by the Paigah authorities before the abolition of Jagirs in 1948. Their possession has been open, continuous, and recognized by government authorities for several decades, as evidenced by layout approvals, tax payments, and mutation entries in revenue records. 20. The respondents further contend that, the allegedclaim of government ownership, disregards decades of open and continuous possession by bonafide purchasers and are not land grabbers. They emphasize that the government’s own records, and judicial pronouncements have repeatedly affirmed the private nature of the land and the validity of the pattas. 21. Thus, the claim of government, especially after such a prolonged period, is not only time-barred but also contrary to principles of estoppel, res judicata, and natural justice. As suchthe claim against the respondents title or to classify the land as government property is unjustified and unsupported. Therefore, the respondents cannot be classified as land grabbers under the Act. IV. Findings of the Special Court: 22. The Special Court by considering the evidence adduced and the documents marked had found that the petitioner/applicant in the underlying LGC has miserably failed to establish their right and title to the subject property in respect of Sy.Nos.74/2 to 74/13 of Marredpally village and Sy.No.844/1 of Malkajgiri (village) to maintain the application. 23. IV. Findings of the Special Court: 22. The Special Court by considering the evidence adduced and the documents marked had found that the petitioner/applicant in the underlying LGC has miserably failed to establish their right and title to the subject property in respect of Sy.Nos.74/2 to 74/13 of Marredpally village and Sy.No.844/1 of Malkajgiri (village) to maintain the application. 23. The Special Court further held that the issue regarding the rival title set up by the respondents 1 to 2047 in the underlying LGC is true, valid and binding on the petitioner/applicant in respect of the subject property situated in Sy.No.74/2 to 74/13. 24. The Special Court held that any attempt to grab land does not constitute an Act of land grabbing under the Act and further held that only when land grabbing is alleged, the Special Court could examine the issues relating to the title and possession. Since, it is only an allegation of attempting to grab the land, the question of declaring the respondents as land grabbers does not arise. Hence, the underlying application was rejected and accordingly, dismissed. 25. Assailing the said order, the present Writ Petition is filed. 26. Heard the learned Special Government Pleader for Advocate General appearing on behalf of petitioner/applicant, Sri Praveen Vyapari, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No.1, Sri M. Surender Rao, learned Senior Counsel for Smt. D. Pramada, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No.2, Sri Sunil B. Ganu, learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondent Nos.7, 376, 384, 423, 425, Sri O. Manohar Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Sri S.V. Ramana, learned Counsel for respondent No.4, Sri Srinivas Polavarapu, learned Counsel appearing for respondent No.6, Sri P. Sashikiran, learned Counsel appearing for respondent No.107, Sri Prem Prakash Jauhari, party-in-person/respondent No.1590 and perused the record. V. Contentions of Petitioner/applicant before this Court: 27. It is contended by the petitioner/applicant that, the underlying LGC was filed by the State represented by Mandal Revenue Officer, Marredpally in respect of land admeasuring Ac.197-32gts in Sy. No.74 of Marredpally and Ac 27.27 gts in Sy.No.844/1 of Malkajgiri Village. 28. It is contended by the petitioner/applicant, that Marredpally (Paigah) Village was part of Paigah Asmanjahi and after abolition of Jagirs, the village was escheated and included in Revenue Administration, Hyderabad and in classified as Government land. 29. Petitioner/applicant contends that, being aggrieved by the issuance of G.O.Ms. No.74 of Marredpally and Ac 27.27 gts in Sy.No.844/1 of Malkajgiri Village. 28. It is contended by the petitioner/applicant, that Marredpally (Paigah) Village was part of Paigah Asmanjahi and after abolition of Jagirs, the village was escheated and included in Revenue Administration, Hyderabad and in classified as Government land. 29. Petitioner/applicant contends that, being aggrieved by the issuance of G.O.Ms. No.1106 Revenue, dated 06.06.1959 a claim petition was filed by Nawab Zahir Yar Jung on 11.09.1959in respect of the lands in Marredpally before the Nazim Athiyat,that, the Nazim Athiyat passed an order dated 28.10.1968 in which Marredpally village was shown at Sl.No.93 out of 106½ villages, which were escheated to the Government for want of valid Grant in favour of Asmanjahi Paigah by the Nazim. 30. Further, it is contended that grant of villages to the Paigah Families is limited for collection of land revenue as perAttested Copy of the Order of Nazim Athiyath and certified copy dated 28.10.1968 marked as Exs.A-4 and A-5 in the underlying LGC. 31. It is contended that, against the order of Nazim Athiyat dated 28.10.1968 an Appeal was filed before the Board of Revenue and the same was dismissed vide order dated 29.12.1976. Challenging the said order of Board of Revenue, Writ Petition vide W.P. No.3530 of 1977 was filed and the same was also dismissed. 32. Subsequently, in Writ Appeal vide W.A No.289 of 1978 filed against the order in W.P No.3530 of 1977, this Court while allowing the appeal by Judgment dated 20.12.1983 taking note of the list of villages given by state archives, directed the Borad of Revenue to scrutinize the relevant revenue record to ascertain whether 72 villages form part and parcel of Jagir of Paigah Asmanjahi or not and pass appropriate order. However, it is contended that, neither of the parties have pursued the matter and no subsequent proceedings were passed. Further, it is also not known whether the Maredpally Village is in the list of 72 villages. 33. It is also contended that, the order passed in W.A. No.289 of 1978 had ample evidence, which has been considered by Nazim Atiyat and the Board of Revenue, wherein it recorded that Marredaplly Village does not find place in the 12 paraganas granted through Sanads of 1241H and 1253H. 33. It is also contended that, the order passed in W.A. No.289 of 1978 had ample evidence, which has been considered by Nazim Atiyat and the Board of Revenue, wherein it recorded that Marredaplly Village does not find place in the 12 paraganas granted through Sanads of 1241H and 1253H. Therefore, it is contended that the State discharged its initial burden to the effect that the subject lands are part of Asmanjahi Paigahinitially and formed part of Revenue Administration subsequently by virtue of Jagir Abolition Act. 34. Further, in order to conduct an eqnuriy into various issues arising in relation to Sy. Nos.74 of Marredpally village and 844/1 of Malkajgiri village, the Government appointed Sri K.V. Natarajan, CLR, as One-Man Commission vide order dated 21.07.1987, who submitted a detailed report dated 17.06.1988, which clearly show that the entire land in Sy No.74 is government land. As the Government has accepted recommendations of One-Man Commissionvide memo dated 10.02.1994 under which the boundaries of Sy Nos.74 and 844/1 were duly identified, it was found that the respondents are trying to encroach the Government Land by producing fictitious and spurious documents, which has given rise to the cause of action for filing the underlying LGC. 35. Petitioner/applicant contends that, in W.P. No.20502 of 1994, the High Court vide order dated 28.08.1997had categorically declared that neither the layout sanctioned by the concerned authorities confer any title nor the same can be deemed to be a document of title. 36. Petitioner/applicant also contends that, the entire land in Sy. Nos.74 and 844/1 is a rocky land with hillocks and big boulders which is unfit for cultivation; that as per the deposition of PW-1 that till 1985, nobody was in physical possession over the property. 37. Further, it is contended by the petitioner that the claim of respondent that the Jagir assigned portions of Sy. No 74 to certain persons from whom the respondents have purchased is false, as there are no records available to show that the Jagirdarmade any such assignments in Sy. No. 74 and also their right to make any alienations. 38. It is further contended that, Sy. No. 74 was not sub-divided at any time prior to abolition of Jagirs; that the respondents started grabbing the land from 1985 onwards on the basis of falsified sale deeds while the entire extent of the land is classified as sarkari. 39. No. 74 and also their right to make any alienations. 38. It is further contended that, Sy. No. 74 was not sub-divided at any time prior to abolition of Jagirs; that the respondents started grabbing the land from 1985 onwards on the basis of falsified sale deeds while the entire extent of the land is classified as sarkari. 39. It is also contended that, as per the pahani for the year 1356 Fasli, Sy No.74 is recorded as ‘KANCHAGUTTA’ and in Kathadar column it is recorded as ‘Sarkari’. As per Ex.A-2 i.e. Pahani in respect of land in Sy No.844/1 and as per Ex.A-3 i.e. Sethwar, the land is recorded as ‘Sarkari’. Further no supplementary sethwar was issued for Sy.No.74 of Marredpally village and there are no subdivisions and also no tippan was available for Sy. No 74. 40. Petitioner/applicant contends that, the Respondents in unequivocal terms trace their title through the alleged assignments made by the Jagirdar in favour of their predecessor in title and also basing on the transactions that took place in 1980's, except respondent No.1 society who claims to have purchased the land in the year 1968. 41. In support of its case, the petitioner/applicant herein filed Interlocutory Application vide I.A. No.1 of 2023 in the present Writ Petition seeking to receive documents i.e. Interim Report of enquiry by Commissioner of Land Revenue and Government. Memo dated 10.02.1994. 42. On the basis of the above, it is contended that the Petitioner/applicant had discharged its initial burden and the respondents failed to prove their title, and the documents relied by the respondents in the underlying proceedings admittedly cannot confer title on the respondents in as much as they are collusive and fraud. Further, the other proceedings which were relied upon by the respondents relating to obtaining of layout, building permissions etc., cannot confer any title over the subject lands; and that the Special Court did not consider relevant material while passing the impugned order. 43. The petitioner/applicant in support of their case have placed their reliance on the following: i. Sarwarlal and Ors. vs. The State of Hyderabad, AIR 1960 SC 862 . ii. Mandal Revenue Officer vs. Goundla Venkaiah and another, (2010) 2 SCC 461 . iii. Jitendra Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors., 2021 SCC OnLine SC 802. iv. Nagubai Ammal and Ors. vs. The State of Hyderabad, AIR 1960 SC 862 . ii. Mandal Revenue Officer vs. Goundla Venkaiah and another, (2010) 2 SCC 461 . iii. Jitendra Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors., 2021 SCC OnLine SC 802. iv. Nagubai Ammal and Ors. vs. B. Shama Rao and Ors., AIR 1956 SC 593 . v. Government of A.P vs. A.V. Papayya Sastry & Ors., 2000 SCC OnLine AP 262. vi. S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu vss. Jagannath, (1994) 1 SCC 1 . vii. Anil Kumar Modi v. Tarsem Kumar Gupta, (2023) 2 SCC 201 . Contentions of Respondent No.1 before this Court: 44. The respondent No.1 contended that, it had purchased the land in Sy No.74/4 admeasuring Ac.16-33gts, under registered sale deed dated 09.02.1968 for valuable considerationafter obtaining the required permission from the competent authority;that at the time of purchase, the entire title was investigated and after finding that the vendor had acquired a sustainable title, therespondent acquired title to the above-mentioned property under registered sale deed. 45. Respondent No.1 contends that, it being a registered Co- operative Housing Society which has a statutory status and having acquired tangible immovable property, it cannot be termed as land grabber. Further, the sanction of layout by the Cantonment Board after due clearance, shows the legality of the title which has been in its uninterrupted possession for the last 30 years. 46. Thus, the respondent No.1 contends that, the entire period of possession has been open and to the knowledge of all including this petitioner/applicant; that the fact of petitioner/applicant’s failure to raise dispute in this regard for such long period itself debars it from raising it under statute;that the petitioner/applicant herein is estopped from claiming the declaration, adverse to the title of this respondent.Respondent No.1 further contends that, the claim of the petitioner/applicant with regard to the cause of action for filing the LGC having arisen in the year 1994, on the basis of the alleged report of One-Man Commission, is wholly untrue and is invented only for the purpose of filing the underlying application before the Special Court; as the report was submitted way back in the year 1988 itself. 47. Respondent No.1 also contends that, the final enquiry report of the One Man Commission dated 21.7.1987 itself states that the land in Sy. 47. Respondent No.1 also contends that, the final enquiry report of the One Man Commission dated 21.7.1987 itself states that the land in Sy. No.74 has always been treated as private patta lands and proves that the case of the petitioner/applicant is without any basis or proof of its alleged ownership to the land in Sy. No.74. 48. It is contended by the respondent No.1 that the case of the petitioner/applicant lacks in details and clarity and not clear on the classification of subject land as Government poramboke land, and from which source the classification and extent has been ascertained. Further it is contended that, the underlying LGC is defective on the ground of misjoinder of the parties, as all the respondents are not similarly situated. Thus, it is unreasonable to contend that all the respondents would be liable for damages. 49. Respondent No.1 contends that, the concise statement filed in the underlying LGC is incomplete as none of the proceedings referred therein are quoted in detail. Further no documents to which reference is made in the concise statement has been filed by the petitioner/applicant. 50. It is also contended that, the conclusion drawn by the petitioner/applicant in ‘para-3’ of the concise statement about the vesting of entire village of Marredpally in the Government is prima facie unreasonable, un-comprehendible and illogical. Further, the entire contents with respect to there being no sub- division of the Sy No.74 and non availability of any record in the Government departments is an immature contention which cannot be either accepted much less presumed to be admitted. 51. Respondent No.1 contends that, in none of the alleged survey proceedings, the details are neither disclosed nor notified. Thus, no such survey was ever done nor any such survey would bind the respondent even if it has been allegedly so done as no notice is issued. Contentions of Respondent No.2 before this Court: 52. It is contended by the respondent No.2 that, it is a Housing Society and it had purchased the land in Sy No.74/7 from the valid assignees of the original Jagirdars by verifying their title/patta and also mutation effected in the names of the pattedars following the implementation of the entry in the Faisal Patti for the year 1960-61. Further, the respondent No.2 has enjoyed the ownership and possession that has been recognized by the petitioner/applicant right from 1860 AD. 53. Further, the respondent No.2 has enjoyed the ownership and possession that has been recognized by the petitioner/applicant right from 1860 AD. 53. Respondent No.2 also contended that, its vendor also obtained U.L.C. vide letter dated 27.03.1950 before selling the same to it. Respondent No.2 further contends that on purchasing the subject land it had obtained layout from the Secunderabad Cantonment Board and accordingly, allotted the plots to its members who have subsequently constructed houses and living therein and also paying taxes. Surprisingly, the petitioner/applicant has never raised any objection for the past 30 years and for that reason it is estopped by time from denying the title. 54. The respondent No.2, denied the allegation that the subject land is included in the Revenue Administration of Hyderabad after the abolition of Jagirs and that the Nazim Athiyat conducted Inam enquiry of Paigahs and that 107 villages escheated to the Government and also the allegation regarding the non sub-division of lands in Sy No.74. Further, it is contended that this respondent is not bound by the enquiry conducted as no notice was served on it. Contentions of Respondent No.3 before this Court: 55. It is contended by the respondent No.3 that it is Housing Society which after due verification of all the relevant documents purchased land to an extent of Ac.14-31gts in Sy.No.74/3 vide registered sale deed dated 01.03.1982; that after obtaining layout sanction and permissions from the Cantonment Board, demarcated and registered the plots in the name of its individual members. Thus, the respondent No.3 society is a bonafide purchaser of the land and the members of the society were put in possession of the plots. 56. It is contended by the respondent No.3 that, originally the subject land Sy. No.74/3 admeasuring Ac.14-31gts. belongs to late Mohd. Mahaboob Khan as per the Khasra pahani wherein his name is shown as pattadar. The above property was put to public auction in the year 1962 wherein one late Sita prasad Srivastava, Advocate became the highest bidder, who paid 1/4 th of the auction amount, and Mohd. Mahaboob Khan subsequently executed a registered sale deed dated 21.09.1962 selling the subject property to an extent of Ac.14-31gts. after obtaining the permission from the Tahsildar vide proceeding dated 07.09.1962. Accordingly, the S. Srivastava came into possession of the above said property, and subsequently his name was also mutated in the revenue records. 57. Mahaboob Khan subsequently executed a registered sale deed dated 21.09.1962 selling the subject property to an extent of Ac.14-31gts. after obtaining the permission from the Tahsildar vide proceeding dated 07.09.1962. Accordingly, the S. Srivastava came into possession of the above said property, and subsequently his name was also mutated in the revenue records. 57. Respondent No.3 contends that, it had purchased the property after due verification of all documents. Further, Srivastava made an application to the Ministry of Defence for grant of exemption under Section 20(1) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, where the Government of India vide proceedings dated 14.10.1981 granted exemption in respect of land in Sy.No.74/3 from the provisions of Chapter-III of the Urban Land Ceiling Act, and thereby allowed the sale of land in favour of the respondent No.3 society. 58. It is contended that, after obtaining the said permission, Srivastava executed a sale deed dated 01.03.1982 in favour of the respondent No.3. The 3 rd respondent society thereafter, made an application to the Cantonment authorities for grant of layout, the same was also forwarded to the Defense Estate Officer, Secunderabad for verification, and the Defense Estate Officer, by his letter dated 15.09.1986 informed the Cantonment Officer that no defense land is involved in layout and there was no objection for grant of layout. The Cantonment Board only after receipt of the relevant information agreed to grant of layout permission in favour of the respondent No.3. 59. On behalf of the 3 rd respondent it is also contended that the legal representatives of late Mohd. Mahaboob Khan, filed suit vide O.S.No.3978 of 1981 seeking a declaration for reconveying the property to them. The above suit was dismissed vide Judgment dated 27.04.1987 by holding that Srivastava is the owner and the transfer is proper. Thereafter, the legal representatives filed W.P. No.15932 of 1986 against the society challenging the alienation of the property, which was dismissed and the same was confirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 60. The above suit was dismissed vide Judgment dated 27.04.1987 by holding that Srivastava is the owner and the transfer is proper. Thereafter, the legal representatives filed W.P. No.15932 of 1986 against the society challenging the alienation of the property, which was dismissed and the same was confirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 60. It is contended that in view of the dismissal of the suit and writ petition, the Cantonment Board took up the issue in their agenda for grant of layout and at that point of time the District Collector raised objection and sought for withholding the grant of layout due to involvement of Government land, without any basis and without verifying the records; that aggrieved by the above action it had filed W.P.No.15127 of 1989, wherein the Court vide order dated 28.06.1989 directed to grant layout within two weeks. After receipt of the order of this Court, the Cantonment Board intimated to the Collector the orderof the Court for his comments, but the Collector failed to initiate any action. The Cantonment Board again vide letter dated 04.09.1993 informed the Collector, Hyderabad to get the stay vacated failing which the authority has no option but to release the layout. In spite of the reminders from the Cantonment Board, as the District Collector had failed to take up the matter. The Executive Officer, Cantonment, Secunderabad by his letter dated 18.02.1993 requested the Director of Defense Estates, Pune, to issue no Objection for grant of layout. The Director of Defense Estates, Pune vide letter dated 05.03.1993 issued no objection for grant of layout plan, and the said letter was also sent to the Collector, Hyderabad, informing about the proceedings. 61. It is also contended by the 3 rd respondent that on the Cantonment Board releasing the layout plan in favour of the 3 rd Respondent society, the respondent No.3 society vide registered deed dated 19.05.1994 gifted the land in favour of the Cantonment Board, Secunderabad as per Bye-Law No.14 of the Layout Bye-Laws. On lay-out being granted, the individual members of the society had taken possession of the plots allotted to them. Thus, neither respondent No.3 nor its members can be termed as land grabbers by any stretch of imagination, as they are the bonafide purchasers of the subject land under the registered sale deeds and they are not the land grabbers under the Act. 62. Thus, neither respondent No.3 nor its members can be termed as land grabbers by any stretch of imagination, as they are the bonafide purchasers of the subject land under the registered sale deeds and they are not the land grabbers under the Act. 62. It is contended that, the MRO, Secunderabad in 1986 after due survey prepared a plan wherein a portion of land was marked in Red colour as un-surveyed land, and informed the Cantonment Board vide letter dated 04.07.1986 to grant layout by excluding that marked portion. Accordingly, the 3 rd Respondent society re-submitted the modified plan by excluding marked portion and modified the plots alignment. Thereafter, the Cantonment Board granted the layout in accordance with the report submitted by the MRO and as per the modified plan. Hence, it can be said that the revenue authorities themselves confirmed that Sy. No.74/3 is patta land and there was no objection for grant of layout. Thus, after a decade it is incorrect to claim that the subject land as Government land. 63. Further it is contended that, the pattas granted by Jagir authorities in 1948 were recognized and accordingly they were implemented during jamabandi and the revenue authorities and the Cantonment Board have also recognized various sub divisions effected in Sy.No.74. Further, the pahanies for the years 1351 to 1356 F clearly show the pattaders as persons in occupation. Further, only a small portion of land to an extent of Ac.3-00gts were shown as Government land and that too for one year. As per Khasra Pahani, the Sy. No.74 was sub-divided into various sub-divisions and the persons in possession were shown in the pattadar column right from 1954 onwards. Therefore, it is incorrect to state that there was no sub-division of Sy. No.74. 64. Respondent No.3 contends that, the Jagir authorities granting pattas is evident from the Khasra pahani and the revenue records, which clearly show the possession of various pattadars having recorded right from 1950 onwards. Therefore, it is incorrect to state that the respondents are trying to encroach the Government land in Sy. No.74 by fictitious and fabricated documents, and on the other hand the 3 rd respondent society and its members are in possession of the application schedule land and the plots made therein after obtaining the layout from the M.C.H. and the Cantonment Board. 65. No.74 by fictitious and fabricated documents, and on the other hand the 3 rd respondent society and its members are in possession of the application schedule land and the plots made therein after obtaining the layout from the M.C.H. and the Cantonment Board. 65. Respondent No.3 contends that, the One-Man Commission was appointed to conduct an enquiry into various issues and during his enquiry, had found that Sy. No.74 was sub-divided and in the revenue records the names of pattadars who are in possession being duly recorded. Accordingly, the State Government by their proceedings dated 10.02.1994 accepted the recommendations of the Commission. Though recommendations were accepted they were not implemented and, on the contrary, the underlying LGC was filed in order to harass the respondents herein. Further, after a lapse of 5 decades of the names of pattadar being reflected in revenue records, the petitioner/applicant is estopped from filing the underlying application alleging that the 3 rd respondent society and its members are the land grabbers. Contentions of the Respondent No.4 before this Court: 66. It is contended by the respondent No.4 that, one Shaik Mohiuddin sold land to an extent of Ac.19-17 gts in Sy No.74/5 vide registered sale deed dated 28.6.1968 in favour of N Suryanarayana Murthy and others. The said Mohiuddin got the same by way of patta granted by Asmanjahi Paigah in the year 1948. Further, Shaik Mohiuddin also obtained permission under Sections 47 and 48 of Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1930 for selling the land in favour of N Suryanarayana Murthy and others vide letter dated 10.6.1969. 67. Subsequently, N Suryanarayana Murthy sold land to an extent of Ac.8½ gts. in favour of Lokesh Babu vide registered sale deed dated 01.07.1968 and in 1984 thesaid Lokesh Babu sold land in favour of respondent No.4 society under various sale deeds marked as documents in Exs. B-55 to B-77.Thus, the 4 th respondent and its members and their predecessors in title have been in continuous and uninterrupted possession of the subject land for over a period of 30 years, and this respondent society along with its members perfected their title to the subject land by adverse possession as well. 68. B-55 to B-77.Thus, the 4 th respondent and its members and their predecessors in title have been in continuous and uninterrupted possession of the subject land for over a period of 30 years, and this respondent society along with its members perfected their title to the subject land by adverse possession as well. 68. Respondent No.4 contends that, this respondent is not bound by the enquiry conducted by the Government due to non- service of any notice and mis-joinder of parties and merely because Marredpally was a Paigah village and it has been abolished under the Abolition of Jagir Act and was included in the revenue administration of Hyderabad, that by itself does not confer any title to the Government in respect of the lands which were assigned during the period when the same were under Jagir. Contentions of Respondent No.5 before this Court: 69. It is contended by respondent No.5 that, this respondent Society with a view to provide residential plots to its members, purchased Ac.30.00 gtsof land in SyNo.74/12from K.V. Subbaiah and others vide registered document dated 17.12.1977; land to an extent of Ac.8-00 gts. in Sy.No.74/8 from Meraj Ahmed Khan and other vide document dated 31.05.1978; and land admeasuring Ac.9-33gts in Sy. No. 74/8 from M. Ram Mohan Rao vide document dated 24.05.1978. These vendors in turn have obtained their title and possession in respect of the said extents from Late Waliuallah Hussaini vide Document dated 27.05.1965 and Late Nawab Mensah Jung Bahadur in June, 1972 respectively. 70. Respondent No.5 contends that, after obtaining necessary layout sanction from the Cantonment Board and also the clearance under ULC Act, it has developed the land and divided the same into plots. Subsequently, it allotted the plots to its members and conveyed the title by registered Sale Deeds, thereby the respondent No.5 along with its members and their predecessors in title were in continuous and uninterrupted possession in Sy. No.74/12, and 74/8 for more than 60 years. 71. Respondent No.5 contends that, the District Collector, Hyderabad and the petitioner/applicant started harassing by writing letters to the Cantonment Board not to issue any permission or layouts in respect of the lands in Sy. No.74 and its sub-divisions alleging the same as Government Land. No.74/12, and 74/8 for more than 60 years. 71. Respondent No.5 contends that, the District Collector, Hyderabad and the petitioner/applicant started harassing by writing letters to the Cantonment Board not to issue any permission or layouts in respect of the lands in Sy. No.74 and its sub-divisions alleging the same as Government Land. Aggrieved, the respondent No.5 filed W.P. No.28118 of 1996 where the Court passed interim order directing the respondents therein to accord building permissions to the members of the Society as per approved layouts. 72. Respondent No.5 contends that, the claim of the petitioner/applicant with respect to Inam Enquiry, order of Nazim Athiyath and escheat made to the Government is absolutely false and ex-facie untenable. Further, in all cases of Jagir abolition the actual occupants were given pattas and the land never became a government land because the Jagirdars had nothing to do with the land, and the petitioner/applicant had deliberately suppressed these aspects and is guilty of suppressi overi suggestion falsi. 73. It is also contended that, the alleged proceedings before the Nazim Athiyath and the Board of Revenue do not bind this respondent society or its members or their predecessor in title as the land in Sy. No.74 and its sub-divisions were already transferred by the respective owners under registered conveyances to third parties. 74. Respondent No.5 further contends that, even the Gazette Notification dated 20.08.1987 part II extraordinary issued under Section 5 of A.P. Survey and Boundaries Act, 1923, issued by the Commissioner Survey, Settlements and Land Records A.P., Hyderabad, shows that land in Sy No.74, Marredpally is a patta land. Further, the Director, Survey, Settlements and Land Records in the letter dated 17.10.1995 addressed to the Collector also clarified this aspect but the petitioner/applicant deliberately suppressed the above documents/records. Contentions of the Respondent No.6 before this Court: 75. It is contended by the respondent No.6 herein that, in the year 1982, it entered into an agreement of sale with Sri E.N. Dass dated 05.01.1982 to purchase the land admeasuring Ac.39- 39gts. in Sy.No.74/6, and paid substantial sale consideration.Accordingly, the owner of the land delivered the physical possession of the land in favour of the society. Originally the land in Sy.No.74/6, admeasuring Ac.39-39gts of East Marredpally, belongs to one Sri Wiliam Caesar, S/o Dr.J.R.Caesar. He sold the said land in favour of Late Dr.E.N. Dass, under two registered sale deeds dated 12.11.1956 and 14.11.1960. 76. Originally the land in Sy.No.74/6, admeasuring Ac.39-39gts of East Marredpally, belongs to one Sri Wiliam Caesar, S/o Dr.J.R.Caesar. He sold the said land in favour of Late Dr.E.N. Dass, under two registered sale deeds dated 12.11.1956 and 14.11.1960. 76. Subsequently, there was a registered family settlement deed dated 05.01.1982 in between E.N. Dass and his legal heirs by which all of them have entered into an agreement of sale by receiving the sale consideration and the society was put into possession on the same day. Further, basing on the application made by the Land owners and Society, the Government granted exemption under Section 20(1)(a) of the Urban Land (ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 vide order dated 18.05.1985. 77. In pursuance of the same, the owners have executed several registered sale deeds in favour of the respondent No.6 society to an extent of Ac.39-39 gts of land vide ten sale deeds dated 10.07.1985; 23.08.1985; 23.01.1986; 06.09.1985; 03.04.1986; 03.04.1986; 03.04.1986; 03.04.1986; 23.07.1987; and 30.05.1987. Accordingly, the society purchased lands under the aforementioned sale deeds. 78. Respondent No.6 contends that, the society developed and divided the said land into 300 plots and submitted layout to the Cantonment Board for its approval, which after due verification and inspection sanctioned the layout vide letter dated 29.11.1985. Subsequently, the plots were allotted to the members who in turn obtained building permissions from the Cantonment Board and constructed the buildings in their respective plots. 79. It is contended that, this respondent and its predecessors in title have been in possession of the subject land in Sy. No.74/6 for the last 45 years, thereby the claim or ownership of the Government extinguishes. Contentions of the Respondent No.7 before this Court: 80. Respondent No.7 contends that, it had purchased land tto an extent of Ac.30.00 gts out of which the land admeasuring Ac.24.00 gtsis located in Cantonment Board limits of Secunderabad and Ac.12.00 gts is located in municipal area of Hyderabad City; that it had obtained layout for Ac.24.00 gts in 1980, and developed the same and allotted plots to various members and transferred it under various sale deeds. Further, the remaining extent of 12 Acres of land in Sy No. 74/9 two layouts were obtained vide document dated 07.03.1992 and 26.03.1997, and thereafter was developed and allotted to its members. 81. Further, the remaining extent of 12 Acres of land in Sy No. 74/9 two layouts were obtained vide document dated 07.03.1992 and 26.03.1997, and thereafter was developed and allotted to its members. 81. It is further contended that, E.N. Das filed a suit vide O.S. No.55 of 1963 against one Sri Bhaskar Murthy and others in which the Hyderabad Municipal Corporation, Secunderabad Division, and the then Hyderabad Housing Board were arrayed as 4 th and 5 th defendants wherein on contest Judgment was delivered on 16.02.1971; thatat no point of time it was stated as to no phodi of land in Sy No.74 was done; as such there exists no Sy No.74/7; and that the land is Government land. 82. Respondent No.7 contends that, in fact a portion of the property said to have been purchased by one Sri Govind Rao i.e. 2 nd defendant in the suit was said to have been purchased by defendant No.4 in the suit i.e. Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad. It was however, claimed that the Planning Committee of the Corporation of Hyderabad vide resolution dated 30.07.1960 resolved to handover the land purchased by it 2 nd defendant. 83. It is further contended that, in the said suit, the Land Record Assistant of the Collector's office was examined as D.W-3 and he specifically stated in his evidence about the demarcation, inspection and report in relation to it. It is further stated that the land purchased by the Corporation was also sub- divided and given S. No.75/6, and it was further contended that, all these details are contained in the judgment dated 16.02.1971 rendered in O.S. No.55 of 1963. 84. Subsequently, the said Judgment dated 16.02.1971 was carried by E.N. Das in appeal vide C.C.C.A. No.152 of 1972 and the said appeal was dismissed by the High Court and the said matter was carried to Hon'ble Supreme Court vide S.L.P which was rejected and the Judgment of the trial Court was confirmed. Thus, respondent No.7 contends that, all the parties to the said suit including the Government of A.P. are bound by the said Judgment rendered in O.S. No.55 of 1963, and also bound by the orders passed by the Board of Revenue on 05.10.1950. Contentions of the Respondent No.8 before this Court: 85. It is contended by the respondent No.8 that, it purchased the subject land in Sy. Contentions of the Respondent No.8 before this Court: 85. It is contended by the respondent No.8 that, it purchased the subject land in Sy. No.74/4 vide different sale deeds dated 01.10.1986, 09.07.1987, 22.09.1988 and 20.09.1988 which were executed by the original owner Sri N.Lokesh Babu in favour of respondent No.8 society. 86. That Sri N Lokesh purchased the said land in Sy. No.74/4, part admeasuring Ac.7-00 gts out of the total extent of Ac.23-33 gts from its original owner Syed Ameenuddin Hussain vide registered sale deed dated 25.12.1967. The vendor of the original owner Sri N. Lokesh Babu obtained exemption from ULC vide order dated 23.09.1985 and was further permitted to transfer Ac.4-33 gts in favour of respondent No.8. 87. Subsequently R-8 society applied to Defence Estate Officer, DEO, ULC, Secunderabad for exemption under Section 19(v) of ULC Act, 1976 for an area admeasuring 5910 Sq.yards vide letter dated 18.10.1985, when both the proceedings are pending, the DEO has accorded the exemption on 18.10.1985. Subsequently, this respondent submitted a layout application dated 31.10.1988 to the Executive Officer, Cantonment Board, Secunderabad requesting the sanction of Layout in Sy.No.74/4 (part) East Marredpally, Secunderabad Cantonment as per plan for an area admeasuring 28,820 Sq.yards. The Executive Officer, Cantonment forwarded the application to the Cantonment Board, but the same was pending for consideration. Thereafter, the society allotted the plots to its members. 88. It is also contended that, the various instances mentioned in the Counter show that the Government is directly involved in granting exemption under Sections 47 and 48 of Hyderabad Tenancy Agricultural Lands Act by the then Tahsildar vide letter dated 17.12.1968 and exemption under G.O. Rt. No.2231 dated 02.08.1975 exempting from all the provisions of A.P. Vacant Lands in (Prohibition of Alienation) Act, 1972 in respect of land in Sy No.74/10 and thus, it is not open for petitioner/applicant to allege that the respondent No.8 having grabbed the land of Government. Contentions of the Respondent No. 1590 before this Court: 89. Respondent No.1590 who appeared as party-in-person contended that, this case was started as a boundary dispute between Sy No.74 of Marredpally village and Sy No.844/1 of Malkajgiri village, in which the eight respondents societies had purchased land in Sy No.74 from various persons. The vendors had obtained the landas pattas granted by PaigahAshmajahi, Nawab Zahir Yar Jung in the year 1358 F i.e. 1948 A.D. before abolition of Jagirs. 90. The vendors had obtained the landas pattas granted by PaigahAshmajahi, Nawab Zahir Yar Jung in the year 1358 F i.e. 1948 A.D. before abolition of Jagirs. 90. It is further contended that, the Government from 1948 onwards considered Sy No.74 of Marredpally village as private patta land which is evident from Khasrapahanis and Town Survey & Land Records (for short ‘TSLR’). However, in 1987 a boundary dispute arose between the Sy No.74 of Marredpally village and the adjoining Sy No.844/1 of Malkajgiri village and in order to resolve it, the then Government constituted a One- Man Commission and appointed Mr. K.V. Natrajan, Commissioner of Land Revenue (for short ‘CLR’) vide order dated 21.07.1987 to enquire into the matter, who submitted an interim report dated 29.09.1987 and final report dated 17.06.1988 to the Government. 91. Respondent No.1590 contends that, though the Government has raised the title dispute regarding Sy No.74 in the year 1997 by the underlying application, infact title dispute of Marredpally village was raised for the first time as early as in the year 1949 before the Jagir Administrator immediately after abolition of Jagirs in 1358 F. 92. Thus, the validity of all pattas was examined in the year 1949 and the findings are given as under: a) Sy No.74 of Marredpally village, admeasuring Ac.306-15 gts, originally was part of Jagir of Paigah Ashmanjahi. Nawab Zaheer Yar Jung was the Amir-e-Paigah at the relevant point of time. He was one of the three Paigahs, who occupied very exalted position being hereditary charge of Nazim's body guard. The ancestors of Paigah family were granted large tracts of land/Jagirs for maintenance of troops and for their expenses. Their Jagirs were exempted from Diwani jurisdiction. They had their own arrangement of Judiciary and Police. They also had their own revenue administration including Survey and Settlement Department. b) In the year 1358 F (1948 A.D.), the Nawab granted pattas to some persons in Sy NoS.74 and 75 of Marredpally village of Non-Khalsa land. The details are given in the pahani of 1359 F (1949 A.D.). However, the Pahani of 1357 F and 1358 F are not traceable as mentioned in the final report of Mr. K.V. Natarajan, CLR dated 17.06.1988. The details are given in the pahani of 1359 F (1949 A.D.). However, the Pahani of 1357 F and 1358 F are not traceable as mentioned in the final report of Mr. K.V. Natarajan, CLR dated 17.06.1988. c) Out of total Ac 306-15 gts, in Sy No.74 an area consisting of Ac.3-01 gts with subdivision No.74/1 only belonged to Government and the remaining area i.e., Ac 303-14 gts belonged to pattadars who have changed over a period of time. d) By A.P. (?.?.) (Abolition of Jagirs) Regulations, 1358 (F), the Jagirs were abolished w.e.f. 15.08.1949; that one Sri L.N. Gupta, IAS, was appointed as first Jagir Administrator w.e.f. 28th August 1949, vide document dated 28.08.1949. As per the report of Deputy Collector dated 02.06.1953 it was stated that, three persons namely i) S/Sri Govind Rao, ii) Sridhar Rao and iii) Guru Swamy submitted a petition to the Jagir Administrator, alleging that their patta lands in Marredpally village were cancelled by Amir-e- Paigah just before the merger of Paigah and the same were assigned to Sri Syed Valiullah Hussaini and Fareed Jahan Begum, who are relations of Amir-e-Paigah. These persons were given pattas by the Paigah in Sy No.75 of Marredpally village and the complaint was made on 14.11.1949. e) Consequently, the Jagir administration department transferred this matter to Secretariat Majlis Mal (Revenue Department, Secretariat) for enquiry and settlement of this case, and the details of the enquiry are mentioned in the interim report of Mr. K.V. Natarajan, CLR dated 29.09.1987, f) It is contended that, the order of the Board of Revenue dated 17.06.1953 applies only to the persons who compromised is patently false. It applies to all the pattas given by the Paigah in all the four villages of Maredpally, Shamshabad, Thigalguda, Faridnagar. 93. Respondent No.1590 contends that, the above report shows the persons who were granted pattas in the 4 villages were not the relatives of the Paigah and objections were called from public in all the cases of issuance of pattas. The Paigah had clear power to grant these pattas under Rule 10 of the pattadari Rules for non-khalsa villages, therefore there is no basis for Mr. K.V. Natrajan, to state that the Board of Revenue accepted illegal assignments without authority. 94. The Paigah had clear power to grant these pattas under Rule 10 of the pattadari Rules for non-khalsa villages, therefore there is no basis for Mr. K.V. Natrajan, to state that the Board of Revenue accepted illegal assignments without authority. 94. It is contended by the respondent No.1590 that, the legality of pattas granted by Paigah was again examined and decision was given in favor of pattadars, and the Collector did not file a revision or review of the order of the Board of Revenue dated 17.06.1953 but he accepted the order. Thus, by this action the Collector confirmed all the pattas given by the Paigah in all the 3 villages are correct and valid. 95. Subsequently, the then Collector, Sri B.F. Dittia, IAS, vide his Letter dated 24.10.1959 informed Tahsildar, Hyderabad West Taluq, Hyderabad District, that the enquiries have been made into improper pattas granted by Ex-Jagirdar, Nawab Zaheer Yar Jung Bahadur in Shamshabad and Marredpally villages of Hyderabad West Taluq, and stated that they are legal and in order. The letter also indicated the sub-division of Sy No.74 of Marredpally village from Sy Nos.74/2 to 74/11 mentioning names of pattadars against each sub-division. 96. Form the Certified Copy of the order passed by the Collector dated 05.10.1959 it is evident that some of the pattadars of Marredpally Paigah village filed a petition on 14.11.1949 to Jagir Administrator that the pattas granted to them by Amir-e-Paigah were wrongly cancelled by him just before the Jagirs Abolition Regulations came into effect and sought for restoration of their pattas. Thus, it can be said that the Jagir Administrator had specific knowledge on 14.11.1949 about the grant of pattas by the Amir-e-Paigah in Marredpally village, who in turn referred the matter to the Board of Revenue for enquiry. 97. Further, the Board of Revenue vide its letter dated 22.06.1950 addressed to Secretary to the Government., Revenue Department stated that prima-facie the pattas issued by Paigah in Marredpally village appears to be illegal and sought his instructions and the Secretary Revenue by his letter dated 27.07.1950 replied to Revenue Board that a detailed enquiry should be made, and all the pattas should be cancelled if granted in violation of rules and regulations. Therefore, it is contended that, the matter of grant of pattas was in knowledge of the Government at the highest level on 27.07.1950. 98. Therefore, it is contended that, the matter of grant of pattas was in knowledge of the Government at the highest level on 27.07.1950. 98. It is also contended thatsince the Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act does not specify a different limitation period, the limitation prescribed under the Limitation Act, 1963 would be applicable to the proceeding under the Act, since, the respondents and their predecessors-in-title are in possession for more than 30 years, the predecessors-in-title have mastered their title to the land by adverse possession, in support of the above contention the reliance is placed on the decision of this Court in K.V. Sreenivasa Rao Vs Special Court , 1996 (4) ALT 844 . 99. Respondent No. 1590 further contends that, a suit vide C.S. No.14 of 1958 was filed for the partition of Matruka property of Late Nawab Khursheed Jah (one of the Paigah family) amongst the shareholders, in which a decree for partition was passed on 28.06.1963 and in 1976 sent to Collector, Hyderabad for effecting partition. Meanwhile, the Government filed Application No.44 of 1982 for the amendment of the decree claiming the entire land belonged to the Government, which was dismissed on 18.12.1982. Aggrieved by it, the Government. filed two appeals vide OSA (SR) Nos.3526 & 3527 of 2000, one against the order dated 28.06.1963 in C.S. No.14 of 1958 and another for condonation of delay of 38 years 4 months 13 days in presenting the above Appeal and the Court vide order dated 07.02.2001 refused to condone the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and dismissed the Appeal. It is contended that challenging the same, the Government preferred Special Leave Petition to the Hon'ble Supreme Court vide SLP(C) Nos.10622 & 10623 of 2001, which were also dismissed on 16.07.2001. 100. Respondent No. 1590 contends that, there is no merit in the petitioner/applicant’s case and is totally false and fabricated and the only evidence relied is the entry in pahani for 1356 F stating that it shows Marredpally village as sarkari which is only an attested copy and the original was not produced despite asking for it, thus it can be said that the entries in the pahani was changed illegally. Further, the impugned pattas were granted sometimes in 1358 Fasli before abolition of Jagirs so, the entries in pahani for a period prior to grant of pattas is of no consequence. 101. Further, the impugned pattas were granted sometimes in 1358 Fasli before abolition of Jagirs so, the entries in pahani for a period prior to grant of pattas is of no consequence. 101. It is also contended by respondent No.1590 that the PW-1 i.e. RDO Secunderabad in his Chief examination on 02.03.2000 stated that the MRO, Secunderabad filed an appeal in the year 1994 before the DRO, Hyderabad U/S.15(2) of Records of Rights Regulation 1358F for cancellation of illegal entries in revenue records in respect of land in Sy No.74, in which no notice was given to any of the respondents; and that the PW-1 could not show proof of the service of notice to any of the 8 accused societies. However, One Sri Bhagwan Das (S/o. late Dr. E. N. Das) a pattadar of Sy No.74/10 came to know of it and filed a WP questioning the proceedings before the DRO, Hyderabad in which the High Court had granted stay. The Government did not pursue the case further before the High Court and no order was passed by the DRO therein. 102. Respondent No. 1590 further contends that, the petitioner/applicant had made the claim of manipulation of entries in the year 1994 i.e. after a lapse of 44 years, the patwaris who might have done the manipulation must have retired by then. Also, neither any such patwari has been identified nor any action taken against such a person. No evidence whatsoever has been produced to prove this claim. The alleged manipulation of entries in pahanis in 1359 F is therefore an afterthought, invented to justify the illegal action initiated by the MRO. 103. Respondent No. 1590 contends that, the pahani patrikas of 1950-51 to 1981-82 show that the names predecessors-in-title of the respondents are shown as the pattadars of the subject land, which was accepted in the final report of Mr. K.V. Natarajan, CLR dated 17.06.1988; that, the TSLR entries had been changed clandestinely by the petitioner/applicant. The claim of Government that in Revenue Survey Record, the Sy No.74 of Marredpally village is shown as one Gut number and never sub- divided is wholly wrong, as the attested copy of TSLR Marradepally for the year 1969 shows that Town Survey Register for Sy No.74 of Marredpally village (Ex.B-149) has been illegally changed by rounding off the name of pattadars by 'G' i.e. Government, which is a fraudulent act. 104. 104. It is contended that, the TSLR prepared and duly notified under the A.P. Survey and Boundaries Act, 1923 also records the names of the predecessors-in-title of the respondents as land holders/owners of the subject land. The petitioner/applicant is the author of the said TSLR and such entries attains finality on being notified under A.P. Survey and Boundaries Act, 1923 and it is not open to petitioner/applicant to question the correctness of the TSLR. 105. Respondent No.1590 contends that, the Sy No. 74 Marredpally village is not a gut number and it has been sub-divided after grant of pattas in the year 1948, as the number of pattadars for Marredpally Paigah village has been recognized by the Board of Revenue in their order dated 17.06.1953, and is also evident from the finding of the Special Court in LGC No.70 of 1994, which relates to Sy No. 74 of Marredpally village, wherein in para 37 it is recorded as under: "In the judgement in LGC Nos. 103 and 114 of 1989, it was found that sub-divisions were given prior to abolition of Jagirs. As it was already pointed out that the persons from the Survey Department of erstwhile Jagir were examined as court witness in LGC Nos. 103 and 114 of 1989". 106. Respondent No.1590 contends that, the Inam enquiry report dated 28.10.1968 does not confer any title in favour of the Government, as on account of very high position enjoyed by the Paigahs, the grants made to them and the succession issues of them had always been kept out of the purview of Inam enquiry, even after Inam Enquiry was made compulsory for 'Exempted Jagirs' by the Nazim VII vide Section 10 of the Gasthi (Circular) of Government, Revenue Department, Secretariat, Hyderabad No. 10, dated 18th Amarded/23rd June 1929 A.D. 107. Respondent No. 1590 also contends that, the Nawab Zaheer Yar Jung stated in response to the Notice No. 68 dated 23.06.1959 that a fresh Inam enquiry is unwarranted as the Sanads and Parvanas were already validated by the Glancy and Reilly commissions and confirmed by Nizams Farman dated 15 th Isfandar 1338F, rendering any fresh Inam enquiry redundant. However, the Nazim Athiyat held the petition to be the claim petition and ordered that necessary notification for enquiry be issued. However, the Nazim Athiyat held the petition to be the claim petition and ordered that necessary notification for enquiry be issued. The Nawab Zaheer Yar Jung again vide application dated 05.10.1959 requested for finding whether an Inam enquiry at this stage can be held. However, the Nazim Athiyat in its order dated 16.11.1959 held that Reilly Commission was not an Inam enquiry, but is administrative in nature and thus res judicata would not apply and thereby the Government has every power to institute an Inam enquiry. Aggrieved by it, the Nawab Zaheer Yar Jung filed an appeal before the Board of Revenue, who by order dated 01.04.1960 dismissed the appeal but made following observations: "The Reilly Commission's report should be given weight and full consideration and whatever work already turned by the Commission need not be re-opened. One specific feature in the Commission's report is that they have recommended for the confirmation of Taluqs in the name of Paigahs (Appendix 'C' of the Commission's Report), and this was agreed to by the H.E.H. The boundaries of the Taluqs have not been clearly mentioned. The Nazim Athiyath will therefore have to see whether the villages are within the boundaries of the Taluqs mentioned in the report." 108. Respondent No. 1590 contends that, aggrieved by the above decision, Nawab Zaheer Yar Jung filed W.P.No.632 of 1960, wherein the High Court while confirming the order of Revenue Board held that expression 'need not be reopened' may be substituted by 'will not be reopened'. As such, the Nazim Athiyat went ahead with his enquiry and passed an order on 28.10.1968. which is stated as under: "The report of the Reilly Commission and its proceedings were requisitioned from the State Archieves. The record sent by the State Archieves does not contain the original report or its authentic copy. The copy received by this Court is an unsigned draft on which Justice Reilly has endorsed on the introduction: "No copy should be made of this draft". The present claimant has relied heavily on this report but did not submit a copy of the report. As such no reliance can be placed on the document sent by the State Archieves." 109. Respondent No. 1590 contends that, by placing reliance on the documents of State Archieves, Nazim Athiyat escheated 106½ village to Government. The present claimant has relied heavily on this report but did not submit a copy of the report. As such no reliance can be placed on the document sent by the State Archieves." 109. Respondent No. 1590 contends that, by placing reliance on the documents of State Archieves, Nazim Athiyat escheated 106½ village to Government. which includes Maredpally Paigah village and its report as relates to Marredpally village cannot be accepted on account of following reasons: a. In all Government. records as well as reports by various officers, Sy No. 74 is shown as Paigah Jagir. Further, the PW-1 in his cross-examination by R-3 on 10.04.2002 has clearly admitted that Sy No.74 was Jagir village of Asman- Jahi Paigah. Thus, the finding of Nazim Athiyat that Marredpally village was not part of the Jagir of Nawab Zaheer Yar Jung, Amir-e-Paigah, Asman Jah is fallacious and there is no basis for escheating it to Government. b. The Marredpally village has been escheated to Government. On the basis that the Sanad of 1253H only mentions parganas, but not the names of villages in it. Hence, names of villages have to be based on the report of the State Archives and not the claim made by Nawab Zaheer Yar Jung, Amir-e-Paigah. c. Further, at page No. 35 of his report, he has stated that the document of Reilly Commission cannot be accepted as authentic. If such an important report from the State Archive cannot be accepted, then how come the documents of State archive relating to estate of Paigah Asmanjahi be accepted as correct? d. The G.O.Ms. No.1106, Revenue dated 06.06.1959, order of the Board of Revenue dated 01.04.1960 and the order of in W.P. No.632 of 1960 directed the Nazim Athiyat to follow the findings of Reilly Commission especially stated that the findings of Reilly Commission will not be re-opened. e. The Paigah was also entitled for claim even on the basis of possession of villages, but on Jagir abolition, he handed over the files of each village to Jagir administrator which included the file of Marredpally village. This fact is confirmed by Letter dated 29.09.1968. However, Nazim Athiyat rejected the claim for Marredpally village on the ground that mere handing over is no proof of possession, which stand is bad in law. Thus, Reilly Commission report about the claim of estate should be followed. This fact is confirmed by Letter dated 29.09.1968. However, Nazim Athiyat rejected the claim for Marredpally village on the ground that mere handing over is no proof of possession, which stand is bad in law. Thus, Reilly Commission report about the claim of estate should be followed. f. After Jagir abolition, complaint was made to Jagir Administrator on 14.11.1949 about illegal cancellation of pattas by the Amir-e-Paigah and as per the interim report of the Natarajan Commission dated 29.09.1987, the Secretary to Government, Revenue Department, stated that all assignments made by Amir-e-Paigah before Jagirabolitions deserve to be cancelled if they are in violation of Rules and Regulations. Thus, if Marredpally village was not the part of Jagir of Paigah Asmanjahi, the pattas granted by him would have been cancelled on that ground only. But, the matter was thoroughly investigated and after 4 years of correspondence and enquiry, it was held that pattas granted by Amir-e-Paigah in Marredpally Paigah village are legal and valid. Hence, on the basis of Nazim Athiyat report, Government. cannot say that Marredpally village was not part of Paigah Jagir and that pattas given by him are invalid. g. Further, under the provisions of A.P (Telangana Area) Atiyat Enquiries Act, 1952, Nazim Athiyat has no powers to escheat any village. The A.P Government. (Revenue Dept.) in its memo dated 24.06.1989, clearly stated that Nazim Athiyat Court does not have jurisdiction with respect of Jagirs abolished under the Jagir Abolition Regulations and to the Inams abolished under the Inams Abolition Act. It can only decide disputes regarding compensation or commutation amount payable, as the case may be. 110. Respondent No. 1590 contends that, the Natrajan Commissioner Report dated 17.06.1988 is perverse and cannot be acted upon, as is not constituted under Commission of Enquiries Act, but it is an executive order of the Government, thus, it is mere recommendatory in nature, and has no legal santity. Accordingly, this respondent placed reliance on the decision of the Delhi High Court in Manoharlal Vs. Union of India ,  AIR 1970 Delhi 178. 111. It is contended that, the first recommendation of Mr. Accordingly, this respondent placed reliance on the decision of the Delhi High Court in Manoharlal Vs. Union of India ,  AIR 1970 Delhi 178. 111. It is contended that, the first recommendation of Mr. K.V. Natarajan was to cancel the order of the Board of Revenue dated 17.06.1953 whereby all the pattas were confirmed as legal and valid; that this recommendation has not been accepted by the Government in the Memo dated 10.02.1994 and nowhere there is any mention of the acceptance of recommendation for cancelling the order of the Board of Revenue. Accordingly, the Government has also not passed any legislation for cancellation of pattas and for resuming the land, as recommended by Natrajan Commission. In the result, the patta rights in favor of the alienees of Jagirdar holds good as on today. 112. It is further contended that, the acceptance of recommendation No.3 to regularize the occupation of Sy No.74, by charging percentage of current market value is perverse as it has no legal basis, and it gives no right to the Government to claim its title to the land in Sy No.74 of Marredpally village and further the recommendation of the transfer of 46 acres of land from Sy No.74 of Marredpally village to Sy No.844/1 of Malkajgiri and its acceptance by the Government is also not correct, which cannot be implemented in view of the report of the Dy. Director of Central Survey Office holding that there is no boundary overlap between two survey numbers. 113. Respondent No. 1590 contends that, the non-production of original pattas granted by the Paigah is of no consequence, as the original pattas were given sometime in the year 1948, and the issue is more than 50 years old and further, the sub-divisions of Sy No.74, have changed many hands. Neither original patta holders nor their legal representatives have been made a party. Therefore, the Respondent Societies cannot be held responsible for non-production of original pattas. 114. Neither original patta holders nor their legal representatives have been made a party. Therefore, the Respondent Societies cannot be held responsible for non-production of original pattas. 114. Respondent No. 1590 contends that, no part of Sy No. 844/1 of Malkajgiri has been encroached by any of the respondent societies, where the Government's present claim of overlapping of Ac.27-27 gts is also totally false, because it has not been able to specify which societies occupied how much area of Malkajgiri village, which had been admitted by PW-1 in his cross-examination on 16.07.2002 by R-4 as extracted below: "In annexure No. 1 in the LGC filed by us there is no specific mention of the encroachers in Sy. No. 844/1 of Malkajgiri village". 115. Respondent No. 1590 contends that, basing on Recommendation No. 4 of Mr. K.V. Natrajan, CLR, the Government. of A.P, Revenue Department issued Gazette Notification dated 20.08.1987 for resurvey and demarcating the boundary of Sy No. 74 of Marredpally village and Sy No. 844/1 of Malkajgiri village; that the Deputy Director, Central Survey Office pursuant to the said notification determined the boundary of the two survey numbers; and that in his report dated 26.08.1997 which is based on aerial photographs supplied by National Remote Sensing Agency, Hyderabad, a categorical finding has been given to that effect that there is no overlap of boundary between Sy No.74 of Marredpally and Sy No. 844/1 of Malkajgiri. Thus, the allegation of land grabbing of Sy No.844/1 of Malkajgiri village is wholly false and has been foisted on societies to harass them and their members. 116. Respondent No. 1590 contends that, there has been private litigation relating to boundary dispute between some pattadars in Sy No.74 of Marredpally village, wherein Late Dr.E.N.Das i.e. one of the pattadar of Sy No.74 of Marredpally village had made petition on 01.08.1963 and 12.12.1963 requesting the Government for phodi and declaring certain portion of land in Sy.No.74 as belonging to him as against title of other pattadars, and to assist but the Government vide Memo dated 02.03.1964 had rejected the said request by stating as below: "…Government sees no reason to interfere in the matter as the dispute is between private parties. The petitions cited are therefore rejected.” 117. The petitions cited are therefore rejected.” 117. Consequently, E.N.Das filed a Civil Suit vide O.S. No.55 of 1963 against other pattadars in Sy No.74 of Marredpally village, in which Hyderabad Municipal Corporation and Hyderabad Housing Board were arrayed as Defendants, in which the Collector, Hyderabad, nowhere mentioned or claimed that land in Sy No. 74 of Marredpally village belonged to the Government. 118. It is contended that, the Court has decided the dispute against Dr. E. N. Dass. Assailing this judgment dated 16.02.1971 in O.S.No.55 of 1963, late Dr. E.N. Dass preferred appeal vide CCCA.No.152 of 1972 and the same was dismissed vide Judgment dated 02.03.1976. Further, the SLP filed by him before Apex Court bearing Civil Appeal No. 880 of 1976 which was also dismissed vide order dated 11.04.1979. Thus, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has confirmed the title of Sy No.74 of Marredpally village, as belonging to some private persons and this judgment has become final and binding. 119. Respondent No.1590 contends that, the provisions of the Land Grabbing Act is not attracted because, the pattas were given in 1948 from in Sy No.74 of Marredpally village the land with its Sub-Divisions and has changed hands before it was purchased by the 8 societies. 120. Respondent No. 1590 contends that, the Jagirdars had no powers to alienate Jagir lands. As the ryots in non-Khalsa villages were an exploited lot, they were given possession of lands to cultivate and pay land revenue without being given any pattadari rights whatsoever. The Jagirdars could have evicted any person even if he was in possession of land and cultivating for very long period without assigning any reasons, if another person agreed to pay more land revenue. Thus, with a view to help the ryots in non-Khalsa villages and to end their exploitation, the provisions of Hyderabad Land Revenue Act 1317 F were amended by the Land Revenue (Amendment) Act III of 1355 F. 121. It is also contended that the Government. of Hyderabad vide Circular No.2, dated 18.10.1949 addressed to Civil Administrators of all the Districts stated that ryots in non- Khalsa villages are still treated as mere tenants at will by the Jagirdars denying permanent pattadari rights to them. It is also contended that the Government. of Hyderabad vide Circular No.2, dated 18.10.1949 addressed to Civil Administrators of all the Districts stated that ryots in non- Khalsa villages are still treated as mere tenants at will by the Jagirdars denying permanent pattadari rights to them. Referring to Jagir Revenue Recovery Regulations 1355 F and the rules regarding grant of pattadari rights in non-Khalsa Villages, it stated that all these legal provisions have mostly remained on paper and the duty of implementing them now devolves on the Government. Revenue Officers in the districts and the amended law and rules would apply to all the Jagir villages, irrespective of the fact whether Jagirdar had life interest or otherwise. 122. Respondent No.1590 contends that, the Board of Revenue which held the validity of impugned Pattas was a very high- powered body constituted to administer land and hear disputes on revenue matters, which now has been replaced by Chief Commissioner of Land Administration; thus, under Article 300 of the Indian Constitution, the Government whether Central or State is bound by the actions of civil servants. In this case, decision was taken at a very high level of Board of Revenue and the Government was fully involved. Therefore, the Government is bound by the decision of the Board of Revenue under Article 300 of the constitution. 123. It was further contended that, the petitioner/applicant herein had deliberately acted to harass the respondents by acting contrary to the Government Memo dated 04.06.2001 i.e. Marked as Ex.B-169 wherein it was clearly stated that the Co- operative housing societies who have obtained the permission of the Competent authorities, their members should not be impleaded separately. Yet the Government ignored its own order and made petition to the Court to implead the individual members. VI. Consideration by the Court 124. Yet the Government ignored its own order and made petition to the Court to implead the individual members. VI. Consideration by the Court 124. At the outset it is to be noted that, though the counsels for the petitioner and respondents argued at length their case as if it is a first-appeal, if it to be noted thar in a Writ Petition filed against order of Special Court under Article 226 of Constitution of India, the High Court will not convert itself into a court of appeal and to reappreciate or re-evaluate the evidence as considered by the Special Court and the scope of examination by this Court is limited only to consider whether the Special Court has considered the relevant material excluding the irrelevant material (See: State of A.P. v. P.V. Hanumantha Rao , (2003) 10 SCC 121 ). 125. Though, on behalf of the petitioners/applicant, an effort was made before this Court to re-appreciate the evidence as adduced before the Special Court, it is to be noted that as per the provisions of the Act, the findings recorded by the Special Court as to whether the act of land grabbing has taken place and the person against whom the said allegation of land grabbing is made is to be declared as land grabber in terms of the Act, is conclusive (See: Goundla Venkaiah and another(Supra) , (2010) 2 SCC 461 . 126. Further, it is settled law that the findings made by the tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings and this Court cannot convert itself into a court of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of the evidence as enunciated by the Apex Court in State of A.P. v. Prameela Modi , (2006) 13 SCC 147 wherein it was observed as under: 46. ….. The High Court and the Special Court have also rightly concluded that the land in Sy. Nos. ….. The High Court and the Special Court have also rightly concluded that the land in Sy. Nos. 116/2 and 116/3 is not government land after perusing both oral and documentary evidence and rightly dismissed the petition filed by the State by holding that there is no error apparent on the face of the record and further holding that the findings of fact reached by the inferior court or tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings and by holding that the High Court in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot convert itself into a court of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of the evidence.The High Court also relied on a judgment of this Court in Ameer-un-Nissa Begum v. Mahboob Begum [ AIR 1955 SC 352 ] and Rajah S.V. Jagannath Rao v. CIT [ (1962) 2 SCR 848 : AIR 1962 SC 141 ] and held that the Nazim and his administration had every right to recognise or grant patta in favour of any individual of his choice in respect of Sarfekhas properties….. 127. It is also pertinent to note that, a Writ under Article 226, can be issued only if it is shown that the Tribunal while recording the findinghad erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, and had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Further, a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for issuing a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Special Court was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. Thus, the adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court (See: Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan , 1963 SCC OnLine SC 24 ). 128. Keeping the law as enunciated by the Apex Court, we proceed to deal with the contentions urged. A. No clarity in the concise statement of the petitioner in the underlying application and application of the Act: 129. 128. Keeping the law as enunciated by the Apex Court, we proceed to deal with the contentions urged. A. No clarity in the concise statement of the petitioner in the underlying application and application of the Act: 129. As per the petitioner/applicant land to an extent of Ac.197- 32 gts in Sy No.74 of Marredpally village and Ac.27-27 gts situated in Sy.No.844/1 of Malkajgiri village has been grabbed by the respondents. However, it is to be noted that, there are as many as 8 Societies and 2047 individual respondents in the underlying L.G.C. and which of the respondents has grabbed the saidAc. 197-32 gts and Ac.27-27 gts has not been clarified by the petitioner/applicant either through the oral evidence of P.W-1 and P.W-2 or through documentary evidence filed in support of his pleadings. 130. In the Concise statement the claim of the petitioner/applicant in respect of subject land in Sy No.74 of Marredpally village and Sy No.844/1 of Malkajgiri village, had stated that ‘the respondents are trying to encroach’ and ‘creates the doubt about the so-called assignments. It is to be noted that mere doubt raised by the State as to the title and possession of the occupant of a land or the act to trying to ‘Grab’ does not attract the provisions of the Act nor make the respondents as a “land-grabber” and for them to be declared as ‘land grabbers’ under the provisions of 1982 Act. (See: P.V. Hanumantha Rao(supra)) 131. The petitioner/applicant, failed to prove the fact as to the predecessors-in-title to the respondents herein not been granted any assignment and without any right, title or interest having encroached or grabbing the subject land to invoke the provisions of the Act. Further, the evidence adduced by the respondents through R.W-1 to R.W-10 and Exhibits marked under Ex.B-1 to B-185 clearly establish the falsity of the claim made by the petitioner/applicant in its concise statement filed along with the application. Thus, the petitioner cannot invoke the land grabbing Act where rival title claim has been set-up. 132. Further, the evidence adduced by the respondents through R.W-1 to R.W-10 and Exhibits marked under Ex.B-1 to B-185 clearly establish the falsity of the claim made by the petitioner/applicant in its concise statement filed along with the application. Thus, the petitioner cannot invoke the land grabbing Act where rival title claim has been set-up. 132. Failure on the part of the petitioner to show any action having initiated by it against the respondents under Land Encroachment Act of 1905, or before the Military Governor Major General Chowdary who was the Jagir administrator at the relevant time or any action initiated against the mischievous Patwaries who it is alleged to have manipulated the revenue records in favour of private persons,i.e., predecessors in title of the respondents in the underlying LGC, clearly goes to show that the petitioner/applicant had initiated the underlying proceedings in the year 1997 claiming the respondent are trying to grab the Government land with malafide intention only to harass the respondents herein. B. Dispute with regard to escheat made in favour of Government: 133. It is to be noted that, the concept of escheating came into operation only in the year 1974 andany transaction prior to it does not connote the act of transfer of title in any property. Further, no judicial authorityor Quasi-Judicial Authority including the Nazim Atiyat was empowered to declare transfer of title from the lawful holders to the State that too under an enactment which does not contemplate such transfer. 134. Though, petitioner/applicant states that Marredpally village was one of the escheated villages, the very first sentence of the application filed by the petitioner/applicant herein in the underlying L.G.C. states that ‘Marredpally village is part of Jagir of PaigahAsmanjahi’, which was admitted by PW-1 in his cross-examination, which makes the order of Nazim-e-Atiyatwith regard to escheat asperverse on the face of it. 135. It is pertinent to note that the petitioner/applicant sought to set up title to the subject land based on the concept of escheat under the provisions of Jagir Abolition Act, however, the State authorities have advanced contradictory claims of ‘absolute title’ and ‘right by escheat’ against the respondents. 136. It is to be noted that, the Reilly Commission is purely administrative in nature but not an Inam enquiry, as statedin theorder dated 16.11.1959 by the Nazim Atiyat. 136. It is to be noted that, the Reilly Commission is purely administrative in nature but not an Inam enquiry, as statedin theorder dated 16.11.1959 by the Nazim Atiyat. Consequently, Nawab Zaheer Yar Jung filed appeal before Board of Revenue, which in turn vide order dated 01.04.1960 dismissed the appeal as under: "The Reilly Commission's report should be given weight and full consideration and whatever work already turned out by the Commission need not be re-opened. One specific feature in the Commissions' report is that they have recommended for the confirmation of Taluqs in the name of Paigahs (Appendix C of the boundaries of the Taluqs have not been clearly mentioned. The Nazim boundaries of the Taluqs mentioned in the report" Aggrieved by the said order of Board of Revenue, Nawab Zaheer Yar Jung filed Writ Petition videW.P No.632 of 1960 wherein this Court while confirming the order of the Board of Revenue held that “expression 'need not be reopened’ may be substituted by 'will not be reopened’”.Subsequently, the Nazim Atiyat went ahead with his enquiry and passed an order on 28.10.1968 wherein it was held as under: "The report of the Reilly Commission and its proceedings were requisitioned from the State Archives. The record sent by the State Archives does not contain the original report or its authentic copy. The copy received by this Court is an unsigned draft on which Justice Reilly has endorsed on the introduction: "No copy should be made of this draft". The present claimant has relied heavily on this report, but did not submit a copy of the report. As such no reliance can be placed on the document sent by the State Archives", Therefore, in view of the above the petitioner/applicant cannot rely on the Reilly Commission report for the reason that Justice Reilly himself clearly observed that 'no copy should be made of this draft'. Further, it is only an unsigned draft which was not approved by Justice Reilly wherein he himself endorsed on the said draft as"No copy should be made of this draft". 137. Further, it is pertinent to note that, the petitioner/applicant has placed no material in order to prove the escheat made infavour of the state other than order dated 28.10.1968 marked as Ex.A-4. 137. Further, it is pertinent to note that, the petitioner/applicant has placed no material in order to prove the escheat made infavour of the state other than order dated 28.10.1968 marked as Ex.A-4. However, it is to be noted that though the reliance was placed on Gazette Notification issued under Survey and Boundaries Act 1923 vide dated 10.08.1987 marked as Ex.A- 10, the same clearly specifies the boundaries of Sy.No.844/1 of Malkajgiri village to an extent of Ac. 298-04 gts and Sy No.74 of Marredpally village to an extent of Ac.302-27 gts as ‘patta land’ which demonstrates the failure on the part of the State to take steps on the basis of the survey notification dated 10.08.1987 with respect to its implementation, which they ought to have done immediately after the issuance of the said notification. Therefore such approach signifies the precipitated action on the part of the State in alleging the respondents as ‘land grabbers’ under the Act. 138. Further, it is the contention of the petitioner/applicant that the list containing villages of PaigahAsmanjahi taken over under Jagir Abolition Regulation at Sl.No.316 clearly mentions Maredpally village and as such the land in Sy No.74 is Government land, it is to be noted that the aforementioned list is neither a certified copy nor original copy but only a draft. Further, the author himself has endorsed that ‘No copy should be made of this draft’,makes the document i.e. Ex.A-4 as not proved and thus valueless. Thus, the claim of the petitioner/applicant that land is escheated to the govt cannot be accepted. C. Dispute as to power and jurisdiction of the Athiyat Court: 139. It is to be noted that, the Nazim Atiyat Court does not have power to deal with the determination of patta rights to the individuals. It has jurisdiction only in respect of making enquiries as to claims of succession and any right, title or interest and matters ancillary thereto during the life time of such person upon issuing a farman and only limited to the commutation amount payable to erstwhile Jagirdars as per the provisions of A.P.(TA) Atiyat Enquiry Act 1952. 140. It has jurisdiction only in respect of making enquiries as to claims of succession and any right, title or interest and matters ancillary thereto during the life time of such person upon issuing a farman and only limited to the commutation amount payable to erstwhile Jagirdars as per the provisions of A.P.(TA) Atiyat Enquiry Act 1952. 140. Further, the A.P Government (Revenue Department) in its memo dated.24.06.1989 marked as Ex.B-167 has clearly stated that Nazim Atiyat Court under Section 2 of the said Act does not have jurisdiction in respect of Jagirs abolished under Jagir Abolition Regulations, and have no powers to decide on any title to the property which includes the grant of pattas to the eligible persons. Thus, in the case of abolished Jagirs, the Atiyat Court can decide only about the right to commutation sum and it does not have jurisdiction to decide on possession or title with respect to Jagirs abolished under the Jagirs Abolition Regulation. 141. Further, under the provisions of A.P. (Telangana) Atiyat Enquiries Act 1952, Nazim AtiyatCourt has no power to escheat any village, which is made clear from the memo issued by the Revenue Department dated 24.06.1989 marked as Ex.B-167. Additionally, no order was passed by the Board of Revenue pursuant to the directions given in W.A.No.289 of 1978, dated.20.12.1983 under which the order of the Nazim Atiyat was set aside with a separate directionto the Board of Revenue to scrutinize the relevant revenue records and ascertain whether 72 villages form part of PaigahAsmanjahi’s Jagir or not. Thus, the said order of Nazim Athiyat Court on the basis of which the petitioner/applicant claims of land of Marredpally village been escheated to Government, does not merit consideration as the said order does not subsist. 142. It is also to be noted that, in the present case the M.R.O had filed the underlying L.G.C and thus, the entire record relating to the Government will be either in his office or in the office of the R.D.O., or the District Collector, Hyderabad. However, the MRO though filed the underlying application did not examine himself as witness. On the other hand RDO was examined as PW-1 and did not produce the record relating to the subject land. Therefore, an adverse inference has to be drawn for the non-submission of the original Exs.A-4 and A- 5 before the Special Court. However, the MRO though filed the underlying application did not examine himself as witness. On the other hand RDO was examined as PW-1 and did not produce the record relating to the subject land. Therefore, an adverse inference has to be drawn for the non-submission of the original Exs.A-4 and A- 5 before the Special Court. Further, the petitioner/applicant produced the order of Nazim Atiyat Court dated 28.10.1968 marked as Ex.A-4 to claim that the subject land is Government land for it to file the underlying application before the Special Court. However, the petitioner/applicant failed to file G.O Ms. No.1106 Revenue dated 06.06.1959 relied in Ex.A-4. 143. Though under Section 12 of the Act it is stated that the decision of the Civil Courts will prevail on questions of succession, legitimacy, etc.,however, after enactment of A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act of 1982, in cases where it is alleged that land has been grabbed, it is the Special Court which decides ownership, lawful title and possession of the said land and not Civil Court. 144. The petitioner/applicant having approached the Special Court under the Act has to prove that the application subject land is Government land. The petitioner/applicant instead of prima facie proving the said land as having become the Government land after Jagir abolition, however, only on the basis of Nazim Athiyat Court order claims title to the application schedule land. As noted herein the jurisdiction of Nazim Athiyat Court being confined to decide only the commutation sum, the order cannot be pressed in aid of claim of title. D. Dispute as to whether there are sub-divisions in Sy No.74 of Marredpally village in the light of Natrajan Commission Report and other documents: 145. With regard to the question of sub division of land in Sy No.74, the petitioner/applicant contended that the subject land in Sy.No.74 of Marredpally village is shown as Gut number and was never sub-divided. However, the respondents herein controverting the said claim have produced documents and evidences i.e. Exs.B-4 and B-6 to prove their claim of sub-division as under: i.As per Ex.B-4 which is letter dated 24.10.1959 addressed to Tahsildar, Hyderabad West Taluq, it was stated that Sy.No.74 was sub divided into Sy.No.74/1 to 74/11. However, the respondents herein controverting the said claim have produced documents and evidences i.e. Exs.B-4 and B-6 to prove their claim of sub-division as under: i.As per Ex.B-4 which is letter dated 24.10.1959 addressed to Tahsildar, Hyderabad West Taluq, it was stated that Sy.No.74 was sub divided into Sy.No.74/1 to 74/11. ii.Further as per Ex.B-6 i.e. Sale Deed executed by one Syed Ameenuddin Hussaini after obtaining permission from the concerned Tahsildar dated 17.07.1967 shows that sub-division was carried out and individual physical possession of the area was given to the pattadar who sold the same in same infavour of respondent No.1 mentioning specific boundries. iii.The District Collector, Hyderabad in his letter dated 31.10.1995 addressed to the Commissioner, M.C.H., Hyderabad has stated that after verification and tallying the town survey record bearing Town Survey Nos. 119 &130 and the corresponding record in several Sy. No.74/2 to 74/13 and found that Town Survey No.2/1 Ward No.130 combinedly corelated to old Survey Nos.74/2 to 13 and also the letter addressed by the District Collector, Hyderabad clearly shows that Sy.Nos.74/2 to 74/13 belong to private persons and not to the Government of A.P. and that Sy.No.74 was already sub-divided. Therefore, it can be said that the Sy.No.74/2 to 74/13 is a patta land and got sub-divided in the year 1948 when the same was under Jagirdar. 146. Further, it is pertinent to note that, if the recommendations of the K.V. Natarajan Commission report were to be accepted, such acceptance ought to have led to the formulation of a regularization scheme by the Government, rather than invoking the provisions of the Act to brand the respondents as land grabbers. Additionally, the petitioner/applicant has not initiated or filed any proceedings to establish that the subject property has been escheated. 147. It is also pertinent to note that, the recommendation No.1 of Sri K.V. Natarajan states that the order of the Board of Revenue dated 17.06.1953regarding grant of pattas to three persons as irregular and deserves to be cancelled by the government. However, the government while rejected the said recommendation No.1, partly allowed the recommendation No. 3 and 4. 147. It is also pertinent to note that, the recommendation No.1 of Sri K.V. Natarajan states that the order of the Board of Revenue dated 17.06.1953regarding grant of pattas to three persons as irregular and deserves to be cancelled by the government. However, the government while rejected the said recommendation No.1, partly allowed the recommendation No. 3 and 4. Thus, by this it can be said that the pattas granted in favour of the predecessors-in-title of respondent Nos.1 to 2047 being accepted by the Government to legal and valid.Thus, the recommendation No.3 which stated that the holders of pattas granted by the Jagirdar may be regularized by collecting a percentage of current market value becomes superfluous due to the rejection of recommendation No.1 by the government. 148. Further, this Court is of the view that, consequent to the merger of Hyderabad State with India in 1948 the Jagirs were abolished by the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) (Abolition of Jagirs) Regulation, 1358 Fasli, wherein the “Khasra pahani” is the basic record-of-rights prepared by the Board of Revenue Andhra Pradesh in the year 1954-1955, and as per Regulation 13, any entry in the said record-of-rights shall be presumed to be true until the contrary is proved. The said regulation of 1358 F was in vogue till it was repealed by the A.P. Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books Act, 1971, which came into force on 15.08.1978. 149. In view of the above, it can be said that the Khasra Pahani is the basic record of land wherein the entries are clearly mentioned which confirms the sub-divisions in Sy No.74. Thus, the petitioner/applicant cannot claim the land in Sy No.74 as not sub divided and it is also incorrect to claim it as government land when said pahani already recorded the names of private persons. (See: Collector v. D. Narsing Rao , (2015) 3 SCC 695 . 150. Further, this Court is of the view that, the Sy.No.74 has been divided into 13 sub-divisions and all the sub-divisions are held to be private lands except land to an extent of Ac.3-01 gts., covered by Sy.No.74/1 of Marredpally. Further, the entries in KhasraPahani also clearly indicate the same. 150. Further, this Court is of the view that, the Sy.No.74 has been divided into 13 sub-divisions and all the sub-divisions are held to be private lands except land to an extent of Ac.3-01 gts., covered by Sy.No.74/1 of Marredpally. Further, the entries in KhasraPahani also clearly indicate the same. Therefore, while holding Sy No. 74/1 admeasuring Ac.3-01 gts., to be Government land, it is not possible to declare the remaining extent of land and the sub-division thereof in possession of the respondents is by way ‘land grabbing’ referring them to be declared as ‘land grabbers’. 151. It may not be out of the context to note that the Special Court in LGC No. 103 & 114 of 1989 and LGC No. 70 of 1994 (Ex.B-179 & B-178) had held that the land in Sy No. 74 has been sub-divided and the said sub-division were given prior to Jagir Abolition. The said findings of the Special Court in LGC No. 103 & 114 of 1989 and LGC No. 70 of 1994 also attained finality. Further, during the course of proceedings when this Court had queried with the learned Special Government Pleader Sri Parsa Anant Nageshwar Rao, as to how the petitioner/applicant can reagitate the issue which has attained finality in a subsequent proceeding without challenging the said orders; as the finding would act as ‘res judicata’, the learned Special Government Pleader addressed the Court by raising voice questioned as to how this Court is concerned with said orders of the Special Court and that the Court should confine itself to the submissions being made by the petitioner/applicant being ‘state’, upon which the learned Special Government Pleader was informed that the order of this Court would speak for itself. E. Dispute with regard to the power to grant pattas: 152. E. Dispute with regard to the power to grant pattas: 152. With regard to the question of grant of pattas by the Paigahs it is pertinent to note that, the Section 54 r/w Section 54A of Hyderabad Land Revenue Act 1317 F provides that a Tahsildar is competent to grant patta for unoccupied land for agricultural purpose pursuant to Section 54(2) known as Laoni Rules, 1347 F. Accordingly, the combined reading of Section 54, 54A of Hyderabad Land Revenue Act 1317-F with Section 3 of Jagir Revenue Recovery Regulation 1355-F and Rules 8 & 10 of Pattadari Rules for Non-Khalsa villages, even a Tahsildar-i-Jagir could grant pattas in non-Khalsa villages for agricultural purposes in accordance with Laoni Rules, 1347 F, wherein the Paigah was an appellate authority under Rule 10 of the said Pattadari Rules. 153. Further, asper Circular No.2, dated.18 th Azur, 1359 F (18- 10-1949) it is the duty of the District Officers to see thatthe Jagir ryots enjoythe right to hold landissued by the Revenue Departmentand in order to implement it, the Government framed rules which has been published in Gazette No.32 on 19 th Thir, 1356 F which provide inter alia that all persons who hold Jagir land and pay revenue direct to the Jagirdar shall be deemed to be Pattadars of the land held by them. Therefore, the Jagirdar had the powers to grant pattas. F. In-action on the part of the petitioner to file a Civil suit when all other earlier proceedings attained finality attracting doctrine of resjudicata: 154. This Court takes note of the fact that, the petitioner herein has lost its case in all forums as is evident from the order of Board of revenue (Ex.A-6);Report of Natrajan Commission (Ex.A-9); L.G.C Nos. 70 of 1994; 103 and 114 of 1989 (Exs.B- 178, B-179); and Civil Suit vide O.S. No.55 of 1963 (Ex.B- 40)and the said proceedings having attained finality. Thus, the petitioner/applicant cannot claim the subject to be government land as illegally grabbed by the respondents. 155. In the aforesaid circumstances, the Special Court by considering the document marked as Ex.B-178 i.e. certified copy of judgement in LGC 70 of 1994 in which the Special Court referred to the finding recorded in LGC Nos. Thus, the petitioner/applicant cannot claim the subject to be government land as illegally grabbed by the respondents. 155. In the aforesaid circumstances, the Special Court by considering the document marked as Ex.B-178 i.e. certified copy of judgement in LGC 70 of 1994 in which the Special Court referred to the finding recorded in LGC Nos. 103 and 114 of 1989 as to the sub divisions being given prior to the abolition of Jagirs; and that the evidences in LGCs.70 of 1994 the underlying application being is one and the same, the Special Court in its judgement answered the said point against the petitioner/applicant. 156. It is to be noted that the findings of the Special Court in LGC Nos.103 and 114 of 1989, with regard to land in Sy No.74 being assigned sub-divisons number prior to the aboloition of Jagirs and the finding having been further relied upon in LGC No.70 of 1994, which orders have attained finality, this Court is of the view that the petitioner/applicant cannot be allowed to plead differently in a proceedings initiated subsequently thereby seeking to revisit the finding which has attained finality thereby attracting the doctrine of res judicate. 157. The Supreme Court in Kaushik Coop. Building Society v. N. Parvathamma , (2017) 13 SCC 138 by reiterating the view taken in Sri Bhavanarayanaswamivari Temple v. Vadapalli Venkata Bhavanarayanacharyulu , (1970) 1 SCC 673 , observed that: “8. ….the doctrine of res judicata is not confined to a decision in a suit but it applies to decisions in other proceedings as well. But how far a decision which is rendered in other proceedings will bind the parties depends upon other considerations one of which is whether that decision determines substantial rights of parties and the other is whether the parties are given adequate opportunities to establish the rights pleaded by them. The doctrine of res judicata is not confined to the limits prescribed in Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code. The underlying principle of that doctrine is that there should be finality in litigation and that a person should not be vexed twice over in respect of the same matter.” 158. It is pertinent to note with respect to sub-division in Sy No.74/10 that, a suitvide O.S. No.55 of 1963 was filed by the plaintiff viz., Dr.E.N.Das in respect of his claim i.e., Sy. It is pertinent to note with respect to sub-division in Sy No.74/10 that, a suitvide O.S. No.55 of 1963 was filed by the plaintiff viz., Dr.E.N.Das in respect of his claim i.e., Sy. No.74/10 though was dismissed, the trial Court held that there was sub-division in Sy. No.74 of Marredpally village and the said Dr.E.N.Das was owner of the property bearing Sy. No.74/11 of Marredpally village, which was ultimately confirmed by the Apex Court, which also operates as resjudicata. 159. It is also pertinent to note that, from the pleadings it is evident that the respondents had set up rival claim with regard to their respective part in subject property. If petitioner/applicant has any right to claim in respect of the subject land it ought to have filed a suit in the Civil Court instead of application under the Act. Further, the petitioner/applicant having raised claim over the application schedule land for the first time in 1986, however failed to initiate any action either by conducting survey over the subject land, or keeping the same in prohibitory list or initiating any other appropriate action under Land Encroachment Act 1905. 160. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Om Prakash Singh v. M. Lingamaiah , (2009) 12 SCC 613 has held as under: 15. Ordinary disputes with regard to a title of property are not within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Special Court or the Tribunal. They have to be determined in ordinary civil courts. The Special Courts and the Tribunals are not substitutes for the civil courts in the litigations involving a civil dispute relating to immovable property within the meaning of Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It has the exclusive jurisdiction where land grabbing is alleged or appeared from the application filed before it. 161. Further in O.S No.55 of 1963 wherein the state through its instrumentalities namely Housing Board and GHMC being parties did not plead that the entire extent of land in Sy No.74 to be Government land and the plaintiff in the suit (Ex.B-40) does not have any valid title or claim for them to be declare as land grabbers now. 162. Further in O.S No.55 of 1963 wherein the state through its instrumentalities namely Housing Board and GHMC being parties did not plead that the entire extent of land in Sy No.74 to be Government land and the plaintiff in the suit (Ex.B-40) does not have any valid title or claim for them to be declare as land grabbers now. 162. The said order of the trial Court in O.S No. 55 of 1963 was subject matter of appeal in respect of issue No.2 therein vide C.C.C.A No. 152 of 1972 (Ex.B-41) and a Division Bench of this Court speaking through Hon’ble Justice Sri O Chinnapreddy (as his lordship then was) did not find any merit in the appeal filed against the order of the trial Court in O.S. No.55 of 1963 and the said order of the Division Bench was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.880 of 1976. Thus, the order in O.S. No.55 of 1963 in respect of land in Sy No.74 including recognizing the existence of sub divisions has attained finality. 163. In view of the above, the doctrine of res judicata operates and the petitioner/applicant cannot be allowed to keep on agitating the same said issue again and again. G. Claim basing on the entries in Khasra Pahani of 1954-55 in favour of private individuals: 164. It is to be noted that, the Khasra pahani of the year 1954-55 marked as Ex.A-14 shows 12 entries (from Sy No.74/2 to 74/13) in favour of private persons through whom respondent Nos.1 to 8 Co-operative societies have purchased the land and one entry to an extent of Ac.3-01 gts. in Sy No.74/1 in favour of the government recorded as ‘Sarkari’. And this fact is not disputed by the petitioner/applicant even before the Special Court and this Court. 165. It is further pertinent to note that, it is the contention of the petitioner/applicant that, the Natarajan Commission's reportis the cause of action for filing of theunderlying L.G.C., which states that pahani extract of 1356 F shows the Sy. No.74 to an extent of Ac.306-15 gts as "Sarkari", whereas pahani extracts from 1359 F(1950-54) shows Sy.No.74 as occupied by 12 persons. However, the Khasra Pahani for the year 1954-55 (Ex.B-82) records that the land admeasuring Ac.3-01 gts. No.74 to an extent of Ac.306-15 gts as "Sarkari", whereas pahani extracts from 1359 F(1950-54) shows Sy.No.74 as occupied by 12 persons. However, the Khasra Pahani for the year 1954-55 (Ex.B-82) records that the land admeasuring Ac.3-01 gts. in Sy No.74/1 to be the only land of the Government and all other extents being shown as under the occupation of pattadars, the claim of the petitioner/applicant to the contrary is not based on any evidence. 166. Thus, the very cause of action shown for invoking the jurisdiction of the Special Court to maintain the underlying application is not valid. 167. Therefore, the contention of the petitioner/applicant that the respondents or their predecessors-in-title fraudulently made entries sometime after 1356 F is false and without any basis. H. Issue as to whether the subject land is a government land or private land: 168. As regards, the dispute whether the subject land is government land or private patta land, it is to be noted that, the Sy No.74of Marredpally village admeasuring Ac.306-15 gts was initially part of Jagir of PaigahAsmanjahi. Before the Special Court the respondents have marked documents as Exs.B-3, B-155, B-157, and B-166 as under: i. Ex.B-3 is the certified copy of the order passed by the District Collector, Hyderabad District on 05.10.1959 in respect of the lands situated in Marredpally, Shamshabad and Tegalguda villages wherein a detailed report was sent by the District Collector to the Board of Revenue which agreed with the opinion of the District Collector regarding the persons who are granted pattas were not the relatives of Nawab and that all the pattas granted were in order and that the pattadars of the above mentioned three villages may continue in possession and enjoyment of the said lands as before. Which makes it clear that the lands situated in Marredpally, Shamshabad, Tegalguda were not Government lands and that they are private lands which were granted pattas by the authorities and that all the pattadars were enjoying the said lands even on 5-10-1959. ii. The document marked as Ex.B-155 regarding the cancellation of pattas in Marredpally and Shamshabad village shows that the lands are of patta lands which were in possession and enjoyment of the respective pattadars. iii. ii. The document marked as Ex.B-155 regarding the cancellation of pattas in Marredpally and Shamshabad village shows that the lands are of patta lands which were in possession and enjoyment of the respective pattadars. iii. As per Ex.B-157 which is a certified copy of the letter dated 15.06.1959 addressed by Zahir Yar Jung, Amir-e-Paigah whereby it is stated that a compromise was arrived between the pattadars of plot Nos. in Sy No.74 & 75 before the District Collector, Hyderabad who accepted it and the same was approved by the Revenue Board on 17.06.1953. iv. From Ex.B-166 i.e. award dated 14.09.1971 passed by the Land Acquisition Officer, M.C.H., Hyderabad to an extent of 2,167 Sq.yds acquired from Pattadar Sri E.Bhagavan Das, S/o. E.N.Das in Sy.No.74/10 of Marredpally village and compensation of Rs.62,301.25/- was paid to him which proves that the Government had accepted the title of the land in Sy. No.74 as private patta land. Thus, in the light of the aforesaid documents marked before the Special Court, it can be safely said that the land situated in Sy.Nos.74 of Marredpally village is a private patta land and not government land. 169. Further PW-1 in cross examination deposed that he does not know as to whether the property of Mohd. Mahaboob Khan in Sy.No.74/3 was purchased in public auction by one Mr. S. Srivastava and having obtained registered sale deed dated 21.09.1962 (Ex.B-89). If only the property in Sy. No.74 of Marredpally village is a Government property, the state would not have allowed the said auction to go through and atleast would have approached the Court after the sale is made in public auction seeking to set aside the said sale deed. Thus, this is another circumstance which goes to show that the property in Sy. No.74 is a private property and not Government property except Sy.No.74/1 admeasuring Ac.3-01 gts. 170. Further, a close scrutiny of evidence produced by petitioner/applicant i.e. the pahani of Sy No.74 marked as Ex.A- 1 shows that in the pahani it is recorded as ‘KANCHAGATTU VAGAIRA’. The term ‘Vagaira’ connotes the meaning as ‘etc. (other similar things)’ specify the subject land as ‘elevated land with the land abetting thereto’. 170. Further, a close scrutiny of evidence produced by petitioner/applicant i.e. the pahani of Sy No.74 marked as Ex.A- 1 shows that in the pahani it is recorded as ‘KANCHAGATTU VAGAIRA’. The term ‘Vagaira’ connotes the meaning as ‘etc. (other similar things)’ specify the subject land as ‘elevated land with the land abetting thereto’. This recording in the pahani makes it clear that the entire land is not fallow or dry or hillock and unfit for grazing/cultivation as claimed by the petitioner/applicant herein but only some part of the land in Sy No.74 being elevated. Further, it is to be noted that the mention of ‘Sarkari’ in pahani of 1356 F (Ex.A-1) is only for the purpose of identifying the land for the purposes collection of revenue i.e., either Sarf-e-Khas or Diwani. 171. It may also be noted that, on the trial Court dismissing the suit filed by Dr. E. N. Das as plaintiff vide in O.S. No.55 of 1963 (Ex.B-40) to restrain the respondent from interfering in Sy No. 74/11, the 4 th respondent- Municipal Corporation passed award in land acquisition proceedings initiated under Land Acquisition Act for acquiring part of the land vide its proceedings dated 14.09.1971, and paid compensation thereunder (Ex.B-166). If only the said land is the government land as being claimed by the petitioner/applicant by the underlying application filed before Special Court, there was no need or necessity for the Municipal Corporation to recognize one E Bhagwan Das as reported/legal owner of the land under acquisition in Sy No.74/10. The fact of acquisition of land and payment of compensation in respect of Sy No 74/10 falsifies the claim of petitioner/applicant that the land in Sy No. 74 is government land and the said number is only a gut number; and there are no sub-divisions of the said Sy No.74. 172. Hence, the respondents in facts of the present case have been able to establish through the evidence produced by them that Sy.No.74 admeasuring Ac.306-15 gts was initially part of Jagir of Paigah Asmanjahi; that Naweb Zaheer Yar Jung was the Amir-e-Paigah; that he was one of the three Paigahs who occupied very high position being hereditary charge of Nazim's bodyguard; and that the ancestors of Paigah family were granted large extents of land called Jagirs for maintenance of troops and for their expenses and the said Jagirs were exempted from Diwani jurisdiction. 173. 173. Therefore, it is clear from Exs.B-156 and B-157 that the land situated in Sy.Nos.74 of Marredpally village is a private patta land and if really it was a Government land, the District Collector, Hyderabad District in whose presence the compromise was arrived, would not have approved the same. Further, the document relied by the petitioner i.e. pahani in respect of Sy No.844/1 of Malkajgiri village marked as Ex.A-2 shows the Sy No as 84/1 and not 844/1 as claimed and the same being government land. I. Burden to be proved by the petitioner when there is sufficient knowledge about the habitation/occupation of the respondents: 174. It is to be noted that, as per Section 10 of the Act, the initial burden is upon the petitioner/applicant to establish prima facie title to the subject land. However, it is relevant to note that in the present case, the petitioner/applicant has placed no material to show that they were in possession of the land and protecting the subject land, therefore, the initial burden cast on the petitioner/applicant was never discharged nor led any evidence in the first instance before the Special Court.Therefore, the burden cannot shift on to the respondents to prove that the allegation of land grabbing. In a similar case, the erstwhile Andhra Pradesh High Court in Bahaggan Bai v. Mandal Revenue Officer, R.R. Dist , (1997) 4 ALD 196 has held as under: 4. …. It is contended that under Section 10 of the Act the initial burden to show that the petitioners are land grabbers is on the respondents and that the respondents should adduce evidence to establish that prima facie, the petitioners are land grabbers. I find force in this contention. Though, the array of parties in the suit has not been changed after transfer to the Special Tribunal for Land Grabbing cases, it cannot be doubted that the position of the respondents in the suit is really that of a petitioner or complainant. It is only on the allegation of the respondents that the land was grabbed by the plaintiffs in the suit that the suit was transferred. The complaint of land grabbing is from the defendants in the suit (respondents herein). Section 10 which deals with burden of proof puts the matter beyond doubt. It is only on the allegation of the respondents that the land was grabbed by the plaintiffs in the suit that the suit was transferred. The complaint of land grabbing is from the defendants in the suit (respondents herein). Section 10 which deals with burden of proof puts the matter beyond doubt. The initial burden to show that the petitioners herein are land grabbers is on the Government at whose instance the suit was transferred to the Special Tribunal. It is only thereafter that the onus shifts. In such a situation, it is only proper and logical that the respondents (defendants in the transferred suit) are called upon to lead evidence in the first instance. It may be that, depending upon the facts and circumstances, the respondents might be given an opportunity to adduce further evidence after the petitioner's evidence. But, it remains the duty of the respondents-defendants to lead the evidence initially. 175. It is pertinent to note that, though the petitioner/applicant claim that the state is the original owner of the alleged subject property and the same was grabbed by the respondents herein, the initial burden is upon the petitioner/applicant to prove the right and title to the subject property and only if it is discharged the burden shifts on the respondents. However, in the present case the petitioner/applicant failed to discharge theburden of proof necessary to shift the onus onto the respondents. (See: K. Sharada Bai vs. Shamshunnisa , (2008) 3 SCC 49 ) 176. Further, the Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that, in the year 1973 a Women’s college by name Kasturba Gandhi Degree & PG College for Women was established at Nehru Nagar, West Marredpally which itself shows the development and habitation was very much existing in the area. Despite having such knowledge, the petitioner/applicant cannot claim the subject property as government land on the basis of the Commission report of the year 1988 which is claimed as accepted in the year 1994 as giving rise to cause of action for filing the application before the Special Court. Thus, in view of above it is crystal clear that the petitioner/applicant’s cause of action is wrong. 177. Thus, in view of above it is crystal clear that the petitioner/applicant’s cause of action is wrong. 177. Further, it is basic principle of law that, the registration of the document is notice to the entire world, since, the petitioner/applicant had knowledge with regard to the registrations that took place of the subject property by the respondent societies and their predecessors-in-title, despite such knowledge they cannot claim right over the subject property as Government land. 178. The Supreme Court in the case of Suraj Lamp and Industries (P) Ltd. thru. DIR vs. State of Haryana and Ors , MANU/SC/1021/2009 : 2009 Supreme(SC) 1104 has held that: 8. The Registration Act, 1908, was enacted with the intention of providing orderliness, discipline and public notice in regard to transactions relating to immovable property and protection from fraud and forgery of documents of transfer.…. Section 49 of the said Act provides that no document required by Section 17 to be registered shall, affect any immovable property comprised therein or received as evidence of any transaction affected such property, unless it has been registered. Registration of a document gives notice to the world that such a document has been executed. Registration provides safety and security to transactions relating to immovable property, even if the document is lost or destroyed. It gives publicity and public exposure to documents thereby preventing forgeries and frauds in regard to transactions and execution of documents. Registration provides information to people who may deal with a property, as to the nature and extent of the rights which persons may have, affecting that property. In other words, it enables people to find out whether any particular property with which they are concerned, has been subjected to any legal obligation or liability and who is or are the person/s presently having right, title, and interest in the property. It gives solemnity of form and perpetuate documents which are of legal importance or relevance by recording them, where people may see the record and enquire and ascertain what the particulars are and as far as land is concerned what obligations exist with regard to them. It gives solemnity of form and perpetuate documents which are of legal importance or relevance by recording them, where people may see the record and enquire and ascertain what the particulars are and as far as land is concerned what obligations exist with regard to them. It ensures that every person dealing with immovable property can rely with confidence upon the statements contained in the registers (maintained under the said Act) as a full and complete account of all transactions by which the title to the property may be affected and secure extracts/copies duly certified. 179. Further, in the K.V. Natrajan report i.e. One-Man Commission report (Ex.A-9) it is clearly stated as under: As no useful purpose will be served in going a head with detailed survey of Sy.No. 74 of Marredpally village and Sy.No. 844/1 of Malkajgiri Village and recording of enjoyment may lead to further complications, the Director of Survey and Settlements was requested to go slow on the survey work. The D.O.S., on request, prepared the layout of the above two Sy.Nos. so as to physically arrive at the extent covered by buildings, roads, built up arca, parks etc. By the above observation in the report it is evident that roads, buildings and parks etc. are very much existing since long, which shows the possession of the subject land is already in the name of private individuals. Therefore, the petitioner/applicant cannot claim that the application schedule land to be vacant till 1985 and being grabbed thereafter. Further, grant of building permissions by municipal authorities and collection of property tax would also go to the existence of habitation since long, as it cannot be accepted that GHMC collected property tax in respect of non-existing buildings. 180. The petitioner/applicant in the present case placed reliance upon the order of the Atiyat Court dated 28.10.1968 to prove escheat in favour of the Government. However, it is to be noted that, the land in Sy.No.74/6, admeasuring Ac.39-39 gts of East Marredpally, originally possessed by one Sri Wiliam Caesar who sold it in favour of late Dr. E.N. Dass, under two registered sale deeds vide dated 12.11.1956 and 14.11.1960. Even the land in Sy. No.74/3 admeasuring Ac.14-31gts was in possession of late Mohd. However, it is to be noted that, the land in Sy.No.74/6, admeasuring Ac.39-39 gts of East Marredpally, originally possessed by one Sri Wiliam Caesar who sold it in favour of late Dr. E.N. Dass, under two registered sale deeds vide dated 12.11.1956 and 14.11.1960. Even the land in Sy. No.74/3 admeasuring Ac.14-31gts was in possession of late Mohd. Mahaboob Khan which subsequently was sold in public auction in the year 1962 to one Sitaprasad Srivastava vide registered sale deed dated 21.09.1962 after obtaining the permission from the Tahsildar dated 07.09.1962. Therefore, it clear that the petitioner/applicant was in knowledge of the registration of land/plots which took place earlier to 1968 infavour of predecessors-in-title of the respondent societies, which includes the permissions taken by various respondent societies or purchasers, from MCH, Cantonment board and from other authorities. 181. In the instant case, the respondent and their predecessors- in-title have been in possession in the subject land from 1950 onwards to the knowledge of all including the petitioner/applicant herein. Thus, failure on part of petitioner/applicant to take steps in respect of land being claimed as Government land for such a long period itself debars it from raising it under statute enacted in 1982 i.e. 40 years after the acquisition of the title by the vendor of the respondents. J. Dispute as to the corrections made in the TSLR entries by rounding off with letter ‘G’: 182. It is to be noted that the corrections in Town Survey Land Register (TSLR) were made without giving notice and following procedure under Sections 5 to 14 of A.P.Survey & Boundaries Act 1923.As per TSLR of Marradepally village marked as Ex.B-149 in Column No.20, the names of the pattadars are mentioned and the said names are rounded off and marked as 'G', which act is wholly illegal as the said corrections were made without giving any notice either to R-1 to R-8 societies or the members of R-1 to R-8 societies who were allotted plots. 183. The Supreme Court in State of A.P. v. Hyderabad Potteries (P) Ltd , (2010) 5 SCC 382 has held as under: 29. In the light of the same, the majority members of the Special Court came to the conclusion that certain entries in TSLR may not be sufficient proof of possession of the appellant State as owner thereof. Copy of the TSLR has been filed showing the details thereof. In the light of the same, the majority members of the Special Court came to the conclusion that certain entries in TSLR may not be sufficient proof of possession of the appellant State as owner thereof. Copy of the TSLR has been filed showing the details thereof. In Column 20 “G” is mentioned meaning thereby the Government, but in Column 23 which is remarks column, the possession of Respondent 1, Hyderabad Potteries Pvt. Ltd. is clearly shown which is in consonance with the stand taken by the respondents. It is also pertinent to mention here that “G” was encircled raising doubts about it and then in Column 23 name of Respondent 1 is clearly stated. 184. Further, a Division Bench of the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh in the case of The Joint Collector, Rangareddy District, Lakdikapool, Hyderabad vs. M/s. Prathap Jungle Resorts Private Limited and Anr ,  Writ Appeal No. 1103 of 2013 dated 28.11.2013 dealt with issue of the suo moto alteration of records of right by deleting the names of the persons who were in possession and occupation and enjoying the property to the notice and knowledge of the state government, uninterruptedly and the Court observed as under: 5. We are of the view that the case of fraud is a late story and it was brought before the writ court in the first instance. Unfortunately for the appellants the Joint Collector did not proceed on the basis of fraud. He proceeded on the basis of erroneous recording and this was done by the then Patwari. In any view of the matter, the learned trial Judge, in our considered view, has rightly held that after a long time suo motu action was not called for. The judicial pronouncements relied on by the learned trial Judge were recorded and we are in full agreement with on this finding. 6. When the learned trial Judge has decided that exercise of jurisdiction of the Joint Collector is not proper and unwarranted, therefore, his factual findings and observations cannot have any binding force, meaning thereby he loses jurisdiction on the question of delay, the decision on merits cannot be said to be valid one. Under the circumstances, we affirm the order of the learned trial Judge otherwise. Under the circumstances, we affirm the order of the learned trial Judge otherwise. However, we make it clear that in the event the Government wants to approach civil Court to establish the correct title, it is free to do so. K. Application of Limitation Act to the present case of the petitioner: 185. It is to be noted that,the petitioner’s right to sue ‘first’ accrued in the year 1949 or atleast 1954-55, when entries were made in Khasra Pahani (Ex.A-14). However, the LGC before the Special Court has been filed on 12.10.1997 invoking the provisions of a Act enacted in the year 1982, also after 15 years of its enactment. Thus, it only shows inordinate delay in filing the underlying LGC, and is accordingly, barred by limitation in view of Section 2(j) and Section 3 of the Limitation Act 1963as per Article 112 and 113 to the Schedule I Part IX of Indian Limitation Act of 1963, the maximum period of limitation within which the Government ought to have filed a civil suit is within 30 years which it has failed to do. Therefore, the petitioner/applicant herein is estopped from making a claim of declaration adverse to the title of the respondents. 186.As per the evidence on record, the respondents or their predecessors in title have been in lawful possession and enjoyment of the application schedule property atleast from 1950 onwards.Therefore, the case of the petitioner is barred by limitation. 187. Further, the Division Bench of A.P. High Court in the case of K.V. Sreenivasa Rao (Supra) has held as under: "There is nothing in the Act to hold the provisions of Limitation Act as regards adverse possession to have been given a go bye under the provisions of the Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act. It is true that under the Act a different limitation period could have been prescribed as the Act is one with the assent of the President. But unless that is done, the provisions of the Limitation Act, so far as not inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, would supplement the later Act." 188. It is true that under the Act a different limitation period could have been prescribed as the Act is one with the assent of the President. But unless that is done, the provisions of the Limitation Act, so far as not inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, would supplement the later Act." 188. It is also pertinent to note that, in the underlying L.G.C the petitioner/applicant herein had sought for declaring the respondents as land grabbers under the Act in respect of land admeasuring Ac.197.32 gts in Sy.No.74 of MarredpallyPaigah and Ac.27.27 gts in Sy.No.844/1 and Ac.4.33 gts in Sy No. 74 of MarredpallyPaigah of Malkajgiri village, with a consequential direction to direct the Special Court to grant all the reliefs that were sought in LGC No.167 of 1997. However, as the petitioner/applicant herein had failed to establish their right and title to the application subject property, this Court is of the view that the petitioner/applicantherein is not entitled for being granted any relief. 189. In the light of the above discussion, we hold that the petitioner/applicant failed to establish their right and title to the subject property in Sy No.74/2 to 74/13 of Marredpally village and Sy No.844/1 of Malkajgiri village, and on the other hand the respondents have proved and established rival title set up by them. Further, the petitioner/applicant only alleged the respondents are trying to grab the land, the petitioner cannot invoke the provisions of the AP Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act 1982. 190. In view of the above, this Court is of the considered opinion that the order of the Special Court in dismissing the underlying L.G.C does not suffer from any infirmity or error for being interfered by this Court in the present Writ Petition. 191. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is devoid of merit and thus, dismissed. 192. Further, taking note of the fact the respondent No. 1590 i.e. Party-in-Person who is an allotee of the plot, had perused the matter before the Special Court as well as before this Court and by considering his age, the effort put by him in collecting the documents the petitioner/applicant is to be directed to pay cost, in a sum of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand only) to the said respondent within a period of 8 weeks from the date of receipt of the copy of the order. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions pending if any shall stand closed.